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This volume originated from a panel we convened at the combined 
Australian Anthropology Society, Association of Social Anthropologists 
and Association of Social Anthropologists Aotearoa New Zealand (AAS/
ASA/ASAANZ) conference in Adelaide in December 2017. Participants 
were invited to consider how ideas of the state as a central actor in resource 
relations are formed, negotiated and enacted, and how these relations 
subsequently influence events, elicit specific effects and shape outcomes at 
resource extraction projects. Collectively, their papers and the discussions 
that followed demonstrated two things: the diversity of ways in which the 
state is articulated and experienced in the context of resource extraction; 
and the opportunity and value of studying the state from the vantage 
point of resource extraction.
We did not begin with ‘absent presence’. This concept followed rather 
than preceded the conference panel, emerging during the day’s final 
discussion on the ways in which the state is present and/or absent in 
resource extraction contexts in both Papua New Guinea and Australia 
(and beyond), and the effects this produces. In the months that followed, 
we asked the panellists to revisit their papers and think about their material 
in relation to the ‘absent presence of the state’. The chapters presented 
here are a result of this process.
We think this concept has provided fertile ground for a wider discussion 
about how we conceptualise and study ‘the state’, and the kinds of 
knowledge and insights this produces. We also hope that it opens up new 
spaces for thinking about the entanglements, uncertainties and relations 
that characterise resource extraction.
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An Absent Presence: 
Encountering the State 
Through Natural Resource 
Extraction in Papua New 
Guinea and Australia
Nicholas Bainton and Emilia E. Skrzypek
Vladimir: We have to come back tomorrow.
Estragon: What for?
Vladimir: To wait for Godot.
Estragon: Ah! (Silence) He didn’t come?
Vladimir: No.
Waiting for Godot (Samuel Beckett 1956)
Introduction
In Samuel Beckett’s famous ‘tragicomedy in two acts’, the tragic tramps, 
Vladimir and Estragon, spend a good deal of time waiting for Godot 
and discussing their desire to see him. Godot never arrives, but he 
figures  as potentially present. The absence of Godot is also about his 
presence and, at one level, the entire play can be read as a meditation on 
absence and presence. We only know of Godot’s intimation, and there is 
little by way of actualisation; however, the promise of his presence provides 
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
2
the backdrop against which all other activities occur. In this respect, he 
is a  totalising influence whose presence is everywhere and nowhere—
he exerts an ‘absent presence’.
The absurdity at the centre of this play reminds us that we can think of 
absence and presence as mutually constitutive phenomena rather than 
simple binary opposites, or logical antonyms of each other. Taking ‘absent 
presence’ as our point of departure, this volume focuses on the unstable 
and even dialectical relationship between the presence and the absence 
of the state in the context of natural resource extraction, and the effects 
this creates. This is the first volume that brings together a sustained focus 
on the absent presence of the state in resource extraction settings—
placing this phenomenon at the very centre of analysis. The volume 
also provides a timely contribution to the ethnography of the state and 
state administration, which historically has received comparatively less 
attention in the Oceanic region. It details different experiences of the 
state in extractive settings at a time when we are witnessing increased 
tensions in many countries around the role of the state in managing 
resource extraction and the shift towards a low-carbon future. The state 
duty to protect the rights of citizens is matched by the corporate 
responsibility to respect these human rights (UN 2011). Malfunctioning 
or missing state-systems exacerbate the burdens of extraction on project 
area communities, and increase the likelihood that corporations may 
infringe upon the rights of these communities. This takes place amid local 
demands that governments enact their state responsibilities to protect the 
interests of the people and find more responsible and less destructive ways 
to harness natural resources for the benefit of society. In these contentious 
contexts, the absence of the state, or its particular bureaucratic functions 
and representatives, often creates a heightened sense of the state, with 
the presence of the state felt through its absence—a peculiar and 
paradoxical absent presence that thoroughly shapes the nature of these 
sites of extraction. These experienced absences tend to reinforce particular 
ideas of the state, signalling the interplay between the ideological and the 
material qualities of the state, as we shall discuss below.
The geographical focus of this volume encompasses Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and Australia, with a final chapter that compares PNG 
and Australia with the French territory of New Caledonia—testing and 
demonstrating a wider application of the absent presence concept. PNG 
and Australia are deeply invested in the extraction and exploitation of their 
natural resources, and the extractive industries play an important role in 
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national and regional economies in both. Until 1975, PNG was a colony 
of Australia, administered under a mandate from the United Nations. 
Historically and today, the relationship between these countries can be 
characterised as simultaneously asymmetrical and mutually dependent, 
entangled in a range of political and economic interdependencies, in 
which the industrialised extraction of natural resources plays a significant 
part. In both nations, the state plays a similar role in relation to the 
extractive industries, with responsibility for permitting and regulation, 
and distribution of resource-related benefits, vested in specific government 
agencies. While the Australian state is commonly regarded as ‘mature’ 
and ‘stable’, the state of PNG is more often described as ‘weak’ and 
‘ineffectual’ (Dinnen 2001). The rich ethnographic material presented 
in this volume challenges this simple point of comparison as it applies in 
resource ‘arenas’ (Bainton and Owen 2019), demonstrating that in both 
jurisdictions the state is often perceived to be an absent or incomplete 
institution, producing common and divergent ‘state effects’ (Trouillot 
2001). In both nations, local landowners and custodians of the land have 
similar expectations to benefit from extractive activities taking place on 
their lands, but they also experience comparable forms of depredation and 
dispossession, directly linked to the operation of extractive projects and 
the concurrent presence and absence of the state.
In this introductory chapter, we develop the idea of the absent presence 
of the state. We then sketch some of the main points of commonality 
and difference between PNG and Australia. These form the basis for 
comparison in this volume, including the role of the extractive industries 
in the development of these nation states and their identity; state 
sovereignty over mineral resources; and the experiences and expectations 
of customary landowners. In the final section, we chart the different 
ways in which the state is experienced in these resource settings and the 
various contributions of the authors. An overarching intention of this 
volume is to advance our understanding of the ways in which the state is 
experienced and instantiated through these resource ‘encounters’ (Pijpers 
and Eriksen 2018). As a whole, this volume illustrates how the concept of 
absent presence can be brought to life, enhancing our understanding of 
the state from the vantage point of resource extraction, and thus 
providing a specific contribution to the anthropology of the state and the 
anthropology of extraction.
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Absence, Presence and the Absent 
Presence of the State
How do we study something that is absent or only partially present? 
How  much do we need to know about a specific thing to understand 
the effects of its absence? More specifically, to what extent do we need 
to define the state before it can be studied or before we can even begin to 
comprehend its effects? Beckett tells us almost nothing about Godot, but 
the effect of his absence places him at the centre of the script—and for some 
readers, he is the central character. Conventional wisdom holds that either 
a thing is here or it is not, whereas we more often find that absent things 
leave ‘traces’ of their presence, so that a thing can be present in some ways 
while being absent in others. Philosophers and other scholars have been 
trying to make sense of the idea of absence, and the relationship between 
notions of absence and presence, for a very long time (for example, Sartre 
1957; Kierkegaard 1971 [1843]; Deleuze 1990; Fuery 1995). The work of 
theorists such as Jacques Derrida (1976) has been instrumental in helping 
us to think beyond the simple static binary distinction between absence 
and presence, challenging conventional assumptions about ‘presence’, 
and attacking a particular view that assumes an absolute presence and 
an absolute absence.1 Likewise, anthropologists and sociologists have 
long recognised that social relations are often performed around what is 
there and the presence of what is not (Hetherington 2004). In this regard, 
absence often serves as a kind of ordering device.2 In their work on the 
anthropology of absence, Mikkel Bille and his co-authors emphasise the 
mutual interdependence between the materially present and the materially 
absent, suggesting that the presence or absence of phenomena—persons, 
things, events or places—may not necessarily depend on absolute, positive 
occurrences or the absolute lack thereof, but instead resides in the way 
1  For structuralists, the concept of ‘absent/presence’ denotes the notion of (present) signifiers 
that refer to (absent) signifieds, which is a critical feature of language and representation. These ideas 
were especially important for media and communication theorists because they helped to emphasise 
the ways that ‘representational absence’ can become a form of presence (Bell n.d.). We also come to 
appreciate how certain terms, concepts, factors, questions or issues are rendered ‘conspicuous by their 
absence’, and the symbolic erasure of specific sociocultural groups in text and other mediums or in 
particular social contexts. A focus on absences allows us to grasp the significance of silences and how 
they are actively created, and pay attention to things that have been suppressed or not even allowed 
to exist in the first place.
2  Perhaps the most explicit examples can be drawn from the body of work on mortuary rituals and 
the myriad ways that people attempt to manage absences and the traces that departed kin leave on 
landscapes and the social realm (Hertz 1960 [1907]; Bloch and Parry 1982; Lipset and Silverman 2016).
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that the experience of certain phenomena differs from expectations and 
preconceptions (Bille et al. 2010: 5). As such, we find a paradox in the 
very nature of presence and absence, where their significance is only fully 
realised through their mutuality.
These ideas about the relationship between absence and presence inform 
our approach to the ways that states are encountered through the 
processes of extraction. From this perspective, states can be understood 
as incomplete projects, which reminds us that in many settings the state 
cannot be taken for granted and must be actively reproduced. For example, 
it has been argued that in PNG the state ‘is not something that has been 
around in the past, nor is it expected to be automatically present in 
the future’ (Dalsgaard 2013: 36). In such contexts, the presence of the 
state is uncertain and incomplete. The state must be made present, and 
conceptualisation of state presence cannot be separated from its absence 
(ibid.).3 By focusing on the absent presence of the state in resource 
extraction settings, we come to see the incompleteness and uncertainty 
that constitutes the contemporary capitalist state—as the contributors to 
this volume show, from the vantage point of resource extraction projects, 
states appear very partial. This helps us to think about the proximity of 
people and processes in relation to these projects and the state, and the 
spatial and temporal dimensions that shape these encounters. The notion 
of absent presence also enables us to move beyond ideas about the total 
absence or total presence of the state and, instead, grasp the ways that 
things, like states, can be simultaneously present and absent. In this 
respect, our approach provides a critical counterpoint to the simplistic 
‘big-picture’ framework of the state developed by Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson (2020) in their popular political science work The Narrow 
Corridor. According to their model, states (which they prefer to call 
‘Leviathans’) can be charted on an evolutionary scale comprising ‘absent’, 
‘despotic’ and ‘shackled’ Leviathans, the latter representing the balance 
between the power of the state and society’s capacity to control it. Their 
primary purpose is to demonstrate the range of factors that influence the 
trajectory of different states and how societies have failed or managed to 
achieve ‘liberty’. But for our purposes, their model locks us into the idea 
3  In his more recent work Dalsgaard describes how the government as a facet of the state in Melanesia 
‘has become locally adopted and institutionalised in multiple and sometimes contrasting ways that speak 
to both the varied colonial history and the cultural diversity of the region’ (2019: 255).
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
6
of categorical absence, which leaves very little room for thinking about 
how states may be absent in some ways and present in others, at different 
moments in time, and for different sections of society.
In thinking about the relative absence or presence of the state in the 
processes of extraction, it is useful to consider the material and non-
material dimensions of the state. Philip Abrams (1988) has suggested 
that we should distinguish between the ‘state-system’ and the ‘state-idea’. 
The former refers to the palpable nexus of institutional arrangements and 
apparatuses centred in government, while the latter refers to the reification 
of this system as a substantial and totalising entity, or a thing, that is 
separate from society. Thus, if we think of the state as both a material force 
and an ideological power—as twin aspects of the same process—then it 
follows that we should also attend to the senses in which the state does 
not exist, as well as those in which it does, and the relationship between 
them. In other words, how the everyday materiality of the state, through 
its routines, rituals, representatives, activities and policies, constitutes 
and regulates modern subjects and shapes how people come to believe 
in the idea of the state and how this in turn effects everyday practice. 
Several contributors to this volume locate the absent presence of the state 
precisely in the localised interplay between state-systems and the state-
idea—the way in which the state is imagined, anticipated and experienced 
in extractive contexts.
A decade after Abrams laid out his formula for comprehending the 
contemporary capitalist state, Michel-Rolph Trouillot made a similar 
argument. He observed that in different times and places the power of 
the state can seem more or less evident and encroaching. This observation 
is echoed in a number of chapters in this volume that reflect on spatial 
as well as temporal dimensions of the state: the sense of distance between 
the state, resource projects and impacted communities, and changing 
experiences of state presence at different points in time throughout the 
project life cycle. Trouillot reasoned that ethnographic analysis of the 
state must recognise that state power has ‘no institutional fixity’, and 
that ‘state effects never obtain solely through national institutions or in 
governmental sites’ (Trouillot 2001: 126). These two features, he said, are 
inherent in the capitalist state, and have been exacerbated by globalising 
processes. If the state is not limited in terms of institutions or geography, 
then its presence becomes somewhat more deceptive, and there is a ‘need 
to theorise the state beyond the empirically obvious’. Trouillot’s suggested 
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strategy was to ‘focus on the multiple sites in which state processes are 
recognisable through their effects’. That is, if the state is not reducible to 
government or a set of apparatuses, and instead can be understood as an 
enlarged set of practices and processes and their effects, then we need to 
pay attention to these practices and processes and the effects they produce 
(ibid.: 131).
Trouillot identified four state effects, which we regularly encounter in 
resource extraction settings. First, as James Scott once observed, state 
power relies on legibility: an illegible society is a hindrance to effective 
interference by the state (1998: 78). Many anthropologists have observed 
these legibility effects, where local communities attempt to make 
themselves legible to companies or the state in order to be recognised as 
project beneficiaries. State actors or representatives are also engaged in 
the project of enhancing the legibility of local communities or assigning 
identities to individual subjects. In the same way, companies engage in 
processes of ‘simplification’ as part of the ongoing, and always incomplete, 
project of legibility. Second, we also witness the so-called ‘isolation 
effect’ as community members are converted into atomised individual 
subjects, achieved by means of company-supplied identification numbers 
for its local  workers or through company-sponsored census lists, the 
identification of ‘project stakeholders’, and so on. Third, the delineation of 
customary landowners and traditional owners who are beneficiaries 
of these projects resembles the ‘identification effect’, which leads to 
Trouillot’s fourth and final state effect—‘spatialisation’, or the creation and 
maintenance of jurisdictions and boundaries. As governments establish 
lease areas and ‘zones of entitlement’ for resource extraction projects, 
this creates new forms of governance within and across these boundaries. 
We  see an equivalence between this final effect and Peter Vandergeest 
and Nancy Lee Peluso’s concept of ‘territorialization’ (1995). Such spatial 
strategies bring the state into being by controlling people and access 
to natural resources. In regards to resource extraction, territorialisation 
entails: ‘the creation and mapping of land boundaries, the allocation of 
land rights to so-called private actors, and the designation of specific 
resource (including land) uses by both state and “private” actors according 
to territorial criteria’ (ibid.: 415). But as the contributors to this collection 
show, territorialisation is often unstable or uncertain, and the people 
most affected by the state’s resource territorialisation often undermine, 
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disrupt or resist the state’s goals and private actor interests—processes 
which can understood as a type of ‘double movement’ in property rights 
(Filer et al. 2020).
The contributions to this volume add several other state effects to this list, 
including ‘order effects’, ‘enactment effects’, ‘responsibilisation effects’ and 
‘material effects’, where companies provide the services and infrastructure 
that states ordinarily provide to legitimise themselves. They also illustrate 
a ‘corporate’ or ‘contractual’ effect where neoliberal states are increasingly 
run like (poorly managed) companies, while multinational corporations 
and multilateral institutions (like the World Bank or the United Nations) 
can assume more state-like powers in resource extraction contexts and 
produce various state effects. This resembles Christian Lund’s observations 
on the ‘state-quality’ of non-state institutions, where private actors ‘strut 
in borrowed plumes’ (2006: 677). As resource companies use the language 
of the state and its props—including deeds and contracts, stationery and 
stamps—this challenges the idea that states have a singular hold on the 
exercise of power and authority, and in some cases blurs the lines between 
‘state effects’ and ‘company effects’, which often demonstrate themselves 
in terms of simplification, spatialisation, isolation and identification. 
When extractive companies use these strategies to assert exclusive claims 
over lease land areas, this also serves to uphold or reinforce the internal 
territorial strategies of the state. We might then ask whether these private 
sector actions constitute ‘state effects’ that demonstrate the presence of 
the state, or whether they are better conceptualised as ‘company effects’ 
that bear the hallmark of state authority but confirm private interests 
according to territorial criteria and signal the absence of the state.
All of this allows us to think about the state, or to recognise the presence 
and the influence or the effects of the state, precisely in those places 
that appear peripheral—like remote resource extraction enclaves in 
Australia and PNG.
Two States and their Resource Journeys
In most respects, PNG and Australia are profoundly different. Australia 
can be classified as a developed settler nation whose ‘development’ was 
based on the dispossession of its Indigenous population, and it is the 
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dominant political and economic nation state in the Pacific region.4 PNG 
is a relatively young nation. Its Indigenous population has acquired control 
of state institutions, and retained ownership and control of their land 
and resources, but the majority of the population live comparatively less 
developed rural lives. The country remains heavily reliant upon Australian 
aid and it is often described by outside commentators as a ‘struggling’ or 
‘developing’ nation state that exerts limited influence beyond its shores. 
While the differences are significant, and we could easily expand this list, 
the two nation states have at least one major thing in common beyond 
their shared colonial history: an extraordinary commitment to resource-
driven economic development, underpinned by favourable geological 
factors and an abundance of mineral resources in their territories. In both 
countries the government has strenuously advocated for extractive 
capitalism, or what the captains of these industries prefer to call ‘resource 
development’.
Large-scale resource extraction looms large in PNG and Australia and 
both countries can be described as ‘resource-dependent nations’. Resource 
extraction has had a profound effect on their enmeshed histories and 
continues to be an important part of their national identities. Mining 
activities shadowed the birth of these two nation states and provided the 
economic base to support a transition away from their respective colonial 
masters—although in the case of PNG, resource extraction has provided 
Australia with new pathways to exert power over this sovereign nation. The 
expansion of the resources sector in PNG provides important economic 
opportunities for many of its citizens and is a primary source of revenue 
for the state, as well as thousands of Australian businesses and skilled 
workers who capitalise on these opportunities. Despite these asymmetries, 
their economies are mutually entwined in a history of extractive 
ventures—through investments, trade and business opportunities, and 
employment—and for the foreseeable future the extractive industries 
will dominate the economic, political and physical landscape across these 
two countries.
4  Although in recent years the influence and authority of Australia across the Pacific region 
has been challenged by the growing presence of China. See, for example, Crocombe (2007) and 
McDougall (2019).
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Figure 1.1 Map of Australia and Papua New Guinea with resource 
extraction projects and sites noted in this volume
Source: ANU Cartography
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Australia
The extraction of mineral resources has long been part of the culture and 
development of Australia, and it has shaped the country as we now know 
it. It could be said that the first mining phase began some 60,000 years 
ago, with the first Aboriginal Australians who utilised resources of the 
earth for cultural and technological reasons and various forms of trade. 
Following European invasion in 1788, coal was soon being extracted to 
provide fuel for heating and cooking, and later steam locomotion. The first 
gold rush began in earnest in 1851 in the state of New South Wales 
and within three months had spread to the state of Victoria (Macintyre 
2009: 87). These rushes quickly transformed the Australian colonies and 
fuelled the dynamic growth of towns and cities. Within just two years 
the number of free migrants arriving in Australia was greater than the 
number of convicts who had arrived in the past 70 years (ibid.). Many 
of these hopeful migrants, known as ‘diggers’, brought new skills and 
professions, and contributed to a burgeoning economy. The population 
boomed and Australia became a ‘multicultural’ society, of sorts. Migrants 
of non-European descent, especially Chinese immigrants who were 
particularly industrious on the goldfields, were unwelcome, signalling the 
xenophobic tensions that would continue to shape Australian society.5 It is 
often claimed that the ‘mateship’ that developed between these diggers 
(of predominantly European descent) and their collective resistance to 
authority laid the foundation for a unified and unique national identity 
independent of British colonial rule.6 In short, the early gold rushes 
transformed the colonies and helped precipitate settler Australia into 
nationhood.
The young colonies were quick to begin exporting minerals. During 
the 1850s, Victoria contributed more than one third of the world’s gold 
output, and by the 1860s exports of copper and lead earned more than 
exports from wool and wheat. Following Federation in 1901, the role of 
mining in the economic development of Australia gradually increased. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, lead, zinc and copper deposits 
5  The presence of thousands of Chinese immigrants, many of whom existed under forms of labour 
bondage, gave birth to the early expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment and the nation’s first race-based 
migration restrictions, which later coalesced in the White Australia policy.
6  In 1854, 1,000 diggers assembled at Eureka in Victoria to protest against the imposition 
of mining licence fees. The Eureka rebellion has since become a favourite event in the national 
mythology of Australia.
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were discovered in Queensland at Mt Isa, although their full potential 
was not realised until the 1950s. In the 1960s, following the Australian 
government’s changes to the restrictions on iron ore exports, exploration 
commenced across the Pilbara region in Western Australia leading to the 
development of numerous large-scale mining operations. By the end of 
the twentieth century, Australia was one of the world’s leading resource 
nations, processing and exporting huge amounts of iron ore and coal, 
and other valued minerals. In the early years of the twenty-first century, 
the industry continued to grow in size and significance. The post-2001 
resources boom was unprecedented in its scope, scale and economic 
significance (Cleary 2011). By 2014 mining contributed almost 
60 per cent of Australia’s exports as resource companies scaled up their 
investments and their operations. What counted as a mega mine in the 
1980s was just a ‘normal’ mine by the 2010s, and resource towns were 
flush with prosperity and opportunity. But, as Thomas Hyland Eriksen 
observed in his ethnography of a Queensland ‘boomtown’, the downside 
of such accelerated change is the rise of ‘treadmill capitalism’ where growth 
is placed ahead of other considerations (like sustainability), constant 
change is necessary in order to stay in the same place within the system, 
and, more importantly, where uncontrolled ‘runaway processes’ preclude 
political or popular governance of the system (Eriksen 2018: 104).
In recent years, the petroleum industries, comprising the extraction 
and processing of oil and gas, have played an equally important role in 
Australia. The first oil well was drilled in Western Australia in 1907, but 
the industry was not developed in a major way until the 1970s when 
massive gas and condensate discoveries (light crude oil) were made off the 
northwest coast of Western Australia. Over the last decade the Australian 
natural gas industry has grown rapidly, as part of ‘global gas revolution’. 
Converted into liquefied natural gas (LNG), this new resource capacity 
primarily supplies international energy markets. In  order to meet 
this demand, unconventional coal seam gas reserves have been rapidly 
developed, especially in the eastern states of Queensland and New South 
Wales, which has included controversial extraction techniques such as 
hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’ as it is commonly known (de Rijke 
2018). Fracking introduced new types of extractive infrastructure into the 
industrial landscape thus far dominated by large-scale projects typically 
centralised in single locations. Given that this gas is not located in easily 
accessible reservoirs, this usually results in numerous wells being drilled 
over large areas. Along with all of the other infrastructure that is required 
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to transport and process coal seam gas—including gathering lines, 
compressor stations, well pad access tracks, and LNG processing and 
export plants—this means that the collective footprint of this industry is 
much larger and more reticular compared to other extractive industries, 
such as mining, which generally produces enclave spaces.
Papua New Guinea
PNG’s resource journey has been somewhat similar to Australia’s. 
Like  Aboriginal people in Australia, Papua New Guineans had been 
extracting and utilising mineral resources for ceremonial and practical 
purposes for thousands of years. In the 1800s, the scale of extraction 
increased with European presence. When Captain John Moresby 
surveyed the southern coast of New Guinea in the early 1870s, he judged 
it was highly likely that the country contained an abundance of mineral 
resources. It was only a matter of years before a gold rush began, setting 
the future nation of PNG on a course towards resource dependency. 
By 1884 Britain had established a protectorate over the southeast portion 
of the country, which it called British New Guinea, but was later known 
as Papua, while the Germans claimed the northeast portion, which they 
called German New Guinea. Some 400 white miners had made their 
way from Port Moresby and north Australia to Sudest Island off the 
southern tip of Papua where gold was discovered in 1888, and then on to 
Misima Island in 1889 (Nelson 1976). In 1926 gold was found at Edie 
Creek in Morobe Province on the mainland, which led to the first major 
investment in the development of alluvial gold mining operations around 
Wau-Bululo in the 1930s (Waterhouse 2010).
The territories of Papua and New Guinea were combined under a single 
administration (or mandate) after the Second World War. In the 
following decades, the Australian administration came to the conclusion 
that the decolonisation of the territories could certainly be managed or 
even delayed, but definitely not prevented. Mindful that the future nation 
would need a stable economic base to support its independence, the 
administration set about mapping the natural resources of the country. 
In 1964 copper and gold deposits were discovered at Panguna on the 
island of Bougainville, and by 1967 an agreement to develop a  mine 
had been reached and enacted by the House of Assembly. The mine was 
fully operational in 1972, just in time to help fund the territories’ 
transition to independence in 1975, but not without some last-minute 
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concessions to avert Bougainville’s secession from the nation (Denoon 
2000). The Panguna mine was operated by Bougainville Copper Limited 
Pty  Ltd, which was a subsidiary of Conzinc Riotinto of Australia. 
The mine mobilised the largest investment in any Australian territory at 
the time and was therefore pivotal to the decolonisation process.
The new independent state set about growing the economy and over the 
following decades several large-scale gold and copper mining operations 
were established for this purpose. The giant Ok Tedi mine was opened 
on the opposite side of the country in 1984, followed by the Misima 
gold mine in 1989, the Porgera gold mine in 1991, the Lihir gold mine 
in 1997, and later the Ramu nickel mine in 2012, along with various 
smaller operations. The growth of this sector played out against the 
backdrop of the crisis that was unfolding back on Bougainville where 
the social and environmental impacts of the Panguna mine sparked 
a full-scale civil war in 1989, which forced the closure of the mine and 
ultimately cost some 20,000  lives (Regan 2017). Panguna represents 
a very special case of state presence and abandonment. The loss of revenue 
from Panguna increased the urgency and necessity to open new mines to 
make up for the shortfall—and rather than reassess the role of resource 
extraction, the state renewed its commitment to extractive capitalism. 
For example, the closure of Panguna led to a series of decisions regarding 
Ok Tedi’s continued operations, ultimately triggering what Stuart Kirsch 
(2014: 133) described as ‘a slow motion environmental disaster’ as a result 
of riverine tailings disposal.7
As in Australia, while mineral extraction continues to play an important 
role in the extractive sector in PNG, the petroleum industry is growing 
in scale and influence, having established itself in PNG shortly after it 
had developed in Australia, with the first oil exports from the Southern 
Highlands occurring in 1992. The most significant development to date 
has been the massive PNG LNG project that pipes gas extracted from 
Hela Province in the highlands down to the huge processing facilities on 
the outskirts of Port Moresby, where it is then shipped to international 
markets (see Main, Chapter 5, this volume).
7  At other mines, like Misima and Lihir, deep sea tailings placement, or DSTP, has been regarded 
as an alternative, because tailings dams are vulnerable to earthquakes. Both riverine disposal and deep 
sea tailings placement practices are banned in Australia, but tailings dams are favoured because the 
country is much less prone to earthquakes.
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Regimes of Resource Ownership
Looking at legal and policy frameworks in PNG and Australia, it would 
appear that Papua New Guineans are better placed to benefit from 
resource extraction than their Aboriginal Australian counterparts. This 
conventional wisdom is mostly based upon the differences between the 
legal regimes that operate in these countries in relation the customary 
ownership of land. In both countries, sovereignty over all minerals is 
vested in the state. In Australia landowners are the owners of the surface 
of the land and have no automatic right to the minerals that may be found 
underneath the surface.8 While surface minerals are not mentioned in 
Australian legislation, in PNG customary landowners have an automatic 
legal right to harvest minerals on the surface of the land or in streams 
and rivers and many communities, including near large-scale resource 
extraction projects, engage in alluvial gold mining activities (Bainton et al. 
2020).9 In PNG the state grants leases to private companies to extract and 
develop these mineral resources, whereas in Australia this responsibility sits 
with the relevant subnational territories and state governments. In both 
jurisdictions access agreements must be negotiated with landowners, and 
compensation paid for disturbances. The major point of difference can 
be found in the legal recognition of customary interests in the land and 
the right to benefit from resource extraction. In PNG customary land 
rights are enshrined in the Constitution, which means that under the 
terms of the Oil and Gas Act 1998 and the Mining Act 1992, the primary 
legislation governing resource extraction, customary landowners have 
a more direct stake in the development of any resources located within 
their ancestral territories. Resource companies are required to compensate 
the landowners for disturbance or damage to their land. They are also 
required to enter into benefit-sharing negotiations with landowner 
communities, and these communities can then expect to receive a range 
8  In Australia, petroleum and mineral resources are generally the property of the Crown. There 
was a time when the common law position stated that the minerals belonged to the landowner, and 
that the minerals were regarded as an inherent product of the land itself. Common law assumed that 
whoever owned the land also owed the soil below and the space above the surface. The qualification 
was the right of the Crown to extract gold and silver, characterised as ‘royal minerals’. This common 
law position was circumscribed with the passing of specific legislation that vested the ownership of 
minerals contained within the soil of private landholdings in the Crown (Hepburn 2011).
9  Section 9(2) of the Mining Act 1992 says that: ‘Any natural person who is a citizen may carry out 
non-mechanized mining of alluvial minerals on land owned by that natural person, provided that the 
mining is carried out safely and in accordance with the Mining (Safety) Act 1977 and that the land is 
not the subject of a tenement (other than an exploration licence).’
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of benefits from these projects (Filer 2012; Bainton and Jackson 2020). 
This is not to dismiss the tensions which arise between different groups 
with competing claims to the same areas of land, or the problems 
associated with ‘mobilising’ customary land for development (Filer 2019). 
However, the legal recognition of customary land rights in PNG shifts the 
question from recognition of those rights, to identifying specific groups in 
possession of those rights and the subsequent capture of benefits.
In the Australian context, the Native Title Act 1993 dictates that 
Aboriginal people must prove a connection to their ancestral lands in 
order to exercise their interests, which is a rather difficult task for many 
groups given the onerous legal hurdles associated with native title (Weiner 
and Glaskin 2007; Glaskin 2017). This situation is compounded by 
the history of Aboriginal dispossession, including the founding fiction 
of terra nullius, which essentially held that the continent was ‘no man’s 
land’, and the fact that so many groups were forcibly removed from their 
land to reserves and missions. Other groups were massacred en masse in 
the frontier wars, which makes it doubly difficult for their descendants 
to demonstrate lines of ancestral continuity. As Sarah Holcombe and 
Gareth Lewis discuss in their chapters for this volume, this early history 
of violence and dispossession set the tone for the relationship between 
Aboriginal communities, resource companies and the Australian state, 
and continues to impact the ways that some Aboriginal groups in Australia 
relate to the state both as an idea and as a system. Aboriginal groups who 
are granted recognition of their traditional ownership of specific areas are 
entitled to the right to negotiate with any entities seeking to develop the 
minerals resources on their land, but it doesn’t grant them veto rights. 
The exception to this rule can be found in the earlier Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act 1976, which grants veto rights to owners of ‘Aboriginal Land’ 
in the Northern Territory. Similar to PNG, in some cases this can result 
in  negotiated agreements for the provision of specific benefits and 
payments (O’Faircheallaigh 2016).
The question of ownership extends beyond land and resources. Following 
global neoliberal trends, the Australian government has steadily reduced 
its stock of state-owned enterprises, which are sometimes termed 
‘government business enterprises’. While the government has retained 
ownership of various energy and infrastructure companies, there are no 
state-owned extractive companies operating in Australia. In PNG, the 
processes of privatisation have been less extensive. The state has maintained 
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ownership of companies providing essential services and established several 
enterprises to consolidate and manage its interests in the business of hard 
rock mining and petroleum development.10 Among other things, this has 
enabled the state to become a major partner in the PNG LNG project, 
and to assume ownership of the Ok Tedi and Tolukuma mines. However, 
the acquisition of these mines took place in rather special circumstances 
and should not be confused with the government’s statutory right to 
acquire a minority stake in joint ventures with foreign investors. While 
the latter may sometimes appear to outside observers as a ‘commitment to 
nationalisation’, it is better interpreted as a commitment to an option for 
‘participation’. The growing public and political discourse about the need 
to actually nationalise the resource sector is partly influenced by ideas 
about resource dependency that were prominent in the early independence 
period (Amarshi et al. 1979), and continuing concerns about the ways 
that powerful foreign states and companies maintain their economic 
and political advantage by exploiting the raw materials of less developed 
countries. There is a popular expectation (in some quarters at least) that 
the state should acquire ownership of all resource projects so that PNG 
can reverse these trends and reap a greater share of the financial benefits 
derived from the exploitation of its natural resources. But this pathway 
to development also entails a fundamental conflict of interest as the state 
becomes both a shareholder and a regulator of these projects. In the case 
of the Ok Tedi Mine, the state made regulatory decisions that sought 
to minimise operational expenditures and maximise economic returns as 
both a shareholder and a tax collector. Many of these decisions were made 
at the expense of people living downstream from the mine. This kind of 
situation emphasises the very selective presence of the state and embeds 
the state in a web of conflicting interests. This includes conflicts emerging 
from the state’s dual role as a regulator and an investor, and extends to 
internal conflicts between different state functions and institutions.
10  In 1975 the Mineral Resources Development Company (MRDC) was established as a 100 per 
cent state-owned company. Originally established to acquire and manage state and landowner interests 
in mining and petroleum projects, including management of equity funds for landowner companies, 
in 2007 the state’s equity interests were then transferred to Petromin Holdings Limited, and the focus 
of MRDC was limited to landowner interests. In 2015, the government passed the Kumul Minerals 
Act, consolidating the state’s oil, gas and mining interests, and Petromin was restructured into two 
companies—Kumul Mineral Holdings Limited and Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited.
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Resource Development
While both countries can be considered resource-rich nations, PNG 
is often described as suffering from the so-called ‘resource curse’ or 
the ‘paradox of plenty’, which generally holds that countries with an 
abundance of natural resources tend to experience less economic growth 
and worse development outcomes (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017).11 This 
term is less often used to describe the Australian experience of extractive-
led development, although some commentators would certainly not 
agree that Australia has avoided the resource curse (i.e. Cleary 2011). 
In PNG, the curse is often thought to be linked to faulty and ineffective 
governance, or ‘maladministration’ (Burton 1998), where the state is 
unable to curb the excesses of the extractive industries or convert natural 
resources into sustainable forms of development. Anthropologists and 
other social scientists working in the country who have written about the 
‘resource curse’ have generally focused on the ways in which it is manifest 
through increased social conflicts and environmental impacts and the 
forms of structural violence that are created and intensified by large-scale 
resource extraction projects (see Filer 1990; Haley and May 2007; Banks 
2008; Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017; Allen 2018). In Australia, on the 
other hand, analytical focus is usually directed at the macro-scale, which 
might go some way towards explaining why the country is not generally 
thought to be afflicted by this curse. But when we shift our focus to the 
local scale, especially to the Indigenous estate, the picture begins to look 
rather different and in many cases pre-existing forms of discrimination 
and structurally unjust forms of political economy have been exacerbated 
by resource extraction (Langton and Mazel 2008; Altman and Martin 
2009). It now becomes clear that the negative force of the resource curse 
should not be understood as a purely economic issue, but it can ‘also be 
portrayed in political, cultural, or environmental terms, which means that 
the resource curse may have several dimensions in the same country or 
region’ (Filer and Macintyre 2006: 217).
The presence of the resource curse can be reconceptualised in terms of the 
absence of development that resource extraction promises to deliver—yet 
another demonstration of the absent presence of the state. Continuing 
with the metaphor of Godot is apposite, as some communities have 
11  The concept of the resource curse was first elaborated by British economist Richard Auty (1993). 
See also Karl (1997) and Ross (2003). See also Ross’ (2015) examination of a relationship between 
‘resource curse’ and state governance.
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maintained their enthusiasm for extractive-led development despite the 
known impacts of extraction and the fact that the anticipated benefits, 
or the government and the developers, have simply never arrived. Many 
of these communities find themselves anxiously ‘waiting for company’ 
(Dwyer and Minnegal 1998). Several authors in this volume describe 
situations where communities are waiting for certain forms of development, 
which, like Godot, ultimately remain unknown and uncertain. In both 
national settings this absence can be partly understood as result of the 
failure of the state to bring ‘development’ (economic opportunities and 
services) to many rural areas. In the Australian context this reflects the 
extent to which most Aboriginal people have been marginalised from 
the mainstream economy and the opportunities enjoyed by the majority 
of the population and the desire for self-determination (and the ways 
in which resource extraction is imagined as a possible pathway to such 
ends). In PNG this enthusiasm is expressed through a particular set of 
beliefs, which Colin Filer has called ‘the ideology of landownership’. This 
ideology generally holds that the road to development can be found in 
the compensation and benefits that are provided by resource companies 
to customary landowners in return for the extraction of the natural 
resources located within their ancestral lands (Filer 1997). Of course, 
commitment to this ideology does not mean that people are not wary of 
the impacts of extraction, but it does highlight a particular expression of 
local sovereignty and understanding of development. In both settings the 
prospect of resource extraction has generated strong contestation between 
groups who want these activities to proceed in the hope that this will 
improve their circumstances and enhance their autonomy, and those who 
remain unconvinced by the ‘value proposition’ of extractive capitalism.
In Australia this resistance is often connected to the broader Aboriginal 
land rights movement, but it also finds expression among a coalition of 
environmental activists and pastoralists in, for example, the ‘Lock the 
Gate Alliance’ that seeks to prevent further fracking operations (de Rijke 
2013; and Espig, Chapter 6, this volume). Enthusiasm and resistance 
at the local level are also mirrored at the national level. Back in 2017 
when he was still the Treasurer of Australia, Scott Morrison, who is now 
the country’s prime minister, brought a lump of coal into the House of 
Representatives as a political stunt to indicate the government’s support 
for the coal industry, coal-fired power stations and a carbon-intensive 
economy (Murphy 2017). Morrison’s support for the extractive industries 
reached new heights in 2019 when he signalled his intent to clamp 
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down on individuals and organisations that protest against the impacts 
of extraction.12 The  government’s position has generated much unrest, 
and in the wake of the 2019 and 2020 mega fires across large parts of 
Australia, there have been increased calls to stop all new coal mining 
developments to help prevent further overheating of the globe. The sense 
of the failure of the state to respond to the emergency caused by the fires 
was made worse by the prime minister’s initial absence, and then his 
widely debated ‘inappropriate’ and ‘inadequate’ presence in the affected 
areas (Brett 2020). While the current conservative government in Australia 
wants to remove the barriers to expand global extractive investment in 
Australia, and has proposed a ‘gas-fired recovery’ to lift Australia out 
its COVID-19 induced economic recession, the PNG government 
has sent a more nationalistic message about containing mineral wealth 
within the country. In his 2019 ‘manifesto’ to the nation, the current 
prime minister of PNG, James Marape, pledged that he would ‘take back 
PNG’ and turn the country into the ‘richest black Christian nation on 
earth’. While these political slogans encapsulated a very broad agenda for 
reform (and represent a direct response to past government failings), his 
manifesto contained specific commitments to ensure that Papua New 
Guineans will obtain a much larger share of the benefits arising from 
exploitation of the nation’s natural resources, positioning extraction at 
the forefront of the future prosperity of the nation. These sentiments are 
best encapsulated in the tagline used by the government regulator of the 
industry, the Mineral Resources Authority: ‘minerals for life’. However, in 
the event, the reality of extractive capitalism frequently belies the promises 
of ‘resource development’. At this point, the experiences of customary 
landowners in PNG begin to converge with the experiences of traditional 
owners in Australia.
Implicating the State in the Extraction 
of Resources
The state is often perceived by different groups as habitually failing to be 
present in meaningful ways in resource extraction contexts. Of course, it 
can also be argued that this failure has occurred in many ‘remote’ areas 
12  In a press release titled ‘Australian mining: Building a better future’, the Minerals Council 
of  Australia (the peak representative body of the Australian mining industry) welcomed this 
political support (MCA 2019).
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where resource projects are not present. And, in the PNG context, the 
state’s absence is just as marked in areas where logging companies or palm 
oil companies have large-scale operations as it is in areas where mining 
or petroleum companies operate (e.g. Tammisto 2016). Nevertheless, in 
many cases, including a number of examples presented in this volume, the 
state is perceived as being more present for some groups and less present 
for others, raising questions about the state’s complex and multifaceted 
obligations towards local communities, foreign investors and broadly 
conceived goals of national development. In both PNG and Australia 
it is common to hear complaints from different quarters that the state 
has abandoned its responsibilities in relation to resource extraction; 
overlooked or overridden its primary duties to its citizens; forgotten that 
some portions of the population even exist; left corporate entities and 
local communities to their own devices; that it is working against the 
growth of the resources sector and blocking industrial progress or, on the 
other hand, that it is too closely aligned with the interests of multinational 
capital, or has outsourced its responsibilities to the private sector, and 
so on.
Rather than trying to unpack all these conflicting expectations and 
critiques, it is useful to first consider what is significant and unique 
about resource extraction and how the state is implicated, experienced 
and brought into being through these activities. Several structural features 
of resource extraction are important in this regard. First of all, states 
reinforce the primacy of their sovereign authority through their exclusive 
claim over the mineral resources in the land. The state’s supreme authority 
is symbolically upheld through formal legislative frameworks that govern 
the ownership and extraction of these resources. States open up land to 
facilitate development, and in some contexts, where states are struggling 
under macroeconomic constraints, the revenues generated by resource 
extraction allow states to continue functioning as states. Perversely, in 
countries like PNG, economic dependence upon extraction, inaction and 
limited capacity also weaken the ability of the state to exercise its sovereign 
power, contributing to the experience of a ‘resource curse’. Similar charges 
have been made against the Australian state, which remains heavily 
dependent on mineral exports and has been captured by the interests of the 
industry at all jurisdictional levels. Second, large-scale resource extraction 
generates profound transformations. It extends capitalist development 
into places where the capitalist economy is not institutionalised or places 
where it is characterised by petty commodity production or agrarian 
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capitalism, such as the development of large-scale mines in frontier zones 
in PNG. In these instances, it introduces a  form of capitalism that is 
characterised by accumulation on a large scale combined with significant 
forms of dispossession and disruption. It is not uncommon for conflicts 
between local and national interests to play out in those arenas, and for 
national political leaders to invoke the ‘greater national good’ to justify 
locally experienced impacts of extraction and the creation of ‘sacrifice 
zones’. Third, large-scale resource extraction also changes the dynamics of 
existing capitalist arrangements by introducing new forms of capitalism 
into areas that are already incorporated into the global capitalist economy, 
such as the development of coal seam gas operations in the pastoral regions 
of Australia. It ultimately affects the geography of capitalist development 
and accumulation in ways that are related to the nature and geography 
of natural resources, and the geography of prior political and economic 
arrangements. And as we discuss below, these structural features point to 
a temporal dimension as the state’s presence or absence alternates through 
different phases of the resource project cycle. As the authors in this volume 
show, presence often turns to absence once approvals and licences have 
been granted.
The rapid and unruly socioeconomic change generated by these projects 
constitute forms of immanent development in the sense conveyed 
by Cowen and Shenton (1996). Under these conditions, there is 
a  heightened need for state-systems to manage or offset the effects of 
these transformations—and it is here that we frequently encounter the 
absence of the state. Indeed, local communities often demand an increase 
in the presence of the state and regard resource extraction as a way of 
securing state services, including law and order, health and education 
services, and public infrastructure. But in lieu of a more active role, states 
have tended to delegate greater regulatory responsibility and discretion 
to resource companies—which may constitute a form of ‘indirect rule’, 
where the state is anchored in project locations through the delegation 
of its functions to extractive corporations.
Large-scale resource extraction is also implicated in a range of intentional 
interventions that are geared towards particular ends. These interventions 
are mainly directed towards the management or governance of people, 
policies, landscapes and resources in ways that secure resource investments 
and extend extractive capitalism, as well as other sociopolitical projects. 
Some of these interventions are designed to secure local support for these 
ventures, which can take the form of community development programs 
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and investment in other forms of ‘intentional development’ that are 
designed to mitigate the immanent processes associated with resource 
extraction (Banks et al. 2017). Here we begin to see a convergence 
of interest between states and private companies, both in terms of 
function (as companies assume state responsibilities) and style (creeping 
bureaucratisation and managerialism). In this respect, extractive companies 
are involved in a form of ‘trusteeship’ that is more typically associated with 
the state (Cowan and Shenton 1996). By assuming some responsibilities 
for the local population, resource companies also play a role in defining 
aspects of a desirable future for that population. More importantly, 
evidence from both countries suggests that resource companies invest 
considerable energy and resources into steering populations towards 
that future, framing it in terms of ‘progress’ and enhanced personal and 
communal opportunities.
States also seek specific goals through resource extraction. In most 
jurisdictions, including PNG and Australia, the state holds sovereignty 
over mineral resources and notionally claims that these resources will be 
used for the collective benefit of the population. It is important to recall 
that states are not passive custodians of the common wealth. They may 
intervene through policies and legislation that enable the expansion of 
extractive capitalism within their national territory, or they may seek to 
constrain extractive activities in certain areas, such as conservation zones. 
The state issues permits to companies to develop these resources, and it is 
expected to perform a regulatory function to ensure that these activities 
occur within prescribed parameters. The state may be a direct financier or 
shareholder in some resource operations, meaning that in addition to its 
regulatory role it has a direct stake in the commercial success of individual 
ventures (which can constitute a contradictory role). And in many 
instances the state—through the relevant branches of government—will 
enter into various agreements with the parties to these projects and make 
specific commitments as part of the overall compensation and benefits 
sharing process.
There can also be an inter-state dimension to resource extraction, both 
in terms of international trade in resources, and attracting and managing 
foreign direct investment, as well as using extraction and trade in 
resources to achieve economic and political aims in international arenas 
as well as domestically. For example, the complete absence of the PNG 
state at the Ramu nickel mine in PNG has opened up a space for the 
Chinese state (as the owner of the company developing this resource) 
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to exercise forms of ‘soft power’ within this sovereign state as part of 
its (somewhat unsuccessful) attempt to retrofit this project into its Belt 
and Road Initiative (Smith 2018). Although states pursue a range of 
political and economic goals through resource extraction, these may not 
always align with corporate interests, and it is for this reason that states 
sometimes grant tax holidays, stabilisation agreements, and subsidies, or 
provide supporting infrastructure to reduce these differences and make 
certain investments more attractive, allowing capital to accumulate in 
some areas and not others. The general point is that in the context of 
resource extraction we find that the state is thoroughly implicated, but 
it is also selectively present—at different times, and in different places, 
it will be more or less present and more or less aligned with the interests 
of different groups. Depending upon the vantage point, the state will 
cast a longer or shorter shadow and its presence or its absence will be felt 
in different ways.
Encountering the Absent Present State
For ease of navigation we have organised the chapters in this volume in 
terms of regional focus, connected via the two chapters concerned with gas 
extraction in PNG and Australia. The final chapter by John Burton and 
Claire Levacher introduces New Caledonia as a point of comparison to 
PNG and Australia. They explore whether the notion of ‘absent presence’ 
can be applied to a national context where the state is of a different kind 
to that in PNG and Australia, and most notably, as they argue, where 
it cannot absent itself. The volume concludes with a short afterword 
reflecting on the uncertainty of the state.
Between them, the contributing authors discuss cases of proposed mining 
ventures, existing large-scale mining operations and the extraction of 
natural gas (both coal seam gas and LNG). While these two national 
settings are distinctive in their own right, several interconnecting themes 
can be found, including particular types of engagement with the state, and 
specific experiences of the absence, the presence and the absent presence 
of the state in extractive contexts. Although these three phenomena are 
found in each, they have different weight in every chapter.
The most prominent theme running through the volume, and the most 
common way in which the absence of the state is manifest, is the failure 
of the state to fulfil its responsibilities (both stated and perceived). These 
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specific failures, silences and expressions of unreliability create a range of 
effects that evidence the presence of an absent state. Although the details 
of these effects differ between the cases, state effects are nevertheless 
present in all the chapters and constitute a second core interconnecting 
theme. These two themes speak to spatial and temporal dimensions of 
the absent presence of the state, and the materiality and morality of this 
absence—all of which are explored in the remainder of this introductory 
chapter, and in the chapters that follow.
Failure as Presence
In one way or another, each chapter speaks to the responsibilities 
of  the state in extractive contexts, and the state’s performance against 
those obligations. In democratic theory, the modern state legitimates 
itself through a simple bargain: citizens pay tax and agree to obey its 
laws, and in return, the state protects its people and keeps them safe. 
The inability of states to keep that pact in respect of resource extraction 
appears to be increasing, especially in Australia where commitment 
to the coal industry will exacerbate climate change and constitutes an 
existential threat to the security of the nation (Brett 2020). Among other 
things, state responsibilities encompass regulatory oversight of extractive 
processes; protection from human rights abuses and other forms of harm; 
the monitoring and management of the social and environmental risks 
and impacts of extraction; implementation of agreements and other 
commitments including the distribution of benefits to project area 
landowners, and the delivery of services and programs or the construction 
of public infrastructure; participation in governance processes surrounding 
resource extraction including involvement in forums, working groups and 
reporting initiatives; the general maintenance of ‘order’ in these extractive 
sites; and so on. These and others are intertwined and actively negotiated 
in the context of resource extraction.
While failures of the state can be taken as a demonstration of state absence 
or impotence, they can also be reconceptualised and experienced as a form 
of presence, what we term an absent presence. Such failure often informs 
experiences and engagement with the state, and these failures are often 
revealed through a series of state effects. Each of the contributing authors 
observes moments where the state is encountered through a series of lacks 
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and problems, unreliability, ineffectiveness or deception. These encounters 
are neither straightforward nor uniform, and paradoxically, these failures 
and absences often lead to an enhanced sense of state presence.
Locating the state in contemporary resource extraction contexts is not 
always a simple task. A number of contributors describe instances of 
what David Szablowski (2007) calls the ‘selective absence of the state’, 
or  what others in this volume have inversely termed a ‘selective’ or 
a ‘strategic presence’. For example, both Gareth Lewis and Sarah Holcombe 
explain how the legal environment in Australia’s Northern Territory allows 
companies to operate with minimum regulatory oversight. Lewis describes 
the systematic marginalisation of Aboriginal people around the McArthur 
River Mine and argues that, from a local Aboriginal perspective, the state 
has essentially absented itself from the project, failing to enforce existing 
legislation designed to protect the rights and interests of Aboriginal 
people. Holcombe uses a case study of a junior mining company seeking 
to operate on Aboriginal lands to show how the state has strategically acted 
to pursue extractive capitalism, and how the state has been significantly 
more present in its role as an enabler for the industry than a protector 
for local Aboriginal communities and environments. In a similar vein, 
Martin Espig describes a ‘partially absent’ state in the context of coal seam 
gas developments in western Queensland, where the rapid development of 
multiple gas projects outpaced the regulating departments of the state and 
pushed them beyond their capacity once developments fully commenced. 
These ‘runaway processes’ (Eriksen 2018) reveal the contradictions at the 
heart of contemporary extractive capitalism, and the double bind that 
encompasses the state, suspended between short-term growth imperatives 
and long-term goals of stability and sustainability.
When PNG gained independence from Australia, ‘many of the new state’s 
claims to legitimacy were based on the promise that all Papua New Guineans 
could expect development to come their way’ (Jorgensen 2007: 58). The 
inability to deliver upon this promise has seriously eroded the legitimacy 
of the state in the eyes of many citizens, which partly explains why so many 
rural communities hope that extractive companies might come along and 
fill this gap, and the willingness of the government to allow this to happen. 
In PNG and Australia, the state habitually reduces delivery of services 
around mining projects. As resource companies ‘have become increasingly 
involved in “community development” roles, often promoting the newly 
acquired corporate language of “sustainability” and “partnerships”’ (Banks 
2008: 24), this extended corporate role often results in the withdrawal 
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of the state from some of its functions and responsibilities,  in what is 
effectively a privatisation of state functions. For  instance, in the Lihir 
islands, Nicholas Bainton and Martha Macintyre have observed how the 
state has consistently failed to fulfil its commitments under the terms of 
the agreements that it has signed for the development and operation 
of  the gold mine. The gap created by absent state actors has produced 
a far more intense relationship between the community and the company 
characterised by ‘mutual incomprehension’ and antagonism, and a very 
high degree of local dependency (Bainton 2021). In the absence of the 
state, the community have ‘manoeuvred’ the company into the space 
ordinarily occupied by the state, forcing the company to provide social 
services and infrastructure that are the responsibility of the government.
Alex Golub’s historical anthropology of the Porgera mine reminds 
us that we cannot take collective actors like ‘the mine’, ‘the state’ or 
‘the  landowners’  for granted, and that an accurate account of history 
must also focus on networks of people who appear in different times 
and different situations as personating one or the other of these entities. 
From this vantage point, we can begin to really grasp the interpenetration 
between collective actors and how the absence or the presence of the state 
is experienced over time.
In her work on kinship and law, Marilyn Strathern theorised the differences 
between ‘categorical’ and ‘interpersonal’ relations, demonstrating that while 
these different relations animate each other, these types of relationships 
are not always present at the same time (Strathern 2005). In PNG, the 
state exercises a substantial categorical presence through its legislative 
and permitting powers, but this may not equate to a relationship. Emilia 
Skrzypek describes how the absence of an interpersonal relationship 
between community members and state actors at the Frieda River Project 
in the remote Sepik region led local landowners to feel like they could 
never really get to know the state. Instead, they invested their hopes and 
energy in the relationships they developed with company personnel, 
which they came to consider as more important, more consequential and 
more effective in pursuit of their development aspirations. Not enacted 
through relations, and not made visible through delivery of services, the 
state constitutes an ambiguous, uncertain and absent presence at Frieda 
River where local communities look to the company to fulfil what would 
traditionally be considered roles and responsibilities of the state, and to 
facilitate the missing relationship with state representatives. Across the 
mountain range, at the PNG LNG project, local landowners staged an 
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attack on project facilities in an attempt to use the company as a proxy 
to get the attention of the government and voice their anger over unpaid 
royalties and unfulfilled promises of development. Michael Main argues 
that their anger was really directed at the state and not the company, 
who they regarded as ‘a pawn in a larger game of corruption that was 
being played out by various levels of government and the judiciary’. Other 
chapters also speak to the lack of interaction between communities and 
state representatives and the effects of these non-existent relationships.
While the chapters by Skrzypek and Main describe instances where the 
state fails to assert effective presence, Jo-Anne Everingham and her co-
authors describe an instance where the state did assert a presence but failed 
to maintain it. Their chapter documents the changing presence of the state 
at the large Century zinc mine in the Gulf of Carpentaria in northern 
Queensland since the negotiation of the Gulf Communities Agreement 
began in 1992. Like many resource extraction projects in Australia, the 
Century Mine evidences the tensions between the state’s responsibilities 
to ensure economic development on the one hand, and the well-being 
of regional populations, especially Aboriginal communities, on the other 
hand. The negotiation of the Gulf Communities Agreement was the high 
point of the mine; it set out a development vision that aimed to reduce 
welfare dependency among Aboriginal people in the region. A range of 
state actors engaged intensively with Aboriginal groups at the outset of the 
project to help establish the various representative committees and bodies 
that would form the institutional framework of the agreement and play 
a central role in implementing its objectives. But as priorities changed 
within the Government of Queensland, combined with considerable 
turnover in government personnel during the operational years of the 
mine, the state’s actions were often at a remove from the region, important 
commitments were not fulfilled and local dependency upon the mine 
increased. The authors of this chapter argue that rather than seeing such 
resource contexts as ‘stateless spaces’, where the state plays a limited role, 
they can be understood as spaces where the state takes ‘action at a distance’ 
to pursue its ends indirectly, through the actions of others, in this case the 
mining company.
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State Effects
In mapping the effects and the presence of the state, anthropologists have 
generally looked for signs of administrative bureaucracies, regulation, 
service provision and other technologies of governance that support larger 
order-making agendas. Thinking of the state in terms of these order-
making functions leads us to consider those places where the state has 
been unable to impose its order. Golub’s historical account of law and 
order in Enga Province, provides a case in point. The presence of gold, 
and in later years the development of the Porgera mine, altered the history 
of policing in the Porgera valley, challenging the state’s monopoly over 
violence, and law and order. The understaffed and under-resourced police 
force contrasts with the company’s well-resourced private security force. 
However, as Golub explains, the picture is more complicated as many 
police officers were also members of the mine’s security team, and the 
latter often supplied resources to the former. As a result, law and order has 
gradually been recast in terms of ‘security’, as order is upheld by privately 
contracted security firms.
The limited presence of the state in those rural areas where mines are 
often located has turned these projects into new sites of ‘governmentality’, 
which can be defined as the ensemble of disciplining processes, 
institutions and tactics that attempt to shape human conduct—or how 
conduct is governed (Dean 1999). As companies are forced into closer 
contact with surrounding communities they often assume some of the 
responsibilities of the state including the provision of social services 
and infrastructure, development and implementation of programs, and 
greater levels of monitoring and self-regulation. In assuming some degree 
of responsibility for classic state functions, resource companies shape local 
desires and configure habits, aspirations and beliefs. They may act with 
a notional ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007) the local population, but they do so 
in ways that are rationally calculated towards the larger goals of extractive 
capitalism. In doing so, the actions of resource companies constitute these 
locales as authoritative and powerful, as different agents are assembled 
with specific powers, and particular domains—like lease land areas, group 
identification or the receipt of benefits—are constituted as governable and 
administrable (Dean 1999: 29). As sites of governmentality, extractive 
projects produce ‘extractive subjectivities’. This occurs by reworking forms 
of exclusion and inclusion in ways that serve the interests of extractive 
companies, by reshaping lifeworlds in areas targeted for investment, and 
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by transforming state–society–market relations, with companies assuming 
state‐like functions and subjecting them to capitalist logics (Fredricksen 
and Himley 2019: 59). This ultimately results in new ‘extractive subjects’ 
coming into being.
These new forms of governmentality often expose the shortcomings of 
the state, and the inability of companies to meet local expectations for 
development. In Australia, Espig describes instances where, let down 
by the state and increasingly distrustful of its ability to regulate and 
monitor the industry and associated risks, citizens stepped in and took 
it upon themselves to hold companies accountable for their actions. This 
is representative of a process addressed by several other authors in this 
volume, where the absence of the state incentivises people to deal directly 
with the company, facilitating new forms of relations, interdependencies 
and interactions. As the state retreats from certain spaces, companies 
and community members can become ‘responsiblised’ as they assume 
greater levels of responsibility for managing various health and social 
risks related to these developments. Drawing from the work of Ulrich 
Beck (2009: 193), Espig argues that these runaway developments have 
resulted in a situation where ‘no individual or institution seems to be 
held specifically accountable for anything’. This resonates with a point 
made elsewhere by Filer and his co-authors that in PNG, and from 
the perspective of the mining industry, the resource curse takes the 
form of a  ‘responsibility vacuum’, which makes partnerships with host 
governments and local communities ‘difficult, dangerous or downright 
impossible’ (2008: 175).
State effects also assume a material form. For example, the original 
agreements for the Lihir gold mine contained a commitment by the state 
and the company to build and maintain a road around the main island 
where the mine is located. After some 20  years of mining operations, 
the road remained unsealed. While the company eventually took steps 
to seal half of the road (fulfilling part of its original commitment), the 
state has not fulfilled its part. The materiality of the road, and indeed 
the mine itself and the various other pieces of public infrastructure that 
are promised as benefits of extraction, invokes the dynamic relationship 
between the presence and absence of the state. Penny Harvey makes 
a similar observation in her ethnography of roads in the Peruvian Andes. 
She engages the state ethnographically through the material ‘traces’ and 
‘effects’ which open out, rather than close down, further perspectives on 
the structures and practices through which specific modes of state power 
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are effected and reproduced (Harvey 2005: 131). Like the Andean roads, 
the local Lihir ring road produces numerous state effects. The road is 
a contested space. It has become the site of political struggle between the 
company and the state as they both shift the responsibility for completion. 
It is a point of conflict between the various levels of government who are 
signatories to the original agreement, and it is a source of acrimony as the 
community demand that the company fill the gap left by the state and 
the potholes left by its trucks. As ‘state effect’, the road provides a complex 
material site through which people experience and negotiate their 
relationships with power (ibid.: 134). Standing on the incomplete road, 
the state then appears in a multivalent form—as the object of people’s 
desire, and the source of bitterness and the feeling of abandonment.
A Multivalent Presence
Anthropologists often study states from the ‘margins’ (Das and Poole 
2004), or indirectly through the prism of nation and nationalism and 
related discourses (e.g. Herzfeld 1987; Handler 1988). Ethnographers 
tend to conduct much less fieldwork in the ‘halls of power’, where state 
political power is articulated and directly wielded.13 In a geographical 
sense, resource extraction sites are often peripheral places, distant from 
metropolitan centres where state power is concentrated, adding to 
the complex task of locating the state in extractive contexts. However, the 
processes of resource extraction occur both at the points of extraction as 
well as in major capital cities and industrial hubs, where companies are 
headquartered in close proximity to financial markets and the functions 
of the state that enable extractive capitalism. The various processes and 
effects of extraction also take place between these spaces, and beyond.
Many of the communities who reside around resource extraction projects, 
or who desire or fear them, inhabit ‘marginal spaces’ characterised by an 
absence of roads, schools, hospitals and other services that are signs of the 
presence of the state. Thus, the geographical distance often translates into 
physical and moral absence of the state and can be used to contextualise 
specific kinds of state behaviour, such as the withdrawal of government 
functions. As the contributing authors show, the state as a macro-actor 
is rarely held responsible for its promises and commitments in extractive 
contexts, which is partly due to the combination of physical distance and 
13  Exceptions from the region include Santos da Costa (2018).
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ideas that circulate about the ‘natural’ marginality of these places and the 
people who inhabit them, especially Indigenous people. This also reinforces 
the value of thinking about the nature of the state as a conglomerate of 
actors and institutions, rather than a collective actor. Skrzypek recalls 
a government representative explicitly telling community members at 
the Frieda River Project: ‘Before, you all lived in the bush and you had 
nothing. The government is too far away, it will not help you. If it was not 
for the company you would still be in the bush with no development, 
nothing. If you don’t support the company, you will go back’.
The geographic distance between centres of national and regional 
governance and the often-remote sites of extraction means that 
communities in those locations find themselves subjected to decisions and 
policies made away from local contexts. Lewis describes the experience 
of those communities affected by the McArthur River Mine who live 
a long way from centres of state power. ‘Absent decision makers’ have long 
‘wielded power from afar’, which has contributed to their experience of 
the state as a distant and disinterested institution on the one hand, and 
as a powerful and malevolent presence on the other hand. He adds the 
neoliberal state to a long list of ‘broken promise men’ who have altered 
the course of the mining project and Aboriginal people’s lives over time. 
An even more extreme case of wielding power from afar is described by 
Burton and Levacher in the context of New Caledonia where the industry 
was directly impacted by events and policy changes decided in France, 
literally halfway around the world. The task of locating the state in resource 
extraction contexts gets even more complicated if we consider other kinds 
of peripheralities at play, particularly those associated with asymmetries 
of power, representation and decision making experienced by Indigenous 
people. Taking stock of legislative systems, procedures and effects, both 
Lewis and Holcombe locate Australia’s Aboriginal communities on a kind 
of political periphery, drawing links between geographic remoteness and 
a history of violence and political and socioeconomic peripheralisation 
which combine to push Aboriginal communities to marginalised and 
compromised positions vis-à-vis the state and multinational corporations.
The temporal dimensions of absent presence also emerge across the 
chapters. Writing about the temporality of the government in PNG, 
Dalsgaard (2013) describes how the state is made present in time, for 
example through rhythms, schedules and engagements. In both national 
contexts discussed here, the state as a regulator influences temporalities of 
resource extraction projects and is present in time through, for example, 
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specific initiatives and interventions (as discussed by Golub), negotiated 
agreements (as illustrated by Everingham et al. and Bainton and 
Macintyre); and changes in the regulatory and governance environment, 
including those related to the critical question of national sovereignty, 
within which the industry operates (Burton and Levacher). The presence 
of the state in time can also be experienced through its failure to be present 
at a time when this presence is expected. For example by delaying the 
distribution of royalties to affected communities (as discussed by Main), 
or where sluggish state processes are outpaced by a fast-moving industry, 
increasing potentially risky gaps in industry permitting and oversight 
(as elaborated by Espig).
While these examples show how the state can be made present in time, it is 
also present (or absent) over time. Most of the chapters in this volume take 
a broader historical view to show how the state was present (and absent) 
prior to extraction, and how and if this changed, or remained the same, 
in the context of extraction. Thus the presence and the absence of the 
state should be considered across the entire mine life cycle. For example, 
Everingham and her co-authors also trace the government’s receding 
involvement over time at the Century Mine. And at the contentious PNG 
LNG project, Main locates experiences of the state in a local ontology that 
interprets the state’s action and inaction in terms of ancestral prophecies of 
abundance and a historical trajectory of decline. The spatial and temporal 
configuration and experience of such encounters with the state, and its 
arbitrary exercise of power, can also be thought of as maps of frustration 
or horizons of disillusioned expectations. These are spaces where the legal 
claims and commitments of the state—and the assurances of the state—
become unsettled by the practices of state representatives and government 
departments and their emissaries. Where state-systems and the actions of 
its representatives and agencies fail to dissolve the tension, people may 
take it upon themselves to address the dissonance.
Lewis provides one of the most ‘colourful’ examples of local protest over 
the failure of the government to make itself present in meaningful ways. 
In order to voice their opposition to the McArthur River Mine and 
gain support for their cause, community members launched an emotive 
exhibition of photographs and artwork in Darwin. The exhibition drew 
attention to the intrinsic cultural and spiritual value of their land, seemingly 
disregarded by the state in its ardent support for the mine. Their artwork 
stood as a moral critique of the state’s absence, or its uneven presence, and 
the effects of state sponsored extractive capitalism. In a similar vein, Main 
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shows how Huli landowners attempted to hold the government responsible 
for unfulfilled promises of benefits and development at the PNG LNG 
project. He argues that local landowners have interpreted a range of events 
and processes, including natural phenomena such as a recent devastating 
earthquake, as a direct effect of what they regard as the ‘immoral absence 
of the state’. He writes that Huli people saw the immorality of the state 
as a ‘material threat to the future aspirations of Huli’ and their prophetic 
entitlement to benefit from their resources.
Conclusion
In this introductory chapter we have claimed that resource extraction 
provides a useful starting point for studying the state and its effects. 
To paraphrase Clifford Geertz (1973: 22) who once argued that 
anthropologists don’t simply study villages, ‘they study in villages’, 
anthropologists do well to not only study resource projects, but can also 
study the state from the particular vantage point of resource extraction. 
The ethnographic examples from PNG and Australia offered here 
illustrate the illegibility and obscurity of the state. From the perspective 
of these resource extraction sites, the state is often barely perceptible. It is 
bamboozling, deceptive, dangerous and two-faced, self-interested and 
sometimes completely unknowable. Material and ideological aspects of 
the state are mutually reinforcing in these resource domains, where the 
state looms as an eternally incomplete and uncertain project having to 
constantly reproduce itself.
The chapters in this volume show that although states might be imagined, 
or contested, they have real effects in people’s lives, especially in the 
settings described here. Where gaps emerge as a result of the failure of 
the state to enact its responsibilities or, to paraphrase Skrzypek, where 
dissonance appears in the networks which inevitably emerge around 
resource extraction projects, something or someone will either choose or 
be persuaded to fill this space. An anthropology of absent presence which 
we propose here offers a unique perspective on the state in relation to 
resource extraction. Not just because it captures the gaps and unruliness 
that is thought to reside in resource frontier zones, but because it suggests 
that incompleteness, partial presence, and frustrated forms of order-
making are a necessary entailment of the state and the way it is experienced 
and encountered in the context of resource extraction.
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Much of the thinking about roles and responsibilities in resource 
extraction projects is framed around the notion of stakeholder categories. 
These categories group people of a given type under a particular label, 
and award them with prescriptive roles and responsibilities. Like many 
countries around the world, in Papua New Guinea (PNG) provisions 
in national legislation make the state the owner of the country’s mineral 
resources and the regulator of the extractive sector. In order to capitalise 
on these resources, the government enters into agreements with mining 
companies, which have the financial and technological capacity to 
operate resource extraction projects, and the host area communities who 
claim customary ownership over the land. The country’s first large-scale 
mining project, the Panguna mine on the island of Bougainville, began 
its operations in 1972, with the Ok Tedi mine in the country’s Western 
Province following 12 years later. In the 1980s and 1990s respectively, the 
two mines were sites  of dramatic events that sent shockwaves through 
the sector. A breakdown of social relations at Panguna resulted in an 
armed conflict, claiming thousands of lives (May and Spriggs 1990), 
while mismanagement at the Ok Tedi mine led to a natural disaster and 
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one of the most famous legal challenges in the history of the industry 
(Banks and Ballard 1997). The legacy of those events forced governments 
and companies in and beyond PNG to acknowledge landowners as the 
third key stakeholder category in resource extraction projects (Imbun 
2007), where stakeholders are defined as ‘groups and individuals who can 
affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organisation’s missions’ 
(Freeman 2010 [1984]: 48).1 This triad model, which recognises the 
state, the company and local communities as the three key stakeholder 
groups, continues to serve as a ‘provisional analytical device’ (Ballard 
and Banks 2003: 289) in industry as well as academia, amid mounting 
acknowledgement that ‘it has not generally served to capture much of the 
complexity of the relationships that form around mining as a site’ (ibid.).
As the sense of a mining community broadened, the significance of 
additional stakeholders such as NGOs, media, legal agencies and global 
financial institutions rapidly expanded, forming what Ballard and Banks 
(2003: 304) glossed ‘the fourth estate’—included in resource relations 
‘by virtue of connections to or alliances with (rather than membership of ) 
one of the three principal stakeholder categories’. More recently, Filer 
and Le Meur proposed extending the triad model to include the fourth 
element, which they called ‘society’. They also reframed the original 
three stakeholder categories as spaces rather than conceptual entities and 
argued that:
there is no large-scale mining project that involves just one 
company, one government agency or even one mine-affected 
community. Instead, there is a corporate space, a government space 
and a community space, each of which is liable to be occupied by 
a number of organisations or agencies in different relationships 
with each other, some of which count as political relationships, 
and within each of these organisations or agencies there are more 
political relationships. (2017: 22)
This view is reflective of a growing recognition in the anthropology of 
mining that, held too tightly, categories can hinder rather than aid our 
understanding of complexities of stakeholder engagement in resource 
extraction projects. Instead, the discipline has turned much of its focus to 
nuanced processes and enactments of categories as they are taking place, 
in project locations (e.g. Golub 2014; Welker 2014). Inevitably, the closer 
1  This development was then reflected in the establishment of the Development Forum process 
for the Porgera mine—PNG’s next major development project (Filer 2008).
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we get to the ambiguities and complexities of on-the-ground relations, the 
more distant and blurry the categorical prescriptions become. Yet, it would 
be dangerous to neglect categorical prescriptions from any systematic 
analysis, as they frame and influence on-the-ground interactions and 
are indispensable to our understanding of ‘stakeholder relations’. Here, 
I focus on the contested spaces in between stakeholder categories and 
their enactments in the project location. Categorical models tend to make 
assumptions about what the latter ought to look like. They often contain 
specific instructions to facilitate types of interactions and relations 
(e.g. through legal frameworks, employment contracts and bureaucratic 
procedures). But, in a version of a looping effect described by Douglas 
(1986), categorical models are themselves influenced by ways in which 
they are experienced and imagined in resource project localities.
Categorical Dissonance
Building on Le Meur and Filer’s take on categories as complex spaces 
rather than discreet entities, this chapter explores what I term here as 
‘categorical dissonance’ which contrasts expectations of perceived roles 
and responsibilities with actual enactments and effects of those roles. The 
concept pivots on cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Festinger 
in the late 1950s, which ‘suggests that when individuals hold two or more 
cognitions that are contradictory, they will feel an unpleasant state—
dissonance—until they are able to resolve this state by altering their 
cognitions’ (Hinojosa et al. 2016: 171). I use it here to investigate the 
role of the state in stakeholder engagement at the Frieda River Project in 
PNG: to explore ways in which the absence of the state was experienced 
in the project location, and describe how the company developing the 
project and members of local communities responded and altered their 
cognition and actions to redress the imbalance these absences introduced 
into the process of planning for a mine at Frieda.
Two interconnected types of categorical dissonance will be described 
here. The first is dissonance within categories, found in dynamic spaces 
between categorical prescriptions of stakeholder roles and responsibilities, 
and their enactment in project contexts. In her study of kinship, law and 
the unexpected, Marilyn Strathern theorised two kinds of relations. 
The first kind, she wrote, are categorical relations, connections acquired 
‘through a logic or power of articulation that acquires its own conceptual 
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momentum’ (2005: 7). The second are interpersonal relations taken 
as connections between persons, which develop over time ‘inflected 
in a precise and particular history’ (ibid.). Together, the two create ‘a tool 
for social living’ as ‘it is through interacting with persons that diverse 
interactions and further connections become intellectually conceivable, 
while it is through creating concepts and categories that connections come 
to have a social life of their own’ (ibid.: 8). This chapter uses Strathern’s 
framework to contrast the state’s categorical presence with its interpersonal 
absences at the Frieda River Project. It describes how members of one of 
the project’s so-called impact communities experienced the categorical 
prescriptions of state legislation which they could neither understand 
nor leverage, and how they became disillusioned with enactments of the 
state and the lack of interpersonal relationships with government agents. 
Instead, they vested their hopes in the relationships formed with mining 
company personnel, in anticipation of using those relations to leverage 
positive outcomes and bring civic infrastructure and services to the Frieda 
River area.
The second type is dissonance between categories, which emerges 
where one or more stakeholder groups fail to meet the expectations of 
their role leading to absences in their respective functions. Where this 
affects functions deemed necessary for the shared project, and where 
such absence arises in a way that threatens it, another actor (or actors) 
with the capacity to do so, will likely be forced to fill the missing role to 
address the disharmony and ensure continuity of the process. Although 
such ‘absences’ can be found in all stakeholder groups, this chapter focuses 
specifically on the state’s performance against its categorical role at the 
Frieda River Project. It describes how the company developing the project 
has attempted to mediate the failures of the government, or its profound 
absence, and found itself under pressure to take on service delivery 
functions in the project area.
To demonstrate the multiple dimensions of the experiences of the state 
on the ground, in a project location, the chapter triangulates findings 
of a village-based ethnography with material collected among on-site 
company personnel and data from interviews conducted with government 
representatives during their rare visits to the area. It follows stakeholders 
engaged in the process of planning for a mine at Frieda River in their 
use of categorical terminology, referring broadly to the government, the 
company, and ‘local’ or ‘impact’ communities as key stakeholder groups 
at the Frieda River Project. It shows how the Paiyamo community of 
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Paupe, who live in the vicinity of the project, strived for a relationship 
with the state and strategically engaged the company to fill some of the 
voids created by the gap between expectations and reality of government 
involvement at the Frieda River Project. An important part of this process 
was the anticipation that if the mine begins operations, the government’s 
interest and its active presence in these communities will follow. This 
chapter follows local use of the Tok Pisin term gavman, translated here 
as government, to describe the state, its institutions and people who 
enact it at any given point in time—expanding on the view of the state as 
a discrete polity made up of organising rules and principles and possessing 
the power to enforce those over particular peoples and territory, to include 
people who enact it and enforce its policies in the project location. It is 
based on ethnographic material collected during 12 months of fieldwork 
conducted in the Frieda area in 2011–12 and again in 2018.
Emergence of the State
The image of the Australian flag being lowered and the Papua New 
Guinean one being raised signalling the birth of an independent PNG 
is widely used in descriptions of the moment in which PNG became an 
independent nation state. The red, black and gold bird of paradise flag 
on a mast at sunrise on 16 September 1975 was heralded in the national 
media as a symbol of a new dawn, uniting the independent nation state 
around imagery filled with hope and anticipation of a bright future. The 
public rhetoric surrounding independence created an idea of a nation 
state akin to Benedict Anderson’s (1983: 6) model of an ‘imagined 
community’—a group of people, spread over a particular geographic 
area, who will likely never meet ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion’ (see also Main, Chapter 5, this volume). Accounts 
of the time leading up to the event speak of high levels of excitement, 
particularly and understandably in the capital district where official 
celebrations were taking place, attended by powerful political figures from 
across the country and abroad.
In the mid-1970s, the newly formed nationalist discourse pivoted on the 
powerful idea that independent PNG will also be a  ‘developed’ PNG. 
Despite early national optimism, in the years following independence 
the newly established government struggled to fulfil its development 
aspirations. Even though the experience of colonialism was brief for 
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a large proportion of the population, it left a lasting legacy of expectations 
and shaped the ways in which citizens of the newly independent nation 
conceptualised the state and the role of the gavman. Accounts of the 
emergence of the ‘state’ in PNG describe the state, seen as regulator and 
provider of infrastructure and services, as very much a colonial creation 
and describe how, particularly in the years between the Second World 
War and independence, the colonial administration played a key role in 
‘development’ (May 2004). As it withdrew, the colonial administration 
left voids in the provision of services, and the maintenance and 
development of infrastructure. While the country’s public service was 
functional, its capacity to deliver services and respond to the needs of the 
country’s growing population was relatively limited (Gelu 2010) meaning 
that gradually, in the years following independence, in large parts of the 
country civic infrastructure wilted and access to government services 
diminished.
Like the experience of colonial administration before it, the experience 
of the state of PNG was unevenly shared across the nation following 
independence. To an extent this is still the case today, with people in many 
rural parts of the country expressing feelings of being forgotten by the 
government and excluded from national political representation and capital 
flows. In 1975 ‘many of the new state’s claims to legitimacy were based 
on the promise that all Papua New Guineans could expect development 
to come their way’ (Jorgensen 2007: 58). By the 1980s tensions arose 
between the goals of ‘development for all’, set out in the country’s largely 
egalitarian Eight Point Plan (1975), and the realisation that development, 
out of its very nature, produces inequality (Rivers 1999; Stead 2016). The 
mining industry seemed to offer an ideal opportunity to bring revenues to 
the national economy and development into local areas (Gilberthorpe and 
Banks 2012). The government embraced the promise of mining-induced 
national development. By the end of the 1970s, PNG became a ‘mining 
resource frontier’ (Hyndman 2001). Over time, mining become a central 
feature of the country’s growing economy, capitalising on what Ballard 
and Banks (2003) referred to as the ‘mining exploration bonanza’ of the 
1980s and early 1990s. By then, at least 10 large mineral prospects had 
been identified in PNG, and national leaders restated the promise that 
‘mining revenues will be the catalyst for an ambitious program of rural 
development and that capital works programs and government services 
will enable subsistence villagers to enjoy the benefits of the cash economy, 
hitherto largely confined to the urban minority’ (Ashton, 1990). By the 
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end of the twentieth century, 156 mining exploration licences had either 
already been awarded or were awaiting grants, and four major operations 
(Ok Tedi, Lihir, Misima and Porgera) and one medium-sized mine 
(Tolukuma) operated in PNG (Hirsch 2001).
The 1990s saw intensification of exploration activities in many parts 
of the country, including the copper and gold prospects in the Frieda 
River area. The companies’ increasing presence on the ground and their 
interactions with members of host communities established exploration 
and mining companies as powerful social, economic and development 
agents across the nation. In light of the ongoing decline in the provision 
of government services, and increasing disillusionment with the 
government’s capacity to maintain and expand civic infrastructure, local 
communities looked to mining and exploration companies to fulfil 
those roles—with the companies’ ability to secure local consent for their 
operations, known in the industry as a ‘social license to operate’ (SLTO),2 
increasingly influenced by their performance against those expectations. 
This anticipation was shared by many local and provincial governments 
that linked their own ability to cater to the needs of their communities to 
their success in attracting and retaining mining interests in their area. For 
some people, the enabling legislative climate created by the state in the 
hope of encouraging growth of the industry was the state’s way of helping 
its citizens.
While people hoped that the companies would bring development to their 
areas in the form of infrastructure, services, and employment and business 
opportunities, in the decades following independence the government was 
very much hoping for the same. Unsurprisingly, over the years, companies 
tended to resist taking on what they saw as the role of the government. 
Nevertheless, faced with the necessity to secure support for their projects 
from the host communities, and confronted with the weak institutions 
of the state, many companies have found themselves with no choice but 
2  Although it adapts technical and tangible language associated with licencing and permitting, 
in reality SLTO is ‘an intangible construct associated with acceptance, approval, consent, demands, 
expectations and reputation’ (Parsons et al. 2014: 84). The term has been criticised on the grounds 
of limiting, not expanding, critical debates about entanglements and regimes of responsibility and 
accountability between companies and society (Owen and Kemp 2014). Despite risks associated with 
the way in which the concept ‘constructs its notion of approval, based on the absence of disapproval’ 
(Owen 2016: 103), it has become a popular shorthand to describe ways in which companies deliver 
benefits to communities in exchange for the latter not interrupting their local operations.
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to either fill these gaps (see also Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4, this 
volume), or facilitate the government in fulfilling its role, and most often 
both—as the remainder of this chapter will show.
The Frieda River Project
As the global geographies of demand and supply in mineral resources 
shift (Bebbington et al. 2008), deposits that have been long considered 
either too dangerous or economically unviable are having their viability 
reassessed. Frieda River’s copper and gold deposit falls into this category. 
It is what can be described as a ‘complex ore body’, where this complexity 
includes a range of geographical, geological and non-technical factors, 
such as political uncertainties and social and cultural complexities 
(Valenta et al. 2019). Frieda River is not a mine, but an advanced resource 
exploration project.
Even by Papua New Guinean standards, the Frieda River Project is 
geographically remote. Located near the border between East Sepik and 
Sandaun provinces, some 70 km south of the Sepik River, the site is not 
accessible by road from either of the provincial capitals, Vanimo or Wewak, 
but it can be reached by air, using a helicopter or a lightweight plane, 
or by water—following the Sepik from Pagwi in the East Sepik or from 
Green River in Sandaun. Despite its geographic isolation (see Figure 2.1), 
the area’s rich copper and gold deposits mean that it is of great interest 
to the mining industry, and has been for a number of decades. Mineral 
prospects were first identified at Frieda during a regional mapping exercise 
in 1966. In 1969 a Prospecting Authority (today known as Exploration 
License 58) was granted to an Australian mining company, Mount Isa 
Mines Ltd, and its subsidiary, Carpentaria Exploration Company, allowing 
for exploration work at Frieda to begin. Exploration has been ongoing 
since, but noticeably intensified in 1996 when, in the middle of the global 
resource high, Highlands Gold Properties Pty Ltd completed the first full 
feasibility study for the Frieda River Project. The second feasibility study 
was completed in 2013 by Xstrata Frieda River, a subsidiary of Xstrata 
Copper, which at the time was the fourth largest copper producer in the 
world. Xstrata withdrew from the project a short time later.
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Figure 2.1 Location of the Frieda River Project
Source: Map created by Kamila Svobodova
The Frieda River Project is now co-owned by Brisbane-based PanAust 
(80  per cent)3 and a Papua New Guinean incorporated company, 
Highlands Pacific Ltd (20 per cent). The current owners see Frieda River 
as ‘a core component of a transformative nation-building opportunity—
which the company has dubbed the Sepik Development Project’ that 
promises to ‘deliver direct and indirect local employment, create business 
opportunities, attract foreign investment and boost trade and commerce’ 
(PanAust 2018). Company materials publicly promoting the project 
claim that:
host communities, especially in rural areas, will benefit from 
access to improved transport, telecommunications, health, 
education and government services that will support a higher 
quality of life and greater social participation. More broadly, 
training and employment of Papua New Guineans will provide 
the skills and capacity to support the nation’s future development 
and prosperity. (ibid.)
3  In 2015, soon after it acquired shares in the Frieda River Project, a Chinese company—
Guangdong Rising Assets Management, acquired PanAust. It is now fully Chinese-owned, 
but continues to operate from Brisbane, and remains listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
The majority of the on-site personnel are either Papua New Guinean or Australian.
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The promotional materials do not specify who will deliver those benefits, 
only that they will be substantial.
Frieda River Joint Venture partners were, at the time of writing, in the 
process of making adjustments to their feasibility study with a view 
of submitting a Special Mining Lease (SML) application to the state 
government, as required by the Mining Act—the main instrument of 
mining industry governance in PNG. The licence is granted on the basis of 
the application and conditional to successful completion of a development 
forum—a  process of tripartite consultations between government, 
company and community representatives developed by the government 
‘for addressing issues of community participation’ and distribution of 
landowner benefits in resource extraction projects (IIED 2002: 211, see 
also Filer 2008). Granting of the SML opens the door for companies to 
proceed to the construction and operations phases of the mineral project 
life cycle.
Since the turn of the century, on-site exploration activities at Frieda were 
tailored towards servicing the demands of the consecutive feasibility 
studies, including but not limited to hydrological testing, drilling 
programs and technical scoping for the project’s numerous designs. They 
also included environmental surveys, social mapping and landownership 
demarcation exercises, and community engagement activities. At the 
time of research, the company maintained a presence of operations and 
community affairs personnel on site. In 2011–12, the community affairs 
team consisted of three superintendents and seven to eight officers, who 
were all accommodated in one of the two semi-permanent residential 
camps—the Base Camp and the Airstrip Camp. In 2018 the team was 
smaller, comprising of two superintendents and six officers, working 
on a roster. On both occasions, the team was led by a manager based in 
the company’s office in Brisbane. While the on-site teams interacted with 
representatives of provincial and district governments, particularly during 
their visits to the site, the relationship with the national government was 




Figure 2.2 Frieda River Project area
Source: Map created by Kamila Svobodova
Following a landowner identification exercise for an area under 
Exploration  License  58, requested by the government and completed 
by the company in 1995–96, seven communities were awarded a status 
of what are now known as ‘impact communities’ of the Frieda River 
Project: Telefolmin villages of Ok Isai and Wabia; Mianmin villages of 
Wameimin  1 and 2, Amaroumin, and Hotmin; and a Paiyamo village 
of Paupe, where I was based for most of the time I spent at Frieda 
(see Figure 2.2). Located in the East Sepik Province, a short boat ride 
away from the Sandaun provincial border, and a few minutes’ walk 
away from the Airstrip Camp, Paupe is a  truly beautiful place nestled 
in the rainforest. At first glance, there is little to signify Paupe’s status 
as an impact community to a large, advanced resource exploration 
project, based upon the visible signs of development that we have come 
to expect in ‘mining impact communities’. In the absence of actual 
mining, Paupe is really an ‘exploration impact community’. Most of its 
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members continue to live in temporary houses made of bush materials, 
and subsistence agriculture remains the main economic activity in the 
village. Saying that, during the time I have spent in the area, there have 
been some noticeable changes in community infrastructure and services. 
In that time, and with the company’s assistance, Paupe gained new school 
buildings and a community clinic, complete with staff housing. A gravel 
service road now runs through the community linking the Airstrip Camp 
with Paupe, and further with a water port on the banks of the Sepik River. 
The service road was built by the company to enable transport of cargo 
between supply barges moored on the Sepik and the company camp. 
In 2018 my hosts told me, with more than a note of excitement in their 
voices, that when the road was being built a PMV (public motor vehicle, 
a popular bus substitute in PNG) travelled through Paupe, bringing 
workers to site in the morning, and returning them to the Airstrip Camp 
in the afternoon. Although the PMV runs ceased once the construction 
was completed, the image of a bus passing through the community stayed 
with the Paiyamo, evoking imagery of the kinds of services they will have 
access to once the project proceeds from exploration and permitting to 
the construction and operations phases of its life cycle.
The Absent Presence of the State
The Paiyamo’s first encounters with state administration occurred 
relatively late in the country’s colonial history, with the first government 
patrol officer (or ‘kiap’) reaching the area in 1962. The kiap brought 
together Paiyamo speakers dispersed around the region, and established 
the foundations of the current village of Paupe. In local narratives, this 
marks a moment of transition from past-focused time of the ancestors, to 
a future-driven time of ‘white men’ and ‘development’. The Paiyamo rarely 
speak about their first experiences of the government. But when probed 
they talk about establishment of the village, advent of local administrative 
roles like luluais (village heads or chiefs) and tultuls (their assistants), 
introduction of village books, and first encounters with organised law and 
order structures which saw a group of local men arrested and taken to jail 
in Ambunti, the district headquarters, in the late 1960s. From its early 
days, the relationship between the Paiyamo and the gavman was weak, 
and limited to sporadic and brief encounters with colonial patrols. Even 
now, the Paiyamo feel very little obligation towards the state and ascribe 
much greater significance to another arrival—which followed a few years 
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after the first kiap moored his boat on the banks of the river—the mining 
company. Over time, members of local communities came to see the 
mining industry as a ‘modern road to cargo’ (see also Bainton 2010) and 
began to conceptualise the future mine as a portal through which they will 
gain access to ‘development’.
For all intents and purposes, the way the Paiyamo see it, they do not have 
a relationship with the government independently of the Frieda River 
Project, and they look to the company for what would traditionally be 
seen as the role(s) and responsibilities of the state. ‘We must support the 
company and work with them. It is the company that will bring services 
to us. It will not be the government who will come and give medications 
to our children. If the company was not there, the government would not 
remember about us’, I often heard them say. The self-description as ‘people 
forgotten by the government’ featured strongly in such statements, as the 
Paiyamo turned to the company for goods and services, which they came 
to associate with the promise of development and modernity they read 
from the imagery of the anticipated copper and gold mine in their area.
Despite their brief and limited encounters with the colonial 
administration, like many people all over the country, they too spoke of 
a decline in government presence in the years since independence. ‘These 
are no longer the times when Australians were looking after us and when 
there was enough of everything for everyone. We should be happy we have 
the company here because the government has completely forgotten about 
us’, I was told by a community leader in Paupe. In the few encounters 
I  witnessed between Paiyamo people and government representatives, 
the latter actively encouraged the communities’ dependency on the 
company for both civic infrastructure and basic services, laying bare the 
government’s own expectations of the company to deliver development 
to what it saw as some of the most geographically remote and hard-to-
access parts of the country. On one occasion in 2012, during a brief visit 
to Paupe, I heard a member of the provincial administration say to the 
community:
Before, you all lived in the bush and you had nothing. 
The  government is too far away, it will not help you. If it was 
not for the company you would still be in the bush with no 
development, nothing. If you don’t support the company, you will 
go back there.
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This is not to say that the government was completely absent from the 
project and the area. National legislation meant that, in categorical terms, 
the state’s presence was very much felt at Frieda. It was demonstrated 
through prescriptions of government forms, laws, procedures and—last 
but not least—the sovereign power held by the government to grant 
the SML for the project. The company would often bring the state into 
conversations by invoking government process and legislation to explain 
its own decisions and actions, and to settle disputes on issues such as 
compensation rates. From the perspective of local communities, the 
government processes were slow, and were often blamed for holding 
back the mine. This meant that there was also a temporal dimension to 
the categorical presence of the government at the Frieda River Project 
(cf. Dalsgaard 2013).
In many ways, the categorical presence of the state at Frieda, where 
subsistence and artisanal mining activities kept people largely outside 
the formal economy and taxation system, and where most law and order 
issues were settled using prescriptions of customary rather than common 
law, was felt more strongly in the context of the project than in any other 
area of people’s lives—the project serving as a tool for local anchoring 
of the state at Frieda. But this categorical presence of the state was not 
equal to a relationship—which the Paiyamo were very quick to remark 
upon when I asked. It lacked the interpersonal component and access 
to government representatives with whom consequential relations could 
be leveraged and built. In that regard, the interpersonal absences, lack 
of direct interactions with government officials, and poor delivery of 
government services in the area contributed to the feeling that the state was 
absent from Frieda.4 These feelings were exacerbated by the community 
members’ very limited understanding of government processes and 
systems—a form of institutional uncertainty about the rules of the new 
game (see also Minnegal and Dwyer 2017). On more than one occasion 
I heard people ask ‘How can we participate fully if we do not understand?’ 
This led to high levels of frustration among the Paiyamo who, faced with 
4  Since independence, Paupe has had a local government councillor. Formally the holder of this 
elected position served as an intermediary between the community and the state, together with 
the village court magistrate. Generally, the Paiyamo respected their local councillor and his role in 
resolving community matters. However, they had little confidence in the subsequent post-holders’ 
ability to leverage relations with ‘the state’. Limited interaction and communication between the 
councillor and higher levels of government, and the company’s emphasis on district, provincial 
and state representatives meant that while respected within the community, the councillor was not 
considered a fully-fledged ‘government representative’ in Paupe.
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state regulations and bureaucratic prescriptions that were inflexible and 
non-negotiable, felt they could not really get to know the government. 
Further, as their local epistemology treats knowledge as a relational 
endeavour, they took the government’s lack of interest in entering into 
interpersonal relationships with members of the community as a sign of 
the state’s unwillingness or lack of interest in getting to know them.
Local ideas of personhood play an important role in the processes 
described here. The Paiyamo judge knowledge and relations against 
the transformative effects these have on the world. For them, personal 
relations award meaning and significance to past and current events, 
and create opportunities for the future. Over time, my hosts in Paupe 
came to see the (future) Frieda River Mine as an effect of knowledge and 
relations, which they actively navigated hoping to reveal the long-awaited 
mine in their area (Skrzypek 2020). Which is why the almost exclusively 
categorical presence of the state, which they did not know and felt did 
not want to know them, and with which no two-way relationship could 
be developed, was so frustrating. In the absence of interpersonal relations 
with the government, members of Paupe community did not identify with 
it in a way in which they came to identify with the company developing 
the project, and did not form relations with government representatives 
in the way they entered into complex relations with company employees. 
There was a strong categorical relationship between the Paiyamo and 
the company, grounded in the national Constitution and prescriptions 
of legally recognised customary land ownership. In this relationship, 
the company (the developer) must secure and maintain access to land 
owned by the Paiyamo (the landowners) in order to develop infrastructure 
essential for the project’s activities and future operations (Bainton and 
Banks 2018). However, to my hosts in Paupe, it was the interpersonal 
relations they entered into with the company’s on-site personnel that 
made the categorical relations meaningful and gave them effect, with the 
ultimate goal of leveraging those relations to precipitate a mine at Frieda. 
On my most recent visit to the area I was told by a company representative 
that now, even when the government representatives visit the villages, they 
are given less priority than the company personnel, the latter seen as more 
capable to impact change and address their desires and concerns. In his 
view, ‘people no longer believe the gavman will help them’.
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Community Leaders’ Forum
The problematic relationship, or the lack of association, between 
government representatives and community members had an effect on 
the company and the way in which it approached the task of ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ at the project. Company representatives frequently raised 
concerns about the government’s limited capacity to proactively engage 
with the project, and the country’s political instability, which, in their 
view, weakened the state’s position as the regulator of the industry. 
‘At  the  national level, elections are coming up next year and anything 
can happen’, I was told in 2011. ‘Personnel changes may mean setbacks, 
interests may change. The bureaucracy is slow. Laws can change all around 
the country. But all companies want security. They invest the money, they 
want to see it back’. Interestingly, this concern with the country’s political 
instability was  shared by many government representatives, including 
those based at the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA)—a government 
agency which acts on behalf of the national government to enforce 
rules and regulations at exploration and mining projects, who expressed 
frustration with the effect political processes had on their own ability to 
fulfil their administrative roles and responsibilities in the context of the 
Frieda River Project.
Rather unsurprisingly, company employees felt uncomfortable with 
refracted responsibilities and the pressure they have found themselves 
under to fulfil what they saw as the role of the state. ‘The government 
doesn’t play its role. It thinks that since we are here we can provide all’, 
a community affairs officer (CA) told me, following a community meeting 
in one of the impact villages. ‘But we cannot be seen as the provider 
of government services in the area—this is just not right’, he added, 
signalling that the absence of state function was not only a practical 
but also a moral issue. In an attempt to manage the absence of the 
government representatives at Frieda, and to fill the void in interpersonal 
relations between the government and local communities, the company 
management revived an old and for some time abandoned model of 
a  ‘community leaders forum’ (CLF)—a common practice in the 1990s 
in the Project Coordination Branch of what was then the Department of 
Minerals and Energy. The revived forum was designed specifically to, in 
the words of one CA officer, ‘connect landowners and the government 
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representatives with the company present’.5 The quarterly meetings 
brought government representatives, company personnel and community 
leaders together in the company’s Base Camp to disseminate and discuss 
project-related information and, as it was described to me by one of the 
participants, ‘to agree on common issues and allow everyone to move 
forward’. The meetings were intended as mechanisms for transparency, 
disseminating information at the same time to the different stakeholder 
groups, and ensuring accountability in decision making and acting on 
items agreed upon during the meetings. For many community leaders 
the forum did indeed offer a rare chance to interact with government 
representatives, although the forum did not address the bigger issue of the 
absence of state functions.
Generally, the list of government invitees included district representatives 
from Ambunti-Dreikikir and Telefomin, and an MRA representative. 
Depending on specific agenda items, representatives of relevant provincial 
government divisions would sometimes also be asked to attend. The costs 
and logistics of their attendance at CLF were covered by the company, 
who flew them into the area on either the company’s fixed-wing charter or 
a chopper, and provided them with meals and accommodation in the Base 
Camp. This was a common arrangement for government representatives 
visiting the site. Often, on top of transport and accommodation, the 
representatives expected and received a daily stipend, to provide an 
additional incentive for travel to site. During the CLF, government 
representatives were encouraged to provide ward reports, speak about 
district priorities and provide updates on broadly conceived government 
issues. The invited representatives did not always come (on occasions 
leading the to the CLF being postponed or cancelled) and when they 
did, the level of their active participation in the meetings varied. Despite 
this, the company as well as community members spoke highly of the 
meetings and considered them to be the single most important stakeholder 
engagement mechanism at the project. A number of people I talked to 
in 2018 went a step further and described CLF as currently ‘the main 
political body’ for the Frieda River Project.
5  The company also meets with the two provincial governments and the MRA at the Joint 
Provincial Consultative Committee (JPCC) meetings. Held quarterly, usually shortly after the CLF, 
the JPCC meetings have been described to me as the ‘main vehicles for formal interaction between 
the company and government stakeholders’. JPCC meetings are held away from Frieda and do not 
include community participation.
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While stakeholders on all sides told me that the forum created a valuable 
platform for discussion, agreeing on action items and allocating 
responsibilities for their delivery, community members felt that of the 
three broad stakeholder groups they had the least influence over forum 
proceedings. To quote one community leader and a regular CLF attendee:
we develop agendas. The company asks us to. But the agenda 
does not have power—our points get missed out, rejected. Why? 
Because this is our thinking. But it is good to bring everyone in 
a meeting. We come from different places we need to get together.
Echoing this sentiment, another community representative told me:
the CLF discussion is generally good. But sometimes we just sit 
and listen to what the company has to say. This has been changing 
as we give feedback, but there is room for improvement. For 
example, the company and the government—they need to change 
how they listen to us.
When probed about the last part of his statement, that particular person 
explained to me that issues brought to the table by the company take 
priority over issues presented by community, the latter often falling off 
the table altogether. This is reflective of a conflict of interpretation about 
the nature of this type of forum among the different participating groups 
and individuals. While community representatives tend to see them as 
opportunities for discussion, expressing discontent and resolving conflicts, 
companies more often see this as the opportunity to ‘share information’ 
and ‘conduct awareness’, and such processes tend to entail a much more 
one-sided flow of information.
There was also the issue of efficacy of agreements made during the CLFs. 
‘Sometimes, decisions are made at the CLF regarding certain projects, 
but nothing happens—no power, talk only’, I heard in Paupe. Company 
representatives I spoke to about this told me that the meetings were 
established to move the project along a particular trajectory, set out by 
the requirements of government regulation and the company’s own 
business processes and procedures. Where the CA officers reject agenda 
items, it was because they felt that they were either not appropriate for 
the forum, or wrongly timed—with the most time-sensitive and pressing 
issues needing to take precedence. While they acknowledged the great 
importance of having good relationships with the impact communities 
and their leaders, the CAs were open about the fact that the directives 
they received clearly prioritised moving the project towards an SML 
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application. Ultimately, the forum was aimed at servicing the needs of 
the project, guided by the business rationality of the company. During 
my conversations with the CA officers, they spoke at length about how 
important it was that the government plays its role in the CLF and in the 
process of planning for a mine at Frieda, and how careful they had to be 
not to become a de facto government in the area. They also talked about 
the difficult task of trying to secure government’s active involvement and 
engagement with the local communities, especially in the context of poor 
accountability and evasion of responsibility for their well-being (cf. Golub 
and Rhee 2013). Community members as well as company staff described 
numerous instances of government representatives making a promise and 
committing to a task or a project, which was never delivered.
For the CA officers it was important that the government representatives 
made promises directly to community leaders. This way, if the promises 
were not kept, the government, not the company (or the CA officers, 
for that matter) were held accountable for the failures—a coping strategy 
in a difficult work context. In a mirror process, it was not uncommon 
for government representatives to exercise a ‘strategic absence’ and avoid 
the meetings in order to avoid accountability, especially if they felt they 
lacked the capacity or were, for any other reason, unable to perform tasks 
and duties required of them. Reflecting on the impact of the CLF on the 
relationship between communities and the government, one CA officer 
told me: ‘for people this is the only time they see the government. They 
out  their complaints, demands and expectations. But do not actually 
expect the government to fulfil them’. ‘No funding is their favourite 
excuse’, I heard some time later in Paupe. But by far the most common 
reaction to my questions about promises made by the government 
representatives during the CLF and the state’s involvement in delivery of 
services was a shrug of shoulders and the word maski (Tok Pisin for never 
mind, forget  about it) uttered under the breath—signalling a certain 
resignation to the absence of the state.
Refracted Responsibilities
Aside from trying to facilitate a relationship between the government and 
local communities, the company actively worked on establishing its own 
relationship with government agencies and representatives. It resisted 
taking on service delivery responsibilities, and what it saw as the role 
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of a ‘quasi-government’, but the CA officers felt that they did not have 
much choice if they wanted to maintain good relations with the impact 
communities, and to secure and maintain their support for the project. 
Over the years, the company made a concerted effort to collaborate with 
the government on facilitating access to basic services in the impact 
communities. For example, PanAust assisted the Telefolmin District 
Health division with delivery of quarterly health patrols in communities. 
This was one of few success stories. On many other occasions, company 
collaboration with government agencies encountered significant 
problems, like when the CA officers worked with communities to finance 
and erect a community clinic in Paupe. A government community health 
worker was brought in on a company charter plane to run and manage 
the facility. Although he was on the government payroll, he often did not 
receive payment for his work. He continued to fulfil his duties but was 
growing increasingly hesitant to do so. This was not the only instance 
where the government did not keep its side of the deal. As one CA officer 
explained to me ‘school funding faced [a] similar challenge. And then 
service providers—the health worker, the teachers—turn to the company 
for help’.6
While the high-level conversations between the company management 
and the national government happened away from Frieda, as the face 
of the company, time and time again the CA officers found themselves 
put on the spot during on-site meetings and gatherings. They spent a lot 
of their time managing community expectations, drawing lines in the 
sand to delineate their role from that of the government and encouraging 
communities to demand that the government provides them with basic 
services and fulfil its obligations to communities. ‘The government thinks 
that we can solve all its problems’; ‘The government is always two steps 
behind, not keeping up the pace’; ‘The government relies too heavily 
on the company to provide development assistance. It is not taking 
initiative’; ‘The government never played its role properly. As a result, 
the communities too are not being proactive with alternatives. They are 
just waiting for the company and the mine’. These are just some of the 
CA voices I heard which expressed frustration with the lack of active state 
involvement in services provision at Frieda.




Many company and government members I spoke to about the 
government’s dependency on the company to fulfil some of its roles and 
responsibilities referred to the lack of government capacity to provide 
infrastructure and services to communities in the Frieda area, rather than 
the government’s bad intentions or lack of willingness to do so. Some of 
my company interlocutors linked this to the weakness of the national 
government and saw this incapacity being passed down through all levels 
of state governance:
The governments know that it is their job, but they lack the 
resources, the manpower. They always thank us. They are very 
appreciative. They know that we are doing what they should be 
doing. But they lack the capacity and resources and as a result 
the company finds that it must provide services it really shouldn’t 
have to.
Others were less sympathetic, of the opinion that the government 
purposefully took a step back and let the company fill the gap in 
providing services and development assistance to the local communities: 
‘The [company] feels compelled—it has no choice.’ Sitting down for 
an interview with another, cup of tea in hand, I recorded him express 
a frustration echoed in many of the interviews I conducted with the 
company’s on-site personnel: ‘Government participation at early stages 
is lacking. CAs are caught in between. They cannot speak for the 
government. They should not have to.’ Trapped in the state’s strategic 
absence, CA officers have become reluctant policy brokers.
A number of district and provincial government representatives admitted 
that they depended on the company’s assistance to bring development 
not  only to the impact communities, but also to the two affected 
provinces.  ‘We are very remote here, we don’t have development. With 
the mine, the company will bring the money for development’, one of 
them told me. ‘We understand the problems associated with mining 
projects and the impact it will have on the [Sepik] River. But if we don’t 
get major  development in the province, where do we get the money 
to help people?’, I heard another official ask on a different occasion. 
Representatives of the national government shared this anticipation and 
also hoped to precipitate development of a mine at Frieda. As one MRA 
officer explained to me:
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The national government has one hope—for the project to 
develop as a mine. We are asking, preaching, hoping—when will 
it happen? When will the company submit the SML application? 
We are waiting happy to grant the lease. We are waiting for the 
economic impact and development.7
Mind the Gap(s)
Despite being host to numerous mining projects, and notwithstanding 
the industry’s dominant presence in the national economy, PNG offers 
a challenging operating environment for mining companies. Upon 
arrival, companies find themselves caught up between what Emma 
Gilberthorpe and Glenn Banks (2012: 188) identified as the ‘weak state’ 
and the ‘powerful local’ and become ‘entangled in a range of pre-existing 
local, regional and national political plays’ over which they have little 
control. The weak state is incapable of regulating not just the corporation 
involved (see Wesley-Smith 1990; Toft 1997; and Walton 2015), but also 
the landowning communities with which companies find themselves 
entangled. As a result, I was told at the PNG Chamber of Mines and 
Petroleum—the peak representative body for the extractive industries—
companies in PNG find themselves ‘operating against a backdrop of bad 
governance and ever growing community expectations’. In academic 
as well as public discourse, the country is often described in terms of a 
failed state, affected by the so-called resource curse (Ballard and Banks 
2003), which has been linked to factors such as government’s incapacity 
to distribute benefits to the people (Jackson 1991, and Main, Chapter 
5, this volume); underperformance of state institutions (Genasci and 
Pray 2008); disconnect between national-level decision makers and 
society (Collier 2008); and the government’s preoccupation with distant 
opportunities over locally defined social and economic goals (Connell 
and Howitt 1991). These macro-level assessments (see Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis 2015) judge the government’s performance against the 
7  This is not to suggest that there were no people in both provinces who opposed the Frieda 
River Project. While their views were reflected by the provincial representatives, their arguments 
were generally overshadowed by the desperate need for basic services and infrastructure in the 
two provinces, emphasised by the government’s self-admitted reliance on the industry to deliver 
‘development’ to the region. The level of opposition increased in 2018 when the developer announced 
major changes in the design of the project, and further in 2019 following the company’s publication 
of an Environmental Impact Statement for the Frieda River Project (see Skrzypek 2020).
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expectation of state function, and the promise it made at independence to 
strategically engage the mining industry with the aim of securing positive 
development outcomes for the country and its people.
At a micro-level, my hosts in Paupe tended to describe their relationship 
with the government in terms of absences and deficiencies. The fact that 
Frieda River is not an operating mine but an advanced mineral exploration 
project means that the area has not yet experienced the entrenched 
negative localised impacts present at the many mines operating across 
the country.8 However, the way in which the government is experienced 
by community and company stakeholders in the project location already 
points to performance and capacity gaps commonly associated with the 
resource curse, judged against categorical prescriptions of the role of the 
state as a regulator for the industry, and provider of services, infrastructure 
and effective governance for its people. The Paiyamo talked about the 
government that has forgotten them, that never came to see them. They 
also spoke of the government’s failure to deliver and maintain basic services 
and the ease with which it made promises, which, the Paiyamo learned 
over time, it almost never kept. Desire for services and infrastructure and 
high expectations of ‘development’ which formed at Frieda in the decades 
since independence meant that there were numerous gaps between what 
they understood the role of the government to be, and the government’s 
performance against this role. The way in which the categorical presence of 
the government in the process of planning for a mine at Frieda contrasted 
with its interpersonal absence further exacerbated the situation, creating 
in Paupe a sense of the government’s presence most strongly experienced 
through its absence. The Paiyamo saw the mining company as a way 
of filling this gap, at least insofar as it demonstrated through securing 
access to what they came to see as indicators of development—services, 
infrastructure, learning and earning opportunities. They considered their 
ability to form interpersonal relations with company representatives 
as a crucially important part of this process, with the ultimate goal of 
leveraging those relations to precipitate a mine at Frieda. Despite their 
difficult experiences of gavman to date they hoped that, once the mine 
starts operating, the gavman will step up and become more actively 
involved in ‘looking after its people and communities’. In spite of decades 
of engagement and exploration, they have not yet succeeded in this task.
8  See, for example, Golub (2014) on Porgera; Bainton (2010) on Lihir; and Kirsch (2014) on 
Ok Tedi.
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Conclusions
Stakeholder categories are based on a series of assumptions and 
expectations about their nature and effect. Governance mechanisms 
commonly used to guide stakeholder engagement in resource extraction 
projects further reinforce such categorical prescriptions. On face value at 
least, categorical models of stakeholder relations are grounded in a belief 
that, in entering into a relationship, the stakeholders accept roles assigned 
to them by the model, and further that they have the capacity required 
to enact them and achieve the desired effect. For example, the popular 
triad stakeholder model reflects a belief that, as a regulator and a main 
service provider, the state can and will regulate the industry, and provide 
services for its people. Furthermore, engrained in categorical models is the 
implication that stakeholders representing different categories have the 
means of holding the others accountable for their performance against 
their designated roles and responsibilities. To that end, such models 
tend to reflect an erroneous assumption that power inequalities can be 
treated as externalities, painting a deceptively apolitical picture of highly 
politicised relations and dependencies.
Conceptually, the models stipulate that if all stakeholders enact their 
categorical roles and meet conditions of their categorical relations, the 
process will succeed. In the ethnographic example presented here, this 
success is anticipated to take form of the Frieda River Mine. However, like 
any attempt at categorisation and standardisation, such models ‘assume 
a set of conditions that do not exist in most of the world’ (Newell 2005: 
556). Once the categorical stakeholder model is enacted in a real-life 
scenario of a resource exploration (or extraction) project, categories are 
exposed to power inequalities, different world-views, political relations, 
personal interpretations and a range of other socioeconomic forces, 
which the conceptual models push aside or hide. What emerges is a form 
of dissonance which questions prescriptive categories on the basis of 
enactment and effect of those; and forces some or all of the stakeholders to 
revise their understandings of their roles and responsibilities at the project.
Cognitive dissonance theory helps us explore how people deal with 
uncertainty, making it useful for thinking through impacts and implications 
of resource exploration projects characterised by prolepsis, anticipation 
and desires to effect and affect the future (see Minnegal and Dwyer 2017; 
and Skrzypek 2020). In cognitive dissonance theory, when there is an 
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inconsistency between attitudes or behaviours, something must change to 
eradicate the disharmony (Festinger 1957). In a similar way, categorical 
dissonance stipulates that where there emerges inconsistency between 
expectations of roles and their enactments, something must change 
to alleviate the tension and eliminate the risk of project failure. At  the 
Frieda River Project, members of local communities saw the potential 
future mine as a pathway to development, a ‘modern road to cargo’. 
They associated the mine with industrial development, but even more so 
with civic infrastructure and widespread access to education, services and 
earning opportunities. Their expectations were high, having grown over 
time, fuelled by generous promises made by early exploration companies 
who sought to secure access to their land for exploration and, when the 
time comes, mining purposes. Government representatives visiting the 
area not only encouraged but actively partook in this imagery of mining 
as a pathway to development and a road to wealth and cargo. As described 
early on in this chapter, the country has a long history of deficiencies in 
service delivery and high levels of dependency on the extractive industries 
for both national economic growth and localised forms of development. 
In anticipation of a large-scale mine, in the Frieda River area, as in many 
other resource-rich parts of the country, the government has largely 
abdicated its service and infrastructure delivery responsibilities, refracting 
them instead onto resource extraction companies.
The ethnographic material presented here described dissonance created 
by expectations of the state’s function and the government’s performance 
against that role; the gap formed by its categorical presence and 
interpersonal absence from the project area; and the company’s response to 
local communities’ and the government’s expectations of service delivery 
assistance. The company resisted becoming a ‘quasi-government’ and felt 
that was not part of its role as the project’s key investor and operator. 
However, in order to maintain local communities’ and the government’s 
support, its representatives felt that they had no choice but to alter what 
they saw as the boundaries of the company’s role and, consequently, 
behaviour at the Frieda River Project. The company took on some of 
the state’s service delivery responsibilities, and facilitated the relationship 
between the government and communities, thus mediating the failure 
and absence of the government from the local nexus of relations, and 
from the service delivery landscape. It did not do so because it wanted 
to—the company’s ideas about community development and engagement 
programs saw their function as ‘in extension’ rather than ‘in place’ of 
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government provision of basic services. The company took on elements 
of the role of the state because this allowed it to advance its interests and 
fulfil its primary role—as a commercial business and project developer.
Such corrective behaviour associated with categorical dissonance brings 
to light critical limitations of oversimplified stakeholder models, which 
assume conditions that do not exist in the lived experiences of stakeholders 
in resource contexts. In this case, the company’s behaviour responded to 
state absences and pointed to gaps between prescriptions and expectations 
of the state role at the project, and the government’s performance against 
those. However, rather than exposing the shortcomings of the model, 
and holding the government accountable for its failure to fulfil its 
obligations, the company provided it with a self-correction mechanism. 
Its actions meant that the government’s demonstrated absence and 
underperformance against its prescribed stakeholder role was mediated, as 
the developer filled the very gaps that could have threatened the future of 
the project. As a result, while the company and the Paiyamo faced ongoing 
tension and conflict over the allocation of responsibilities, viewed from a 
distance, the demands of the categorical model were met, and the project 
could continue moving forward towards the desired effect—the Frieda 
River Mine.
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‘Restraint without Control’: 
Law and Order in Porgera and 
Enga Province, 1950–2015
Alex Golub
The clans are fighting a mile away.
They paint their faces, wear bits of grass and bark
to tell us this is happening at an earlier time.
Do not believe it, this is wishful thinking;
they wear suits and conquer the centuries
by aircraft. In capital cities
they shake each others hands, careless
of what smears them.
They are what old men fearing, feared to predict.
‘Lambchops in PNG’ (Markham 1985)
Introduction
On 6 November 1884, Commodore James Erskine hoisted the Union Jack 
over Port Moresby and declared British New Guinea to be a protectorate 
of the British empire. At the ceremony, he promised the Motu-speaking 
men assembled there that:
Evil disposed men will not be permitted to occupy your Country, 
to seize your lands, or to take away from your homes … Your lands 
will be secured to you. Your wives and children will be protected. 
Should any injury be done to you, you will immediately inform 
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Her Majesty’s Officers who will reside amongst you, and they will 
hear your complaints and do justice … You will all keep peace 
among yourselves, and if you have disputes with each other you 
will bring them before the Queen’s Officers, who will settle them 
for you without bloodshed. (Biskup et al. 1968: 56–7)
Wolfers describes Erskine’s policy as one of ‘restraint without control’ 
(1975: 13). On the one hand, the British administration sought to make 
the colony ‘attractive to white settlers and entrepreneurs exercising their 
undoubted rights’ (MacWilliam 2013: 24–5) to make a profit in Papua, 
assuming that the ‘immanent, spontaneous development led by private 
firms and expatriate planters’ would transform British New Guinea into 
‘a  profitable (colonial) possession’ (ibid.: 17), to the presumed benefit 
of everyone, including Melanesians. On the other hand, as a sign of 
its enlightened paternalism, ‘the protectorate administration  …  was 
empowered by law only to control the entry of foreigners to the area, and 
to legislate only for its non-indigenous population’ (Wolfers 1975: 14) 
and would restrain ‘the depredations of the British fortune- soul-
and adventure-seekers’ (ibid.: 14–15) without unduly controlling the 
Indigenous population.
Erskine promised, in essence, that the presence of the state would benefit 
the people of what is now Papua New Guinea (PNG). This chapter 
uses historical anthropology (Sahlins 1985) to describe the historical 
transformations of Erskine’s promise and to analyse the role it plays 
in PNG today. In particular, it examines the history of ‘restraint’ and 
‘control’ in Enga Province, PNG, from 1950 to 2015. Erskine’s promise, 
although made far from Enga and decades before government would 
reach the highlands, is key to understanding the post–Second World War 
history of PNG because it was the historical precedent that grounded 
the state’s legitimacy for both the colonial and postcolonial governments 
of PNG. This chapter describes how violence, policing and governance 
changed over time in central Enga, where Wabag, the provincial capital, 
is located. It then examines continuities and differences between central 
Enga and the Porgera valley in the western half of the province where a 
large gold mine operated by the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) is located. 
The chapter argues that in contemporary Enga the relationship between 
restraint and control is the reverse of Erskine’s vision. Rather than the 
government protecting Melanesians from global capitalism, in Porgera 
today the government protects global capitalism from Melanesians. 
Where once the government aspired to restrain foreign business without 
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controlling the population, today the government exercises little control 
over mine employees even as it seeks to restrain Papua New Guineans who 
act against the PJV’s interests.
This chapter takes up this volume’s focus on the state’s absent presence by 
examining the role restraint and control have played in realising Erskine’s 
promise. Erskine’s vision is essentially a nineteenth-century liberal one of 
restrained government: that a limited government would protect lives and 
properties while allowing the market to create a spontaneous order which 
enabled prosperity and growth. Present to protect Melanesians from 
dangers of alcohol and indentured servitude, it would restrain itself from 
imposing in their customary life, but preserve their ownership of land and 
guarantee their personal safety. Thus the state was present in some areas of 
activities but absent in others.
The governments which followed sought to fulfil Erskine’s promise, 
but used different means to achieve it. Both the postwar Australian 
administration and the independent state of PNG pursued 
a developmentalist agenda (Ferns 2020) which actively intervened in life 
in Enga. Theirs was an order-making project (Golub 2018) that sought 
to routinise and regulate life. Most obviously, ‘control’ meant controlling 
outbreaks of violence and bringing peace. But it also manifested itself in 
subtler ways. The construction and maintenance of schools, roads and 
hospitals required transformations in senses of time and labour. Protecting 
the rights of women meant intervening in the ‘private’ domain of the 
family. Agricultural officers would teach people new ways of farming, 
transforming nutrition and diet. Control, not restraint, was the means by 
which the government sought to fulfil Erskine’s promise. As we shall see, 
in Enga the government has failed to achieve many of the goals it has set 
for itself. In this sense, it is an ‘absent presence’ in that its promises to be 
present, to control and regulate life, are too often honoured in the breach 
rather than the observance.
But this chapter challenges the concept of the state as an ‘absent presence’ 
as well. While broad historical narratives must necessarily involve 
collective actors such as ‘the state’ and ‘society’ or ‘the mine’ and ‘the 
community’, this chapter will argue that an accurate understanding of 
history cannot take these actors for granted. Using the approach I have 
followed elsewhere (Golub 2014), I will demonstrate how history is not 
really made up of these collective actors, but rather of networks of people 
who appear in different times and different situations as personating one 
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or the other of these entities. A full history of Enga requires understanding 
how at times ‘the government’ and ‘clans’ overlap, just as ‘the police’ and 
‘mine security’ interpenetrate.
Decomposing these corporate actors contributes not only to the history 
of PNG, but to broader social scientific work on ‘the resource curse’ and 
‘resource conflict’. It is easy to write particularistic histories of individual 
resource projects, just as it is easy to produce highly abstract, schematic 
models of resource conflicts. But it is much more difficult to produce 
‘middle range’ (Tilly 2010) theories of resource conflict which engage in 
comparison and make generalisations about cases without losing track 
of the historical uniqueness of each one. This chapter aims to show how 
a historical anthropology which decomposes corporate actors might help 
make this middle range theory possible. In doing so, it attempts to answer 
Le Billon’s call for ‘“thick” historical and geographical contextualisation, 
relating the past to the present, as well as resource locales to places of 
belonging and spaces of social relations’ (Le Billon 2014: 57–8).
The main body of this chapter is split into two primary sections. In the 
first, I describe state governance and tribal fighting in central Enga 
Province from 1950 to the mid-1990s. In doing so, I take issue with one 
common narrative of the history of Enga and of PNG more generally. 
I will call this a ‘degenerationist’ narrative (Golub 2014: 169–70) similar 
to the ‘discourse of abjection’ that Bashkow notes (Bashkow 2006: 231). 
This is, in essence, a narrative of successful control, a claim that Australia 
developed PNG and brought peace and government to the country, but 
that after independence the country went backwards. A good example of 
this narrative can be found in the comments of the YouTube video ‘Tribal 
Conflict in Papua New Guinea | On The Frontline’:
PNG under Australian administration, life was pretty close to 
normal. Tribal conflicts were extinguished quickly. Small police 
stations scattered throughout the highlands kept an eye out for 
trouble. Riot squad was stationed in the highlands and a backup 
unit in the capital, Port Moresby. Back up squad could be 
deployed at a moment’s notice to hot spots. All weapons were 
seized/destroyed. Those involved were sent to prison to face 
judgement. Police regularly visited places searching /seizing/
destroying confiscated weapons. Locals started to respect law and 
order, mediation was encouraged. After independence, the png 
government closed all regional stations, not sure what happened 
to the riot squad. PNG government past/present offer very little to 
regional areas unfortunately. (comment on ICRC 2017)
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In the first section of this chapter, I will claim that key aspects of this 
narrative are incorrect. The Australian administration never devoted the 
resources necessary to police Enga adequately. It is true that there was 
a decrease in violence in Enga after the administration arrived, but this 
was due to Engans, not the administration, who ‘self-pacified’ for roughly 
a decade between 1955 and 1965 due to a temporary enthusiasm for state 
governance. Disillusion with the administration and other factors led to 
a growth in fighting prior to independence. In Enga, the breakdown in law 
and order was not something that Papua New Guineans created, it was 
something they inherited from the Australians. During the independence 
period, tribal conflict increased as different groups attempted to control 
the spoils system of governance that took hold in the province. Policing 
in Enga, before and after independence, was often both illiberal and 
ineffective. Restraint without control has been a hallmark of governance 
in Enga during both the Australian and independence period. In its 
unfulfilled promises, the state has been both present and absent in Enga.
Using this discussion of central Enga as context, the second section of 
this chapter examines the history of Porgera from the mid-1980s to 
2015. This  section examines the growth of violence and disorder that 
accompanied the creation and operation of the Porgera Gold Mine. It tests 
two more hypotheses that circulate in the public sphere about Porgera. 
The first one, which might be associated with mine management, claims 
that Porgera is a ‘rough neighbourhood’ and that violence and disorder 
are cultural norms for which the mine cannot be blamed. Second, there 
is the ‘resource conflict’ hypothesis, which argues that in Porgera, as in 
so many other resource projects, it is the presence of the mine which 
induces conflict. The evidence in this section shows that both hypotheses 
explain some of the historical evidence for Porgera, but are insufficient 
alone. The ‘rough neighbourhood’ model does not capture the way that 
social change—including that created by the mine—has amplified the 
negative aspects of Engan culture. The ‘resource conflict’ model, on the 
other hand, cannot see how police and PJV violence is a transformation 
of the illiberal policing tactics which have been the historical norm in the 
valley. Disorder in Porgera is not new: it is an amplified version of existing 
trends in Enga.
Finally, this chapter intentionally dwells on the some of the most troubling 
aspects of life in Enga so as to understand them and, hopefully, form 
some small part of a solution to them. I want to note at the beginning of 
this chapter, therefore, that there are many dedicated police officers and 
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mine employees who do their best to act ethically, just as there are many 
Papua New Guineans who abhor war and seek peace. There have also 
been numerous attempts at conflict mediation over the decades in Enga 
and Porgera as well. For reasons of length and analytic focus this chapter 
does not focus on these people, but I want to emphasise at the outset 
that I recognise their existence and contributions. While I focus on the 
negative parts of life in the province, the reader should not develop an 
overly negative view of Enga and Porgera.
Enga and the ‘Pax Australiana’
Enga Province is part of the Highlands Region of PNG (Figure  3.1). 
This chapter focuses on two areas of the province. First I examine what 
I call ‘central Enga’, or the area around Wabag, the capital of the province. 
Second, I will focus on the Porgera Valley, which is in the far west of 
the province. Unusually for PNG, Engans consider themselves to be 
part of a single ethnolinguistic group (the largest in the country) whose 
boundaries are coterminous with their province—a unique political and 
ethnic unit. Porgerans, who speak a language called ‘Ipili’ by linguists, are 
often seen as a separate group. In fact, linguists and anthropologists view 
this area to be characterised by interconnection than clear separation. 
‘Engan’ appears to be a series of closely related dialect chains which 
stretch across the province rather than a single language. Porgerans and 
their ‘Engan’ neighbours in Laiagam have more in common linguistically 
than people from Laiagam would have with Engan speakers on the other 
side of the province. Historically, the area was characterised by a complex 
system of migrating and intermarried social groups rather than bounded 
and localised ethnic groups and these connections continue to this day. 
In fact, the ethnonyms ‘Porgeran’ and ‘Engan’ developed in the 1950s and 
are not endogenous to the area. This is not to gainsay the identity claims 
of any particular group. On the contrary I will use terms like ‘Engan’ and 
‘Porgerans’ throughout this chapter. But it is important to understand 
that behind this useful shorthand is a more complicated ethnolinguistic 
situation which will become relevant in different contexts in the chapter, 
especially as I tack between the history of central Enga and Porgera.
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Figure 3.1 Enga Province
Source: Map by Nelson Minar with data from OpenStreetMap, Humanitarian Data 
Exchange, OpenDEM, and SRTM. openstreetmap.org/copyright
While a few early exploratory patrols by miners and government officers 
began entering Enga in the early 1930s, it was not really until after the 
Second World War that outside powers seriously attempted governing 
what is now Enga Province. In the late 1940s Enga fell within the Trust 
Territory of New Guinea, which was administered by the Australian 
government on behalf of the United Nations. The Australian territory of 
Papua would later merge with the Trust Territory of New Guinea to form 
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea in 1975, which was also 
governed by Australia, but under a different administration.
The nature of Erskine’s promise had shifted in the postwar period. 
Administration policy in this period was overseen by Paul Hasluck, who 
sought ‘uniform development’ to bring the highlands region the same level 
of administration of government services as the coast, which had a much 
longer history of entanglement with the global system (Hasluck 1976; 
MacWilliam 2013). The administration sought to control and develop 
areas, not merely to restrain bad behaviour and trust in spontaneous 
development. The result was what some authors have seen as ‘acceptable 
colonialism’ or ‘administrative colonialism’ (Hawksley 2007), a form of 
colonialism that would lead to development. In terms of policing, this 
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meant pacification and the creation of law and order, a situation frequently 
described in the literature of this period as the ‘Pax Australiana’ on par 
with the Pax Britannica or Pax Romana of the past.
And yet, from the beginning the New Guinea administration was 
remarkably understaffed. In 1948–49 the territory was roughly 
250,000 square kilometres and home to 1 million people (UN 1951: 8) 
but was policed by just 22 white officers and 1,236 New Guinean 
policemen (Kituai 1998: 45). This was an all-time high. In 1927–28 
there were just 10 white officers and 588 police in New Guinea (ibid.). 
So, despite Erskine’s promise, the Australian government never produced 
a police force sufficient to protect Papua New Guinean property and 
safety. At the same time, it could not project sufficient force to dispossess 
Papua New Guineans of their lands and property. The relatively benign 
nature of Australian colonialism in PNG was as much a result of a lack of 
capacity as it was of good intentions. The state was ‘absent’ in PNG long 
before independence.
Enga was originally part of the Western Highlands province and was 
declared ‘uncontrolled’ (later this category was changed to ‘restricted’) and 
off-limits to foreigners on the assumption that they could both harm and 
be harmed by highlanders if they ventured into the area. The government 
centre of this section of the Western Highlands was Wabag, an area that 
had first served as a staging ground for the large ‘Hagen-Sepik Patrol’ of 
1938–39 (Gammage 1998). In 1941 it was repurposed as a patrol post 
with an expatriate ‘kiap’, or patrol officer, stationed there (Lakau 1988: 84). 
Land was not alienated there for a government station until 1949 (ibid.). 
Government during this period took the form of patrols from Wabag to 
neighbouring areas, during which government patrols would attempt 
to census the population, resolve disputes peacefully and administer basic 
healthcare. Over time the government would open additional patrol posts 
and derestrict the areas around the patrol posts until, segment by segment, 
they had the entire highlands under their control.
Conflict was a part of the situation which Australian officials encountered. 
All sources agree that in precolonial Enga, violence and fighting were 
common but not highly culturally valued by most people. Wiessner 
and colleagues summarise this view when they write that ‘in Enga oral 
history, there was never a time before war’ but that ‘historical traditions 
do not glorify war, but describe it as an unfortunate last resort when 
problems could not be solved by other means’ (Wiessner et al. 2016: 164). 
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A common cause of war was ‘to re-establish the balance of power and 
respect between clans after insult or injury so that exchange could flow’ 
(ibid.: 165). Warfare was a topic of ambivalence, in that it was destructive 
and inhibited the flow of wealth, but it also provided an opportunity for 
young men to demonstrate their bravery and for the clan to reinforce its 
solidarity. Confusingly, the Enga unit of customary social organisation 
known as tata is often translated into English as ‘clan’ even though the 
conflict between them is often referred to as ‘tribal’ fighting.
Overall, casualties were low and there was not a great deal of training 
for warriors, songs glorifying combat and death, and so forth. As in 
much of the highlands, prosperity and wealth were highly valued, not 
one’s reputation as a warrior. It is no surprise, then, that the arrival of the 
government in the 1950s began a relatively speedy process of ‘pacification’, 
in which fighting declined markedly and people became fascinated with 
the arrival of white men and what the administration could mean for their 
history. In a remarkable piece of early opinion polling, Spruth found that 
in 1968 ‘97 per cent of people agreed with the statement, “I think the 
government should stay here always,” (katawaka katapyali lao masilya)’ 
(Spruth 1968: 6). Peace was a central benefit of the arrival of government. 
‘The Enga people feel good about and recognise the value of the peace 
bought by the administration. Particularly in private interviews this was 
seen as one of the most important things that administration had done 
and the door through which many other good things have come’ Spruth 
wrote, and ‘99% of the people believe that fighting would break out all 
over if the government was to depart’ (ibid.: 7). A similar poll showed that 
42 per cent of people felt that the main work of the government was to 
‘keep peace’ (the runner-up, at 21 per cent, was ‘to get money’) (Lutz and 
Rivers 1968: 6).
Most writers of this period agree that it was Engans, not kiaps, who 
stopped the fighting. Wormsley and Toke noted in the 1980s that 
‘increasing violence is the trend and the period following pacification was 
the anomaly’ (Wormsley and Toke 1985: 63). According to them, it was a 
‘fiction’ that ‘pacification was achieved at the hands of the kiaps and that 
fighting ceased. Reality suggests that Enga took a step back, viewed what 
the government offered, and agreed to give the government an opportunity 
to deal with disputes’ (ibid.). When it was discovered that ‘what the 
government offered was inadequate  …  the Enga  …  simply reverted 
to their own tried and true techniques of dispute settlement’  (ibid.). 
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Gordon and Kipalan agree: ‘Law and Order [sic] was achieved, despite 
acts of intimidation against them, through the active cooperation and 
collaboration of the Engas’ (1982: 332).
Why did Engans embrace the administration? Access to wealth and 
prosperity were key. As we have seen, Engans do not value warfare and 
aggression. Peace was in accordance with Engan values as an end in itself. 
Another central Engan value is generating wealth and prosperity through 
trade and exchange with wealthy external sources, such as trading partners 
in the large-scale exchange ceremonials known as tee. Peace furthered 
this cause. As Gordon and Kipalan point out, the most desired forms of 
wealth were manufactured goods, whose distribution was controlled by 
the administration. They quote someone (identified only as ‘an old Enga’) 
as saying:
The first ‘kiaps’ gave beads, salt, steel-axes—everyone wanted it 
so they all followed the ‘kiap’ and stopped fighting. They stopped 
fighting because the ‘kiap’ told them to and they obeyed because 
they did not want to lose the source of these things. (Gordon and 
Kipalan 1982: 333)
In sum, peace was in accordance with Engan values and interests, and 
kiaps had a near monopoly on manufactured goods.
This golden age of harmony did not last long. Spruth and Lutz’s early 
opinion polling work was presented in 1968. And yet, ‘by the early 1970s, 
the Australian administration believed it was facing a rapidly deteriorating 
law-and-order situation’ (Gordon and Meggitt 1985: 27). From February 
1972 to February 1973, 17 ‘large riots’ occurred in Enga which killed 
20, wounded ‘hundreds’ and did ‘untold damage’ to ‘gardens, cash crops, 
and buildings’ (MacKellar 1975: 215).1 A sign of the seriousness of the 
situation was the commissioning on 20  December 1972 of a special 
committee to study tribal fighting in the highlands (GPNG 1973: 1). 
As  the decade continued, Engans had adapted to the incursions of the 
mobile squads of police by learning to exploit the patterns of response 
‘including counteracting tear gas canisters by throwing them back at 
the police or covering them in mud’ (Gordon and Meggitt 1985: 31). 
1  Throughout this chapter I use terms such as ‘riots’ or ‘mobs’ following the terminology of the 
authors I am quoting. These are not terms of art for me.
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In 1979 the Enga provincial government declared a state of emergency 
after a policeman was killed in revenge after an Engan died in prison 
(ibid.: 34). By this time, one report noted that:
tribal fighting on a vast scale has completely paralysed the 
Enga … the field service has all but disintegrated in this province, 
and the police there have for the best part of three years been 
almost powerless. They repeatedly express themselves unable to 
find or arrest the accused, or to bring witnesses to court. In these 
circumstances the Law does not run. (Gordon and Meggitt 
1985: 18–19)
Given these facts, it is hard to see a decline in law and order from the 
‘Australian’ period to independence. Self-government was achieved in 
PNG on 1 December 1973. Nineteen days later, the Paney Commission 
on tribal fighting was formed. It appears that tribal fighting was escalating 
even as Australia was preparing to withdraw from the country. One can 
hardly say, then, that Australia had Enga under control when it handed 
the province over to the newly independent state of PNG. Nor could one 
say that police in this period had a high standard of conduct from which 
the post-independence police force would fall. There have been numerous 
government attempts at various culturally appropriate grassroots projects 
to restore law and order throughout the province (e.g. Young 2004). 
However, this should not give the impression that policing as a whole 
in Enga has always strictly adhered to international best practices in 
human rights—while Edward LiPuma is doubtless right that ‘there is 
no … Australian Cortez’ and that ‘few peoples of Melanesia have felt the 
exercise of power in its most crushing, overt, agentive mode’ (2000: 24).
The Australian administration relied on illiberal modes of justice, just as 
the PNG government would. Despite Erskine’s promise, Native Regulation 
Acts were in force in both Papua and New Guinea which deprived 
Indigenous people of many basic human rights. The ‘traditional method 
of stopping fighting’ used by police was by ‘taking pigs and women as 
hostages’, at least until courts declared such activity unconstitutional in 
1979 (Gordon and Meggitt 1985: 31). The Paney report on tribal fighting 
recommended group punishment (GPNG 1973: 30) and a majority of its 
members recommend hanging as punishment for murder to disincentivise 
violence (ibid.: 15). Other suggested innovations included ‘reversing the 
onus of proof ’ (ibid.: 29) (that is, assuming people to be guilty of tribal 
fighting until proved innocent), and group punishment (making all 
members of a group guilty for the action of one of its members) (ibid.: 29). 
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These recommendations were implemented in the Inter-Group Fighting 
Act 1977, which allowed the government to declare areas ‘fight zones’, 
and to make any attempt to prepare for fighting or to incite fighting in 
such zones illegal (Gordon and Meggitt 1985: 31–2). The law was later 
overturned as unconstitutional.
Clans and the Government after 
Independence
In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s conflict continued in Enga 
Province even as the province elected its first leaders and created an 
Indigenous provincial civil service. Daniel Kumbon writes that during 
the 1980s ‘there was a widespread breakdown in law and order. Tribal 
warfare, armed robbery, rape and other social problems reached high 
levels as government services deteriorated. Intense politics and deep-
rooted corruption took centre stage’ (Kumbon 2017: 41). A large grant 
from the World Bank funded and integrated development programs in 
Enga which included a report on ‘law and order’. In the course of three 
years it ‘observed and recorded the details of eighty-five tribal fights’ and 
developed ‘incomplete profiles on another twenty fights’ (Wormsley and 
Toke 1985: 49). Enga also developed a reputation for violence, fighting 
and corruption in this period. The Law and Order Project reports 49 
headlines appeared in the press between January 1981 and June 1985 
which featured headlines such as ‘clansman axed to death’, ‘chopped to 
death’, ‘police harass Enga villagers’ and ‘police burn down huts in Enga’ 
(Wormsley and Toke 1985: 21). It should be noted that Enga was not 
alone in seeing a rise of crime in this period. Law and order were issues 
around the country, a situation reflected in the fact that a national law and 
order study was also commissioned and completed in this period (Clifford 
et al. 1984).
There were many causes of conflict in this period, only some of which 
were novel. Historical enmities remained. Wormsley and Toke, the authors 
of the Law and Order report, note that ‘one fight is estimated possibly 
to be as long-lived as one hundred sixty years, based on oral histories 
and conflicting claims to occupation’ (1985: 59). Kundapen Talyaga, an 
Engan scholar and public servant, argues that the presence of alcohol and 
the degeneration of traditional forms of control resulted in more fighting 
(Talyaga 1982). Wormsley and Toke point out that these incidents 
85
3. ‘RESTRAINT WITHOUT CONTROL’
always take place in the context of clan affiliations and past clan histories 
(1985: 61). As a result a single drunken incident can reignite pre-existing 
grudges and mobilise an entire clan. Indeed, given how ineffective the 
government has historically been at settling disputes, ‘Engas conceive of 
fights not as problems (or crimes) but as a solution to other problems and 
not as threats to order but attempts to restore order’ (Wormsley and Toke 
1985: 61). ‘Engans,’ the report notes, ‘recognise impotence when they 
see it’ (ibid.).
Changing relations to wealth also shifted in this period, and this in turn 
shaped conflict. As Engans became integrated into the global economy 
the government lost its monopoly on imported goods, giving it less 
ability to control fighting by controlling the flow of wealth. Moreover, 
the greatest source of wealth was control of government funds, resources 
and positions, which were provided by the funding the province received 
directly from the national government. By the early 1990s, Harry Derkley 
could write that:
Provincial government … functions as an arena where the furious 
contest between clans for the spoils of government—jobs, cash, 
houses, vehicles—continues unabated. It is often only the threat 
of total loss of control of the source of these goods by the ultimate 
sanction—suspension of provincial government—which serves to 
preserve a facade of legality and adherence to ‘proper procedure’. 
(Derkley 1997: 142)
Derkley’s comments are consistent with contemporary observers, who 
described democratic politics as a contest between the haves and have-
nots, or rather ‘those who eat and those who don’t eat’ (Lakane and 
Gibbs 2003; Kanaparo n.d.). In a serious sense, in post-independence 
PNG the government did not govern Engans, but rather the other way 
around. Gordon and Kipalan write that ‘in Enga it appears that the state 
is being held at spear-point by pre-capitalist forces’ (Gordon and Kipalan 
1982: 334).
In 1973 Enga was established as an ‘area authority’, a transitional 
administrative structure which was governed by a white colonial 
official and a selected group of Engans nominated by Indigenous Local 
Government Counselors and approved by the administration (Scott and 
Pitzz 1982: 280). The next year Enga was established as a district separate 
from Western Highlands. This district then became a province of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea in 1975. Leadership was still 
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provided by the area authority figures, who in 1978 were appointed as the 
Interim Provincial Government until 1980, when the first elections were 
held (Scott and Pitzz 1982: 280).
It was in this period that concerns about ‘corruption’ increased in Enga. 
In 1984 PNG’s auditor-general found ‘gross financial mismanagement’ 
in the province’s accounting systems, and the premier of the province, 
Danley Tindiwi, was jailed for misappropriation (Dorney 2000: 238) and 
the provincial government was suspended from February 1984 to March 
1986 (GPNG 1987: 25). In May 1986 a new provincial assembly was 
sworn in, with Ned Laina as the new premier. In retribution, supporters 
of the losing candidate in the election burned down the administrative 
headquarters along with eight motor vehicles, resulting in a half million 
kina worth of damages (Dorney 2000: 254). In the 1987 national election, 
Malipu Balakau unseated Paul Torato, only to be shot in June 1988 
in what many considered a payback killing. In the rioting and looting 
which followed, the Bromley and Manton supermarket was burned 
down in Wabag, an example of the way that commercial property could 
be threatened by tribal rivalries (Derkley 1997: 142). In 1990 Tindiwi 
re-won the premiership, only to have provincial government suspended 
for corruption and financial mismanagement again on 12 March 1993 
(GPNG 1994). On 26 March, the provincial capital—which had been 
rebuilt, at the cost of PGK5 million (Dorney 2000: 260)—was burned 
down again by Tindiwi’s supporters. In 1997 Peter Ipatas was elected 
governor of Enga Province, and gained sufficient control to win four more 
five-year terms, bringing a measure of stability to the province—in 2002 
when hand grenades were used to detonate the helicopter fuel in which 
ballots were soaked, the provincial headquarters was merely damaged, 
not destroyed.
The thrust of Engan history is clearly that it is not the case that a weak 
state struggles to govern a strong society in Enga. Rather, the state was 
a  prize over which a society of clans competed. Indeed, the first full 
elections were held in Enga in 1980, and in 1984 the government began 
a series of crises from which it did not fully recover. In this situation, it is 
hard to see ‘the state’ as an enduring, agentive institution at all.
Wormsley and Toke are clear on this point when they state ‘the government 
is not in control of law and order’ (1985: 69, emphasis in original). 
During this period police were able to restrain fighting but not control 
it. That is to say, they could mobilise sufficient force to disperse fighters 
but could not stop tribal fighting in the long run. A state of emergency 
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was declared in 1979 which allowed increased use of force, and this was 
followed up by a special police operation in 1982. Both achieved short-
term success in ending immediate conflict, but did not bring lasting order 
in the province. Policing continued to be both illiberal and ineffective. 
‘Police do burn houses. Police also “confiscate” property. Police harass and 
physically assault people not only in tribal fights but in the streets and 
market place of Wabag’ (ibid.: 68, emphasis in original). Enga politicians, 
like their colonial predecessors, did not emphasise human rights. A ‘senior 
provincial politician’ told the authors of the Law and Order study that 
‘were it within his power he would remove all the special police [who 
might be witnesses] from Enga. Then when a tribal fight erupted he 
would ‘“wipe them out”’ (ibid.: 69).
Violence and Policing in Porgera
Porgera’s history is both similar to and different from that of central Enga. 
Like the Wabag area, it appears that fighting was part of pre-contact life 
in Porgera. In the diary of his 1939 patrol, one of the first Australian 
explorers in Porgera noted that ‘today’s journey was through a devastated 
tribal no-man’s land, the scene of recent tribal fighting. All houses had 
been burnt and gardens razed to the ground. Several square miles had been 
devastated’ (Black in Jacka 2019: 4–5). Jacka reports that prior to contact 
people in Porgera felt like they were ‘“living in a fence” owing to restricted 
social mobility arising from inter-group conflict’ (Jacka 2016: 134). This 
is consistent with reports I received that the arrival of government and 
missionaries ‘opened the roads’ and allowed people to move freely without 
fear (Golub 2001: 225). In his review of government patrol reports from 
the late 1940s to the 1960s, Glenn Banks concludes that ‘an outstanding 
feature of the Ipili …  is the amount of fighting that was taking place’ 
(Banks 1997: 93). My own review of these reports (Golub 2014: 80–7) 
reached a similar conclusion.
While both central Enga and Porgera experienced violence pre-contact, 
Porgera’s experience of governance was very different. Despite the brevity 
of Australian administration in Wabag, formal administrative authority in 
Porgera was even shorter: The government established the first airstrip and 
government station in the valley in 1962 and independence occurred in 
1975, making Porgera’s entire ‘colonial period’ 13 years long—including 
two years of self-government between 1973 and 1975! It is hard to sustain 
degenerationist narratives about Porgera given such a short timeline. 
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In this regard, Porgera was similar to Kandep, Kompiam and other rural 
areas of the province: it took longer for the effects of the administration 
to be felt in remote areas of the province.
Porgera was different from other peripheral areas, however, because of the 
presence of gold, which attracted outsiders and provided a source of wealth. 
Alluvial gold was discovered in Porgera by a government exploratory patrol 
in 1939. After their war service ended, in 1948, a handful of expatriates 
moved to Porgera, creating a small but robust artisanal mining operation 
in which Porgerans began as workers but soon began operating their own 
claims. During this period the valley was patrolled occasionally by kiaps 
stationed at Wabag and, after 1952, at Laiagam. Thus unlike central Enga, 
Porgera experienced ‘development’ (i.e. income from mining) before it 
received ‘government’. In this frontier zone, Porgerans learned that the 
government was not an all-powerful force, but rather just one factor, 
albeit a potent one, in valley life.
In 1962, Porgera was derestricted and an airstrip was put in. Originally, 
police in Porgera were stationed in a building adjoining the main 
government office at Yandiakale, at a strength of less than 10 men (Kelly 
Talia and Geoffrey Puge, personal communication, 28  April 2019). 
Although it is difficult to estimate the population of Porgera and Paiela, 
the sister valley which the Porgera government station was also responsible 
for, it is clear that the police must have been extremely underpowered, 
even given the fact that they had firearms and Porgerans did not.
During the colonial period, as in the rest of Enga, the government 
was viewed favourably as a source of wealth and prosperity. When the 
Australian flag was lowered at an independence ceremony in 1975, a man 
climbed up the flagpole and attempted to raise it again (Biersack, personal 
communication, April  1999). This was a period when alluvial gold 
workings were common and Porgerans earned good money as artisanal 
miners relative to the rest of the highlands. A permanent government 
presence meant that the government was willing to issue exploration 
leases for potential large-scale mines. This resulted in additional wealth 
flowing into the valley. In Wabag, hopes for quick and extreme wealth and 
development were disappointed as worries about government corruption 
and warfare became widespread. In Porgera, on the other hand, these 
hopes were realised, at least to a certain extent—given the sometimes 
millennial expectations of Porgerans, the mining economy was at best 
a partial success.
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Figure 3.2 Porgera mining area
Source: Map by Nelson Minar with data from OpenStreetMap, Humanitarian Data 
Exchange, OpenDEM, and SRTM. openstreetmap.org/copyright
Wealth flowed into Porgera because of business interests, not the 
government. In fact, if anything, the reverse was true: government 
followed extractive industry and worked, to various degrees of success, to 
enable it. It is clear that Porgera was a place the government had its eye on 
because gold mining was happening there. However, it could not be said 
that it provided much initial security.
It is not really until the mid-1980s that the first historical records of the 
valley are available. They clearly demonstrate that the government was 
unable to control the valley’s population. In 1987, a group of Ipili broke 
into the prospecting camp where Placer (the company then looking for 
gold) and its contractors has their base of operation. The Ipili stole the 
safe from Coya Constructions, an Australia-based contractor. The safe 
contained PGK69,000 in cash as well as the passports of expatriate Coya 
employees. The response of the state was to burn down houses at Alipis, 
an area near the prospecting camp, in the course of three days. One of the 
heist’s leaders went to jail, while the other reappeared and was employed 
by the PJV just a few months later (Golub 2001: 322).
During the construction period when the mine was being built, the 
fighting continued. From 1989 to 1992, ‘100 percent of Porgera Census 
Division’s population was affected by tribal fighting’ (Bonnell 1999: 64). 
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In the 1980s, the Enga Law and Order Project noted only one conflict 
which involved a gun. In the 1990s fighters in Enga began using automatic 
weapons in conflicts, despite there previously having been a ban on them. 
Wiessner writes that this move was based on dissatisfaction with the 
government’s ability to govern and a desire to settle scores for one’s self 
(Wiessner and Pupu 2012: 1251). Bonnell reports that it was in 1992 
that guns first began to be used in the valley in fights (Bonnell 1999: 
64–5). In 1990 the Westpac bank agency was robbed and there was 
a ‘riot’ in 1990 on New Year’s Day in which the IPI Supa Stoa, the most 
modern-looking store in the valley, was looted (ibid.: 66–7). There were 
also ‘riots’ connected to a union strike in May 1991 (ibid.: 67). Weissner 
and Pupu (2012: 1251) note a skyrocketing amount of violence following 
the introduction of guns and record over 250 conflicts (which Wiessner 
calls ‘wars’ and which other have called ‘fights’) between 1991 and 
2005. During this period, mean fatalities per war were 17.8, almost five 
times higher than the mean of 3.7 per fight which Wiessner and Tumu’s 
ethnohistorical work uncovered. This was the context against which the 
Porgera mine would begin operation.
Policing in Porgera followed a similar pattern to that of the rest of 
the province: the illiberal and often ineffective use of force. As Glenn 
Banks diplomatically noted, ‘the activities of the police often undermine 
parallel work of corporate community affairs staff ’ (Banks 2000: 255). 
Police burning of houses also occurred in this period. For instance, in 
1990, ‘the police reportedly burned and looted approximately 39 houses 
in the Mungalep area after the official opening of the Porgera mine on 
20 October’ (Dinnen 2001: 213). In 1993 a policeman was killed while 
trying to intervene in a tribal fight in Paiam. In retaliation, ‘mobile squads 
and other police’ burned down ‘more than 200 homes and buildings’ 
(Banks 2000: 260).
As the mine’s presence increased in the valley, government policing was 
increased. In late 1986 a police station was built in Porgera with three 
officers and five constables (Banks 2000: 256) at Pandandaka, close to the 
exploration camp and the future mine site. The Pandandaka police station 
was moved to make way for the mine, initially to containers at the Anawe 
boom gate (Bonnell 1999: 60–1) and then in 1990 to an ‘impressive 
concrete building’ at the Yandiakale. The multilateral legal agreements 
which created the mine specified that policing should be increased in 
Porgera and that the police headquarters in Mulitaka, the regional hub, 
should be upgraded as well. Unfortunately, the new police station was 
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destroyed by a huge landslip in 1991 (Derkley 1997). As a result, the 
centre of governance was moved from geologically unstable Yandiakale to 
Paiam. In 1992 police stations were built in Paiam and Suyan, and Paiam 
increasingly became the centre for law and order infrastructure in the 
valley (Bonnell 1999: 60–1).
In addition, the government used special militarised police forces to 
(unsuccessfully) secure law and order in the valley. As a result, in the early 
1990s Porgera was policed by three disciplined forces: the police, a mobile 
squad, and a rapid deployment unit, or ‘RDU’. Mobile squads are widely 
used around PNG. These squads were modelled on earlier forces used in 
Fiji to control riots in urban areas, and were first used in PNG’s islands 
provinces to quell anti-colonial movements such as Mataungan in East 
New Britain (Mapusia 1986: 65). In the highlands, they were used to 
intervene in tribal fights in the 1970s, and continue to be used to this 
day. The RDU was a special force designed by the national government 
of PNG, with the support and encouragement of the Papua New Guinea 
Chamber of Mining and Petroleum. They were stationed near each major 
resource development in order to secure them (Banks 2000; Dinnen 
2001). Like the regular police force, whose housing and uniforms are 
provided by the mine, the RDU was stationed at the PJV camp in Tipinini 
(Bonnell 1999: 61).
The RDU was perhaps more a source of disorder than of order. 
On 14 October 1992, members of the RDU confronted a group of young 
men at Anawe, and the confrontation escalated until a man was shot and 
killed. The RDU then fled the scene, trying to head east back to their base 
camp at Tipinini. They were pursued by a large group (perhaps as many 
as 1,000 people) and sought shelter at Suyan camp before leaving and 
continuing back to Tipinini. There, the mob destroyed mine property 
worth PGK1 million (Banks 2000: 256–9). Bonnell notes that ‘the only 
surprising thing about this serious attack on Suyan was that it had not 
happened sooner’ (1999: 67), arguing that:
even with all the new security arrangements which now give Suyan 
the appearance and ambience of a prison, it would be hard to 
say that the risk of such an attack has been removed. There are 
plenty of Porgerans with grievances against the mine and vast 
numbers of idle outsiders ready to fuel these grievances or join 
in demonstrations. The rent-a-crowd mob have nothing to lose. 
(Bonnell 1999: 68)
After it sparked this violent conflict, the RDU program was cancelled.
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While these forces received various amounts of PJV support, they were much 
smaller and more poorly equipped than the PJV’s own security forces. In 
1992, Porgera had eight police, and the PJV employed 210 security guards, 
140 of which were on-shift at any time. This included a dog squad, as well 
as ‘static guards, escort teams, investigators, and supervisors. These figures 
included a group of 40 special constables, known as the Mobile Reaction 
Force, trained to respond to riots and low-level armed-offender incidents’ 
(Dinnen 2001: 213). On the surface, then, it would appear that the PJV 
had a large and well-resourced security program while the police are under-
resourced. But the picture is more complicated than this. In 1996, for 
example, 56 members of PJV’s Loss Control Department (the department 
which includes security) were police reservists (Banks and Bonnell 1997: 
10). Mine security literally were the police, or at least reservists (see Bainton 
and Macintyre, Chapter 4, this volume).
In central Enga the major source of wealth was the government, which 
could be controlled by clans through elections. In Porgera, in contrast, 
the mine was a source of wealth but the PJV’s security were capable 
of restraining Porgerans who sought to compromise its operations. 
For  instance, the PJV rebuilt and refortified Suyan camp after the 
disturbance there, despite the fact that it cost PGK1  million to do so 
(Banks 2000: 256–9). Unlike the government, however, the PJV had 
no charge to control Porgerans or maintain public order. Restraint, rather 
than control, was the goal of mine management.
Porgera mine security used the same illiberal force to restrain Porgerans 
which the police had used throughout Enga’s history. A 2005 report 
claimed that PJV security and police had shot 10 people to death (Akali 
Tange Association 2005). By 2015, the mine had indemnified 130 women 
for sexual violence committed against them by mine employees (Jungk 
et al. 2018: 24). As of September 2018, 821 additional people had filed 
human rights abuses claims against the mine using its Porgera Remedy 
Framework (Jungk et al. 2018: 28). Rosenau reports that ‘local PJV 
security staff and contracted Reserve Police personnel were acting without 
due regard for six of the seven major categories specified in the VPSHR 
[voluntary principles on security and human rights]—the principle 
document that defines guidelines for extractive companies when seeking 
to protect their facilities’ (Rosenau et al. 2009: 27). In the early 2000s, 
of the 65 hours of training received by Reserve Police hired by the mine, 
only 40 minutes focused on ‘wider relations with the local community’ 
(Rosenau et al. 2009: 29).
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Call-Out Operations and States of 
Emergency: 2000–15
Porgera changed dramatically in the early 2000s. As ‘an enclave of 
overdevelopment in a sea of (relative) poverty’ (Banks 2005: 140), 
it  attracted economic migrants who swelled the valley’s population 
(Bainton and Banks 2018). While accurate figures are hard to come by, it 
may be that the valley’s population increased from roughly 5,000 in 1980 
to 40,000 in 2015 (Kemp and Owen 2015: 8). The greatest increase in 
population occurred after 2001 following the opening of Paiam town, 
a planned community built by the PJV. As a visitor to the valley myself, 
the change was striking. In 2001, the largest public space in Porgera 
was the disused airstrip at Yandiakale, which was largely empty. By 2016 
it was the site of a bustling market which was thronged with people.
With this increase in population Porgera also became more violent. 
Jacka writes that ‘in the eastern Porgera Valley  …  a series of tribal 
fights … raged from 2004 to 2012 … approximately one hundred people 
were killed, hundreds or more displaced, and nearly every structure in 
eastern Porgera was burned or razed to the ground’ (Jacka 2019: 2). John 
Burton estimates that between 2002 and 2006 annually there were 103 
homicides per 100,000 people. By contrast, the number for Iraq civilian 
casualties in 2006 was 101 and the number for Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, in 
2009 (during a huge drug war), was greater than 132 (both per 100,000; 
Burton 2014: 44).
The PJV’s internal assessments were equally dire. Unauthorised miners, 
many of them migrants, were increasingly breaching mine security and 
working gold in the open pit, leading to violent clashes with security 
guards (Bainton et al. 2020). By 2005, the mine’s security staff was 380 
people, including 10 expatriates, 100 Papua New Guineans from other 
areas of the country and 180 local hires (Gray 2005). Despite this large 
force, ‘the prevailing view among senior management was that the security 
status quo at Porgera was no longer viable’ (Rosenau et al. 2009: 28). 
The PJV was losing its ability to restrain the population. For instance, in 
early January 2007 ‘Police Mobile Squads from Mt Hagen, Mendi and 
Laiagam’ were ‘sent into the valley  …  following reports of continuous 
law and order problems in the area’ (Tiptip 2007). In late April and early 
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May 2007, work was halted for a week when roads into the mine were 
blockaded by disgruntled landowners who felt a relocation program was 
not moving fast enough (Anon. 2007).
As a result of the worsening law and order situation in the valley, the PJV 
made the decision to move to a strategy not only of restraint, but control—
that is, becoming more directly involved in the maintenance of law and 
order in the valley. As a result, in 2008 Philip Kikala (the MP for Porgera), 
Ila Temu (a Barrick executive) and Peter Ipatas (Governor of Enga) wrote 
a discussion paper outlining a public–private partnership between the 
mine, the Enga provincial government and the national government to 
restore order to the valley (Kikala et al. 2008). This was part of a public–
private initiative undertaken between the mine and government called 
the ‘restoring justice initiative’ (RJI), whose steering committee was led 
by Sir Barry Holloway (Safihao 2009). The organisers of the RJI did not 
see it as a case of corporate repression of the community—as might be 
familiar from resource conflict in Africa—but rather as a situation in 
which the PJV was aligned with the ‘community’ against ‘troublemakers’, 
many of whom were categorised as ‘squatters’ or ‘outsiders’.
The RJI had many components, including strengthening civil society. 
One of those components was a state of emergency declaration similar 
to those used in Enga in the past. In February 2009, Kikala petitioned 
PNG’s National Executive Council (NEC) to ‘take action against an 
increase in violent crime and lawlessness’ in Porgera (BGC 2009:  2). 
On  26  February 2009 the NEC responded by announcing plans for 
‘the call-out of additional police resources’ to ‘re-establish law and order 
in Enga province, including the Porgera region’ (ibid.), and in April 
‘Operation Ipili’, as the call-out was known, got underway. According 
to the Post-Courier, the operation involved 200 policemen, including 
a police air unit and an ‘intelligent unit’ [sic] from the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force (PNGDF). It was designed to last six weeks (Timb 2009).
Newspaper coverage describes broad support for the operation 
(Timb 2009). Nixon Mangape, a prominent landowner and future 
parliamentarian, said that ‘all leaders and the population of Porgera 
welcome the call-out’ (ibid.). The governor of Enga, Peter Ipatas, also 
‘welcomed’ the call-out after initial misgiving about not being consulted, 
and his concern that this was a temporary solution to a long-term problem 
(Kepson 2009). The most widely covered aspects of the call-out were 
the eviction of residents and the burning of houses on 27 and 28 April 
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2009 on Wuangima, a piece of land at the base of the open pit where 
police had previously razed a settlement in 1987. Mine management 
believed that this area was home to unauthorised miners. Mark Ekepa, the 
chairman of the Porgera Landowners Association (PLA), arrived in Port 
Moresby on 29 April to meet with the prime minister and withdraw PLA 
support for the operation, because the state of emergency was targeting 
‘not the homes of illegal settlers’ but rather houses which ‘belong to the 
second and third generation landowners who were not thought of by the 
National Government and Barrick Gold in their relocation plan in 1989’ 
(Eroro 2009). Ultimately a team from Amnesty International found that 
‘at least 131’ buildings had been destroyed by police forces during the 
three months of Operation Ipili (Amnesty International 2010: 3).
The RJI may at first appear to be a shift in PJV strategy from a focus 
on restraint to a focus on control. But it appears that once successful 
operations were over, the PJV returned to a focus on restraint. After the 
burnings, for instance, the mine built a fence around the open pit which 
was finished in late 2010 at the cost of USD30 million (Stirton 2010). 
One consultancy report noted that by 2011 the RJI ‘had to a degree 
served its original purpose’ even though ‘the community had struggled to 
manage many of the impacts of the mine’ (Robinson 2014: 7), suggesting 
that the original purpose was to restrain activities against the mine rather 
than control and order society.
Indeed, throughout this period the police were understaffed and under-
resourced. From 2008 to 2012 there were 14 police in the valley to police 
perhaps as many as 73,000 people, ‘equating to one (1) police officer to 
over 3529 people’ (Robinson 2014: 8). In comparison, US cities with 
50–100,000 people in them averaged 16.1 police officers per 10,000 of 
population (Anon. 2018). Police facilities at the station in Paiam were 
a shambles:
Prisoner numbers were often above forty (40) housed in three 
excessively sub standard cells … There was an ageing fleet of three 
(3) police vehicles and no equipment such as firearms, computers, 
ammunition, basic office supplies and cleaning services … The 
Police Station did not maintain an up to date ‘Occurrence Books’ 
which is one of the most basic functions of any police station. 
(Robinson 2014: 9)
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Conflict had not abated either. ‘Tribal clashes in the Porgera District were 
a major contributor to a serious breakdown of law and order in the final 
quarter of 2011 and early 2012’, Robinson notes, ‘as violence between the 
Ano and Nomali clans resulted in the deaths of 15 clan members. There 
were violent attacks towards the mine and its employees, in particular the 
mine’s security guards’ (Robinson 2014: 5). She continues:
In mid to late 2012 when half the police station was burnt down 
and tribal fighting continued a serious breakdown in law and 
order resulted, culminating in the forced shut down of numerous 
businesses including the local bank, post office and looting of 
local business IPI. The highlands highway was closed and the 
operations of the mine were seriously impacted in various ways 
including industrial action by employees who refused to travel to 
work. During this time, several employees were injured and one 
killed while travelling to and from work. (Robinson 2014: 7)
As a result, the RJI was ‘re-invigorated’ (ibid.: 7). In October 2011 the 
PJV hired an expatriate, Julian Whayman, to manage the project, which 
he did until late 2014 (Whayman 2015). In 2012 the PJV built a new 
police barracks, a project managed and paid for through the tax credit 
scheme (see Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4, this volume). It also 
purchased furniture for the houses. As a result, the number of police in 
Porgera was increased to 50 (Robinson 2014: 6). It is hard not to notice 
this renewed interest in controlling Porgera came at the same time as the 
mine was losing the battle to restrain the valley’s inhabitants.
Disorder in the valley continued to threaten both the mine and the 
community. In 2013 four people were killed on 2 December, allegedly 
by PJV security and police mobile squads who shot them at the Pongema 
bridge. The next day, a mob attempted to move towards Paiam but was 
blocked by police. It turned towards the mine site but did not enter it. 
As a result, work at the mine was suspended for 12  hours as the next 
shift of workers could not be safely transported to the site (Boyle 2013). 
Unauthorised miners, mostly young men who entered the open pit of 
the mine to work for gold, were also increasing in number. In December 
2013, 1,000 illegal miners entered the mine site in a fortnight (Kepson 
2013). By March and April 2014, the situation in the valley had gotten so 
bad that the government deployed two mobile squads and 40 members of 
the PNGDF, who had been made ‘Special Constables with arrest powers’, 
to the valley. The total force, counting the soldiers, was 140 people. 
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In May the Post-Courier reported that the total number of police in the 
valley was 200 (Anon. 2014). On 6 June 2014 police again burned houses 
in Wingima, with estimates varying from 20 to 200 (Poiya 2014).
At this point it appears that Porgera may have entered a cycle in which 
increasing disorder led to a state of emergency or call-out operation, 
followed by a period of calm before the pattern repeated itself. Although 
the rhetoric and perhaps the intention of the stakeholders involved in 
planning the call-outs was one of control and normalisation, in practice 
this appears to be a circular pattern of restraint and disorder, not a linear 
increase in control of valley life.
This may not be entirely true, however. In 2016 landslips and sinkholes 
challenged the mine’s feasibility and caused the destruction of a large 
settlement in the valley. In 2017, elections created their own tensions 
similar to those seen in the discussion of central Enga above. The Post-
Courier and other newspapers focused less attention on the valley, perhaps 
because beat reporters no longer visited there. By 2018 life in Porgera 
entered a new phase, as negotiations began to renew the mine’s lease, 
which was set to expire in 2019. These negotiations continued up to 
the time of expiration. With these negotiations ongoing at the time of 
this writing, the mine has been put on care and maintenance and is not 
currently operating (see Afterword, this volume).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided a history of policing, violence and governance 
in Enga and Porgera, which reveals the shortcomings of several popular 
narratives about the province and the valley. Degenerationist narratives 
claim that government control of the country declined beginning in the 
independence period. This account has shown, to the contrary, that neither 
the Australian nor the Papua New Guinean government has controlled the 
population of central Enga. Rather, they have merely been able at times 
to restrain it. While this narrative is correct in that violence has been on 
the rise in the province, it incorrectly places this rise in the independence 
era and not in the pre-independence era. Insofar as Erskine’s promise has 
never been realised, the government in Enga has always been an ‘absent 
presence’. This raises the wider question of how representative Enga is 
of the country as whole. While PNG is a large and complex place with 
extremely diverse histories of governance, it may be that as historians turn 
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their attention to the twentieth century, they provide a different history of 
colonialism and policing in PNG then that produced by the ‘men on the 
spot’ who rule the country.
Claims that the mine operates in a ‘rough neighbourhood’ clearly have 
some prima facie validity. However, this chapter demonstrates that Enga 
is ‘rough’ not only because of pre-existing cultural norms but because 
of its history. Banks astutely notes, for instance, that it is not merely 
the case that ‘large resource developments transform the nature and 
focus of people’s lives’. Rather, ‘the mine  …  and the possibilities and 
problems it creates, become captured into the existing society, lives and 
ways of understanding of the local population’ (Banks 2008: 30). Taking 
this point even further, I would emphasise the dialectic nature of this 
ongoing encounter: both governance and local norms are transformed 
in their encounter with one another, and at each further encounter they 
are confronted with a transformed partner whose identity and structure 
they are, in some part, responsible for (Sahlins 1985). The mine does 
not merely work in a rough neighbourhood, it has ‘roughened up’ the 
neighbourhood itself through its actions and indeed its mere presence 
in the valley. In particular, its strategy of restraint rather than control has 
had long-term consequences for both the community and the PJV itself. 
Banks et al. (2013) are correct to distinguish between ‘immanent’ and 
‘spontaneous’ social change around Porgera, but it must be pointed out 
that the mine’s response (or lack of response) to these changes becomes 
part of the causal chain which produce these unintended and unwilled 
events in the valley.
That said, we should not overstate the role of the PJV in the history 
of policing and governance in the valley. Illiberal use of force, states of 
emergency, house burnings and violent actions are not methods which 
are newly invented by the government and the company to keep Porgera 
secure. On the contrary, they are the historical norm in the province. 
Without historical perspective, it may appear that these forms of violence 
are a novel result of the mine’s presence and thus part of a generalised 
‘resource curse’ phenomenon which occurs across multiple resource 
extraction projects. This is incorrect. In fact, they are part of an ensemble 
of governance techniques which the PJV inherited.
The case of Porgera shows that more care must be taken in developing 
the concept of the ‘resource curse’. There is a danger in using this 
term indiscriminately simply to mean anything bad that happens near 
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a mining or petroleum project. Porgera is very different from the cases 
of Bougainville and West Papua described by McKenna (2016) in that 
the PJV has never lost its ‘social license to operate’—the question has 
been who should benefit from the operation and how much. Disorder in 
Porgera is not an insurgency against the mine. Nor is Porgera like some 
resource conflicts in West Africa described by Le Billon (2014), in which 
profits from resource extraction fuel civil war. Each of these cases are 
different, and adequate comparison must avoid historical particularism 
(which treats each case as too unique to be comparable to any other) on 
the one hand and a reductive analysis which cannot discriminate between 
cases on the other. Historical anthropology is, I believe, well-suited to 
this purpose because it can explain structural transformation across time 
and can work to build mid-level comparisons across cases (Sahlins 1985; 
Tilly 2010).
Finally, this discussion has implications for discussions of policing and 
the ‘absent present’ state. It is a truism to say that extractive capitalism 
takes on the role of the state in and around project areas. On the surface, 
Porgera is a clear example of this. But this more detailed historical 
overview also complicates this picture: in Porgera, security guards are also 
Reserve Police officers. Police vehicles, housing and uniforms are provided 
by the mine. A specialised police unit has been created at the urging of 
business interests. To understand these complexities it may be worthwhile 
to abandon the commonly used narrative that there are two collective 
actors called the ‘mine’ and the ‘government’. It may be more useful to 
ask instead: What are the networks of individuals that lie behind these 
supposedly solidary corporate actors? When and why is a use of force 
attributed to the PJV or the state? Why call political conflict associated 
with elections ‘tribal’? Whose interests and what moral purpose are served 
when the agency behind violence is disambiguated one way and not the 
other? Studies of corporate capitalism have demonstrated how managing 
blame and attribution are central in managing the fallout of environmental 
pollution. It may be that fine-grained analyses of resource conflict could 
adopt this lens when they turn their attention to policing and governance.
In closing, I would like to note that there is something tragic about the 
history of Enga and Porgera. In 1884 Erskine promised that Melanesians 
would benefit from the blessings of government. Engans believed in 
this promise because they value wealth and prosperity, not warrior 
prowess. Yet  Western-style government has too often participated in 
the amplification of the negative things in Enga culture rather than the 
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positive ones. The result is a tragic situation in which structural forces 
encourage a situation which no one in the province wants, but which too 
few seem able to escape. I hope that this essay offers an understanding 
of this situation, and in some small way contributes to creating a better 
world for the province and the people in it.
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Being Like a State: How 
Large-Scale Mining Companies 
Assume Government Roles 
in Papua New Guinea
Nicholas Bainton and Martha Macintyre
Introduction
It is now a common orthodoxy to regard the state as an absent institution, 
or missing ‘stakeholder’, around large-scale resource extraction 
projects. In  Papua New Guinea (PNG), local-level actors and external 
commentators frequently bemoan the dysfunction within local-level and 
provincial governments; the ineptitude of the national government; the 
lack of basic service provision and governance in these project settings; 
the absence of accountability among elected members and public servants, 
and the expectation that resource developers will somehow fill the void. 
Media outlets and online forums are replete with accounts of enraged 
communities demanding that the state fulfil its role under the terms of 
the various agreements that have been signed for these extraction projects. 
At the same time, many people also see the state as a competitor for the 
benefits perceived to be available from resource extraction projects, rather 
than a neutral arbiter, which leads many people to conclude that the state 
is ineffectual and corrupt.
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In this chapter, we move beyond these default descriptions of the state to 
consider how the state is instantiated and experienced in these extractive 
contexts, or ‘Melanesian mining arenas’ (Bainton and Owen 2019). 
While it is not our intention to disprove these everyday observations 
and criticisms of the state, we argue that the state exhibits a selective and 
strategic presence throughout the life cycle of resource extraction projects. 
At different times it will be more or less present for different actors and 
institutions, resulting in the prioritisation of some interests and the 
marginalisation of others. The state often exhibits a heightened presence 
in these settings through the local agreements to which it is a party, and 
the obligations that it habitually fails to enact. This ‘absent presence’ 
creates situations where mining companies are routinely manoeuvred into 
‘being like a state’. The failure of the state to fulfil its duties in regard to 
the regulation of the industry and the management and implementation 
of benefit-sharing agreements, for example, frequently forces companies 
to fill these gaps when they would rather concentrate on the task of 
extracting natural resources and accumulating capital.
Local perceptions of the government’s failure to protect the interests of 
its people coincide with those of analysts who have characterised PNG 
as a ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ state (Dinnen 2007; Firth 2018). Here, 
failures in service delivery (especially health and education), infrastructure 
provision and maintenance of law and order, and incapacity to ensure 
the security of its territory and population, are definitive—the state 
being the politically defined entity that is responsible for such functions. 
The legislation and policies surrounding mining in PNG do give the 
appearance of sovereign state management of economic activity. But as 
we demonstrate, the government’s contractual commitments are regularly 
ignored or fail to materialise, which is exacerbated by the tendency 
of  national and provincial-level governments to reduce the amount of 
funding for delivery of services on the presumption that mining companies 
will fund the difference. As a result, mining companies frequently assume 
responsibility for state functions in the interests of maintaining stable 
operations, shareholder investment and profitability.
To illustrate this point we describe how these processes and the absent 
presence phenomena have unfolded around a large-scale gold mining 
project in the Lihir group of islands in the province of New Ireland. Even 
though the state often appears to be invisible in Lihir, because of its inability 
to fulfil its duties, the idea of the state has served as a point of reference for 
actions carried out by a local public administration, community members 
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and the company. These manoeuvrings and manipulations are not simply 
the result of government absence and inaction or corporate acquiescence 
to community demands. Contemporary events and processes have 
historical roots and antecedents (in colonial administrations and Christian 
missions) that are unearthed, or brought to the surface, through the work 
of resource extraction. For this reason, the absent presence of the state 
must be understood within its historical context.
Ambivalence and Tension: Emergent 
State Formations in Lihir
In 1985 the Kennecott Niugini Joint Venture Company established its 
exploration camp on the site of the current mining operation in Lihir 
(Figure 4.1). The following year Colin Filer and Richard Jackson were 
contracted to undertake a socioeconomic impact assessment for the 
proposed mining project (Filer and Jackson 1986). Their observations 
confirmed a certain degree of state neglect. On the one hand, the level of 
basic services in Lihir was thought to be above the national average; on the 
other hand, it was somewhat below the average for New Ireland Province. 
Filer and Jackson concluded that it was the second of these facts, not 
the first, which was evident to the people of Lihir, and this no doubt 
encouraged the local belief that the government was giving them a ‘raw 
deal’. While existing services were largely funded by the government, 
they were in practice dispensed by other agencies: health and education 
services, and economic activities like the marketing of copra, and the 
provision of shipping services, were primarily managed by the Catholic 
Church. Approximately 50 public sector workers were employed by the 
provincial government to undertake decentralised government functions 
in Lihir, ‘serving’ a resident population of roughly 5,900 people in 1985. 
These public sector employees included a single patrol officer and an 
agricultural officer, 11 health workers, and the rest were teachers, but there 
were no police. The distance to the islands from mainland New Ireland 
certainly made it harder to attract teachers and health workers from other 
parts of the province, and provided an excuse for these workers (and their 
administrators) to shirk all sorts of responsibilities. The airstrip had also 
fallen into a state of disrepair, which prevented more regular travel and 
communication between Lihir and the provincial capital in Kavieng at 
a time when the provincial government should have been taking a closer 
interest in the islands.
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At this stage, Lihirians were officially represented in the province by the 
Namatanai Local Government Council, Namatanai being the closest 
administrative centre on mainland New Ireland. Since the institution of 
the provincial government in 1977, Lihir had been represented on the 
provincial assembly by a succession of three members, the latest of whom, 
in 1986, was said to be a supporter of the People’s Progress Party, while the 
national Member of Parliament was the leader of that party. The Lihirian 
member of the provincial government had not been seen in Lihir since he 
was elected, but few people were surprised, or even particularly resentful of 
this fact, since most constituents apparently did not expect their member 
to do anything but enjoy the temporary spoils of office (Filer and Jackson 
1986: 121).
In the 1980s, the Lihirian representatives on the council maintained an 
uneasy relationship with the members of a local sociopolitical movement 
that had flourished in Lihir, known as the Tutavul Isakul Association or 
the ‘TIA’ (meaning stand together and work), which had its origins in the 
so-called Johnson cult that had emerged in northern New Ireland during 
the 1960s (Billings 2002; Bainton 2008). In 1984, the TIA broke away 
from the mainland movement and changed its name to Nimamar—an 
acronym derived from the names of the four islands in Lihir (Niolam, 
Malie, Masahet and Mahur)—which was intended to convey the idea of 
cooperation. The Nimamar Association held hostile views towards formal 
political institutions, which largely stemmed from Lihirian experiences 
with government and business and the belief that these institutions had 
been more of a hindrance than a help in unifying the community.
Nimamar Association leaders preached a form of millenarianism 
combined with singularly economic objectives. The desire for a radical 
reordering of society was explicit in the belief that ‘Lihir will become a 
city’, the state will be abolished, the Nimamar Association will become 
the government, schools will be abolished, there will be universal literacy, 
and that society will be divided between the ‘faithful members’ due to 
receive heavenly blessings (here on earth), and those condemned to a life 
of labour and toil (Bainton 2010: 55–69). Filer and Jackson eventually 
settled upon the term ‘ritual communism’ (1989: 116) to describe the 
mixture of religious commitment and aspirations for economic progress, 
and the desire for increased social and political unity.
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We might therefore say that even before the mining project had begun, 
the state exerted an absent presence in Lihir. This was expressed through 
a combination of weak administrative functions, and the presence of 
formal political institutions which most people thought had limited 
capacity to represent their interests—especially in regards to the decisions 
that would have to be made in relation to the development of mining 
operations. Anti-government feelings were widespread in Lihir, and there 
was a growing desire for local independence. In other words, despite its 
material absence, or the lack of visible presence, the state loomed large in 
the collective consciousness of the residents of Lihir as an outside force to 
be replaced by a local organisation that could respond to the ‘real’ needs 
of the community.
In the 1986 provincial elections, a local Nimamar member, Ferdinand 
Samare, was elected to the provincial assembly, further obscuring the 
division between the Nimamar Association and ‘official politics’. Lihirians 
were growing eager for their own government and by 1988, councillors 
and Nimamar members decided to break away from the Namatanai 
Local Government Council. It was not until 1988 that the New Ireland 
Provincial Government instituted their Community Government Act, 
largely to appease Lihirians after the feasibility of the mine had been 
established. Consequently the Nimamar Community Government was 
formed, representing a real transition towards more independent local 
governance. At this point Nimamar leaders stated their intention to 
withdraw from ‘politics’ and ‘business’, at least in the sense in which the 
government would regard these domains. This shift was compounded 
by the belief that the forthcoming mining project was the fulfilment 
of earlier prophesies for change. Many Lihirians were suspicious of the 
government’s interest in the project, believing that the gold was theirs and 
that the state would ultimately benefit at their expense.
As mining negotiations continued into the 1990s Lihirians were 
determined that they would retain a greater portion of potential economic 
benefits. The New Ireland Provincial Government passed a bill in 1994 
to transform the Nimamar Community Government into the Nimamar 
Development Authority (NDA), which was supposed to function as 
a  type of interim local-level government until the Organic Law reform 
in 1995. This coincided with the signing of the mining agreements 
between Lihirians, the company and the state in 1995. It was not until 
1997 that Lihirian leaders held the first elections to officially reconstitute 
the NDA into the Nimamar Rural Local Level Government (NRLLG). 
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The delay may well have been the result of internal divisions between 
supporters of  the newly established government and older versions of 
Nimamar. It might have also been because the NDA primarily functioned 
like a technical administrative unit during the construction of the mine 
(to control the spending of money received from the mining operation on 
community development projects), rather than a political body (see Filer 
2004: 3). And as we discuss below, the blurring of political interests and 
administrative functions has been a recurring theme in the history of the 
mining project and its agreements. In the end, the political inactivity of the 
NDA opened the door for the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association 
(LMALA)—originally formed in 1989 to deal with the land disputes that 
were arising as exploration activities and negotiations got under way—
to emerge as the major political force on the island, primarily due the 
intensifying heat between the company and the landowners during the 
construction of the mine (1995–97).
The new local-level government comprised 15 Ward Members elected by 
their ward constituents. The first Ward Members internally elected their 
chair, but in subsequent elections this has been a directly elected role. 
Only two members of the old Nimamar Association group were re-elected, 
representing a gradual shift in political stance. Together they formed 
the Tumbawinlam Assembly. The name derives from the local term for 
the larger of the two moieties that structure Lihirian clans—the other 
moiety being known as Tumbawinmalkok (small clan). While the original 
NDA remained as the administrative arm of the local-level government, 
Lihirians continued to refer to the local-level government as the NDA, 
which may have been a reflection of public confusion surrounding the 
role of the local-level government which was now in control of substantial 
amounts of money received through the mining operation, intended for 
community projects. Problems surrounding the legitimation of the NDA 
into the local-level government were finally solved in 2001 when the 
Nimamar Special Purposes Authority (NSPA) was established as a body 
separate from the political functioning of the local-level government that 
would administer government-funded projects (Filer 2004). However, 
this did little to resolve the underlying issues around the actual execution 
of their new responsibilities.
If the NRLLG functioned as the lower branch of the state that represented 
all Lihirians, it found itself in competition with LMALA, which represented 
the ‘landowners’ and the ‘mine affected communities’ but was not part of 
the state, but was already firmly entrenched in Lihir and recognised by the 
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company. While both organisations shared a certain level of ambivalence, 
if not antipathy, towards the state and institutional governance in general, 
as we shall see, they were increasingly divided over their roles and the 
control of mining benefits in Lihir. This early representational division 
signalled the beginning of a much larger and more complicated set of 
issues that would split the members of these institutions, and enable the 
proliferation of other ‘corporate bodies’ purporting to represent different 
sections of the population of Lihir.
The Mine and its Agreements
In 1993 Lihirian leaders from LMALA and the NRLLG travelled to 
Port Moresby to participate in the state’s newly established development 
forum process, which entailed a set of tripartite discussions between 
the national government, the provincial government and the project 
area landowners to secure their joint endorsement for the terms of the 
project and to spell out the distribution of the costs and benefits, and 
the roles and responsibilities arising from the development of the mine 
(Filer 1995, 2012). Throughout proceedings, Lihirian representatives 
insisted upon their primacy in the distribution of royalties and other 
benefits. On several occasions, they rejected the notion that the minerals 
below the ground were owned by the state and dismissed arguments by 
government representatives in terms that were redolent of secessionism 
and political autonomy. Their main representative, Mark Soipang, 
brushed aside provincial government claims stating that ‘The developers 
are foreigners and the State is only a concept. It is us, the landowners who 
represent real life and people’ (Soipang in Filer 1995: 68). Nevertheless, 
by 1995 Lihirian leaders had come to an agreement with the state and 
the Lihir Management Company, which was appointed as the developer 
and operator of the mine.1 This new agreement highlighted the tension 
between the presence of the ‘state-system’, which required Lihirians to 
enter into formal arrangements with the government, and local resistance 
1  The exploration program and feasibility studies for the Lihir project were conducted by 
a joint venture between Rio Tinto and Nuigini Mining Limited. Under the terms of the original 
project approvals, the Lihir project was transferred to a new Papua New Guinean company—Lihir 
Gold Limited (LGL). Rio Tinto established the Lihir Management Company (LMC) to develop 
and operate the mine on behalf of LGL. In 2005, Rio Tinto divested its interests in Lihir, allowing 
the Lihir operation to become owned and operated by LGL, until a merger occurred in 2010 with 
Newcrest Mining Limited.
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to the ‘state-idea’ (Abrams 1988). Under the terms of the Mining Act, 
the developer and the state then signed a Mining Development Contract, 
and a Special Mining Lease (SML) was granted.2
In the period leading up to this agreement, the landowners association 
(LMALA) presented the developer with a ‘position paper’ that captured 
their ideas about compensation and development.3 Compensation was 
presented as an ‘all-encompassing issue’ that would need to be addressed 
in a ‘comprehensive’ way to secure the approval of the landowners. 
The  resulting set of agreements, known as the Integrated Benefits 
Package (or the ‘IBP agreement’), was structured around the landowners’ 
fourfold classification of their ‘compensation principle’: compensation for 
‘destruction’; compensation as ‘development’; compensation as ‘security’; 
and compensation as ‘rehabilitation’ (Figure  4.2). The underlying 
objective contained in this all-encompassing concept of compensation 
was to ensure that the landowners received a ‘permanent substitute for the 
permanent losses and impacts associated with the mine’ (LMALA 1994):
Compensation if properly defined should be the state of 
equilibrium reached when the forces of destruction and impact 
must be equal to the forces of compensation. The end result of 
this process should provide for a balance where the Landowners 
are forever happy and accept the losses and impact they will suffer. 
Stability, peace and harmony should be the end result of the 
compensation payment. (LMALA 1994)
From the perspective of the landowners, compensation encompassed the 
full range of payments and provisions that would offset the losses they 
would suffer and their desire for greater control over the development of 
their resources. In other words, this was an expression of their expectation 
that mining would provide the springboard to propel them into a desired 
development future. If some Lihirians regarded the IBP agreement as the 
fulfilment of previous millennial prophesies, it could also be regarded 
as a manifestation of the state’s so-called ‘preferred area policy’ that had 
2  One particular point of contention which had delayed the completion of the agreement was 
the issue of equity in the mining project. LMALA had demanded 25  per cent equity—for each 
stakeholder (i.e. the state, the company, the provincial government and Lihirians). After five years 
of intensive negotiations, it was only when the provincial government opted to give up its share of 
equity in the project in favour of Lihirians that LMALA agreed sign off at the last moment. A former 
government liaison officer involved in these proceedings described this as ‘an amazingly precocious 
coup’ (Ron Brew, personal communication, August 2020).
3  The total value of one of the first ‘position papers’ delivered to the company was apparently 
calculated at some USD4 billion.
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
116
already become a feature of the nation’s mineral policy landscape (Filer and 
Imbun 2007). In practice, this policy effectively creates a set of concentric 
rings or ‘zones of entitlement’ around each major mining project, starting 
with the innermost zone occupied by the customary landowners of the 
mining lease areas who typically experience the greatest burdens and 
impositions, followed by the project area community, the residents of the 
region and finally the nation as a whole. This policy is notionally meant to 
reflect the belief that those communities who experience the most impacts 
should be granted the most benefits.
Figure 4.2 The 1995 IBP agreement
Source: N. Bainton
At the time, the IBP agreement was considered in some circles to be 
the new benchmark for community benefit-sharing agreements across the 
nation. The Mining Act 1992 made a distinction between development 
forum (benefit-sharing) agreements (or memoranda of agreement) 
between the state and affected area communities, and compensation/
relocation agreements between the developer and the landowners. 
The real innovation of the IBP agreement was to bundle together 
the compensation and relocation agreements and three memoranda 
of agreement (MOAs), along with the company’s environmental 
management plan (see Figure 4.2). The MOAs established the distribution 
of royalties and defined the responsibilities and undertakings of the 
parties in relation to the development of the mine and its benefits for 
the community. The MOAs and the environmental management plan 
were included in the IBP agreement so that the landowners could see 
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the entire package of commitments and benefits they would receive from 
the mining operation in exchange for their land. This created a certain 
level of confusion between agreement conditions and operational plans, 
although the community have generally shown much less interest in the 
specific details of the environmental management plan, just as the state 
has shown limited interest in monitoring the company’s compliance with 
its responsibilities under the IBP agreement, or its own commitments 
contained in the MOAs.
In practice, the only integrating factor in the IBP agreement is the 
blue hardbound cover that holds this set of commitments together. 
This observation stems from the lack of integration between various 
commitments and the roles and responsibilities of different parties, 
and inability of these parties to implement the IBP agreement in ways 
that matched the original vision of the landowners, which has been the 
source of considerable frustration and local political conflict. If the IBP 
agreement was once the high-water mark for such arrangements, within 
a matter of years it had become the low tide mark. It is likely that the 
parties would agree that this state of affairs arose as a result of a lack 
of governance around the agreements that would allow for effective 
coordination and monitoring of the various activities and responsibilities. 
It is less likely, however, that the parties would necessarily agree on who 
is to blame, which is partly due to the different ways that each party 
has understood the IBP agreement. As the self-proclaimed architects 
of the IBP agreement, the landowners (or more specifically the leaders 
of LMALA) have defended their design and pointed the finger at the 
company and the government as the principal agents and funders for 
implementation. On the other hand, the company has often argued that 
it has complied with most of its responsibilities and the real issue is the 
government’s failure to enact those MOAs to which the company is not 
a party. While there may be some element of truth in these assertions, 
this overlooks the propensity of the government to treat the company 
as a ‘contract administrator’, sidestepping its responsibilities to monitor 
how well the company has upheld its obligations—or to actually test 
the substance of the development programs it claims to have delivered. 
This selective absence of the state has helped to reinforce the view among 
the community that Lihirians should control the funds and benefits 
derived from the operation of the mine to secure their independence from 
the state, and for that matter, the company.
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Government Neglect
As we have seen, prior to the presence of the mining company, Lihirians 
were of marginal interest to the Government of Papua New Guinea. 
Like many other rural people, they were poor and services were 
minimal. The  New Ireland Provincial Government had a presence at 
Potzlaka where the local-level government offices were located with two 
resident officers. But with the promise of various mine-related funds for 
developing services in Lihir, and the provision of housing, offices and 
other facilities for provincial government officers, the approval of the 
SML and the signing of the MOAs was accompanied by recognition 
that state service provision had to be expanded and improved in Lihir, 
and that responsibility for changes associated with the mining project 
would be subject to regular review. During the mine construction 
phase and the first two years of gold production there were quarterly 
meetings in Port Moresby, Lihir and Kavieng (on a cyclical basis). The 
quarterly meetings were chaired by the Department of Mining and 
attended by representatives of relevant departments in the national 
government (Labour and Employment, Commerce and Industry, and 
Environment, who all chaired subcommittees relevant to their MOA and 
statutory responsibilities), provincial government heads of department 
and occasionally others, such as the Police Commander and the chair 
of LMALA. These meetings were meant to provide timely assessment 
of emergent problems, to present interim reports of the company’s 
compliance with environmental and social commitments and to identify 
appropriate responses from appropriate agencies.
From the outset it was clear that the government and Lihirian parties to 
these meetings viewed their purpose as occasions for lobbying the company 
representatives to provide funding for their respective departments 
and projects. Although the company supplied written information and 
assisted in drawing up an agenda prior to each meeting, these were 
rarely read, and attendees displayed little interest in their content. For 
both the provincial and the Lihirian contingents, the main concern 
was to ensure that the company financed the extension of government 
services for Lihirians. Whereas Lihir had formerly been an unattractive 
‘backwater’ for government employees, the prospect of new offices and 
houses, efficient communication systems and life in a township suddenly 
made it a desirable location. The agreements had already indicated the 
need for these expanded services and people were eager to participate. 
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For many in provincial government the mine meant new employment 
opportunities and the chance to work effectively because the company, 
rather than the government, would be funding them. Meanwhile in 
Lihir, the infrastructure for all of these local administrative functions—
roads, a ‘town site’, houses for police and other government employees, 
and new offices—was viewed by many as evidence of the dawn of the 
era when Lihir would become a city. This also marked the beginning of 
a process whereby the company would support government infrastructure 
and services.
Lihir was formally designated a sub-district within Namatanai District, and 
a sub-district administration was established which employed local public 
servants responsible for various services, including health, education, 
law and order, land administration, community welfare and agricultural 
development. A sub-district administrator was appointed to maintain 
oversight of these functions, each of which notionally reported back to 
its functional counterpart at the provincial or national level. Sub-district 
officers are public servants, part of the provincial or national bureaucracy, 
and as such are meant to be independent of the local-level government 
and the mining company. Their independence was compromised from 
the start as government funding was regularly delayed, often inadequate 
and occasionally failed to materialise.
Public servants therefore depended on the mine. The simplest examples 
are communications (fax machines and telephones) and transport (vehicles 
and fuel). The provincial government didn’t pay bills so phones were cut 
off. The people in the sub-district office had vehicles, but often the ‘fuel 
allowances’ didn’t come through—so the company supplied fuel to enable 
people to actually do their jobs.4 There were also numerous instances 
where community pressure demanded a response from the company. 
The refrigerator at the Catholic Church’s Palie Health Centre, which 
stored pharmaceuticals and vaccines broke down and—in the absence of 
government action—was replaced by the company. During the early days 
of mine construction, the mobile squad police were called in to deal with 
community conflict following a murder. The police officers got drunk 
4  One former government liaison officer for the project noted that the National Department of 
Mining had provided a lot of funding in the first five years of the mine to support other departments, 
including funds to meet state infrastructure commitments under the MOA. The funds began to dry 
up as other national projects were prioritised (Ron Brew, personal communication, August 2020).
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and crashed the police vehicle, damaging it beyond repair. After months 
without any means of travelling around the island, the mining company 
supplied a new vehicle in the interest of maintaining law and order.
Perhaps the most egregious failure initially was that of the national 
government to provide equipment that would have enabled the government 
environment officer to independently monitor environmental impacts of 
the mining operation. The officer arrived around 1997 to find he had 
a desk and a computer, but no equipped laboratory, no boat or motor 
vehicle and no storage for samples. In order to fulfil his designated duties, 
he appealed to the company for use of their equipment and facilities, 
which were provided. While he did in fact work entirely independently, 
the integrity of his routine assessments could readily be questioned by any 
external review.
This pattern has persisted, and little seemed to change when the regulator 
transitioned from a government department (the Department of 
Environment and Conservation) to a statutory authority (the Conservation 
Environment Protection Authority or CEPA) in 2014. Among other 
things, this change was meant to ensure that the regulator would be better 
resourced to carry out its functions in an independent manner. But if 
a certain kind of ‘wilful dependency’ upon the company has persisted, in 
some respects this also extends in the opposite direction. The company’s 
environment department relies upon the local CEPA officer to maintain its 
relationship with senior CEPA management in Port Moresby, to facilitate 
any changes to permit conditions, and to help manage local community–
environment issues. While company management have sought to limit 
direct assistance to the local CEPA office—to avoid accusations of ‘buying 
off the government’—some managers have also come to the conclusion 
that some assistance will be necessary to ensure that the regulator can 
carry out those basic functions that serve the interests of the company. 
These challenges are by no means limited to Lihir and similar frustrations 
are frequently voiced across the industry.
The failure of government departments to support their staff is simply 
one of the ways that the ‘absent state’ problem manifests itself. To outside 
observers, the company’s responses might appear as the illegitimate 
assumption of state functions. But Lihirian people viewed them as entirely 
appropriate, maintaining that the presence of the mine created the need 
for these expanded services and that the company should therefore pay for 
all services. In the words of one woman: ‘Before the mine we didn’t need 
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police to patrol. Now people buy beer, fight and spoil our places, so we 
have to have policemen come and take them to the station. It’s because 
of the mine there is beer and trouble.’ Others referred to the way that 
company agents had promised that the project would improve living 
standards, health services and education. While government officers 
presented these as indirect effects of economic progress, local people saw 
them as direct benefits promised by the company.
At the provincial level, the abrogation of responsibilities was justified 
differently. In discussions with public servants in Kavieng in 2000 
about the lack of provincial support for staff stationed in Lihir, the 
somewhat cynical response to questions posed by Martha Macintyre 
was that ‘Lihirians are rich now—the money should be spent on other 
New Irelanders’. From their perspective, the mining project had brought 
economic advantages that other New Irelanders lacked. Public servants in 
other parts of the province did not have the nice new houses, new offices 
or other facilities that their colleagues working in Lihir enjoyed. As word 
spread about the houses, new roads, water tanks, electricity supplies 
(usually greatly exaggerated as in fact only the relocated Lihirian villagers 
had such benefits), so the idea of relative deprivation flourished.
The complexities of state neglect and the mismatched expectations of the 
various parties involved in benefit distribution require closer examination. 
Under the terms of the MOAs, the national government was to provide 
the provincial government and the local-level government with an 
annual Special Support Grant (SSG) to compensate for the decline in 
their share of mineral royalties under the terms of the Mining Act. The 
SSG was calculated in the same way as royalties (a percentage of annual 
gold sales from the mine) but this was not an additional tax levied on 
the developer.5 The SSG also functions like a redistribution mechanism, 
whereby the state allocates a portion of its revenue derived from resource 
extraction projects to the region or the province hosting the operation to 
compensate those who do not directly receive benefits from the project. 
It was intended for use on projects that are approved by the national 
government and to be administered by the provincial and the local-level 
governments. The payment of the annual SSG has been a continual 
source of political frustration, and the Governor of New Ireland, Sir Julius 
Chan, has often publicly proclaimed that the national government has 
5  The 1995 MOA calculated this at 1  per cent of annual revenue. The revised 2007 MOA 
calculated this at 0.25 per cent of annual revenue.
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deliberately withheld or delayed the payment of the SSG, which in turn 
has supposedly impacted the ability of the provincial government and the 
NRLLG to carry out their functions and deliver infrastructure services 
to the people of Lihir. Some observers have suggested that the state has 
continually failed to deliver the SSG because it is a conditional grant and 
provinces must apply for project funding in a designated format through 
the National Planning Office, whereas provincial governors would prefer 
to think that the SSG is unconditional funding which they can ‘manage’. 
This demonstrates the political struggles around the payment of funds 
related to the mining operation. It also reveals the antagonism between 
the different levels of government over access to mining ‘benefits’, and 
the connection between Sir Julius Chan’s well-known political ambitions 
for provincial autonomy and the desire to contain resource wealth to 
the province.
Providing Services and Assuming 
Responsibilities
With the advent of the mine vast amounts of physical infrastructure soon 
emerged in Lihir. In the newly defined ‘affected area’ villages, this entailed 
the provision of improved housing, sealed roads, reticulated water supplies 
and electrical connections. While these were originally catered for under 
the terms of the IBP agreement, there was much less clarity around who 
would be responsible for their maintenance and upkeep, and who would 
foot the bill. In the absence of the government or any other capable 
local institution, this has largely fallen to the company, as it provides the 
only source of power and manages the supply of water. The company 
also manages the Village Development Scheme (VDS), which was 
originally proposed as a benefit for communities who were not covered 
by the negotiations, but was later expanded and redesigned as a housing 
improvement program across affected and non-affected villages.6 A similar 
situation has emerged in regards to the other civic services.
6  Annual VDS provisions are outstripped by the expectation that each household will receive 
a new house. This is compounded by the need to use some of these provisions to maintain the existing 
housing stock, which creates a further cycle of dependency and community frustration. See Bainton 
(2017: 323–34).
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In the years immediately prior to the establishment of the mine, policing on 
Lihir was carried out by a couple of policemen stationed at Potzlaka. Their 
station comprised a single room, and a small shipping container served as 
the holding cell. During the construction phase of the mine, a new police 
station was constructed with several holding cells, the number of officers 
increased and several new police vehicles were supplied. The influx of 
returnees, fly-in-fly-out employees, and migrants hoping for employment 
meant that police suddenly had more to do. Crimes increased—or at least 
appeared to do so, as people reported crime more. There were more court 
cases and so the need for a courthouse arose. The mining company soon 
established a working relationship with the police as they came to rely 
on them for local law and order enforcement and to maintain a stable 
operating environment. Over time these provisions have expanded, and 
were later captured in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between 
the company and the Royal PNG Constabulary that outlined annual 
support for police operations, housing maintenance, vehicles, meals, 
uniforms and travel. In many other contexts this type of support would 
be regarded with suspicion, and in those places where the police have 
meted out forms of extrajudicial punishment it would be considered as 
evidence of corporate-funded state violence (see Golub, Chapter 3, this 
volume). But for the most part, Lihirians continue to expect the company 
to support law and order services due to the prevailing expectation that 
mining will deliver social and economic development, the belief that the 
mine is responsible for increased law and order issues and the lack of faith 
in any government department to undertake this role.
The provision of improved health services is often regarded as one of the 
most significant benefits of resource extraction. Many resource companies 
seek to improve their social and political standing through conspicuous 
contributions to community health programs, and governments often 
encourage companies to help them fill basic service gaps as a condition 
of their operating licence. Prior to the mine, health services were limited. 
Malaria was endemic, and there were high rates of infant mortality, 
tuberculosis and yaws. The Lihir Medical Centre was established in 
1996 when an MOU was put in place between the state, the provincial 
government, the Nimamar Development Authority, the Catholic Church 
health agency and the mining company for an integrated medical facility 
to be built at Londolovit to serve mine employees and their dependents 
and other residents of Lihir. The medical centre is managed by a contracted 
international health service provider, and operational costs are covered by 
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the company. The medical centre is staffed by national and expatriate 
doctors and national nurses, and in addition to servicing the company 
it provides primary healthcare services to the local community, runs 
community health outreach programs and supports the Catholic Church 
and government-run health services in Lihir.
While many Lihirians make good use of the medical centre—and the 
centre has undoubtedly helped to improve overall health conditions in 
Lihir and perhaps represents the most significant benefit of the mine—
from an early stage many Lihirians were frustrated by the fact that the 
medical centre primarily existed to serve the needs of the company. As a 
result there have been several ill-fated attempts to develop an ‘independent’ 
Lihirian-managed health program. These initiatives reflect local desires 
for autonomy—and the expectation to have the same services as white 
Australians—and the tension between simultaneously wanting the mining 
company to provide these benefits and services, and wanting to own or at 
least control specific institutions.
In the pre-mining era, education services were just as limited as health 
services. The IBP agreement contained provisions for the government 
to construct the first high school in Lihir (which has only recently been 
upgraded to cater for grades 11 and 12), and to appoint a school inspector 
who would be responsible for improving education standards across the 
schools. The company also built an international primary school in the 
residential town site which is staffed with expatriate teachers and delivers 
an Australian curriculum. The school is owned and operated by the 
company and was initially intended to service expatriate families residing 
in the company town. This situation has gradually changed as more Papua 
New Guineans are employed by the company in senior roles that come 
with housing entitlements, meaning that their children also attend the 
international school, and as wealthy Lihirians and local business people 
opt to send their children there. In addition to its technical training centre, 
the company provides annual scholarships for tertiary studies and runs 
a distance education school in partnership with the University of Papua 
New Guinea, which offers local community members an opportunity to 
complete their high school certificate. The company has a special interest in 
the local education system, since low education standards in Lihir directly 
affect the ‘talent pool’ for its local employment obligations. In order to 
address these issues, at one point the company’s human resources function 
was forced to establish bridging programs to develop basic numeracy and 
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literacy among some junior and apprentice-level employees from Lihir. 
Taken as a whole, the image that emerges is one of total dependency upon 
the company to keep essential services in place.
The Lihir Destiny: New Agreements for 
Old Issues
By the turn of the century, there was a growing realisation in Lihir that 
the IBP agreement had failed to deliver all the expected goods. The IBP 
agreement contained a provision for review every five years, and so in 
2000 LMALA and NRLLG representatives set about preparing themselves 
for this task. The review process soon became a political process as 
a self-styled group of elite male leaders who called themselves the Joint 
Negotiating Committee (JNC), comprising leaders from LMALA and 
the NRLLG, along with several members of Lihir’s ‘educated elite’, 
assumed an uncompromising stance towards the company and the state 
which prolonged the review process for multiple years as they refined 
their catalogue of requirements. The JNC members experimented with 
various strategies and formulas as they attempted to articulate their 
preferred ‘road to development’ that would provide the basis for a revised 
agreements package. By the early 2000s the JNC members had concluded 
the that first era of the mining operation had been ‘wasted’, and with each 
revised position paper their demands looked more like a development 
manifesto or a blueprint for an independent micro-nation than a standard 
compensation package that would be recognisable to the company, 
let alone the state.
During this time, the JNC members were introduced to the self-help 
philosophies of the Personal Viability (PV) movement that was taking off 
throughout the country, and they recruited the founder and director of 
this movement, ‘Papa’ Sam Tam, to implement his PV training program 
in Lihir and advise them throughout the renegotiation process. The PV 
course contained a mixture of lessons in self-help, financial management 
and entrepreneurialism. By completing various grades of training, 
individuals would become ‘personally viable’ and responsible for their 
own ‘destiny’.7 The emphasis on individual responsibility resonated with 
7  Sam Tam coordinates this program from his Entrepreneurial Development Training Centre. 
The  program has been adopted in various places in Papua New Guinea, and other Melanesian 
countries. See Bainton (2010, 2011); Bainton and Cox (2009); and Macintyre (2013).
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a broader set of concerns about local dependency upon the mine, and 
for some Lihirians PV tapped into historical aspirations to ‘unlock’ the 
secret to the wealth held by white Australians and represented the kind 
of knowledge that they suspected they had previously been denied. The 
JNC members eventually arrived upon the idea of the ‘Lihir Destiny’ 
vision, which they explained as the goal of creating a ‘healthy, wealthy, 
happy and wise society’ based upon ‘financial independence and self-
reliance for all Lihirians’, which sounded like a more consolidated version 
of the landowners’ original compensation principle presented to the 
company in 1994.
The path that would lead to this future state of balance was articulated 
in a  policy document called the Lihir Sustainable Development Plan 
(LSDP). The JNC had devised the LSDP as the road map for the Lihir 
Destiny vision. According to this vision, the mine would provide the 
financial base to enable a form of sustainable development that would 
be aided by their newly acquired commitment to the teachings of the PV 
movement. If this sounded like a vernacular form of neoliberal theory—
that placed the onus on the individual and obfuscated other structural 
inequalities—then it partially reflected the extent to which some Lihirian 
leaders had also given up on the idea that the state would provide the 
development they desired, the realisation that Lihirians would have to 
harness the future for themselves, and the belief that this would also create 
the conditions for a greater level of Lihirian independence.
In April 2007 LMALA, NRLLG, the New Ireland Provincial Government 
and the company signed the revised IBP agreement, or what came to be 
known as ‘IBP2’. The original four-chapter structure was expanded to 
a five-chapter structure to incorporate the LSDP, and the three existing 
MOAs were consolidated into a single MOA between the same parties.8 
The IBP2 agreement was underpinned by a commitment from the 
company for 100  million kina over five years (or PGK20  million per 
annum plus CPI) for the implementation of the LSDP, which represented 
8  The revised MOA set out the terms for the royalty rate and the distribution of funds; the Special 
Support Grant from the state to the provincial and local level governments; landowner equity in the 
mining project; the Tax Credit Scheme; the New Ireland Trust Fund; the roles and responsibilities 
regarding the provision of community infrastructure, health and education services, law and order 
programs, environmental monitoring, training and localisation programs for the mine, and local 
business development; and endorsement of the LSDP as the long-term economic development plan 
for Lihir.
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a substantial increase the annual funding commitment.9 This figure 
was not calculated on the actual cost of rolling out the plan, but was 
instead offered an impressive sum to unlock the negotiations and bring 
the review to a close. As one former company manager put it, ‘this was 
a  “nuclear” option to end what had been six years of torturous and at 
times acrimonious and expensive negotiation’.
These funds were referred to as the ‘IBP2 grant’, which was split across 
the five chapters of the agreement that cover various projects and 
programs, and was inclusive of the compensation paid to Lihirians for 
the physical impacts of the mine (see Figure 4.3). The scope of the final 
chapter (‘Rehabilitation’) was revised to include the mine closure plan 
and the trust funds, and the company’s environmental management plan 
was removed. Ongoing obligations from the original IBP agreement 
(including compensation payments, the VDS program and the trust 
funds) were carried over to the revised agreement, along with outstanding 
obligations like the sealing of the ring road around the main island, and 
were classified as ‘fixed obligations’. The remaining funds were then 
allocated against the other projects and programs across the chapters.
Figure 4.3 IBP2 agreement and LSDP structure
Source: N. Bainton
9  The annual PGK20  million  +  CPI payment has continued beyond the original five-year 
commitment date, due to the failure to renegotiate this agreement at the five-year mark (as discussed 
further under ‘Derailing the Destiny’).
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Figure 4.4 The Lihir IBP agreements (1995 and 2007)
Source: N. Bainton
The IBP2 agreement contained revisions to the terms of the original 
IBP agreement, combined with a set of policy statements on the LSDP 
as the blueprint for the future of Lihir, and a series of accompanying 
spreadsheets that detailed the various budget allocations for LSDP 
projects, along with the mine closure plan. The blue, hardbound cover 
of the 1995 IBP agreement was replaced with a yellow, soft-bound cover, 
replete with an aerial image of Putput village and the mine site that was 
accidently set in reverse on some copies of the agreement, which might 
be retrospectively read as a symbolic indication of the direction that the 
LSDP would eventually travel (see Figure 4.4).
The agreement required a novel set of institutional arrangements to 
govern and implement the new commitments. Some of the responsibilities 
contained in the different chapters were aligned with the functions of 
existing institutions like the NRLLG and LMALA, or the Nimamar 
Special Purposes Authority (NSPA). In other cases new ‘offices’ or 
corporate bodies were created to support the overall management of the 
LSDP, including a joint stakeholder ‘LSDP Planning and Monitoring 
Committee’, which was meant to steer Lihir towards its destiny. Figure 4.5 
provides a simplified outline of the institutional landscape in Lihir. 
The number of state entities has evidently increased since the pre-mining 
era, just as the number of Lihirian or landowner entities has flourished to 
represent an expanding set of local interests. The creation of several ‘joint 
entities’ was meant to represent their different interests and convey their 
mutual commitment to the Lihir Destiny vision.
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Figure 4.5 The institutional landscape in Lihir (past and present)
Source: N. Bainton
Under the terms of the IBP2 agreement, the NRLLG agreed to consolidate 
its budget with the IBP2 grant for the purposes of implementing the LSDP 
as the shared vision for Lihir.10 The intention was to combine the benefits 
and compensation package from the company (the annual IBP2 grant of 
PGK20 million) with the funding received by the NRLLG (the royalties 
and SSG) to provide a larger consolidated resource base to support an 
integrated development plan for Lihir (the LSDP). The aim was to 
ensure that the landowners received their due entitlement, to supplement 
the government’s resources to deliver services and infrastructure for all 
Lihirians, and to avoid duplication between projects and programs that are 
provided by the company (mainly for the affected area communities), and 
those that are provided by the government (mainly for the community as 
a whole).
Chapter 1 of the agreement therefore contained a raft of social development 
projects and programs that were meant to enhance those services that 
the government was already responsible for delivering under the terms 
of the MOA. This was to be coordinated through a newly established 
Lihir Sustainable Development Office (LSDO) in conjunction with 
the NRLLG. Chapter  2 set out the range of compensation payments 
and grants that would be received by the affected area communities, and 
10  The IBP2 agreement also contained provisions for a capacity-building program to ensure that 
the primary stakeholder institutions would be able to implement the LSDP. Curiously, this did not 
include the company; it was incorrectly assumed that the company had sufficient capacity to play its 
role. The agreement also contained provisions related to Lihirian equity in the mine, and landowner 
participation in mining (i.e. business contracts).
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commitments to a newly formed group of ‘Specific Issues Committees’ 
or ‘SICs’, that notionally represented the interests of specific landowner 
groups and their ‘specific issues’ in relation to the mining operation.11 
LMALA was responsible for the overall coordination of this chapter, 
which entailed oversight of these new SICs and their programs, and the 
delivery of various affected area community grants, while the company was 
responsible for directly managing royalty and compensation payments.
Chapter  3 outlined the social infrastructure projects (like bridges, 
roads and buildings) to be delivered by the NSPA, which served as the 
technical arm of the NRLLG. Funding provisions were included to 
cover the administration of the NSPA. Chapter 4 focused on providing 
‘economic security’ for Lihirians through the delivery of the PV training 
program, and the development of ‘non-mining dependent’ economic 
activities, including a livestock farm and a micro bank to support those 
‘grassroots’ entrepreneurs who would soon graduate from the PV course. 
The institutions notionally responsible for this chapter included a new 
local company called Lihir Sustainable Development Limited, the peak 
landowner company Lakaka (later rebranded as Anitua), and Mineral 
Resources Lihir, which managed Lihirian equity in the mine (which was 
later sold down to create the MRL investment and future funds12). The 
final chapter contained the annual commitments to the trust funds, and 
the conceptual mine closure plan to be administered by the company. 
As an entire package this was the basis for achieving long-held visions 
of ‘modernity’ and the transition towards an autonomous future.
Derailing the Destiny
Soon after the signing of the IBP2 agreement, the parties retreated to 
their respective corners of the island and the company was left with the 
task of working out how to handle these revised commitments. The new 
agreement, and the visionary plan that it underpinned, was meant to 
represent a new era of collaboration. But it was soon apparent that it would 
take a lot more to address the historical tensions between these groups 
and to align their competing interests. This situation was partly related 
11  This included, for example, a ‘Plantsite SIC’, ‘Putput and Ladolam SIC’, ‘Pit and Stockpile 
SIC’, ‘Kapit Relocation SIC’, ‘Airport SIC’ and others. The list of SICs has since grown, as each 
aggrieved community group has sought formal recognition of their specific set of issues.
12  See MRL Capital: www.mrlcapital.com.pg/
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to the structure of the new agreement, and the lack of detail around how 
these arrangements should be managed, especially the so-called ‘LSDP 
consolidated funds’ comprising the IBP2 grant from the company and the 
NRLLG’s budget contribution.
The management and control of the LSDP consolidated funds has been 
at the centre of a long-term dispute between LMALA and the NRLLG, 
which started immediately after the signing of the revised agreement. 
The dispute arose around the implementation of the LSDP and because 
governance processes for the management of government royalties and 
company grants were not established as provided for under the terms 
of the  revised MOA and new agreement. The consistent inability of 
the parties to work together has resulted in numerous revised and 
interim arrangements for the management of projects supported by the 
IBP2 grant.13
Up to 2012, IBP2 grant projects were budgeted by the joint stakeholder 
LSDP Planning and Monitoring Committee with the NRLLG. In June 
2012, the NRLLG and LMALA signed a joint resolution that ended 
this short period of troubled collaboration. The LSDP Planning and 
Monitoring Committee was effectively folded into LMALA, who then 
assumed responsibility for implementing the IBP2 grant and the overall 
LSDP, while the NRLLG ‘independently managed’ the expenditure of 
its royalty funds. The parties justified the split by appealing to Biblical 
law: let the government (or Caesar) claim what was ‘rightfully’ theirs, 
which in turn confirmed the autonomy of LMALA over all land-related 
benefits and compensation (the IBP2 grant from the company). This 
immediately undermined the philosophical intent of the LSDP. Since 
2012, the company and LMALA (and its LSDP Planning and Monitoring 
Committee) have jointly agreed upon annual budget allocations for 
LSDP projects and programs across the five chapters. The company has 
managed ‘fixed obligations’—which largely amounts to the direct payment 
of compensation monies under Chapter 2 and the VDS program under 
Chapter 1—and LMALA has assumed responsibility for implementation 
of all other LSDP projects and programs.
13  There is insufficient space in this chapter to document the details of the disputes between 
these parties, the subsequent legal investigations, the various mechanics for the governance and 
implementation of LSDP programs, or the outcomes of these arrangements.
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This arrangement partly reflects LMALA’s efforts to control all funds and 
programs under the LSDP, and the commitment of LMALA leaders to the 
Lihir Destiny vision and their sense of frustration over the capacity of the 
government to provide services for the Lihirian community. It also reflects 
the belief within LMALA that the IBP agreement is a  compensation 
agreement primarily between the developer and the affected area 
communities, which therefore entitles them to control and manage all 
funds derived from this agreement, along with an overarching desire to 
minimise any interference by the state. Both parties have attempted to 
claim the moral ground, with LMALA asserting that if it was not for the 
sacrifice of their members there would be no benefits or royalties, while 
the NRLLG has claimed that it existed well before the mine and will 
continue to exist once mining operations end, at which point there will 
be no further need for landowners to incorporate their interests. This has 
resulted in a deepening twist, as LMALA has deliberately assumed a quasi-
government role as it has attempted to implement the LSDP, which has 
demanded even greater efforts by the company to manage the local fallout 
from this arrangement, leading it further down the path towards behaving 
more like a quasi-state than a developer.
These struggles and contradictions have been exacerbated by a further 
review of the compensation and benefit-sharing agreement that has run 
in parallel to the implementation of the existing arrangements. In 2012, 
the company commenced the second review of the IBP agreement, which 
came to be known as the Lihir Agreements Review process. This has been 
a stop-start affair that has divided Lihirians and come at great cost to the 
company, LMALA and the NRLLG. At the time of writing this chapter, 
the review process was still in progress because the parties have been 
unable to agree on the size, content and structure of a revised agreements 
package—or what may eventually become the ‘IBP3’. The changes and 
issues we have described are set against the background of an unresolved 
and politicised review process and a local crisis of representation. This has 
meant, among other things, that implementation of the IBP2 agreement 
is thoroughly entangled with the politics of the Lihir Agreements Review, 
as the frustrations with the current arrangements are intensified by the 
delays to the review process, which in turn places even greater pressure 
upon the company to keep basic community services running, and 
increases the unrealistic expectation that a new agreement will somehow 
solve all of these problems. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that any 
new agreements package will be considered acceptable by the residents 
of Lihir.
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The Tax Credit Scheme
In an attempt to address the gaps created by state absence, and to reconcile 
the wider expectation of service and infrastructure provision, in 2011 the 
company started implementing the tax credit scheme, which is perhaps 
the most blatant manifestation of the ‘absent state’ phenomenon and 
the blurring of the boundaries between state taxes and corporate-funded 
community development. This scheme was developed when it became 
apparent that neither national government agencies nor provincial 
governments are able to fulfil their commitments in the various benefit-
sharing agreements to which they are a party. The tax credit scheme 
originated in 1992 at the Porgera Gold Mine, after the management of 
the mine came to the conclusion that the benefit-sharing agreements, to 
which they were not a party, presented a major risk to stable operations.14 
The national and provincial levels of government had failed to uphold their 
commitments under these agreements and as a result local community 
representatives were justifiably annoyed, inflaming an already volatile 
social landscape in the vicinity of the mine (see Golub, Chapter 3, this 
volume). The company understood the importance of maintaining local 
political support for the mine, so they persuaded the national government 
to introduce an ‘infrastructure tax credit scheme’ in the 1992 budget 
(Filer and Imbun 2007: 89). The scheme entailed an amendment to the 
Income Tax Act that then allowed the developers of large-scale resource 
projects to expend up to 0.75 per cent of their gross revenues on social 
and economic infrastructure projects. This expenditure would then be 
offset as a credit against the annual tax on profits ordinarily payable by 
these companies to the national government. In practice, this meant 
that companies could use their own engineering and project delivery 
capacities to satisfy the demand for improved infrastructure within local 
project areas and in adjoining areas that would otherwise not receive any 
project-related benefits. In theory, this would increase the level of local 
and regional support for individual mining projects at no extra cost to 
these developers.
14  A second key driver was the failure of the national government to maintain the Highlands 
Highway. The Porgera Joint Venture wanted to ensure that it remained open, as a primary lifeline for 
the operation, but it did not want to take on that particular state responsibility without some fiscal 
compensation.
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Although the tax credit scheme already existed when the original benefit-
sharing agreements for the Lihir gold mine were signed in 1995, the 
company did not start implementing the scheme until 2011, which was 
partly because the company had previously claimed it was not in a position 
to pay corporate tax to the national government, and was therefore not 
eligible for any credits. The program got off to a bumpy start that sparked 
a public relations debacle as the provincial governor, Sir Julius Chan, 
launched an offensive against the company for its failure to complete 
agreed tax credit infrastructure projects on mainland New Ireland. 
In 2013, the price of gold fell substantially, although not as substantially 
as the share price of the company, but by that stage the company had 
already made commitments to the provincial government to fund 
numerous infrastructure projects over the coming years. The governor 
insisted that these funding commitments must be upheld regardless of 
corporate profitability and so, as a show of compromise, the company 
agreed to fund tax credit scheme projects at a set annual level from its own 
internal cash flows even though the company still maintained that it was 
no longer in a tax-paying position.
The tax credit scheme originally arose as a company-led solution to the 
lack of capacity within provincial and national governments, and as 
a kind of strategy to enhance local political support for a specific mining 
project. In the case of Lihir, the primary source of pressure to deliver 
upon this scheme has come from the provincial government rather than 
the project area communities. This is partly due to the local expectation 
that the company will directly fund development projects as a form of 
compensation or as a benefit under the IBP agreement rather than an 
additional corporate tax offset. Management of the tax credit scheme in 
Lihir has been via a joint committee (comprising provincial, sub-district 
and NRLLG representatives), and has targeted projects that are not 
covered under the IBP2 agreement, which is Lihir-specific, whereas the 
tax credit scheme is notionally province-wide.
If multinational mining companies have their own reasons for implementing 
the tax credit scheme, or being seen to do so, this obviously lightens the 
load on national government agencies and provincial governments and 
delivers tangible benefits that might otherwise not be seen. But this should 
not blind us to the real decline in the capacity of relevant government 
agencies to accomplish their commitments and uphold their obligations 
to project area communities. Although the operator of the Lihir mine 
claims to have expended almost PGK100 million between 2011 and 2019 
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on various education, health and road infrastructure projects across New 
Ireland Province, including in Lihir (NML 2019), this has barely lifted 
the capability of the provincial government, much less the NRLLG, to 
provide comparable contributions and fulfil their commitments under 
the IBP agreement and the MOA. So while the tax credit scheme might 
represent a ‘good news story’ for individual companies and local members 
of parliament who are invited to participate in the ceremonial opening of 
these projects, in practice it has done little to alleviate the pressures arising 
from the lack of governance around the core benefit-sharing agreements 
at each resource extraction project. And in Lihir it more or less serves 
as a parallel or supplementary development program managed by the 
company to fill some of the spaces created by the failure of the IBP2 
agreement and the selective absence of the state (or at the very least to 
divert some attention away from this development fiasco).
Conclusion: Being in a State 
of Compromise
In his account of the original planning and negotiation processes for the 
Lihir gold mine, Colin Filer suggested that the government may consider 
the geographical isolation of the project as a pretext for treating Lihir 
as an enclave that the company could then administer from its own 
plentiful resources, while the company may find that it is too engrossed 
in its engineering and accounting problems to pay serious attention to the 
needs and fears of the local community (Filer 1995: 73). A variation of 
this dilemma has ultimately come to pass, and equally so at every other 
major mining project throughout the country.
While the state has maintained a limited presence in Lihir relative to the 
expectations of some Lihirians and most managers of the company, the 
state clearly has a far greater presence now than it had in 1985, when it 
was almost completely absent. If the presence of the state is measured 
by the number of residents who are now on the government payroll, it 
does not appear to have any less of a presence than it has in other rural 
local-level government areas in New Ireland Province. The size or scale 
of its presence should therefore be distinguished from the source of the 
funds used to maintain it and people’s perceptions of its capacity to keep 
its promises. And it could certainly be argued that its presence has been 
dwarfed by the expansion of the mining company, and further diminished 
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by the company’s assumption of governmental functions. Moreover, the 
selective absence of the state has cornered the company into a far more 
intensive relationship with the local Lihirian community, enhancing the 
perception of the absence of the state.
The inability of the government to fulfil its basic duties under the 
terms of the MOA is only one part of the problem. The other part of 
the problem is that the company has been lumbered with responsibility 
for the implementation of agreements that were substantially devised 
by other stakeholders. The original development forum agreements 
(or MOAs) were mainly based on a template devised by public servants 
in Port Moresby, which was then modified in light of pressure from local 
community (especially LMALA) representatives. The IBP2 agreement, 
and the LSDP, were predominantly the product of the JNC and reflect 
the thinking of its members who saw themselves as the vanguards for 
a  cultural revolution in Lihir. This partly explains why the company 
has been unable to set in place robust governing controls around the 
agreements. This situation has been compounded by the emergence of 
a complex institutional landscape comprised of numerous competing 
entities or corporate bodies. The net result is a convoluted and constantly 
shifting set of governance arrangements for managing benefits and 
compensation payments and maintaining the delivery of basic services.
Several interrelated processes now begin to emerge. Historical experiences 
of neglect and local engagement with external forces—manifest in 
a combination of ambivalence, tension and enthusiasm for institutional 
governance and order—have culminated in various schemes to attain 
a form of independence, which have most recently taken the shape of 
the Lihir Destiny vision, captured in the LSDP. But the inability to fully 
enact these policies and programs (funded by the mining company) has 
reinforced local desires to maintain total control over all mine-derived 
funds and programs as a way of dealing with their real and perceived 
issues with the company and the state, and as a way of satisfying their 
needs and aspirations. At this point, we can ask whether local community 
and landowner representatives actually want the state, in the shape of 
the national or provincial government, to have a greater presence in the 
islands. In some respects, it seems that they do not.
The concept of fungibility also helps to explain the government’s 
abrogation of its responsibilities in Lihir (just as it does in the case of 
the global aid industry). Mine-related funding intended for social 
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development projects has frequently been diverted, directly or indirectly, 
to other programs or uses, including administrative expenses. This has 
been a constant concern for the company—in relation to both the NRLLG 
and its use of royalties and the SSG, and LMALA’s use of the IBP2 grant. 
In order to protect its interests and keep the operation open, the company 
is therefore routinely required to assume the functions of the government, 
sometimes arbitrating between disputing parties or acting as a corporate 
community development agency, which ultimately creates conditions of 
total dependency upon the mining operation. The very structure of the 
agreements is partly to blame for this situation, and has exacerbated this 
state of corporate and community compromise.
From this perspective, the state is perhaps better described as an 
inattentive parent who periodically meddles in community affairs, or an 
absent landlord who occasionally comes to inspect their industrial estates, 
regularly collecting ‘rental payments’ (in the form of royalties and taxes), 
yet pays no attention to the harm their corporate tenants are inflicting 
upon their residential neighbours. However, these analogies only go so far, 
and from the perspective of the community, the government has no moral 
right to benefit from the mine and ‘their’ resources so long as it fails to 
enact its state responsibilities.
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Absence as Immoral Act: 
The PNG LNG Project and the 
Impact of an Absent State
Michael Main
Inside Gigira burns Laitebo, which when kindled, the flames will 
illuminate Hela and the land beyond.
‘The Hela Prophecy’ (Cuthbert 2009)
Introduction
In May 2014, Papua New Guinea (PNG) exported the first shipment 
of liquefied natural gas from its newly completed Papua New Guinea 
Liquefied Natural Gas (PNG LNG) project. The PNG LNG project 
had been promoted as a nation-defining project that was predicted to 
‘transform the economy of Papua New Guinea’ creating benefits that 
would ‘improve the lives of Papua New Guineans by providing essential 
services’ and declaring that the project’s landowners ‘stand to benefit from 
direct payment of royalties on production of gas and associated petroleum 
products, as well as improved social and economic infrastructure’ 
(ACIL Tasman 2008: v). The project has since become synonymous with 
the struggle of aggrieved landowners against the social and economic 
failures of resource development, and the corruption and neglect of 
a largely absent Papua New Guinean state. Analysis has shown that in 
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reality ‘the PNG economy is in a worse state than it would have been if 
it stayed on the underlying growth path of the 2000s and had no PNG 
LNG project’ (Flanagan and Fletcher 2018: 12).
The PNG LNG project began construction in the mountainous terrain 
of what is now PNG’s Hela Province in 2010. The project took around 
four years to construct at a reported cost of USD19 billion, making it 
the largest and most capital-intensive resource project in the history 
of the region. The project is vast in scale and includes a purpose-built 
international airport at Komo (see Figure 5.1), a gas conditioning plant 
at Hides where the gas extraction wells are located (the Hides Gas 
Conditioning Plant (HGCP)), a 290 km onshore pipeline to the Omati 
River and a 407 km offshore pipeline beneath the Gulf of Papua to the 
LNG plant at Caution Bay. The large footprint of the project means that 
it affects a number of landowner groups. The HGCP and extraction wells 
are located along a mountain ridge, known as Hides Ridge, the Huli 
name for which is Gigira. The overarching agreement signed between 
the landowners for the project and the state is known as the Umbrella 
Benefits Sharing Agreement (UBSA), under which landowners in specific 
Petroleum Development License areas signed License Benefits Sharing 
Agreements (LBSA). The landowners of the gas resource are the Huli-
speaking clans of Hela Province who have genealogical ties to land 
associated with the PNG LNG project, and whose representatives signed 
up to a series of LBSAs prior to the project’s construction. These LBSAs 
also included development promises that pertain to the entire province, 
which is expected to benefit as a whole from the project. These agreements 
were signed between the landowners and the state of PNG, and included 
promises of direct royalty payments to landowners in addition to a range 
of infrastructure projects including the construction of roads and schools, 
power supply and medical centres. Landowners from other parts of the 
project such as the pipeline and the LNG plant at Caution Bay in Central 
Province also signed various agreements. This chapter focuses on the 
Huli population of Hela Province, who are by far the largest landowning 
population and the customary landowners of the gas resource.
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Figure 5.1 Hela geography
Source: Modified from Ballard (1995): Vol. 2, Figure B11
During fieldwork conducted in 2016, two years after the project began 
operating, it was immediately clear to me that Hela Province and its 
landowners had benefited little from the project, and it seemed that 
the majority of the population were arguably worse off as a result of the 
project. Frustration seethed among landowners at the absence of promised 
infrastructure and the failure to pay royalties because the landowners 
were yet to be officially identified by the state through the ‘landowner 
identification’ processes required under the terms of the Oil and Gas Act 
(see Filer 2019). Health and education services that existed prior to the 
project were in decline, and blame for the situation was largely attributed 
to the corrupt behaviour of politicians and various public servants. Yet the 
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PNG LNG project remains a venture that defines Hela as a province, and 
even, as this chapter will argue, as an Indigenous nation for its majority 
Huli-speaking population.
The concept of the state itself has been a highly contested subject for 
social theorists. The state of PNG exists firmly as an idea in the minds 
of its citizens, despite the extraordinary diversity of its cultural terrain, 
hundreds of language groups, immense poverty, lack of state infrastructure 
and the inability of the state to project power to its own borders. For 
many Papua New Guineans, the state of PNG therefore exists largely in 
spite of its apparent absence. This chapter reverses the focus from James 
Scott’s concern with how the state sees its citizens (Scott 1998), to an 
interest in how citizens view the state, and by extension, how it is that 
the state can exist at all when it refuses to see its citizens. This poses the 
obvious question: how can the state be described as something that sees or 
doesn’t see? The state is not an object but the subject of itself, consisting 
of its own citizens, some of whom come to represent the state and occupy 
positions of state power. The state is not other to itself, and when it 
sees, it is doing the seeing of itself. This has important implications, as 
highlighted in this chapter, for when state officials are caught between 
their simultaneous roles as state representatives and state subjects. I take 
the view proposed by Chernilo ‘that social theory’s ambivalent attempts 
at conceptualizing the nation-state reflect the actual ambivalence of the 
position of the nation-state in modernity’ (2006: 6). Out of this embrace 
of ambivalence that might liberate social theory from the need to define 
the state, I propose that the state be viewed simply as a value proposition 
held by a collective. The value propositions that form modern nation 
states are encoded and symbolised in ways that are common to all of 
these states: in foundational text, in national song, in flags and in the 
arts. This value proposition invests the state with a great deal of power, 
including the power to dispense justice. I would go as far to suggest that 
it is unreasonable to ask what it is that defines the state, because it is 
the undefined nature of the state that makes it possible for the state to 
exist. A better question to ask is: why does the state exist? The state is a 
desired and idealised collectivity with strongly defined borders. The state 
exists because it consists of subjects who collectively value its existence. 
The difference between a state and a nation is a legal one; both are value 
propositions that are collectively made. The question as to why humans 
have come to form collectives that value the existence of states is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. This understanding of the state creates the space 
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for the state to be materially absent, yet still exist firmly as a set of values 
according to which the state should behave even if it does not. An analogy 
might be made with Lao Tzu’s famous observation that the wheel is 
defined by the hole in the middle (Tzu 1963: 67). The state is an enabling 
constraint encircling the desire that the state should exist.
This chapter explores the role of natural resources in the value proposition 
that is the state of PNG. The country’s Constitution includes the 
declaration of its fourth goal ‘for Papua New Guinea’s natural resources and 
environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, 
and be replenished for the benefit of future generations’ (GPNG 1975: 4). 
Former prime minister Sir Julius Chan’s famous statement that PNG 
‘is  a  mountain of gold floating on a sea of oil’ seeks to legitimise the 
state by establishing a natural resource base upon which PNG’s founding 
values can be proposed. In the eyes of the state and the Huli landowners, 
these values ideally underpin the establishment of the PNG LNG project.
Once Were Hegemonic
At the beginning of the PNG LNG project’s construction Hela did 
not exist as a province, and the Hela landscape was part of the larger 
Southern Highlands Province. Yet Hela did exist as a concept and calls 
for the creation of Hela as a separate province date to the 1960s. During 
a sitting of the third House of Assembly of Papua and New Guinea in 
1974, Andrew Wabiria, member for the Koroba-Kopiago electorate of 
PNG’s Southern Highlands District, moved a motion that called for the 
establishment of a new Hela Province to be carved out of the existing 
Southern Highlands District.1 It was not until the full potential of Hela’s 
vast gas reserves began to be exploited by the PNG LNG project that the 
realisation of Hela as a province started to become a reality. By the time 
the province of Hela, covering an area of 10,498 km2 with an estimated 
population that in 2011 exceeded 250,000 (GPNG 2013), was finally 
established in August 2012, the struggle for its creation had become 
inextricably linked with the development of the vast natural gas reserves 
that exist beneath Hela’s mountainous terrain.
1  Districts became Provinces when PNG became independent in 1975.
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The historical underpinnings of the contemporary notion of Hela need 
to be described in order to understand the contemporary relationship 
between Hela, the PNG LNG project, ExxonMobil and the state. The 
population of Hela Province is dominated by Huli-speaking clans that 
identify a geographical and cultural core of Huliness which includes the 
main township of Tari (Ballard 2002). The mythology at the basis for 
the concept of a Hela people involves an apical ancestor named Hela 
who was the progenitor of the five groups that occupy the Tari basin and 
surrounds. These five groups are derived from the offspring of Hela’s four 
sons and one daughter: Huli, Duna, Obena, Duguba and Wana Hewa.2 
This is the contemporary rendition of the Hela story, which has solidified 
into a neatly packaged concept that is widely accepted and understood 
across the population of Hela, and that has been disseminated through 
PNG’s media to become part of PNG’s national story. For Huli, Obena 
include Ipili and Enga groups to the northeast and east; Duna lie to the 
northwest; Duguba include Papuan Plateau groups to the south; and 
Wana Hewa to the southeast (see Figure 5.1).
Many different versions of Huli and Hela origin stories were in existence 
prior to the influence of the Australian colonial administration, which 
began in earnest during the 1950s. Following the exploration and/or 
exploitation of nearby gold, oil and gas reserves during the 1980s, Hela 
as a political project took on a much greater urgency, solidifying into 
a singular Hela narrative and vision of development for the province 
and its people.3 However, the concept of Hela itself pre-existed both 
the exploitation of natural resources, and the earlier influence of the 
Australian administration, as did a Huli hegemonic tendency towards 
the material and cosmological control of their entire known world. After 
the first Patrol Post in Huli territory was established at Tari in 1951, the 
early patrol officers soon realised that the people of the Tari area were 
part of a much broader understanding of a Hela people: ‘The word 
Hela Huri4 is often heard and seems to embrace all true Huri people’ 
(Esdale 1955: 21). Esdale’s interpretation of the word ‘Hela’ as ‘altogether’ 
or ‘one kind’, while semantically incorrect, does describe the sentiment 
2  Wana Hewa is usually contracted to Wan Hewa in common parlance. Other versions have Wana 
Hewa as a son, rather than a daughter, however the version that includes a daughter has emerged as 
the dominant mythology.
3  These include the Mt Kare gold rush in neighbouring Enga Province, and gas exploration 
undertaken by BP in what is now Hela Province.
4  Huli was initially spelled as ‘Huri’ by the Australian administration during the 1950s.
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of a people united by a singular, apical ancestor named Hela. Hela is 
simply the name of the apical ancestor described above. The idea of Hela, 
as it is held by its Huli-speaking majority, may be reasonably described 
in terms of an Indigenous nationhood. If we take Benedict Anderson’s 
(1983: 49) model for nationhood as a community where most people 
are unknown to each other and ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion’, then the size and extent of the shared historical, 
cosmological and genealogical understanding of Hela, linked by extensive 
trade routes and ritual connections, is a snug fit. This understanding of 
nationhood is incorporated by my definition of the state, and there is no 
reason why the two cannot coexist, as one value proposition encompassed 
by another. The state of PNG is able to incorporate a diverse range of 
Indigenous groups who all subscribe to the value proposition that is the 
state, which is something that Huli have done enthusiastically since PNG 
gained independence.
Huli view themselves as having a central location in relation to 
surrounding groups, and have historically imposed their own hegemonic 
understanding of themselves on their neighbours. This understanding is 
realised simultaneously in terms of their trading relationships, mythical 
genealogical recall and cosmology. At this point it should be stated that 
much of Huli traditional knowledge has either vanished or been radically 
transformed over the past few decades; however, what is being described 
here does provide the foundation for contemporary Huli understandings 
of themselves and of their relationship to both the PNG LNG project 
and the PNG state. In cosmological terms the most important Huli ritual 
site was a place called Gelote, which roughly translates as ‘the support of 
the universe’ (Goldman 1981: 75). This site was at the centre of a vast 
cosmological system known as dindi pongo (‘root of the earth’) that linked 
together several other ritual sites that are dotted across the extent of Hela. 
Gelote was also referred to idiomatically as dindi hanuni, or ‘the middle 
land’.5 In material terms, Huli are situated centrally in relation to their 
trading partners. Prior to colonial intervention, Huli not only identified 
themselves as being at the cosmological centre of the universe, but also 
played a central role in the control of regional trade (Ballard 1994). Here 
I differ from Aletta Biersack when she writes that Huli, Duna and Ipili 
people ‘were “ex-centric,” centred not on themselves as geographical 
isolates but on the culturally diverse field in which their mythology, 
5  Quite literally, ‘middle earth’.
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trade routes, and marriage practices embedded them’ (1995:  7). Huli 
did not consider themselves to be ‘geographical isolates’, but their 
geographical connectivity was certainly centred upon themselves, which 
was also recognised by their neighbours as Huli functioned as a regional 
trading language. Indeed, their centrist and hegemonic understanding of 
themselves depended upon their connections throughout the diverse field 
that surrounded them.
Much has been written on the cosmological underpinnings of this 
expansive Huli world-view (Goldman 1983; Frankel 1986; Ballard 1994, 
1995), but economic factors in the form of trade routes and centres of 
production peripheral to a centralised Huli-controlled trading zone are at 
least equally important to providing an understanding of the Huli-centric 
notion of Hela, and it is these material concerns that have transformed to 
become the most important aspect of people’s lives. As Tom Ernst writes, 
‘The degree of freedom of movement by Huli and to Huli territory is more 
likely to have been “the peace of the trade” than a commonly subscribed 
to Huli ritual or cosmological hegemony’ (2008: 31). Today the primacy 
of these material concerns has emerged as the strongest motivator of 
contemporary events. The PNG LNG project has returned Huli to the 
centre of economic activity, which is a position to which they feel both 
cosmologically and historically entitled. The major difference between the 
present situation and the past is that power is now located external to Huli 
territory, and the material destiny of Hela is largely in the hands of the 
state rather than Huli themselves.
Huli have retained an understanding of their historically superior status 
at the centre of economic activity, and have incorporated the existence of 
gas reserves into their trading cosmology. A Huli friend in Tari explained 
to me his understanding of the history of Huli trading relationships in the 
following way:
Engans get salt, they cut small trees and throw them into a spring 
and stay for months in the water. Salt crystals grow on the wood. 
Then they dry and burn the wood and collect the salt to make 
bundles of salt. The Engans (Obena) want to trade with Komo 
people, but not the Tari Huli. Men from Hulia (Tari Huli) stopped 
the Obena from travelling down to Komo and Bosavi by telling 
the Obena that the Duguba people will eat them. Obena are fatter, 
stockier people and the Duguba will like to eat them. It is safe for 
the skinnier Huli to trade with the Duguba, so they take the salt 
from the frightened Obena and trade with Duguba for cassowary 
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feathers and bones, bird of paradise feathers, tree oil, and wood 
that Huli use to make bows. The Huli give some of these things to 
Obena people but keep the best for themselves. Huli people must 
keep the Obena and Duguba people apart. The prophecy states 
that one day they will see each other and then an eternal fire that 
exists beneath the Gigira Range, the Lai Tebo fire, will light all the 
way from Gigira to Obena territory.
This is now interpreted to be the power line that runs from Nogoli to 
power the Porgera Gold Mine. Nogoli is located about 20 km southwest 
of Tari and is the site of the gas turbine that generates power for Porgera 
in neighbouring Enga Province.
This cosmological aspect of the Huli trading relationship, expressed as 
a desire to prevent the meeting of the Duguba and Obena people lest the 
land be destroyed, has been described by Ballard (1995).6 The economic 
and cosmological drivers for this concern are not easily separated, and my 
opinion is that the movement of people across distances amounting to tens 
of kilometres into neighbouring territories should be viewed through the 
lens of the primacy of material interests. Huli cosmology more broadly, 
I would argue, needs to be understood in material terms, and it is these 
material desires that are driving the reconfiguration of Huli cosmology to 
incorporate the presence and extraction of natural resources. This view is 
supported by Huli themselves who consistently describe the purpose of 
their cosmological rituals in terms of the maintenance and resurrection 
of the fertility ‘of the entire universe’ (Ballard 1994: 142). With the 
development of the PNG LNG project, the material underpinnings of 
Huli cosmology are well and truly dominant, but the power to realise 
material desires is in the hands of the state.
A Prophecy of Abundance and the 
Immorality of an Absent State
The PNG LNG project is so vast in scale and conception that its 
gravitational pull has reduced the development aspirations of Hela to 
a singularity. Every hope and dream of every Hela citizen was expected 
6  Ballard reports ‘a somewhat cynical young Huli businessman’ who posited that ‘this stricture 
was formulated by his ancestors precisely to maintain the monopoly enjoyed by Huli on the lucrative 
trade between Obena and Duguba groups of such wealth items as salt, tree oil and blackpalm bow 
staves’ (Ballard 1995: 57).
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to be realised via the LNG wealth that had been imagined without end. 
PNG LNG was imagined by the project’s main protagonists, ExxonMobil 
and Oil Search, and the PNG state, as well as the Huli population, as 
a paradigm shift in the material landscape of the people and of the future. 
To an extent, Huli had been here before when in the 1660s the Long 
Island volcano erupted and changed their world utterly and instantly. 
A Plinian eruption of equivalent magnitude to that of Krakatau in 1883 
deposited a layer of volcanic ash across the PNG highlands (Blong 1982). 
Huli stories of a time of darkness, known as mbingi in Huli, were first 
recognised as being related to this eruption by Blong (1979). The details 
of the stories varied, and were recorded by the first patrol officers assigned 
to Huli territory during the 1950s. During a patrol into the Komo basin 
from Lake Kutubu, Charles Terrell (1953: 18) recorded a story about 
a time of ‘white rain’ when the sky became dark and ‘white stuff that was 
like the ground’ fell for seven days. After that event the people found that 
their sweet potato crops grew faster than they had before. The volcanic 
ash brought such enhanced fertility to the soil that ritual practices 
emerged that were dedicated to bringing on the event again. Crucially, 
the line between disaster and renewal was finely balanced and depended 
on correct moral behaviour and observance of strict moral codes, breaches 
of which are known in Huli as ilili (forbidden act). Improper behaviour 
could result in the failure of mbingi and the destruction of the entire 
known Huli universe.
A preoccupation with mbingi combined with the rapid embrace of 
Christianity from the mid-1950s onwards was shown by Ballard (2000) 
to have intersected neatly with Christian notions of the apocalypse and, 
in particular, the role of human moral agency in bringing about the 
destruction of the land. One of the most enduring features of a Huli 
world-view has been the perception that the world is in a constant state of 
decline. This ‘entropic’ perception of the Huli universe has been influenced 
by recurring natural events such as droughts and floods and much of Huli 
ritual was devoted to reversing this downward trajectory of material and 
social change (Ballard 2000: 207). By the time of the PNG LNG project, 
the cultural memory of mbingi was in retreat and the time of darkness was 
no longer evoked in Huli expectations of the future. But an expectation 
of apocalyptic transformation remained as a habitus of anticipation that 
was ready and open to the promises of PNG LNG to which Huli believed 
themselves to be ancestrally entitled. PNG LNG became the new mbingi 
and the prophecy known as Gigira Lai Tebo (see below) was elevated into 
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the realm of truth and demonstrable fact, evidenced unmistakably by the 
giant fire that burns day and night from the top of ExxonMobil’s flaring 
tower. As a technical-political project, the PNG LNG project is also finely 
balanced between success and development failure. Notwithstanding the 
technical success of the PNG LNG project, and its ability to generate 
revenue for the companies and their investors, from the point of view of 
its Huli landowners, the immoral behaviour that has tipped the project 
towards development disaster is found in the corruption and neglect of 
an absent state. The immorality of state absence is a material threat  to 
the future aspirations of Huli and the prophetic entitlement of Hela 
to benefit from its gas.
Gigira Lai Tebo
As stated above, the gas resource for the PNG LNG project lies beneath 
a northwest–southeast limestone mountain ridge commonly known as 
Hides Ridge. The Huli name for this mountain is Hari Gigira (Mt Gigira).7 
ExxonMobil drilled its gas wells along this ridge and constructed its vast 
Hides Gas Conditioning Plant (HGCP) towards the southeastern end of 
the ridge between 2010 and 2014 (see Figure 5.1). The topography of the 
Gigira Range results in soft cloud formations that settle blanket-like and 
fall down the sides of the range. The effect is similar in appearance to the 
white smoke that oozes from the kunai-grass roofs of Huli houses when 
a fire is burning within (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). This visual effect is the 
source of the belief that there is a fire that burns beneath the Gigira Range. 
Huli houses are built with a central fireplace that is fed by long pieces of 
split firewood extending towards the doorway. The hardest and hottest-
burning firewood comes from the lai tree (Dodonaea viscosa), commonly 
known in Australia as sticky hop bush, of which an unusually tall variety 
grows in the PNG highlands. The Huli word ‘tebo’ refers to the glowing 
coals of a fire. Running beneath the Gigira Range is a giant, burning piece 
of lai wood—the Gigira Lai Tebo. The Gigira Lai Tebo story is one of 
many Huli mythological tales that relate to land formations across Hela. 
One of the LNG ships dedicated to the PNG LNG project even bears the 
name ‘Gigira Laitebo’ (see Figure 5.4).
7  Hari means ‘mountain’ in Huli. Gigira is a range or ridge formation rather than a mountain 
peak, however, hari is a more generalised descriptor for a mountain form rather than a geographically 
specific mountain peak.
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Figure 5.2 Huli house with smoke oozing through the roof
Source: Photograph by author
Figure 5.3 Gigira Range with cloud
Source: Photograph by author
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Figure 5.4 Gigira Laitebo ship
Source: Geraldo Pietragala on VesselFinder (www.vesselfinder.com)
Figure 5.5 ExxonMobil’s HGCP on Gigira Range
Source: Photograph by author
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
154
When gas extraction wells were first drilled on Gigira, people living on 
the slopes of the Gigira Range fled their homes in fear that they would 
be engulfed by the Gigira fire. The fact that ExxonMobil built its 
conditioning plant and gas flare on the mountain further cements the 
legend. Figure 5.5 shows the visual impact of the PNG LNG project on 
the landscape. The prophecy associated with the project is widely known 
and was often repeated to me whenever I asked anyone about the PNG 
LNG project: One day a man with red legs will come to take the Gigira fire. 
You may share with him some of the fire, but do not give him the whole 
fire lest the world will end. Everyone who told me this story concluded 
with the observation that the Huli have given away the whole fire.
The Gigira Lai Tebo prophecy has not featured in previous academic 
literature, although it has featured occasionally in PNG media reports 
since the PNG LNG project began, and little was known about its detail 
prior to the PNG LNG project. In 2009, just prior to the construction 
phase, the prophecy was described in a blog post that was published by the 
son of former schoolteachers at Lake Kutubu (Cuthbert 2009). Cuthbert 
wrote ‘Inside Gigira burns Laitebo which when kindled, the flames will 
illuminate Hela and the land beyond’. He went on to say: ‘When the 
man with the orange legs comes to take the fire from you, give him an 
axe and tell him to go get his own firewood for his own fire.’ In 2016 
I visited areas on the slopes of Gigira Range that I was told were now 
uninhabited because the people had moved away in fear of the fire spilling 
out. Warnings that the world will come to an end as a result of prohibited 
human behaviour is a Huli trope that is common to the majority of Huli 
prophetic understandings.
A Nation-Defining Resource within 
an Absent State
Historically, Huli have observed deterioration in productivity of the 
land, epidemics of disease, increase in social disorder and warfare, floods, 
drought and earthquakes as representative signs of the decline of the Huli 
universe (Ballard 2000). Humans had a role in controlling the fate of 
the universe by observing ilili codes, and implicit in the decline of the 
universe was failure to observe these moral codes (Ballard 2000). Giving 
away the Lai Tebo fire was one such act encoded in prophecy. During my 
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time in Hela, signs of the Lai Tebo prophecy playing out were expressed 
in observations about the general malaise of Hela Province, increasing 
conflict, corruption, a decline in basic services and a general increase 
in poverty. Hela was rich in resources and therefore entitled to benefit 
from those resources. In moral terms, Hela’s resources belonged to Hela 
itself, and to its people, and the state had a duty to facilitate Hela’s 
development. The understanding that PNG’s customary landowners are 
also the owners of the natural resources that exist beneath their customary 
lands is a commonly held view that Filer (2014: 79) describes as part 
of ‘the founding fiction of the independent state’ (see also Bainton and 
Skrzypek, Chapter 1,  this volume). I would argue that this is one of the 
founding values of the independent state, which persists regardless of its 
legal standing. Huli have a cosmological entitlement to Hela’s resources, 
and the historical and cultural depth to this entitlement precedes the 
colonially introduced legislative tradition that grants ownership of 
resources to the state. Moral failing therefore resided partly with Huli 
themselves, who had clearly given away their fire for nothing. But most 
of the blame was laid upon the state for failing to deliver on its promises, 
and therefore failing to live up to itself as a value proposition. The LBSAs 
had been negotiated and signed between landowners and the state, and 
it was the state, therefore, that landowners expected to make good on 
its promises. The nonappearance of promised development infrastructure 
represented the material absence of the state. The breaking of promises 
and demonstration of neglect represented the moral failing of the state. 
The failure of state officials to respond to the concerns of landowners was 
a demonstration of the absence of the state in moral terms.
Crucially, references to the Lai Tebo prophecy were based on observations 
of material decline primarily witnessed through a lack of government 
services and decaying infrastructure, rather than natural phenomena. 
The 2015–16 drought that severely impacted much of the highlands 
was coming to an end, and its impact was noted in terms of the lack of 
government response and the fact that the majority of people still had to 
eke out an existence as subsistence farmers. One reported example was the 
failure to maintain downpipes and water tanks at schools, which resulted 
in the forced closure of many schools due to lack of water (Bourke et al. 
2016). The same report documented an increase in the crude death rate 
as a result of the drought. Development was expected to change the 
dependent relationship that people have with the land. The potential for 
development to save lives in the context of the drought and the failure 
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of the state to realise that potential is a classic case of structural violence 
(Galtung 1969). It is also a failure of the value proposition that constitutes 
the state’s existence. Drought was therefore a phenomenon that served 
to highlight the lack of development and the extent of state neglect in 
the province and their continuing dependence upon the land. The same 
can be said for the magnitude 7.5 earthquake that struck Hela Province 
in February 2018, as described later in this chapter. The PNG LNG 
project was widely regarded as a tool of the state to enable it to provide 
development in the form of infrastructure, health and education services, 
business development, employment, and cash for the landowners. Some 
landowners even expressed a certain level of sympathy for ExxonMobil 
because, like them, it had no choice but to deal with a corrupt state.
Attacking the State by Proxy
This sympathy was expressed in a letter to ExxonMobil that was drafted 
by a  group of landowner leaders who had gathered near the Hides 
conditioning plant to organise a blockade in August 2016. These leaders 
had taken their case to the Supreme Court in Port Moresby to have 
PNG LNG project royalty payments, that were supposedly being held in 
abeyance, released to them and their clans. Two leaders in particular, who 
had previously been rivals for the leadership of the Petroleum Development 
License 7 (PDL7) landowner’s group, had united in their efforts against 
the state.8 When they finally got their day in court, the court turned down 
their application on the basis that they had not demonstrated themselves 
to be legitimate landowners. As a result, they took matters into their own 
hands and came to Gigira and the epicentre of the PNG LNG project—
the conditioning plant compound. I was invited to witness the drafting 
of the letter to ExxonMobil. The letter was addressed to Andrew Barry, 
managing director of ExxonMobil PNG, and it politely and apologetically 
explained the reason that the project had to be shut down and made 
promises that no ExxonMobil property or personnel would be harmed. 
The authors specifically requested that ExxonMobil turn off the gas 
flare that burns within the compound. They drew an explicit distinction 
between the gas agreement that had been signed between the state and 
the developer in 2008, and the UBSA that had been signed between the 
8  The Hides gas field and HGCP are located within the boundaries of PDL7.
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state and the landowners in Kokopo in 2009. The letter explained in some 
detail the grievances between the landowners and the state and finished 
with the following statement:
Thus we do not have hope and trust in this government as they 
continue to dishonour the agreements entered in to in Kokopo 
and in Hides respectively.
Therefore we PDL 01, 07 and 09 landowners are calling on Exxon 
and its partners to voluntarily shut down the HGCP and well pads 
B and C. We also want Exxon to put off the flare in the HGCP so 
that the whole operation can be shut for indefinite period until the 
state responds to the petition positively.
Thank you so much for your cooperation.
The landowner leaders’ grievances were quite clearly directed towards the 
state rather than the company. In establishing a ‘social license to operate’ 
for the PNG LNG project, ExonMobil had been an outspoken advocate 
of the benefits that the project was expected to bring to the landowners. 
Prior to the project’s construction, ExxonMobil had promoted numerous 
expected benefits from the project via its community affairs officers as 
they engaged with local communities. Yet when it came to confrontation 
over the failure of the project to deliver on its promises the landowner 
leaders directed their concerns to the state rather than the company. Why 
did these leaders focus almost exclusively on the state and not consider 
the responsibility of ExxonMobil and the potential for it to engage 
directly with the development of Hela Province, as Oil Search has done 
via its investments in the Hela Provincial health system?9 I argue that the 
landowner leaders at PNG LNG were representatives of Hela, while the 
state of PNG is legitimised by its valued role in facilitating the viability 
of Hela and its transformation into a wealthy and prosperous example 
of a desired Papua New Guinean modernity. ExxonMobil is regarded as 
a tool, as an exclusively material entity being used by the state for its 
own benefit. The landowner leaders viewed ExxonMobil as a pawn in 
a larger game of corruption that was being played out by various levels of 
government and the judiciary. During the course of my fieldwork several 
people made the comment to me that ExxonMobil was just a company 
doing its job. ExxonMobil, in their eyes, was doing exactly what it was 
9  Oil Search, via the Oil Search Development Foundation, has taken over the Hela provincial 
health system, including significant upgrades to the Tari hospital. A common complaint made to me 
was that ExxonMobil should behave more like Oil Search.
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supposed to be doing: extracting gas, selling the gas for a profit, and 
paying royalties and taxes to the state.10 It was the state, therefore, that 
had the responsibility of passing on agreed royalties and benefits to the 
people. Poorly understood by the landowners, however, was the aggressive 
tax-minimisation regime that the state had signed up to with the PNG 
LNG project. Details of this regime were reported by a World Bank 
investigation that attributed the lack of state revenue from the project to 
‘a complex web of exemptions and allowances that effectively mean that 
little revenue is received by government and landowners, either through 
taxes, royalties or development levies’ (World Bank 2017: 27).
The landowner leaders were playing a dangerous game and, after two 
days, having received no response from ExxonMobil, they organised their 
clansmen to lock the main gate to the HGCP and blockade the project. 
My companions would not take me back up to the HGCP to witness 
these events as they were concerned for my safety and were worried 
about the potential for a shootout between the landowners and the police 
mobile squad that was stationed to protect the project. When I did return 
to the HGCP the next day, I was told by one of the landowner leaders 
who was the main organiser of the blockade that he had directed all his 
people to get hold of any weaponry they had and to enter the HGCP 
and lock the gate. The landowners responded by arming themselves and 
approaching the gates of the HGCP, compelling security personnel to 
step aside and allow them in. The organiser of the blockade then ushered 
the landowners back out and the gate was locked. Landowners also 
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to shut down the gas wells by breaking 
through the security fences that surrounded them and manually turning 
off the taps. When I later spoke with members of the police mobile squad, 
they told me that they had no intention of risking their lives by going 
against the landowners in defence of ExxonMobil, and they could see for 
themselves that the landowners were getting nothing from the project. 
The landowner leaders stated that the project would remain in lockdown 
until the government came to listen to their concerns.
10  This contrasts with the situation in Lihir, where landowners have maintained very strong 
expectations that the mining company will deliver development (see Bainton 2021; Bainton and 
Macintyre, Chapter 4, this volume).
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Four days later the state responded by materialising at Gigira on the 
playground of the local school at Para to face questions from landowner 
leaders.11 This was a crucial moment of state presence that stood in stark 
contrast to the experience of state absence that had thus far defined the 
relationship between the Huli landowners and the state. The landowner 
leaders had a very good grasp of the complexities of the gas agreement, and 
were able to hold their own when arguing about various forms of equity, 
well head production values, the value of LNG shipments and the amount 
of money that the government was receiving. The majority of landowners 
in the crowd, or people that I met at the market also spoke of royalty 
percentages, the number of LNG shipments to date and the structure of 
the state’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process that was then 
underway, which had failed to resolve any of their issues over landowner 
identification and the distribution of benefits.12 The  questioning was 
aggressive and accompanied in equal part by a torrent of abuse and threats 
that rained down upon the delegation for several hours in the baking sun. 
The highlight of the event was the moment the finance minister and Huli 
member for Tari-Pori, James Marape, was challenged to partake in a ritual 
practice known as dindi nabaya, which translates as ‘we eat the ground’. 
The challenge was made by a representative of the Juha landowners who 
had questioned Marape about the fate of certain development funds, 
in response to Marape’s answer, which was considered to be a lie by 
the majority of the crowd. In situations where people have competing 
claims over the historical truth of land ownership, the practice of dindi 
nabaya, which entails each person eating a handful of the disputed land, 
serves as a way of divining the truth. The land itself, being the subject 
of the argument, is the material objectification of a singular truth being 
disputed. The person who is lying about the truth of land ownership, 
specifically about the historical truth claims made in relation to the land, 
will become sick and die as a result of eating the land. Death is not instant 
but may take some months. This was perhaps a novel application of dindi 
11  The government representatives included the Huli finance minister James Marape (who later 
became the prime minister of the country in 2019), the prime minister’s departmental secretary, 
the managing director of the Mineral Resources Development Corporation (MRDC) Augusten 
Mano, the mining and petroleum minister Nixon Duma, the managing director of Kumul Petroleum 
Holdings, the secretary for the Department of Petroleum and Energy David Manan, the member for 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Philip Undialu, and the district administrator for Hela William Bando.
12  Many landowner leaders were in dispute over the identification of landowners and the failure 
to undertake a proper process of landowner identification. Once these disputes were taken to court, 
Justice Ambeng Kandakasi ordered that landowner benefit distribution be halted until the landowner 
issues could be resolved through the ADR process (Filer 2019: 41).
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nabaya, but the intent was clear. Marape was invited to come down off 
the stage and the crowd parted to create an open space for the two men 
to perform the ritual of dindi nabaya. His response to this ritual challenge 
was stunned silence. His evident fear and non-response was damning. And 
for many people in the crowd it represented the moral failure of the state.
Apart from the appeal to Huli tradition in the invoking of dindi 
nabaya, there was no invoking of the Gigira Lai Tebo prophecy or any 
other mythological understanding. The arguments were well-informed, 
pragmatic, and based on the material concerns of the landowners. 
The appeal to dindi nabaya was a body blow to the finance minister, as 
it was personal and a way of weaponising a shared ancestral and spiritual 
connection to land. The invoking of dindi nabaya was an extension of its 
original application in land disputes. Marape and the landowners were 
not arguing over land ownership, but over the truthfulness of Marape’s 
statement about the fate of money that had been generated by the PNG 
LNG project. The landowner leaders decided that Marape, as a son of 
Hela, had a moral duty to tell the truth about Hela’s resources; his duty to 
the state was secondary. Marape’s silent response was taken by the crowd 
as evidence that he understood that his primary moral duty was to Hela. 
In the nation of Hela, state trumps company, but land trumps them both, 
and as a Huli it was generally expected that the Papua New Guinean 
finance minister James Marape’s first duty was therefore to Hela.
Hela Trumps State
Prior to independence, Huli eagerly subscribed to the value proposition 
that was the colonial state. For Huli, the colonial state was symbolically 
represented by the crown worn on the policemen’s headwear. When 
I  asked John Hocknull, the last patrol officer to be stationed at Komo 
until independence in 1975, how Huli at Komo reacted to independence, 
he responded that the strong reaction was not to independence, but earlier 
when the national emblem of PNG replaced the crown that was worn on 
the policemen’s uniform. The crown had been recognised as the head of 
power, out of which all social order emanated, and its removal, according 
to Hocknull, was like the sky had fallen in. Huli desire a benevolent power 
that is invested in the state, but if the state itself is absent then decay 
and disorder is the feared result. This is crucial to understanding Huli 
perceptions of the independent state as a value proposition. Today the 
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absence of the PNG state in Hela, and especially in the remoter areas of 
the PNG LNG project operations at Komo and Hides, is palpable. When 
the landowners attacked the PNG LNG project, they were not attacking 
ExxonMobil but the state of PNG. Hela, much like the imagined state of 
PNG, or the imagined status of the crown, is constituted as an idea, and 
has more salience in its idealised form than does the material presence of 
the world’s largest oil and gas company, which was ideally understood 
as a tool of the state. The landowners did not attack the tool, but the 
entity that wielded it. The state, constituted as an absence, and therefore 
as a value proposition that has collapsed, only loomed larger as its absence 
became the defining issue of the conflict.
Crucial to understanding Huli perceptions of ExxonMobil and its material 
presence in Hela is the perceived relationship between the PNG LNG 
project and the land. Unlike other extractive projects in PNG, or some 
large-scale mines in Australia (see Everingham et al., Chapter 9; and Lewis, 
Chapter 8, both this volume), the environmental footprint of the PNG 
LNG project is relatively benign. What impact the PNG LNG project has 
on the landscape consists mainly of infrastructure: the Komo airfield, the 
gas conditioning plant, even the waste incinerator, are all viewed as orderly 
and technologically advanced examples of material development. Unlike 
the Ok Tedi and Porgera mines, there is no production of waste material 
or tailings being disposed in the river system (see Golub, Chapter 3, this 
volume). Land ownership in Huli, or more accurately custodianship, is 
as much about the historical use of the land as it is about genealogical 
connections to land. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the 
complexities of Huli land ownership. However, one feature that is relevant 
here is the fact that it is possible to lose rights over land through neglect. 
If your garden is allowed to become overgrown and go to waste then you 
are at risk of someone else coming along to work and improve the land 
and thereby gain rights to its occupation. Neglect of land is regarded as 
a moral failing. If you allow the land to go bad by allowing it to become 
overgrown with weeds and fail to put the land to some productive use 
then someone else has a moral right to occupy and improve the land. 
In this sense, ExxonMobil is doing work to the land and has a degree of 
user rights as a result. Had the PNG LNG project resulted in pollution 
to large tracts of land and waterways it is likely that ExxonMobil would 
have been imagined as an active agent in the destruction of Hela and it is 
arguable that the PNG LNG project would not have survived for as long 
as it has.
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A Seismic Presence
On 26  February 2018 Hela was hit by a magnitude 7.5 earthquake. 
The  earthquake caused devastation to the landscape and people and 
caused significant damage to the PNG LNG project. Several days later, 
on 2  March, ExxonMobil declared force majeure on exports of LNG 
and the project was shut down for six weeks. The earthquake induced 
a radical shift in the way the PNG LNG project is perceived by its Huli 
landowners. Almost overnight the perception of state absence went 
from one of moral failing to active agent in the destruction of Hela. 
ExxonMobil went from misappropriated tool to malevolent partner in 
Hela’s demise. The initial response to the earthquake was a widespread 
belief that it had been caused by the operations of the PNG LNG project. 
This belief had both a mythological and scientific basis and the two are 
not easily separated. That an earthquake should occur of such magnitude 
that it caused severe damage to project infrastructure as well as large areas 
of the PNG highlands, killing many and leaving many more in desperate 
need of assistance, was perfectly in line with the doomsday scenario 
that accompanied the Lai Tebo prophecy, as well as a more generalised 
entropic perspective of a world in constant decline. Many landowners as 
well as people across PNG and in the global activist community believed 
that the act of gas extraction had caused the tectonic activity that resulted 
in the earthquake. This view was supported by strong evidence that the 
process of fracking (a process not used by the PNG LNG project) has 
caused earthquakes elsewhere, particularly in the United States, and 
communicated via popular publications such as National Geographic 
(Gibbens 2017). The suspicion that the earthquake had been caused by the 
PNG LNG project was so strong and so widely held among business and 
political elites that the PNG government was moved to ask the Australian 
government to conduct a review into the cause of the earthquake, which it 
agreed to do via the services of Geoscience Australia (Anon. 2018).
An earthquake of such magnitude, occurring at that location, came as no 
surprise to anyone with an understanding of the history of tectonic activity 
in the PNG highlands. With the PNG LNG project shut down, the belief 
that the disaster had a metaphysical component was far from universal, 
and intense debate occurred on Huli social media networks where these 
views were often ridiculed. None of my Huli friends spoke to me in terms 
of traditional cosmology or prophecy. Rather, their concerns were framed 
around the inadequate response from the state and the plight of many 
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who had been cut off from essential services. The aid post that serviced 
the Komo region was built on a low-lying area that sank into the ground 
due to liquefaction caused by the earthquake. Roads became impassable 
and desperately needed medical assistance was eventually supplied by the 
Australian military and Oil Search helicopters. It was these immediate 
concerns that were in the forefront of people’s reaction to, and perception 
of, the earthquake.
The argument that prevailed more broadly across Huli society was 
a debate between two material causes: was it a natural or anthropogenic 
phenomenon? But at the same time the disaster was imbued with the 
sense that there was a moral component, not attached to its cause, but 
to its happening. For Huli, natural phenomena that happen without 
any particular cause, or those with a direct human cause albeit lacking 
in mindful intent, may still be classed within a family of events that 
are indicative of moral decline and a general trajectory of social and 
physical decay. The Oil Search managing director Peter Botten, was 
quoted as saying that the perception of an anthropogenic cause was 
‘a  communications issue’ (Barrett and Gloystein 2018). With this he 
missed a crucial point: the perception of the earthquake as having an 
anthropogenic cause was not a communications issue, but a development 
issue (Main 2018). Dozens of people were killed by landslides or collapsed 
buildings, however the majority of the suffering that resulted from the 
earthquake could be attributed to failing or non-existent infrastructure, 
a lack of government capacity at the local level, an absence of government 
response at the national level and the failure of the PNG LNG project 
to have contributed to a more developed Hela Province that would have 
otherwise been better placed to respond to natural disasters of any kind. 
In the eyes of the Huli, the earthquake also imposed a heavy moral status 
on the company, which had previously enjoyed a more morally neutral 
position. Lack of development was a moral failing of both the state and 
the project developer, and in the context of the earthquake, this lack, born 
of absence, became in itself a powerful agent of suffering.
The Rise of ATALA
Several weeks after the earthquake in June 2018, part of the PNG LNG 
project was attacked with new a level of ferocity and organisation by 
a group calling themselves the Angore Tiddy Apa Landowners Association, 
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or ‘ATALA’.13 Their attack was a direct response the earthquake and the 
impact of the absent state. ATALA was formed in 2014, declaring itself as 
the umbrella association for the Angore PDL8 landowners. According to 
ATALA’s founding document the UBSA that was signed in May 2009 was 
done so before Petroleum Retention License (PRL) areas were converted 
into smaller Petroleum Development License (PDL) areas. ATALA were 
claiming that the social mapping was undertaken while Angore was still 
part of the old PRL11 and the results of this process were therefore null 
and void. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to undertake an analysis of 
the legal framework around petroleum development in PNG and I make 
no comment about the legitimacy or otherwise of ATALA’s claims. Rather 
my intention is to provide an outline of the point of view of ATALA, 
who claim the support of 150 clans spread across the former PRL11 area, 
totalling some 100,000 people (Woods 2018a).
The gas resource tapped by the Angore wellhead is a later addition to 
the main resource at Hides and was planned to connect to the existing 
HGCP via an 11 km pipeline. The ATALA leadership is quite separate 
from the group that came together to blockade the HGCP in August 
2016. But during that time ATALA gave their support for that action 
via their Facebook page, which has been the main forum for ATALA to 
communicate its objectives, which included asking ‘the Member for Tari 
Pori, Minister for Finance and Government Business Leader, Honorable 
James Marape to acquit the Angore PDL8 Project Area Funds which 
he has  been paying to his political cronies’. Up until February 2018, 
ATALA was primarily a political voice that was generally well-informed 
and articulate and engaged in online debate around PNG LNG land 
ownership issues and royalty payments. The 26  February earthquake 
induced a seismic shift in the attitude and approach taken by ATALA. 
The last post published by the association prior to the earthquake was 
a lengthy and considered statement related to the continuing issue 
of landowner identification and included the observation that ‘Failures of 
successive attempts by the key State Agency stakeholders of the project is 
embarrassing for such an important project that underpins the economy 
of  PNG for the next 30  years’.14 The first post published after the 
13  It is more common to spell ‘tiddy Apa’ as ‘dindi apa’, which means ‘land father’. The Huli ‘d’ is 
pronounced closer to the apical consonant sound of ‘t’ and is often interchangeable with ‘d’. It is unclear 
why the ‘n’ has been left out.
14  See: www.facebook.com/pg/angorePDL8/posts/?ref=page_internal (10 November 2017).
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earthquake simply stated: ‘Our struggle is a struggle that has no definition 
to the Government and Stakeholders of the PNGLNG Project. One day, 
Hell will break loose!’15
On 21 June 2018, heavily armed ATALA representatives ‘unleashed hell’ 
on ExxonMobil’s Angore camp, destroying buildings and machinery 
and shutting down the Angore tie-in project for the foreseeable future. 
Sources based in Tari told me that during this event 35 Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force (PNGDF) soldiers were flown by helicopter to secure the 
camp. The soldiers positioned themselves to mount an attack against the 
landowners but withdrew at the last moment when they realised that they 
were vastly outnumbered and outgunned. When the soldiers retreated, 
their helicopter was shot at. ATALA published an account of the attack 
on their Facebook page that included the statement: ‘Exxon, we missed 
that chopper but its gonna come down. Look across and look at the 
smoke and flames. When you say so we talk.’ ExxonMobil supplied the 
helicopter to the PNGDF for use in their action against the landowners. 
At the same time landowners at Komo under the umbrella leadership of 
ATALA placed a log across the Komo airfield to symbolise that they had 
shut down the facility for the foreseeable future.
Their actions were a clear violation of their own mission statement, 
which reads:
Work with honesty and integrity, and equitably share all benefits 
with neither fear nor favour.
Work hard and transform the wisdom of the laitebo prophesy into 
socioeconomic and political achievements for the Angore people 
now and into the future.
Negotiate without violence, and work honestly and diligently with 
the key stakeholders of the PNGLNG Project.
The principle of negotiation without violence was buried with the 
earthquake, and this change in approach is documented in a statement 
released on 21  May 2018 that asserts: ‘Since the EQ Disaster in the 
Hela, Southern Highlands, Gulf and Western Province; the shift of 
the negotiating power is now with the people.’ This statement gets to the 
core of the fundamental shift in power relations between people and 
15  Ibid. (28 April 2018).
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the state that was created by the earthquake. The earthquake provided 
ATALA with the moral authority to assert themselves as a military power 
and to bypass the practice of negotiation and deploy violence to achieve 
their ends. In this action, ATALA has made a concerted effort to gain 
the support of a large number of clans across a greater part of Hela. State 
neglect in the context of the earthquake and its aftermath has become 
a form of structural violence, as the inability and unwillingness of the 
state to provide adequate disaster relief has resulted in increased suffering 
for a great many people. For ATALA and many Huli landowners the 
earthquake amounted to the total collapse of the value proposition that is 
the state of PNG. This opened up the space for ATALA to reinvent itself 
as a morally superior alternative to the state. Furthermore, the failure of 
the state to respond to a natural disaster of such magnitude removes the 
logic that accompanied previous efforts at negotiation and the pursuit 
of state-based mechanisms such as court actions and political directions. 
For ATALA and its supporters, violent action has become both a morally 
justifiable and rational method of advancing their cause. Hela must assert 
itself as a nation without the need for a state, since the value proposition 
that is the state barely exists. State neglect has become more than just a 
source of frustration and a perceived moral failing—it has emerged as 
a form of negative agency that must be combatted.
The boldness of ATALA was expressed not just through violent action, 
but in its demand for a stand-alone gas stripping facility for the Angore 
resource, and its offer to buy ExxonMobil out of its gas resource at 
Angore.  A statement released by ATALA on 20  June 2018 asserts 
a sovereign claim to the gas resource, something that had previously been 
ceded to the state in the expectation that the state and developer would 
act in the best interests of the landowners:
In Angore, ATALA Incorporated is the landlord, not the 
government of Papua New Guinea. ATALA Incorporated has 
taken over Angore PDL8 Operations including the 5.4 Trillion 
Cubic Feet of LNG.
This project, the PNGLNG Project, has brought curse and 
suffering to the people of Angore and we will need that now. 
ATALA Inc as the landlord is taking over the Angore PDL8 and 
will develop separately from the PNGLNG Project.
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The document then outlines in some detail the economic mechanisms by 
which the Angore gas resource is to be utilised specifically for the benefit 
of the landowners within PDL8. It goes as far as demanding ‘a standalone 
gas stripping facility so as to determine and quantify how much LNG and 
Condensate are produced from our reserve which is an independent service 
to other gas-fields within and outside of the Hela Province’. The political 
impact of the earthquake was to negate the state and its development 
apparatus in ExxonMobil as legitimate entities. Instead of desiring the 
absent state to become materially present, the material consequences of 
state absence in the context of the earthquake reversed this desire: the 
absent state bereft of value was to be banished altogether. Emerging from 
this negation is an organisation within the nation of Hela that believes it 
has no choice but to go it alone, backed by a sense of legitimacy based on 
a concept of Gigira Lai Tebo, which provides both the entitlement to the 
benefits of the gas resource and the moral authority to control it.
Conclusion: The State of Nothing
The PNG LNG project has profoundly shaped the PNG economy, 
and has helped to define PNG as a state that has absented itself from 
its basic obligations to its own people. The PNG LNG project has 
simultaneously transformed and helped to define an understanding of 
Hela as an Indigenous nation endowed with resource wealth and entitled 
to a parent state that can fulfil its development aspirations. The experience 
of an absent state in Hela Province in the context of greatly increased 
expectations of the state resulting from the PNG LNG project reveals the 
extent to which the state itself is a concept that exists as a shared idea that 
may increase in salience as the material presence of the state disappears. 
The PNG LNG project was expected to enhance the value proposition 
of the state by enabling it to provide a bonanza of promised development 
projects as well as direct cash payments to landowners. The state exists 
materially in the form of the built environment that is constitutive of 
its value: the schools and hospitals, roads and services that the state is 
expected to provide. The state also exists materially in the form of its 
representatives who hold positions of power and authority who are valued 
for their ability to deliver development outcomes. At Hides in August 
2016, when this absence became intolerable to a group of Huli elites, they 
were able to exercise power over the state using the PNG LNG project as 
a proxy, and force the state to become present and to take notice of those 
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that it had been refusing to acknowledge. One Huli elite, the minister for 
finance James Marape, was caught between his identity as a son of Hela, 
and his role as a representative of the state. As part of the state Marape 
could retreat into absence, but Hela was part of Marape and that was 
a presence that he was unable to deny.
This chapter has demonstrated how the concept of state absence took 
on a special significance in the context of the state’s failure to respond to 
natural disaster. The state, as an externalised, parental authority, derives 
its legitimacy and is defined as a value proposition through its ability to 
service the viability of the nation of Hela. The destructive power of the 
earthquake of February 2018 was the ultimate exposure of the state to the 
abrogation of its most fundamental responsibilities. Where corruption 
and neglect had only made the state loom larger for its absence, the 
trauma of the shaking of Hela has turned this absence into a form of active 
malevolence. In the process, ExxonMobil has become a weapon rather 
than a tool of the state, and has endured the consequences at Angore. 
On 26 June 2018 the PNG government offered ATALA PGK20 million 
in return for ending their protest (Woods 2018b). The landowners rejected 
this initial offer, asking that the state also provide their organisation with 
official recognition as a legitimate organisation, to which the state duly 
complied. With this request the landowners were keeping a foot in both 
camps, as they were simultaneously trying to bypass the state and asking 
to be recognised by the state and extracting as much value from the 
state as they could. The state continues to exist, even as its existence is 
repelled, as its value has not entirely collapsed. It is unclear how the future 
will unfold for Hela and the PNG LNG project, however the granting 
of cash and negotiating power to ATALA as an official organisation 
has thus far prevented further attacks against the project, as no further 
threats have emerged from this organisation. In both August 2016 and 
June 2018, landowners demanded that the state ‘present itself ’, and on 
both occasions the state complied. But these occasions have only had the 
effect of satisfying the demands of particular landowner leaders and their 
supporters, many of whom had borrowed substantial amounts of money 
in the expectation that a development windfall was coming, and needed 
the state to bail them out when the debt collectors started calling. These 
protests, although made possible by the absence of the state, have done 
nothing to create the substantial reform that is desired and expected by 
the broader Huli population. As the gas continues to flow and be shipped 
out to be sold offshore, it remains to be seen whether Hela landowners 
will continue to tolerate the impact of the state’s absence into the future.
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Postscript
On 12  April 2019, James Marape resigned as finance minister, citing 
disagreements with the prime minister over the signing of the agreements 
for the new Papua LNG project in neighbouring Gulf Province, which 
appears destined for a similar fate to that of the PNG LNG project. 
The  next day Marape returned to Tari, the capital of Hela Province, 
to a hero’s welcome, stating that the government had brought nothing 
tangible to Hela, only promises. After seven years as finance minister of 
an absent state, Marape chose to be present as the representative of the 
Nation of Hela as his self-perceived value as a representative of the state 
was finally exhausted. On 7 May 2019 Marape was elected ‘alternative 
prime minister’ by PNG’s opposition party, and, after a complex 
succession struggle, was sworn in as prime minister on 29 May. Marape’s 
rise has done much to dissolve the boundary between the nation of Hela 
and the state of PNG. Marape based his power struggle on the failure of 
PNG to benefit from its considerable extractable resources, and, following 
his swearing in, immediately called for economic independence for 
PNG, and derided the systemic impairment of the translation of PNG’s 
‘opportunities and blessings’ to its people (Auka-Salmang 2019). Since 
then Marape’s ‘take back PNG’ rhetoric has been consistent, bold and has 
translated into robust policy positions (Kama 2019). Marape has thus far 
maintained a consistent position in negotiations between the state and 
ExxonMobil over the P’nyang gas field, and, in February 2020, suspended 
negotiations describing ExxonMobil’s position as ‘unacceptable’, stating 
that PNG’s resources must ‘allow us to improve our people’s way of life. 
We don’t believe the last offer made by ExxonMobil would have done 
that’ (Wilkinson 2020).
By the time of writing, in July 2020, Marape has thus far avoided the 
pitfalls of his predecessor, has the appearance of being genuine in his 
motives and engages much more intimately with PNG’s extraordinarily 
diverse grassroots population. Marape communicates directly to 
the nation via Facebook, making himself present in households across the 
country, and was initially signing off with the Huli term ‘Hulukuyama’. 
This is a praise term for a Huli man, and will only be recognisable to Huli 
speakers. Huli could not be more legible to the state, and yet their struggle 
to obtain state royalty payments for the PNG LNG project continues. 
The reason for this is that their struggle is about making themselves 
legible internally, rather than to the state. Dispute over land ownership 
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is part of a centuries-old argument over the control and interpretation of 
Huli land ownership history, and this has intersected with disputes over 
royalty payments. But royalty payments are not what the promise of the 
PNG LNG project was ever about. It is about development, and that 
means infrastructure, it means services, it means meaningful employment, 
improved standards of living—all of which are only possible via the 
accumulation of capital, and the effective use of capital. Royalty payments 
to thousands of landowners are about the thinning of capital, they are not 
a pathway to development, and they have never been the sole objective 
of the Huli population. Royalty payments are at least an indication that 
the state is paying attention, and that perhaps real development might 
be possible. It is arguable that the PNG LNG project, and its stark reveal 
of an absent state, are responsible for Marape’s rise to power. Marape’s 
term might finally reveal whether the presence of the extractive industries, 
and the activities of multinational extractive corporations, should even 
be considered as viable pathways towards the development of the nation.
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In Between Presence 
and Absence: Ambiguous 
Encounters of the State 
in Unconventional 




Australia’s natural gas industry has grown rapidly over the last two 
decades. Sourced from conventional and unconventional resources, 
a majority of this new capacity is supplying a liquefied natural gas industry 
that exports to overseas energy markets. In the country’s northeastern 
state of Queensland, the extraction of gas located within the cleats of 
underground coal seams has become technologically and economically 
viable since the turn of the millennium. This unconventional coal seam 
gas (also called coal bed methane) is not contained within pressurised 
reservoirs like conventional oil and gas but dispersed throughout coal-
bearing strata of large geological basins. Accessing coal seam gas (CSG) 
therefore requires numerous wells to be drilled in close grids across broad 
areas (see Figure 6.1). Groundwater is removed to lower the hydrostatic 
pressure that holds the gas in place, and both then flow to the surface 
where they are separated. Although less than in other unconventional 
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gas sources, this process also includes controversial extraction techniques 
such as hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’). Following the industry’s swift 
growth and over AUD70 billion invested over the last decade and a half, 
around 11,000 producing CSG wells are currently operational across 
Queensland. The total number of wells is expected to double once the 
industry is fully established. The processing and transport of gas and 
water involve additional infrastructure such as gathering pipelines, well 
pad access tracks, compressor stations and water treatment facilities.
Establishing these extractive networks and accounting for the various 
impacts of their collective footprint has so far resulted in some 5,700 
Conduct and Compensation Agreements negotiated between gas 
companies and landholders (GCQ 2018). However, CSG developments 
and associated regional transformations have not occurred without 
disputes over potential risks associated with the dynamically evolving 
industry (de Rijke 2013a: 46–8; Espig 2018: 11). Particularly salient 
points of contestation within host communities and among the wider 
public revolved around impacts to groundwater and negative health 
effects for those living in proximity to CSG infrastructure. These debates 
were exacerbated by perceived absences in state regulatory and oversight 
function and the fact that, considering the pace and complexity of the 
industry’s developments, many decisions involved scientific uncertainties 
regarding its short and long-term impacts.
Figure 6.1 A coal seam gas field in the Western Downs region
Source: Google Earth 2020
177
6. IN BETWEEN PRESENCE AND ABSENCE
Figure 6.2 The Western Downs local government area and Curtis 
Island, the location of LNG processing and export facilities some 
500 km to the north
Source: ANU Cartography
This chapter focuses on the risk controversy surrounding CSG 
developments in Queensland and how they pertain to the role of the state 
in natural resource developments. My analysis draws on research of CSG-
related topics since 2011, including multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted between late 2014 and 2016 in one of the CSG hotspots in 
Queensland, the Western Downs local government area (see Figure 6.2). 
This predominantly agricultural region covers a land area of almost 
38,000  km2 and is home to some 33,000 people. With thousands of 
operational wells, the Western Downs is the most intensively developed 
area in Australia in terms of unconventional gas projects. Its  gas fields 
supply three major liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants that are located 
some 500 km to the north on Curtis Island near the town of Gladstone 
(Eriksen 2018).
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Many irrigating farmers and graziers in the Western Downs, who rely on 
historically already overused aquifers, voiced concerns about uncertainties 
regarding the quantity of groundwater extracted over the CSG industry’s 
multiple decades-long lifespan. Especially early on, these concerns were 
well-founded, as levels of uncertainty were high even among scientific 
researchers, industry professionals and regulators (Espig and de Rijke 
2016). Debates also emerged around the potential impacts of chemicals 
used during extraction. Some residents were further opposed to possible 
human health risks from environmental pollution associated with, 
for instance, leaking wells and infrastructure, which prompted them 
to emphasise potentially unknown side effects of CSG extraction and 
perceived shortcomings in state departments’ regulatory oversight. In this 
sense, uncertainties not only existed around the scientific aspects of CSG 
developments and potential environmental impacts. For many concerned 
residents, uncertainties also manifested in a normative sense regarding 
the roles of state departments and their regulatory capacities, as well as 
in moral terms concerning the trustworthiness of state and CSG industry 
actors. This chapter is developed around interlocutors’ accounts regarding 
these aspects.
While my research also involved Queensland state politicians, regulators 
and urban-based scientists, the chapter is primarily based on ethnographic 
work with rural landholders and regional residents in the Western 
Downs. Among those community members, only small minorities 
either unequivocally supported or outright opposed CSG developments. 
I more often encountered mixed feelings towards the industry, with many 
interlocutors describing positive as well as negative aspects of CSG projects. 
This is in line with surveys conducted at the time of my fieldwork, which 
show that a majority of participating Western Downs residents either 
tolerated or accepted the CSG industry (Espig 2018: 160–6). In  this 
chapter, I focus specifically on interlocutors who expressed concerns 
over CSG projects’ risks and uncertainties, regardless of their overall 
attitude towards the industry.1 Those interlocutors dealt with a variety 
of Queensland state departments, including the Department of Natural 
Resources, Mines and Energy and the Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection, as well as associated entities such as the Office of 
1  By focusing on one segment of my ethnographic data, I do not intend to oversimplify community 
members’ differences nor to ‘sanitise’ the local politics of representation and conflict (Trigger 2000: 
203; Ballard and Banks 2003: 306; see Espig and de Rijke 2018 for a corresponding discussion). For 
a relevant debate on the ‘problem of ethnographic refusal’ (Ortner 1995) in the context of mining, 
see Bainton and Owen (2018) and Kirsch (2018: 9–12 and 28–9).
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Groundwater Impact Assessment or GasFields Commission Queensland. 
It would therefore be misleading to regard the Queensland state as a single 
monolithic entity and community members’ encounters with the state 
as uniform. The following account should be read accordingly.
Through the lens of CSG risk debates, it is possible to understand 
community members’ experiences of the state within natural resource 
developments, especially the ambiguous encounters and frictions that 
projects can create between the state and concerned members of host 
communities. My primary intention behind developing this perspective is 
not to analyse the Queensland state as a government apparatus of specific 
institutions, regulatory instruments and bureaucratic procedures. Instead, 
I follow Sharma and Gupta (2005: 27) in regarding states ‘as culturally 
embedded and discursively constructed ensembles’, and Trouillot (2003: 
89) in presenting the state as ‘a set of practices and processes and the 
effects they produce’. My aim is to contribute towards an anthropological 
understanding of ‘how states are culturally constituted, how they are 
substantiated in people’s lives, and  …  the sociopolitical and everyday 
consequences of these constructions’, which makes it necessary to focus 
on ‘everyday practices and representations as modes through which the 
state comes into being’ (Sharma and Gupta 2005: 27). Rather than 
attending to its mere institutional contours, I focus on the community–
state interface and examine how concerned host community members 
encountered ‘the state’ in CSG risk debates.2
The following section briefly describes the regulatory foundations of CSG 
developments and highlights the Queensland state’s presence in terms of 
granting and guaranteeing land access rights. I outline residents’ reactions 
to this presence, and how the Queensland state’s risk governance policies 
account for uncertainties. The two subsequent sections paint a contrasting 
picture of a partially absent state, with CSG projects outpacing regulating 
departments in some cases and pushing them beyond their capacity, 
especially once developments fully commenced. Concomitantly, 
concerned members of affected communities and the wider public 
struggled to receive clear answers while navigating what I described as 
the resulting organised irresponsibility around CSG developments. 
This leads to a discussion on the displacement, or delegation, of state 
functions and a responsibilisation of community members. Exploring the 
2  See Bainton and Skrzypek (Chapter 1, this volume) for a corresponding discussion of Philip 
Abrams’ distinction between the ‘state-system’ and the ‘state-idea’.
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theme of ‘absent presence’, I argue that a dialectic of state presence and 
absence reconfigures the relationships between the Queensland state, its 
subjects, and multinational gas companies. In these relational contexts, 
gas companies cannot merely rely on the state for their operational and 
‘social licence’. Conversely, material presented here also demonstrates that 
a privatisation of risk emerged around CSG developments, which can 
create significant uncertainties and (re)produce social inequalities among 
members of host communities. The ambiguous encounters of actors in 
the spaces in between state presence and absence thus produce a set of 
interwoven sociocultural and political challenges. The chapter concludes 
with a critical question regarding the responsibility and accountability 
of the various actors involved in contemporary resource developments.
The State within CSG Risk Debates
Australia has an identified 257  trillion cubic feet of conventional and 
unconventional natural gas resources, of which CSG accounts for about 
one third (AFG 2018). The legal and regulatory framework for the oil and 
gas sector is broadly divided into onshore and offshore activities. Under 
Australian law, ownership of onshore gas resources is vested in the Crown, 
namely the states or Commonwealth. This means that exploration and 
production titles are granted by respective state and federal governments 
(Hepburn 2015).3 Throughout this chapter, I therefore refer to the 
institutional, legal and regulatory aspects of the Queensland State and, to 
a lesser extent, the Western Downs local government when discussing ‘the 
state’. One of the main legal instruments regulating the CSG industry’s 
activities is the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 
(Queensland).4 The Act’s main purpose is, among others:
to facilitate and regulate the carrying out of responsible petroleum 
activities and the development of a safe, efficient and viable 
petroleum and fuel gas industry, in a way that (a) manages the 
State’s petroleum resources (i) in a way that has regard to the need 
for ecologically sustainable development; and (ii) for the benefit 
of all Queenslanders; and … (c) creates an effective and efficient 
regulatory system for the carrying out of petroleum activities and 
3  See QSG (2020: 62) for a process map that details the responsibilities and entities throughout 
the coal seam gas process, from tendering, exploring, producing to decommissioning.
4  See www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/current/act-2004-025
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the use of petroleum and fuel gas; and … (f ) ensures petroleum 
activities are carried on in a way that minimises conflict with other 
land uses.
Two important notions, which are commonly found in similar regulatory 
instruments, are that publicly owned natural resources are to be developed 
for the ‘greater good’ and that the state assumes the entrusted responsibility 
to regulate these developments on behalf of its citizens, including those 
with interests in other land uses (Hepburn 2015; Taylor and Hunter 2019; 
also Bainton and Skrzypek, Chapter 1, this volume). For landholders in 
the Western Downs, as in most other jurisdictions around the world, 
this means that subterranean hydrocarbon resources underneath their 
properties are the domain of the state and not of their private ownership.
More than any other Australian state, Queensland has followed a pro-
development agenda in support of the CSG industry (Cronshaw and 
Quentin Grafton 2016; Espig 2018: 79–84 and 206–7). With resource 
extraction being part of a wider Australian ‘culture of development 
ideology’ (Trigger 1997; also Cleary 2011) and a ‘growth-first’ political 
economy (Mercer et al. 2014), the prospect of substantial CSG project 
investments was embraced by successive Queensland governments. 
As some observers have argued, this included approaching uncertainties 
over environmental impacts and risk concerns through ‘an attitude 
of “technological optimism”  …  a confidence that the engineers and 
geologists (and markets) will solve whatever disposal or environmental 
problems arise’ (Edwards 2006: 97). With resource ownership vested in 
the Queensland state, landholders had limited authority over whether and 
how CSG reserves were developed.
Gas companies that have been granted exploration or production titles are 
within their rights to demand access to private properties and can request 
the state to enforce this right, subject to a number of legally prescribed 
procedures and compensation provisions. For example, access disputes 
can be referred to the Queensland Land Court that specifically deals with 
matters relating to land and resources. For some landholders, encounters 
with the state in the context of CSG developments resemble Ballard and 
Banks’ (2003: 299) observation of the mining sector:
Disputes over access to and ownership of mineral resources have 
generated protracted confrontations between the legal apparatus 
of the state and the precepts of local communities, many of which 
first encounter the full power of the state’s sovereign claims to 
resources only through this process of dispute.
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Figure 6.3 Lock the Gate Alliance paraphernalia at a demonstration 
in Brisbane, Australia, 2015
Source: Photograph by author
While only a relatively small number of cases actually proceeded to Land 
Court, the mere possibility already asserted enough coercive force in many 
instances. Acknowledging companies’ state-guaranteed rights, several 
landholders who negotiated access, primarily through Conduct and 
Compensation Agreements, likened the process to a ‘shotgun wedding’ 
rather than voluntary negotiations. As the facilitator of the industry, the 
state is, in this sense, all too present for regional landholders, whether 
its sovereign powers are actually enforced or not (see also Holcombe, 
Chapter 7; and Lewis, Chapter 8, both this volume).5
Other members of host communities and the wider Australian public 
have instead chosen to resist and challenge gas companies and the state. 
The Lock the Gate Alliance, for instance, is an organisation that promotes 
a path of civil disobedience by advising landholders to refuse gas and 
mining companies access to their properties. They provide warning signs 
5  Notions of coexistence with agricultural land uses or the industry’s social licence to operate—
predominantly invoked by staff in CSG companies and some state departments—might therefore 
first and foremost be about successful land access rather than the establishment of mutually beneficial 
relationships (Owen and Kemp 2017: 24).
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that can be attached to gates and fences, bright yellow triangles that are 
well known in some parts of Australia—although less so in the Western 
Downs (see Figure 6.3). The alliance and associated individuals also make 
regular submissions to CSG and mining-related government bills and 
appear in regional and national media. Lock the Gate initially formed 
in the Western Downs with the first wave of opposition to local CSG 
developments. Since then, key protagonists have left the region and the 
alliance has shifted its focus and head office into the adjacent state of New 
South Wales, where proposed CSG projects are still at exploration and 
planning stages. According to some alliance members, part of this transition 
has been due to the industry progressing too rapidly in Queensland. 
This meant that organised resistance only formed once projects were 
in full development and many landholders had already entered into 
agreements. However, Makki (2015) investigated the identity politics 
within the Western Downs and put forward an alternative explanation. 
He noted that the perceived ‘protester’ identities of alliance members and 
associated community groups was incompatible with the predominantly 
conservative agrarian identities of the region’s other residents (also Makki 
and van Vuuren 2016). Throughout my ethnographic research, I similarly 
observed that residents’ critical engagements with CSG often occurred 
through forms of ‘conforming resistance’ instead of active protest; that 
is, by focusing on (scientific) evidence-making as a means of producing 
legitimate claims that can influence the decision making and regulation 
around CSG activities. This has, at least partly, been an attempt to avoid 
delegitimising ‘protester’ labels (Espig 2018: 196–204). These forms of 
resistance emerged in response to what was perceived as unacceptable 
uncertainties over CSG projects’ various impacts. In turn, highlighting 
these uncertainties became an important aspect of their challenges of the 
state and gas companies.
Uncertainties are also an essential part of the ‘adaptive management’ 
regulatory regime applied to Queensland’s CSG developments. This 
‘learning by doing’ framework is a reaction to the pro-development 
ambitions of Queensland governments to establish a substantial gas export 
industry while pivotal questions regarding potential impacts were still 
uncertain. As Taylor and Hunter (2019: 51, footnote omitted) emphasise:
The dilemmas in creating effective petroleum regulation are 
the estimation of risks and benefits, which are often based on 
limited scientific knowledge, particularly in relation to hydraulic 
fracturing technology. Thus, the regulatory conundrum presents 
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itself as follows, ‘regulating too soon may stifle innovation, 
but regulating too late may result in significant or irreversible 
damage’. Such an approach is very much reactive, as the State 
responds to regulatory issues as they occur, rather than trying to 
anticipate and legislate for problems prior to the activity taking 
place. For  example in Queensland, regulating unconventional 
gas activities ‘too soon’ has led to the search for a regulatory 
mechanism to manage coexistence.
Swayne (2012: 184) thus noted during the initial rush of CSG activities 
that ‘only time will tell whether the current adaptive approach will be 
able to protect the Queensland environment from what the Queensland 
Government acknowledges are the “unknown and unintended impacts” 
of CSG production’. Uncertainties therefore remained not just with 
residents in host communities but also within the Queensland state’s 
regulation of CSG projects—albeit in different forms and to varying 
levels of acceptability.
By focusing on these uncertainties, community members’ conforming 
resistance brought forward more nuanced challenges wherein the epistemic 
and, ultimately, regulatory authority of gas companies and the Queensland 
state in relation to CSG developments’ associated risks is at stake. Such 
challenges and their counter-claims are often articulated through debates 
over the status of scientific research in relation to environmental and 
health risks—discourses that tie into appealing and powerful tropes of 
environmental degradation and human rights violations. However, these 
scientific debates can mask wider conflicts around crucial sociocultural 
aspects of resource extraction, including envisioned development futures 
and the relationship between the state, its citizens and multinational 
companies (Ballard and  Banks 2003: 299; Espig 2018: 222–6). The 
political dimension and critical role of the Queensland state’s ‘go grow’ 
attitude in this regard is apparent in comparison to other Australian states 
that followed a ‘go slow’ approach or have banned onshore unconventional 
gas developments altogether (Cronshaw and Quentin Grafton 2016; de 
Rijke 2018). From this vantage point, the next section outlines Western 
Downs residents’ experiences of CSG risk debates with the aim of 
exploring the wider sociocultural aspects of resource developments and 
the role of the state within them.
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An Arms Race of Sorts: Outpaced and 
Beyond Capacity
The scale and pace of the CSG boom in the Western Downs played a major 
role in the narratives of my interlocutors. The authors of an industry review 
note that companies got ‘swept up in a groundswell of enthusiasm and 
a “get it done at any cost” mentality’, resulting in ‘an “arms race” of sorts 
in assuring access to scarce resources’ (Reid and Cann 2016: 4, 10). The 
pace and manner of development created a range of social impacts, from 
labour shortages to housing pressure, and gave rise to questions around 
CSG developments’ potential impacts and associated uncertainties. These 
were not merely issues for local community members. Similar views 
were also expressed by urban-based industry professionals, consultants 
and researchers who, for instance, discussed the inexperience of some 
government departments and companies with large-scale unconventional 
gas developments. Many of these interlocutors were critical of CSG 
projects’ initially fast pace:
When this whole tsunami started in 2010 nobody, nobody, not 
even the lawyers, had any experience in what was going to happen 
and what the impacts were. Yet we are supposed to work out this 
agreement [with CSG companies] right at the start … it has been 
a real problem. (Female landholder and CSG-specific regional 
NGO representative, Senate hearing, Brisbane, 27 July 2015)
That’s the nightmare about it, it’s so fast and that’s why they’re 
pushing so hard. (Female landholder with nearby CSG 
infrastructure, interview, June 2015)
It’s the first time it’s been done on this scale. … It was a bit of 
a race. Everyone wanted to be first. I speak for the CEOs of the 
companies, they all wanted to get in before the rules changed. 
Because it was very favourable early on … We described it as the 
big steam roller … If we don’t move fast enough to stay ahead of 
it, it’s just going to get you … Once they had invested the money, 
there was no stopping the project. (Male industry-based senior 
hydrologist, interview, April 2015)
The responsibility for this rapid development lies largely with 
pro-development Queensland state governments that approved CSG 
projects and the gas companies that pushed them. The local council 
in the Western Downs was frequently bypassed (de Rijke 2013b: 15), 
which is unsurprising given that legislative barriers usually prevent 
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Australia’s local governments from taking more active roles in planning 
for major resource projects (Barclay et al. 2012).6 Around the time of 
the CSG resource boom, Barclay and co-authors (2012: 19) also noted 
‘a widespread perception that [Australian] state governments are failing 
to provide adequate resources to assist local governments in meeting the 
challenges created by rapid expansion in the resources sector’. However, 
state governments themselves may lack these resources when confronted 
with multiple large-scale natural resource developments. Some observers 
have therefore linked the rapid expansion of Queensland’s CSG projects to 
a then already decade-old Australian resource boom that saw governments 
approve mineral and hydrocarbon developments at a scale and pace that 
challenged—and possibly exceeded—their own regulatory capacity and 
policies (Cleary 2011; Taylor and Hunter 2019; cf. Eriksen’s 2016, 2018 
notion of ‘runaway growth processes’ more broadly).
Following this rush, many questioned whether the industry and Queensland 
state departments were able to understand and manage CSG’s potential 
impacts. According to some observers, this was partly due to a long 
decline of departments’ internal capacities and the transitioning of expert 
public servants into the CSG industry. Such transitions were prompted by 
departmental staff reductions and financial incentives from better paying 
industry positions. Concerns thus often involved departments lacking staff 
and time to adequately assess projects’ Environmental Impact Statements 
(EISs) and an imbalance of scientific research capacities skewed towards 
CSG companies (see also Holcombe, Chapter 7, this volume). A female 
public servant in charge of the assessment of one CSG project noted in 
an informal conversation how she and colleagues often had to ‘take things 
at face value from proponents’, which was ‘difficult, especially when you 
don’t believe them’. They thus ‘felt constantly behind’ in their assessment 
(February 2016). The public servant’s comments signal a disparity between 
the department’s entrusted responsibilities of regulatory oversight and 
actual ability to fulfil this responsibility, perhaps primarily in terms of the 
6  Barclay and co-authors (2012: 15) highlight that Australian local governments primarily 
perform two functions: a service/management role (delivery of local services and collection of taxes) 
and a political/representative role (represent the interests of their constituents at the local level). 
In terms of statutory authority over mineral and hydrocarbon developments, the Department of 
Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning (QSG 2017: 3) clarifies that ‘resource development 
proposals are not assessed against local government planning schemes or by local governments’.
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department’s capacity rather than its willingness to perform these tasks 
(see also Skrzypek, Chapter 2, this volume). This perspective resonates 
with the concerns of other industry and government professionals:
It outpaced organisations that were far better equipped 
to deal with that sort of thing than any individual in the 
community  …  We  [the  regional mayor and I] were talking 
about how many EISs they were having to deal with … He was 
talking about five or six at any one time, not just five or six in 
total … And they were worried at the time that they didn’t have the 
capability or the capacity to do it full justice. We got one delivered 
here … It was 12,000 pages. It was ridiculous. Now tell me of 
anybody around, particularly regional areas, outside of the highly 
specialised knowledge of a university or government agency that 
can even begin to interpret that. (Male regional natural resource 
manager, interview, April 2015)
Everybody from our side, from the environmental professional 
side, were saying ‘there’s just not enough people to do this job 
properly for all of these sites’ … The three companies would have 
had the most water experts in any one room at any one time for 
any government or industry … Government had eight technical 
people and two managers in all of Queensland … In perspective, 
we had 32 technical people … So, we were essentially educating 
the government on what we were going to do with that water. 
(Male industry-based senior hydrologist, interview, April 2015)
Such limitations are not unique to the context of CSG projects in the 
Western Downs. State and provincial governments frequently struggle to 
effectively assess and manage impacts of large-scale resource developments 
(Measham et al. 2016: 107–8). However, a discrepancy between the state’s 
sovereign power to approve extractive projects and its ability to oversee 
and responsibly regulate the sector can be problematic, particularly for 
local residents who are caught up in this disparity.
Legitimate doubts were therefore expressed regarding the initially low 
levels of scientific certainty of the CSG industry’s risks and the ability 
of various departments to adequately monitor developments, including 
potentially unknown side effects. Scientific uncertainty was accompanied 
by normative uncertainties regarding the efficacy of regulatory processes 
and the state’s capacity to enforce regulation. Against a background of 
rushed projects, these uncertainties became a point of contestation, with 
more prior scientific research or a slower pace of development being viable 
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alternative pathways. The rapid progress of CSG projects and associated 
unknowns were not accepted by a number of actors who argued that many 
uncertainties could, and should, have been avoided (see more broadly 
Wehling 2006: 127–31; Beck and Wehling 2012: 40). Citizens’ trust 
in the Queensland state responsibly facilitating CSG developments was 
therefore, among other things, contingent upon its perceived regulatory 
capacities. Unsurprisingly, some local community members who were 
confronted with uncertainties around potential impacts on their future 
agricultural livelihoods or health demanded answers to open questions. 
However, the responses they received were often unsatisfactory.
No Straight Answer: The Encounter 
of Organised Irresponsibility
In searching for certainty, a number of interlocutors noted that the 
responses they received to their questions from government or company 
staff were often limited to their area of expertise and assigned responsibility. 
Some were advised to instead contact another department or unit. As a 
result, these community members felt that they were sent around in 
circles and were not satisfied with what they regarded as specific questions 
remaining essentially unanswered. A sense of frustration was frequently 
palpable:
The response that we got to a seven-page letter detailing all of 
the issues … was embarrassing, particularly with regard to things 
like very specific information we’ve given them about actual 
harm … It was three pages versus my seven pages. It’s this: at arm’s 
length, no actual depth, no investigation … Please [government 
department] tell us what happened, please advise us? They have 
told us nothing … And it’s in free fall, hands off the wheel, choose 
your own adventure. (Female landholder with nearby CSG 
infrastructure, property tour, April 2015)
And you ask them [a government department] questions about 
health impacts of CSG and they ask you a question for the answer. 
(Male regional town resident and church minister, interview 
May 2015)
Who is taking responsibility for collating all this 
stuff?  …  Somebody needs to be responsible  …  So, there are 
four or five government departments in there conflicting and 
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belting each other up  …  Half the government agencies have 
skin in the game in this space and no one is ultimately saying or 
doing anything about the problems … What he [local grazier] is 
concerned about is the way the department has written that has 
made it so ambiguous, so farcical that it doesn’t make any sense. 
Hence, he gets cranky because he doesn’t understand it—none 
of us understand it because the letter is a pile of rubbish … And 
how poles apart are Natural Resources and Mines and Queensland 
Health? … So, then you throw in the middle of that Environment 
and Heritage Protection, then Agriculture … to muddy the waters. 
(Male state politician, interview, April 2015)
For citizens seeking clear answers to questions regarding risks associated with 
CSG developments, these perceptions of Queensland state departments’ 
lack of responsibility can increase uncertainties, lead to mistrust—itself 
a form of moral uncertainty—and alienate them from government 
structures (Wynne 1996: 42; Gill 2011).7 The above observations were 
echoed in a subsequent review of two Queensland departments with 
CSG-specific regulatory responsibilities and one entity with a legislated 
oversight role to the state’s regulatory framework (QSG 2020).
From the perspective of concerned local community members, I interpret 
these findings by borrowing from sociologist Ulrich Beck who argues 
that in contemporary ecological risk debates ‘[r]esponsibilities can indeed 
be assigned but they are spread out over several social subsystems’ (Beck 
2009: 193). This, he contends, leads to ‘responsibility as impunity or: 
organized irresponsibility’ wherein ‘no individual or institution seems 
to be held specifically accountable for anything’ (ibid.: 194, original 
emphasis; also Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 79–82; Dwyer and Minnegal 
2006: 10–2 and 20). This organised irresponsibility stands in contrast 
to the Queensland state’s authority to approve and regulate resource 
developments. As a result, concerned members of host communities 
and the wider public who submitted complaints were left searching 
for definite answers and advice. They questioned the perceived lack of 
government oversight, which caused problems of unclear responsibilities 
and ultimately accountability. This led to further normative uncertainties 
regarding the role of state departments and other entities with legislated 
oversight (e.g. the GasFields Commission Queensland). It is in these 
7  Cf. Auyero and Swistun’s (2008: 369–71) notion of the social production of toxic uncertainty 
through, among other aspects, state officials’ ‘labor of confusion and state (mis)interventions’. 
See also Stilgoe (2007).
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liminal spaces, in between state presence and absence, where concerned 
community members who experience the rapid environmental and social 
transformations of a natural resource boom can encounter what Bainton 
and Skrzypek (Chapter 1, this volume) describe as the absent presence 
of the state. Here, everyday perceptions and practices, such as moving in 
circles between state departments, are important modes through which 
the state comes into being for concerned community members, mainly 
in the form of a heightened sense of its perceived failure to fulfil regulatory 
responsibilities (Sharma and Gupta 2005).
Considering the difficulties in forecasting impacts and projects’ rushed 
progress, it is debatable whether definite answers could have been 
given to some of the questions raised by community members.8 Several 
industry professionals also emphasised the indeterminacies of CSG 
developments; for example, exact infrastructure locations or the ultimate 
numbers of wells in a field can often not be determined at the onset but 
are influenced by outcomes of ongoing extraction. Other interlocutors 
appeared somewhat satisfied with the information and conflict resolution 
processes offered by, for instance, the Queensland Government’s CSG 
Compliance Unit. However, for many concerned community members, 
perceived irresponsibilities have resulted in a diminishing trust in 
the relevant governing structures (Lloyd et al. 2013; Gillespie et al. 
2016). Some addressed the perceived absence of adequate oversight by 
either individually or collectively trying to scrutinise the industry and 
government. One landholder argued at a community meeting that CSG 
companies ‘need to be made accountable. No one else out here is going to 
do that. It’s up to us, the community, to do that, because there simply is 
no other overseer. There should be, but there isn’t’ (April 2015). A grazier 
and representative of a regional CSG-focused NGO similarly criticised 
the Queensland Government’s Mineral and Energy Resources (Common 
Provision) Bill 2014 that temporarily restricted public objection rights to 
extractive projects by noting, ‘We are the watchdogs for our democracy 
and don’t let any politician tell you otherwise’ (group discussion April 
2015; see Espig and de Rijke 2018: 220–1).
8  In contexts of uncertainties and unknowns one might also not be willing to accept responsibility 
and refuse to give a straight answer. Povinelli’s (1993: 685) analysis of the language of indeterminacy 
in an Australian Aboriginal community is insightful, particularly ‘the relationship among knowledge-
claims, responsibility-culpability, and authority-status’. See also Gluckman (1972).
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Such a felt absence of government oversight can, in tandem with scientific 
uncertainties and a heightened sense of mistrust, lead to insecurities and 
frustration among local residents and landholders (Checker 2007; Beck 
2009: 45–6). Some citizens and groups find themselves compelled to 
scrutinise the CSG industry themselves, which can create privatised forms 
of risk management (Jasanoff 2002: 375; Rose 2005: 158; Pyysiäinen et al. 
2017). However, whether scrutiny can be exercised effectively in light of 
the techno-scientific and ecological complexities of CSG developments, 
and by whom, must be critically evaluated.
Displacement, Responsibilisation and the 
Absent State
The two preceding sections portray instances of an absent presence of 
the state, within which securing investments and economic benefits 
might be perceived by some as taking priority over community 
members’ risk concerns. A variety of local and ‘outside’ interlocutors 
(cf. Espig and de Rijke 2018: 220–1) attempted to assume regulatory 
responsibilities by challenging gas companies and the Queensland state’s 
adaptive management regime through the means available to them, from 
conforming resistance to outright civil disobedience. Many concerned 
residents were not satisfied with a circular transfer of responsibility 
between companies and impotent state departments through, for instance, 
reference to regulation-compliant behaviour. As a female attendee 
at a company-organised gas facility tour emphasised in her response to a 
CSG company representative, ‘[p]eople want answers and details. It’s 
not going to help to say, “We comply”’ (July 2015). Such ‘discourses of 
compliance’ (Stilgoe 2005) can turn questions concerning unknowns into 
issues of measurement and compliance to set guidelines. These guidelines 
represent what is known about particular hazards and politically 
acceptable regulation at a given moment in time. Discourses that stress 
compliance with such guidelines might then create cognitive and social 
authority, but they can potentially obscure uncertainties and demarcate 
unknowns from further consideration. Reference to compliance also 
allows regulatory agencies to manage contested issues solely in scientific 
terms, which excludes non-scientific forms of knowledge from decision-
making processes. Actors whose concerns remain unanswered, or are 
not even acknowledged, might consequently feel prompted to challenge 
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
192
the foundations of regulatory processes. The efficacy of discourses of 
compliance can thus be limited, especially when the underlying adequacy 
of guidelines is questioned (Stilgoe 2005, 2007).
Similar problems emerge when Queensland state departments passed on 
complaints about misconduct or impacts to companies for investigation. 
As a regional town resident explained:
It’s not just a blind mistrust. The mistrust is because we’ve seen 
it over and over again: here’s my complaint and I’m giving it 
to [government departments]. They take it and go to bloody 
[company name] and say, ‘Here’s this complaint’. So, they hand 
it over and [company name] write their report, hand it back to 
them and then they take it back to the landowner saying, ‘There’s 
the report, everything is fine’ … Self-regulation, self-reporting—
it doesn’t work. (Opposing female town resident, interview, 
May 2015)
Such instances constitute what Trouillot (2003: 90) describes as 
a displacement of state functions from governments to, in this case, private 
transnational companies (also Sharma and Gupta 2005: 21–2). In  the 
context of the extractive industries, examples of such practices include 
the delegation of regulatory responsibilities to resource companies and 
their self-regulation through corporate social responsibility or voluntary 
industry initiatives (Brereton 2003; Dashwood 2012; Owen and 
Kemp 2017; also Bainton and Skrzypek, Chapter 1, this volume). One 
implication is that, within host communities, residents’ uncertainties and 
distrust can increase when compliance is associated with irresponsibility 
among state departments as well as adaptive management regimes 
being reliant on company expertise and self-regulation. Unsurprisingly, 
concerned Western Downs residents and their allies in the wider public 
often contested the scientific foundation of state regulations and company 
conduct.
The resources they have at their disposal to put pressure on CSG companies 
and the government vary, though. The relatively wealthy and politically 
well-represented farmers in the Western Downs’ eastern cotton growing 
area mounted a formidable challenge by investing considerable amounts 
of money into independent hydrological studies that demonstrated the 
limited understanding of interconnectivity between agriculturally used 
aquifers and those targeted by CSG companies. This kept proposed 
developments off prime agricultural land and prompted lengthy research 
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trials. Small-scale residential landholders further west, on the other hand, 
found themselves in the midst of multiple gas fields. Among those living 
on so-called ‘lifestyle blocks’, located on agriculturally less valuable land, 
are members of vulnerable and lower income groups who could hardly 
afford a few hundred dollars to have water in their tanks or dams tested 
(Makki 2015; Makki and van Vuuren 2016).9 The effectiveness of their 
challenges has therefore generally been lower than that of other groups in 
the Western Downs. I interpret this as the result of an interplay between 
multiple, unequally distributed financial, social and political ‘capitals’ 
(Bourdieu 1986; Everingham et al. 2014, 2015; QSG 2020). Residents’ 
ability to mobilise such capitals influences experiences of regional change 
and the uncertainties associated with CSG developments by allowing some 
to develop a sense of agency and beneficial engagement with the industry. 
It seems that actors and groups with greater levels of pre-existing capitals 
tend to have benefited to a higher degree from CSG projects and were 
able to negotiate better compensation agreements, have a stronger say in 
where infrastructure is located on their property, or could avoid certain 
impacts (Measham et al. 2016: 107–8). So, while concerned Western 
Downs residents from a range of socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds 
challenged companies and the Queensland state, the outcomes they 
were able to achieve varied. This led to different experiences of CSG 
developments and of their encounters with the state.
The observation that individual community members become self-
reliant on their own capabilities and capitals to secure their welfare is 
consistent with a broader neoliberal shift that has occurred in Australia’s 
agricultural regions since the 1970s. This policy shift includes the private 
responsibilisation of farmers as individual, economically independent 
entrepreneurs and responsibility-taking agents (Pyysiäinen et al. 2017). 
In the context of Pennsylvania’s shale gas projects (another form of 
unconventional natural gas), Malin (2014) critiqued similar developments 
as imposing a form of neoliberal individualisation and logic onto farmers. 
In debates over the complex environmental and health risks associated 
with CSG extraction, such an individualisation creates new demands 
and responsibilities for concerned community members. For some, 
profound limitations emerge if, for example, they are unable to conduct 
9  There are some 2,100 rural subdivisions, or ‘lifestyle blocks’, between Tara and Chinchilla, 
typically ranging from 13–40ha. Established since the 1980s on poor agricultural land, these 
subdivisions are primarily affordable residential properties. Here, the civil disobedience movement 
against CSG developments began (see Makki 2015).
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or afford scientific testing for suspected air pollution from nearby CSG 
activities. These residents and interested outsiders often face higher levels 
of uncertainty and what risk scholars describe as a decline in ontological 
security. As Beck (2009: 45–6 and 195, original emphasis) emphasises 
within his risk society thesis:
a dramatic decline of ontological security now confronts 
lifeworlds, even in the peaceful corners of the earth. The three 
pillars of security are crumbling—the state, science and the 
economy … and are naming the ‘self-conscious citizen’ as their 
legal heir. But how are individuals supposed to accomplish 
what state, sciences and economic enterprises are unable to 
achieve? … The brutal fact of ontological insecurity always has 
an ultimate addressee: …  the individual. Whatever propels risk 
and makes it incalculable … shifts the ultimate decision-making 
responsibility onto the individuals, who are ultimately left to 
their own devices with their partial and biased knowledge, with 
undecidability and multiple layers of uncertainty.
Similarly, Giddens (1991: 131, original emphasis) notes ‘the inevitability 
of living with dangers which are remote from the control not only 
of individuals, but also of large organisations, including states’. This 
uncontrollability can lead to a ‘sense of dread which is the antithesis of 
basic trust’ (ibid.: 133). Notwithstanding the problematic generalising 
tendencies of these grand theoretical claims (see Dwyer and Minnegal 
2006), Beck and Giddens highlight an often underappreciated aspect of 
what it might mean to live with the insecurities of complex ‘manufactured 
risks’; that is, those predominantly created by the increasing scale of humans’ 
application of techno-scientific capabilities. Negative psychological, 
sociocultural and political ramifications of risk and uncertainty can be 
observed especially within contexts where citizens perceive a disparity 
between the regulatory mandate of the state and its capacity to fulfil those 
responsibilities.
However, a retreat of the state and corresponding privatisation of risk 
management might also create opportunities for the reconfiguration of 
the power relationships between the state and its subjects. Rose (2005: 
159) contends that the active citizens of ‘advanced’ liberal democracies 
can create new demands and challenges towards those in positions 
of authority:
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Here we can witness the ‘reversibility’ of relations of authority—
what starts off as a norm to be implanted into citizens can be 
repossessed as a demand which citizens can make of authorities. 
Individuals are to become ‘experts of themselves’, to adopt an 
educated and knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect of 
their bodies, their minds, their forms of conduct and that of the 
members of their own families.
Such challenges cannot only be established in relation to the private self 
but also in terms of wider societal debates, such as within environmental 
risk controversies. As indicated above, engaged landholders who could 
mobilise their various capitals effectively were able to create significant 
obstacles for gas projects. In the case of CSG developments in the 
adjacent state of New South Wales, the combination of local resistance 
and a national anti-gas movement was partly responsible for prompting 
the state government to even declare a moratorium on unconventional gas 
developments (Cronshaw and Quentin Grafton 2016; de Rijke 2018).10
These cases indicate that driven individuals, well-organised groups 
and international networks of interest can indeed challenge states and 
extractive companies in response to what they experience as an absence 
of adequate government regulation and a subsequent privatisation of risk 
management. However, this does not answer the questions of  whether 
those who can bring forth such challenges should have  to assume this 
responsibility, what eventually constitutes successful challenges, and 
whether their claims can be articulated in time before rapidly progressing 
projects create realities on the ground that foreclose alternative 
development pathways. It is thus possible that one element of conforming 
resistance is a ‘neoliberal “unloading” of public services onto empowered 
and “responsibilized” selves and communities who … are thereby made 
complicit in the contemporary workings of power and governance’ 
10  Similar challenges can also be found in other extractive sectors. Stuart Kirsch (2014, 2018), for 
instance, describes how Yonggom community members and a network of international NGOs and 
sympathisers were able to successfully sue BHP in Australia over the environmental damages caused 
by riverine tailings disposal at their Ok Tedi copper and gold mine in Papua New Guinea.
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
196
(Sharma and Gupta 2005: 21).11 Local community members who are 
already vulnerable, marginalised or in socioeconomically weaker positions 
all too often find themselves on the downside of the  accompanying 
individualisation of risk. The responsibilisation of the self can, in this 
sense, lead to the inconspicuous (re)production of social inequalities 
and unequal risk positions. As Jasanoff (2015: 17) notes, ‘[i]f networks 
diffuse responsibility, they can also depoliticize power by making its 
actions opaque or invisible’. With limited means to respond to what 
community members regard as the transfer of responsibility for their 
environments and health, their options are restricted to either moving 
away—as a number of interlocutors did—or to protest with their physical 
bodies against CSG development as a last resort. In any way, challenging 
regulatory institutions and those in positions of power and authority 
never occurs without significant personal investment, effort and sacrifice. 
Many individuals and groups can therefore only temporarily resist the 
pressures that arise from a perceived absence of the state.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed concerned host community members’ 
experiences of the state regarding CSG developments in the Western 
Downs. This ethnographic account should not be read as a thorough 
analysis of the Queensland state’s regulatory instruments and agencies. 
Neither does it address the experiences of residents supporting CSG 
development or those who were not concerned about associated risks 
(see  Espig 2018: 141–66). Here, I focused specifically on community 
members for whom CSG projects posed a clear and present threat. While 
I do not suggest that the Queensland state should be considered as ‘failed’ 
in this regard—especially in comparison to other jurisdictions discussed 
in this volume and elsewhere—my aim was to demonstrate that marginal 
11  Pyysiäinen and co-authors (2017) present a critical analysis of Australian farmers’ reactions to 
neoliberal ‘responsibilisation’ that provides complementary insights into individuals’ experiences of 
the state. Contrary to neoliberal theory, most farmers they surveyed did see the causal explanations 
for their situation in external structural factors, such as government policies or macroeconomic 
conditions. As neoliberal theorists argue, however, a majority reacted with an internally-oriented 
response, or ‘psychological reactance’, wherein they took on the responsibility of actively regaining 
control and changing their circumstances, while only a smaller group demanded structural changes. 
These observations are insightful for the presented ethnographic findings: one might interpret 
individuals’ or groups’ attempts to regain control and ‘hold the industry accountable’ as an 
internalisation of responsibility in reaction to a perceived absence of satisfactory state regulation.
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spaces of partial state presence do not only emerge in relatively recent 
postcolonial, new or ‘weak’ states (Das and Poole 2004: 4). Instead, 
a  dialectic of presence and absence might also manifest within highly 
industrialised and, at first sight, well-regulated democratic states. The 
experiences of concerned community members in the Western Downs 
highlight that a perceived lack of regulatory oversight can become all 
too present in their daily encounters with the state, which shows that 
‘phenomena may have a powerful presence in people’s lives precisely 
because of their absence’ (Bille et al. 2010: 4, original emphasis). This 
dialectic of presence and absence is part of an ongoing reconfiguration 
of the relationships between the Queensland state, its subjects and 
private, multinational gas companies. In this sense, CSG risk debates 
do not just concern ecological hazards in a narrow sense but constitute 
a broader commentary on the social world (Espig 2018: 222–6) and the 
sociocultural transformations associated with large-scale natural resource 
developments.
While Ballard and Banks (2003) emphasise that, as part of these 
reconfigurations, local communities encounter the full power of the 
state’s sovereign claims to natural resources, they also recognise the 
countervailing powers communities can mobilise. The outlined cases of 
resistance to CSG developments detail how states and private companies 
can face formidable challenges from local community members. This 
has critical implications for the relationship between citizens and 
the extractive industries. Writing about mining contexts, Kirsch (2014: 
32–3) suggests that states’ limited presence, especially in rural areas, brings 
extractive companies into closer contact with surrounding communities. 
As companies assume state responsibilities, however, they might also be 
held accountable for shortcomings of the state more broadly (also Owen 
and Kemp 2017: 187). This means that:
The mining industry can no longer assume that the state is its only 
negotiating partner or that rural or indigenous communities lack 
the resources or capacity to challenge their operations, whether 
by forging international alliances with NGOs and other partners, 
through legal action in the countries in which the corporations are 
based, or by force—albeit at a terrible cost. (Kirsch 2014: 232)
My ethnographic account of Queensland’s CSG developments supports 
this assessment, with the important caveat that the ‘reversibility of 
relations of authority’ (Rose 2005: 159) is contingent upon community 
members’ various capitals and capacities that enable or constrain them 
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from formulating challenges to the state or private companies. These 
capitals may be considerably higher for many citizens in the Western 
Downs, compared to other communities discussed in this volume. 
Across these diverse contexts, however, it is important to pay attention to 
social inequalities, power imbalances and unequal risk positions that can 
be (re)produced in local responses to a limited state presence.
In outlining the dialectic of presence and absence within CSG risk 
debates, I discussed the encounters between a subset of host community 
members and the Queensland state. The ethnographic account of 
their experiences points towards the roles citizens might assume within 
resource development contexts that are seemingly driven by neo- or 
advanced liberal policies. Considering the ecological and techno-scientific 
complexities of CSG developments, I echo Beck’s (2009: 45–6 and 195) 
concern over whether individual citizens can close the gap left by, at least 
partially, absent states. This is, of course, not to suggest that all citizens 
perceive such a gap or are equally affected by it, nor to follow Beck’s 
(ibid.) gloomy outlook that they are ‘ultimately left to their own devices’. 
Nonetheless, it is important to critically consider what happens when, for 
some, states appear to fail in their task to safeguard against risks and harm, 
especially against a backdrop of an uneven distribution of different forms 
of uncertainty, risk and sociocultural as well as economic capitals. What, 
then, are the responsibilities and accountabilities of state departments, 
community members, private companies, NGOs, universities or research 
institutes in regard to the risks of extractive projects such as CSG 
developments? Drawing out some of the challenges local community 
members experienced around the ongoing reconfiguration of the public 
and private within the dialectic of the Queensland state’s presence and 
absence can contribute towards addressing this pressing question.
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The State’s Selective Absence: 
Extractive Capitalism, 
Mining Juniors and 




Junior mining companies are an elusive group. They are by far the most 
numerically significant mining companies to operate globally, but most of 
them have a limited public profile and very few are publicly listed. Unlike 
the majority of major mining companies and some mid-tier companies, 
junior miners are unlikely to subscribe to international standards for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), nor are they likely to have the 
internal resources and capability to demonstrate alignment with these 
standards.1 We know comparatively little about how junior miners engage 
with local and prior interests, especially those of Indigenous people. 
1  International standards for the extractive industry include the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) Performance Standards, and those that the International Council for Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) members endorse, which mirror the IFC standards. To gain membership of the ICMM, 
companies have to commit to establishing particular policies and procedures to ensure that they align 
with the standards. However, compliance measures to ensure implementation of these policies is 
a significant gap.
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
206
For instance, do they simply follow the minimum regulatory standard for 
the jurisdiction and, if so, are these adequate for the task of ensuring that 
Indigenous peoples can access their rights and interests?
While there is no set definition for a junior mining company, ‘juniors’ 
may be defined by their size or by their role within the industry (e.g. as 
companies that discover and develop new resources to the point at which 
they can be taken over by larger operators). The latter appears to be 
a function of the decision by many of the ‘senior’ companies to cut back 
on exploration spending around the turn of the millennium. However, 
what matters for the purpose of this chapter is the way that juniors are 
defined by their entitlement to specific state subsidies; yet they typically 
underperform in terms of social and environmental responsibility 
compared to larger mining companies (Dougherty 2013: 3; Lyons et al. 
2016). Noting, of course, the obvious caveat that major companies do not 
always meet their own CSR commitments.
This chapter will explore the case of one such company seeking to operate 
in the Northern Territory (NT) of Australia, which, for ethical reasons 
I will refer to as ‘Top End Mining’, as they are still seeking approval 
to develop a mine. I argue that a focus on junior miners provides an 
important (and largely overlooked) window into the strategic presence 
and absence of the state in resource extraction contexts, and helps to reveal 
the structural factors that shape the relationship between miners and 
Indigenous communities. In this chapter, I set out to achieve three things. 
In the first part of the chapter, I provide an overview of this particular 
mining project, and the key features of junior miners, addressing a gap 
in anthropology of mining literature (see Bainton 2020). I then consider 
the regulatory limitations within the environmental and social impact 
assessment processes in the NT, in comparison with other Australian 
jurisdictions, and the way that junior mining companies have been 
able to take advantage of this ‘absence’ to the detriment of Aboriginal 
communities in mine-affected areas. This provides the basis to consider the 
disconnection between this impact assessment process and the agreement-
making process for which provision is made under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) and subsequent native title 
legislation. This disconnection is by no means unique to the NT; it is also 
found in other parts of Australia, and in Papua New Guinea.
The political context of the NT includes the regulatory frameworks at 
state and federal levels; local-level agreements between Indigenous groups, 
the mining company, Indigenous representative bodies; and, importantly, 
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the structural inequality that frames this ‘Top End’ remote Indigenous 
region. The broader sociopolitical context is framed by the paradigm of 
extractive capitalism, exemplified by the Australian Government’s White 
Paper on Developing Northern Australia (AFG 2015). This narrative draws 
on the language of developing the ‘untapped promise [of ], abundant 
resources’, ‘enabling infrastructure [for] agriculture, aquaculture and 
previously stranded energy and minerals resources’ and ‘making it easier 
to use natural assets’ (2015: 4–5). While there is a nod towards consulting 
with Indigenous interests, Indigenous people are regarded as another set 
of stakeholders rather than a distinct majority interest (in remote areas) in 
this development approach, which has been robustly critiqued (Morrison 
2017; Chambers et al. 2018; Archer et al. 2019).2 Likewise, neither does 
this approach to Indigenous interests specifically recognise or focus on 
the distinct and unique cultural and social conditions of this Indigenous 
domain, as the mainstream or standard approach to permitting and 
approvals processes for extractive projects is transplanted to this context.
In this chapter I am especially concerned with the limitations of the 
current ‘environmental impact assessment’ (EIA) regulations and 
processes, which also include the requirements for undertaking an 
‘economic and social impact assessment’ (ESIA) for new mining projects 
(NTG 2013). Conventional approaches to ESIA (and social impact 
assessment or SIA generally) are based on a ‘no harm’ approach, where 
the intention is to ensure that projects do not inflict additional harm 
upon local environments and communities. However, this raises critical 
questions about how conventional forms of ESIA can address existing 
socioeconomic disadvantage. This also draws attention to the relationship 
between the ESIA process and the agreements that are negotiated between 
the proponents and the Indigenous groups for mining projects. These 
regulations and processes concomitantly highlight the multiple ways in 
which the inherent deficiencies of junior mining companies are exacerbated 
in remote Indigenous contexts. The sociocultural elements of project 
impact, which are arguably the most complex, are demonstrably the least 
regulated. Yet, it is in this domain where Indigenous rights and interests 
are most at risk, and the possibilities for local forms of development are 
most pressing. In this context, the limitations of the usual ‘no harm’ 
approach to EIA for extractive capitalism become apparent.
2  In response to the criticism from Indigenous leaders based in the north, including Yu and 
Morrison, an Indigenous reference group was established in late 2017, which included these two 
leaders among the eight (Canavan and Scullion 2017).
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Tracing the key aspects of the regulatory context within which the Top 
End Mining company is seeking to operate sheds light more broadly on 
the political economy within which the extractive industries in general 
operate across this jurisdiction—for which, of course, there may be 
parallels in other jurisdictions. Likewise, I argue that the approach of this 
particular company to the task of seeking project approval is in some 
ways representative of other junior companies that are also operating, 
or have done so, in the NT. And, as will be elaborated, although the 
absence of the state is apparent in the channelling of particular models 
of extractive development on its remote Indigenous citizens, the state 
is present for these same citizens in other governance contexts (see also 
Lewis, Chapter  8, this volume). This sectoral dimension of the state’s 
selective engagement is felt through the structural inequalities that mark 
out the daily lives of Indigenous Territorians in a diverse range of punitive 
governance and conditional social welfare measures, where the state is 
very present.
Top End Mining: Reviving 
a ‘Stranded Asset’
Top End Mining is a subsidiary of a larger international company that 
has multiple business interests, including trading and vehicle distribution. 
This mining company was established through the purchase of existing 
mining leases, their associated ‘stranded assets’ and the existing exploration 
and mining agreements that had been negotiated between the previous 
company and the Northern Land Council (NLC), as the statutory 
representative body for Indigenous interests under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act (ALRA). The previous company, also a junior miner, had 
gone into voluntary administration. The stranded assets include a trial 
pit (where bulk sampling was undertaken by the previous company) in 
an open-cut operation, a laboratory and an accommodation village, both 
in the form of demountable buildings, for up to 60 staff. This trial pit 
remains in ‘care and maintenance’: there is a rotating skeleton staff of two 
on/two off, as it has not been producing since 2014 and operated for less 
than two years. The other mining leases and exploration licences do not 
have any infrastructure, while the total ‘mine area disturbance footprint’ 
is potentially around 2,400 hectares, according to the ‘notice of intent’ 
lodged for the environmental impact statement (EIS).
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As a result of the resuscitation of this mining project, the ESIA process 
did not start from scratch, so the company had effectively purchased 
a  range of approvals. The existing local agreements had been moved 
across (or ‘novated’) to this new company at a meeting convened by the 
NLC for the company to discuss their proposal to reopen the mine and 
develop the other leases with the Traditional Owners (TOs), as customary 
land owners are termed under the ALRA. At that meeting, however, the 
additional aspects of the project, which subsequently required the ESIA 
processes, were not raised. Yet, as it unfolded, approval for the new aspects 
of the project were essential for its economic viability and, as will be 
discussed, the proponent appeared keen to ensure that the only approvals 
required for this additional stage were those of the state, rather than the 
TOs as well.
The agreements entail a range of company commitments, which include: 
cultural heritage protection, payment of mining royalties, and preferential 
employment for TOs as agreement beneficiaries. Likewise, if the project 
proceeds (and the new aspects gain the appropriate approvals) then, as 
part of the agreement, Top End Mining has to prepare and complete an 
ESIA and associated management plan with the input of TOs and the 
NLC. This second ESIA is in addition to that required by the regulatory 
regime, and the focus would be on Indigenous interests. This ESIA, 
including a  baseline assessment, is not only essential for assessing the 
social impact of the operation over time, but, if done well, could also 
be a very useful tool for the region in negotiating their service delivery 
needs with government (see for instance Taylor et al. 2000; Taylor and 
Scambary 2005; Taylor 2018).3 Indeed, the possibility of being engaged 
in establishing such a  baseline for the region was a catalyst for my 
involvement in this project through the Centre for Social Responsibility 
in Mining at the University of Queensland. As I will discuss below, I was 
engaged to prepare the section of the ESIA on ‘culture and heritage’ and, 
as an extension of this, the draft ‘cultural heritage management plan’ for 
the project. Hence, my growing recognition that the predominant focus 
3  However, such an ESIA will require significant resourcing and good faith from the company, 
while the NLC will need to ensure that the research occurs. There is no evidence that the previous 
company—under the same agreement—undertook an ESIA. Furthermore, in remote areas especially, 
the methodology of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) census collection has been strongly critiqued 
as not reflective of Indigenous households and patterns of mobility. Likewise, in some regions there is 
an acknowledged undercount by as much as 40 per cent. Such an undercount has direct implications 
for service delivery (Martin et al. 2002; Taylor 2018).
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of the regulatory system that I had to work through was to assess and 
manage for environmental impacts. Minimal state guidance was provided 
for the social impacts, which are embedded within the ESIA process.
As this mining company was specifically established to develop several 
mineral deposits, it is not surprising that they do not have existing 
‘social performance management systems’ and staff in place. This term 
refers to the resources and capabilities that companies need in order to 
manage a broad range of socioeconomic and political issues, and risks, 
in the context of their operations (see Johnston and Kemp 2019). In this 
case, the entire company consists of two directors, one of whom lives 
internationally, a secretary and the four staff members responsible for the 
care and maintenance of the site—and as we shall see, this is more or less 
representative of many junior miners.
The Precarity and Culture of Junior Miners
There is no universal definition of a junior mining company and 
considerable debate surrounds the criteria that classify a company as 
a  junior miner. Much of the critical literature (Dougherty 2011, 2013; 
Lyons et al. 2016) and the online financial guidance (Anon. 2019) focuses 
on junior gold miners. The boundaries between the different classifications 
of senior, mid-tier and junior firms are ambiguous, though they are 
usually categorised by their numbers of sites, levels of capitalisation and 
sources of revenue. According to Cranstoun, senior firms derive their 
revenue from production and sale, whereas juniors are essentially venture 
capital companies, while mid-tier firms derive capital from both equity 
financing and production and sale (quoted in Dougherty 2013: 343). 
Another definition also indicates that junior miners are neither producing 
companies nor the recipient of significant income from production or 
from some other business venture (Anon. n.d.a). These definitions do 
not fit the current case study, nor the neighbouring operation, which 
will also be briefly discussed, as they are both producing companies. This 
reinforces the fact that very little research seems to have been undertaken 
on junior companies, and that they are an extremely diverse bunch.
The Australia-based ‘Junior Miners’ website (www.juniorminers.com/
about.html), which began in 2007, lists over 2,000 junior miners 
globally. To gain perspective, this compares with the Minerals Council of 
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Australia (MCA), which has 45 members,4 and the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM), which has 27. The largest transnational 
companies, or the ‘majors’, and some aspirational mid-tier companies 
seek membership of these peak professional bodies. While these majors 
also extract the bulk of the earth’s minerals, there has been a proliferation 
of junior companies globally (Dougherty 2011). One reason cited for 
this proliferation has been the rent-seeking behaviour of juniors, as 
incentivised by the state (Dougherty 2013), as well as the recent uptick in 
the mining industry.
Similar to Canada (see Dougherty 2013: 341), the Australian state 
incentivises the formation and proliferation of juniors, as it does more 
generally the mineral and fossil fuel industries. A 2017 federal government 
scheme involved ‘tax incentives for junior exploration companies to 
encourage investment and risk taking’ (Turnbull 2017). This entailed 
a  government commitment of AUD100  million to secure additional 
private investment, referred to as the Junior Mineral Exploration Tax 
Credit.5 Likewise, on a significantly larger scale, the industry more generally 
receives significant support. According to Peel et al. (2014), over a six-year 
period, Australian state and territory governments spent AUD17.6 billion 
supporting the mineral and fossil fuel industries. Of this total, between 
2008 and 2015, the NT Government spent almost AUD407 million on 
minerals and fossil fuel expenditures and concessions. Ironically, given the 
deficit position of the NT budget, in 2013–14, of the AUD113 million 
in mining royalties received, AUD88 million was returned in assistance to 
the minerals and fossil fuel industries (Peel et al. 2014: 4–12). Powerful 
industry lobby groups, including the MCA and the Association of Mining 
and Exploration Companies (AMEC) are active in pursuing these cost 
savings on behalf of industry.6
4  It also has approximately 15 ‘associate members’ who are not mining companies but consultancy 
firms.
5  The Junior Mineral Exploration Tax Credit is said to be an improvement on previous pilot 
programs assisting junior mineral explorers and has been developed based on industry feedback. Offering 
incentives for investment is of course not limited to junior mining companies. Glencore, which owns the 
MacArthur River mine in the NT, is known to pay zero royalties in most years. The only known royalty 
payment, of AUD13 million, came in 2008 after a historic peak in the zinc price. At best the mine would 
contribute just one third of 1 per cent of NT Government revenue (Campbell et al. 2017).
6  According to AMEC’s 2019 annual report, they have ‘saved the industry millions of dollars 
by being willing to challenge public policy issues and advocate crucial initiatives to reduce the cost 
of doing business for the industry … AMEC has ready access to ministers, leading politicians and 
government decision makers in territory, state and federal levels’ (AMEC 2019: 5).
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The absence of the state therefore manifests as a fiscal absence, reflected 
in the failure to claim taxes from the industry at both territory and 
federal levels. The NT is the only jurisdiction in Australia with a profit-
based royalty system and because many extractive industry operations 
are capital  and infrastructure-intensive, this often means that no 
royalties are paid at all by industry. This approach also assumes that any 
infrastructure and development the industry builds will have flow-on and 
broader benefits to communities and the region, in a ‘trickle-down effect’, 
both during and beyond life-of-mine.
Although some junior companies may subscribe to particular industry 
standards or may have developed their own policies, online ‘networks’ 
seem to be a major forum for information and discussion.7 These online 
services, some of which are fee-based (for subscriptions to magazines 
such as Junior Mining Monthly), provide insight into the attitudes and 
approach of juniors.8 Delving into several of these online sites is a window 
into the capital logic and cultural drivers that underpin the junior mining 
entrepreneur. An American investment site called the ‘Outsider Club’ (that 
also publishes the Junior Mining Monthly and the Junior Mining Trader), 
which runs the byline ‘because you’ll never be on the inside’, speaks to an 
idealised frontier spirit that resists regulation and state oversight. As they 
state on their website: ‘[W]e’ll … help you shield your civil liberties and 
freedoms. We pledge allegiance to no political party. The Outsider Club 
will inform you of suspicious laws and policy—and show you how to 
stand up to and fight against them’ (Outsider Club n.d.).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the editors of this site are six white American 
men, suggesting that the ‘outsiders’ as a frame of reference is a limited 
reference point. The business logic of junior miners is framed around 
risks and uncertainty. As the Australian junior mining online page states: 
‘those uncertainties and risks can range from everything from government 
politics to commodity prices and everything in between’ (Anon. n.d.b). 
Though such risks are not unique to junior companies, they are typically 
very reactive to the volatility of the global minerals market and can 
disappear just as fast as the mineral stocks plummet. This is one reason 
7  See for instance: www.juniorminingnetwork.com. Note that mid-tier and major companies also 
engage in networks and forums.
8  Note, however, that there are blurry and shifting boundaries between these ‘categories’. For instance 
the Australian company Newcrest is listed as a junior on the ‘Junior mining’ site, but according to its 
website it is one of the largest gold mining companies in the world and it is also a member of the MCA 
and the newest member of the ICMM.
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why it is commonplace for mines operated by junior companies to become 
abandoned or placed in ‘care and maintenance’ until another company 
picks up the operation. This was the case of the ‘stranded asset’ purchased 
by the Top End Mining company. Likewise, during the same period 
another neighbouring mine, and its associated stranded assets, were also 
purchased by another junior company.9
The parent company that established Top End Mining is not readily 
searchable online and no information could be located about their 
corporate business standards. Of note however, is that mining does 
not seem to be a significant element of their diversified business. Since 
incorporating, however, and during the process of applying for the EIS 
approvals (still ongoing as I write), Top End Mining has developed a one-
page ‘Sustainable Development Policy’ (available online as an appendix 
in their Mining Management Plan). Their priority is clear in the first 
line: ‘A fundamental objective of [the company] is to create long‐term 
value for its owners through the discovery, development and delivery to its 
customers of mineral and related products’.10 The model of sustainability 
at play here is thus of the corporate financial kind. I am not suggesting 
that there is anything exceptional about the fact that these companies do 
not have social performance standards in place or have not employed the 
rhetoric of corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, the significant 
chasm between the approach to CSR of such companies and those of 
major companies and many mid-tier companies is of particular note.
Major companies, including those who are members of the ICMM, and 
some who are members of the MCA, generally have ‘social performance 
management systems’. This term refers to the suite of integrated policies, 
procedures and guidelines that assist the company to manage the social 
dimensions and impacts of their operations.11 I suggest that we need to 
recognise that a major feature of junior mining companies is a consistent 
lack of CSR standards and associated governance systems. As Margaret 
Lyons and her co-authors note: ‘little is known about the meaning and 
practice of CSR in junior and mid-tier companies’ (Lyons et al. 2016: 
9  According to one often cited estimation, there are approximately 50,000 abandoned mines in 
Australia—from major open-cut mines to small mine shafts. No major open-cut mine has been fully 
rehabilitated and relinquished in Australia (Roche and Judd 2016).
10  Note, that in the interests of not identifying this company I will not provide a reference for this.
11  These typically include policies, guidelines and standards that cover: ‘communities’, ‘stakeholder 
relationship management’, ‘human rights’, ‘Indigenous peoples’, ‘local procurement and employment’, 
‘social baseline and impact assessment’, and ‘local and community grievance’ mechanisms.
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204). Though there has been a significant global push to develop such 
standards across most corporate sectors, juniors seem to have missed this 
trend and largely continue to fly under the radar. As observed by a staff 
member of a major mining company:
a lot of the juniors … think community engagement is just a kind 
of luxury or add on [because] it costs money  …  and they just 
want to get on with digging ore out of the ground … the digging 
the hole bit is easy, its what’s outside the mine fence and engaging 
successfully there that’s the key to business going forward. 
(in Doyle and Cariño 2013: 48)
In other words, for junior miners, the ‘social’ is an externality, far removed 
from core business,12 whereas more mature companies tend to consider 
the risk profile of new purchases and conduct their due diligence to 
understand what legacies they might be buying into. As a result, the ability 
of a junior company to sell the project to a larger development partner, 
once the project has gained the relevant approvals and established viability, 
can prove hazardous. The risk is that a development can be worthless if 
the project is encumbered by negative social and environmental legacies; 
a point also made by one particular mining major when it considers 
purchases (Doyle and Cariño 2013).
Nevertheless, even though major companies may have systems and 
standards in place, these are inconsistently developed and applied. As a 
result, many of the criticisms directed at juniors also hold for some mid-
tiers and major companies. And, likewise, I readily acknowledge that there 
is a performative element to both the implementation of voluntary and 
mandatory industry standards, and public reporting (Fonseca 2010; Boiral 
2013). While recognising these caveats and limitations, communities stand 
a stronger chance of gaining better social, economic and environmental 
outcomes with a company that has some social performance systems 
in place (and associated resourcing), and a reputation to protect, than 
a company that does not. Against this background to the operating logic 
of junior mining companies, I will trace the context within which this 
company, and the industry, operates in the NT.
12  See also Kemp and Owen (2013) who discuss this concept of ‘core and non-core’ for social 
performance in mining, noting that ‘community relations is core to business, but not “core business”’. 
I suggest that this issue is significantly more pronounced for junior miners.
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The Political Economy of the NT and 
Indigenous Social Development
Unlike the Pilbara or Goldfields regions in Western Australia (WA) 
that are known as ‘mining regions’, and that effectively underpin that 
state’s economy, the NT does not have a comparable regional or big 
infrastructure economy.13 Though mining is one of the three dominant 
industries in the NT, contributing 12.9 per cent of gross state product 
in 2019, the largest ‘industry’ is ‘government and community services’ at 
23 per cent of gross state product, followed by service industries (which 
includes tourism) at 19.4 per cent (NTG 2020). This sector comprises 
public administration and safety, education and training, healthcare and 
social assistance. This most significant sector is also predominantly funded 
by the Commonwealth Government, to the effect that approximately 
80 per cent of the NT’s income is funded federally (see Zillman 2018). One 
reason the NT receives such a significant proportion of commonwealth 
funding is primarily because of its large Indigenous population.
Approximately 30 per cent of the total population of the NT is Indigenous 
and it is recognised that on the major indicators—education, health, 
housing and employment—they experience high levels of disadvantage, 
relative to the mainstream population. More than 70 per cent of this total 
Indigenous population live in remote or very remote areas with significant 
historical deficits in civil society organisations (such as not-for-profits, 
educational and advocacy bodies) and public infrastructure. Although 
a significant proportion of this Commonwealth grant is funding for 
Indigenous Territorians, because the money is calculated by accounting 
for Indigenous disadvantage and remote servicing, only about 50 per cent 
of the allocation is actually spent on them.14
The mendicant position of the NT Government is raised here as it 
has implications for their engagement with proponents of large-scale 
infrastructure projects, including mining. And it is in tension with the 
fact that the NT is one of the few jurisdictions globally with legislation 
recognising collective Indigenous rights to land that includes rights to 
13  Mining makes up 36 per cent of gross state product in WA (WASG 2020).
14  This is because there are ‘no strings attached’ to the money when it leaves Canberra and flows 
into the NT Government’s accounts. This issue has been a major and ongoing source of contention 
and debate in the NT, and between the NT and the Commonwealth governments, notably for 
Indigenous parliamentarians and Indigenous representative bodies (Davidson 2018; Walsh 2018).
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free prior and informed consent (FPIC) over development on this land 
and inalienable freehold title.15 More than 50 per cent of the NT is now 
recognised as Aboriginal Freehold Title, under the ALRA, while much of 
the remaining land is subject to native title rights and interests, including 
85 per cent of the coastline. The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which applies 
to the whole of Australia, is a poor cousin to the ALRA. Native title is the 
recognition that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have rights 
and interests to land and waters according to their traditional law and 
customs, as set out in Australian law. However, it comes in two forms: 
non-exclusive possession and exclusive possession.16 The vast majority of 
native title recognised Australia-wide is non-exclusive and only offers the 
right to negotiate, not the right of veto or to protect places of significance 
(McGrath 2016). However, in the NT there have been significant cases 
where exclusive possession has been recognised, including Blue Mud Bay 
No. 2 (AIATSIS 2016).
While this land tenure in the NT would appear to provide Indigenous 
landowners with a powerful and strategic political position, the regulatory 
and governance environment diminishes these rights at both territory 
and federal levels. A significant mechanism leading to marginalisation 
of Indigenous interests in land occurs principally through the state 
(Territory) level EIA process (which encompasses ESIA). This is triggered 
when a  proponent submits a ‘notice of intent’ to develop a project—
including mining operations. The NT Government Environmental 
Protection Authority then provides terms of reference for the preparation 
of an EIS for the specific project.
In the case discussed here, and similar to other projects, this requires 
the proponent to identify all of the processes and activities associated 
with the project and the ways in which they will mitigate and monitor 
15  The ALRA is Commonwealth (federal government) legislation. The right to FPIC is a qualified 
one, however, as a ‘yes’ to exploration is also a ‘yes’ to mining. While a ‘no’ to exploration is only 
for 5 years, when the company can return to ask again. There have been some strong campaigns by 
TOs that ‘no means no’; that the company is not welcome to return. Of note, other states globally 
that have legislated Indigenous peoples’ land rights, including the right to FPIC, are the Philippines 
(with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) and some Latin American states that are signatories 
to ILO Convention 169 (which recognises Indigenous and Tribal Rights) and that have adopted 
domestic laws to implement the Convention, including Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Peru.
16  In the case of non-exclusive possession, native title is found to coexist with non-Indigenous 
property rights such as pastoral stations or areas where there is a shared interest with another party (being 
the most common form). Exclusive possession native title includes the right to possess and occupy an 
area to the exclusion of all others. Exclusive possession native title can only be granted across certain 
areas such as unallocated crown land or areas that were previously held or owned by Aboriginal people, 
which was found to be the case for the Blue Mud Bay native title claim in Arnhem Land.
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environmental and social impacts, as well as outlining the proposed 
potential economic and social benefits. Because the reporting requirements 
are so specific, the proponent typically engages a consultancy firm, who 
then engages experts to prepare sections for the EIS addressing particular 
areas that require impact assessment, such as hydrology and the biological 
and physical environment. In the NT context, archaeological experts are 
routinely engaged to address the tangible cultural and historical aspects of 
the project, but it is less standard for other social scientists, such as social 
anthropologists, to be engaged in the cultural and social aspects of the 
impact assessment.
The Top End Mining company has to deal with a challenging socio-
political context of poor mining legacies in the region from previous 
juniors, including abandoned mines and associated agreements, complex 
land tenure arrangements and customary governance structures. These 
land tenures include Aboriginal Land (both granted and not yet finalised), 
native title, pastoral lease, national park, marine reserve and a special 
purpose lease. All of these formal land tenures are underlain by customary 
land tenures, which, in the case of Aboriginal Land, intersect. The rest of 
this section begins to outline the social and political context within which 
this company is seeking to operate and the existing vulnerabilities for the 
Aboriginal population.
As a very remote area in the NT, the region where the company is seeking 
to operate is an Aboriginal domain. The population, the languages 
and the social structures are Aboriginal, while the formal land tenure 
is Aboriginal land, recognised as native title land or under native title 
claim. More specifically, in this local government area, as one of five in 
the regional shire, 80 per cent of the population identify as Indigenous.17 
Only 30 per cent speak English at home, with nearly 50 per cent of the 
population speaking Kriol and 15  per cent local and other languages. 
In  administrative terms, this region is part of a regional shire with 
a  total population of 7,500 people over a geographic area that covers 
186,000 square kilometres.18 This regional shire includes nine Aboriginal 
communities, many more outstations (small family-focused homelands) 
and four towns, which are mostly populated by non-Aboriginal people. 
17  To avoid identifying the proponent, I do not name this region.
18  Key industries in the region are pastoralism, some agriculture, extractive industries, and tourism and 
government services. The Council is one of the largest employers in the region. Like all the other remote 
areas of the NT, this shire is dependent on public sector grants and funding, having only a low rates base 
from which to derive income for municipal services (via privately owned houses/private property).
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
218
According to the 2016 census, the average annual income in this region is 
AUD23,500.19 This average income is low, reflecting the fact that almost 
half of the population is unemployed. The basic Newstart (government 
unemployment) allowance is just under AUD15,000 per year, which is 
less than half of the national minimum wage. A majority of people living 
in households whose reference person receives a social security benefit 
fall below the poverty line, according to the Australian Council of Social 
Services (Davidson et al. 2018).20 Other barriers to mainstream forms of 
development are also high rates of substance abuse and the use of violence 
as a form of social regulation.21
This demographic profile is indicative of a vulnerable and marginal 
population. The regional education profile also suggests limited 
employment, as only 7.6 per cent of the population have completed year 
12, while the most substantial cohort, at 21.1 per cent, have completed 
year 9 or below.22 The region is also very young demographically, with 
a median age of 24 years, while 31.5 per cent of the total population is 
under 15 years of age. Aboriginal people over the age of 65 make up less 
than 5 per cent of the population.
This set of structural factors clearly requires an innovative approach, not 
only to forms of development, but also to the ESIAs that are required as part 
of the EIA process before developments proceed—and, if developments 
do proceed, to the ongoing role of the company in supporting said forms 
of development. Yet, with few other mainstream economic opportunities 
in remote communities, there has been growing pressure and a normative 
assumption by the state (in this case the NT Government) that mining 
is  a  preferred development path. The recent government approvals for 
non-conventional gas fracking to proceed is also indicative of this approach 
(Chlanda 2017; NTG 2018a; see also Espig, Chapter 6, this volume).23
19  See Martin et al. (2002) for a critical engagement with the appropriateness of the ABS census 
method for remote and very remote populations.
20  Housing tenure also has a major impact on poverty. The majority of people below the poverty line 
are also renting, another characteristic of this regional Aboriginal population (Davidson et al. 2018), 
where there are very few home owners. Note that there are no incentives to own your own home (hence 
take on a mortgage), as the market economy barely exists in remote communities (Altman et al. 2005).
21  In 2005–06 the rate of alcohol-attributable deaths in the NT among non-Aboriginal people was 
double the national rate and, among Aboriginal Territorians, 9 to 10 times the national rate (D’Abbs 
2017).
22  These unemployment rates and the education profile is comparable to other remote shires in the 
Northern Territory.
23  Fracking has been banned in Victoria and there are moratoriums in place in NSW and WA. 
In NSW there have also been buybacks and cancellations of exploration licences (Cox 2018).
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This extractive capitalist approach to development has been reinforced 
by the diminishment of the welfare or social state, so that market-driven 
development has begun to present the dominant option for Aboriginal 
people. Likewise, access to social security is increasingly conditional via 
various ‘work for the dole schemes’. The abolition of the Community 
Development Employment Program in 2015 was part of a broader policy 
approach enforcing the mutual responsibility paradigm as an element in 
citizenship entailments. The Community Development Employment 
Program was purpose-built for remote Indigenous contexts and provided 
flexible adaptive forms of employment. Its replacement with the Community 
Development program, in which people effectively do the same work but are 
classed as unemployed and now under the surveillance of the social security 
system, was perhaps one of the most obvious shifts towards a punitive order 
of federal state governance (see Kral 2017; Sanders 2017).
Though extractive capitalism is often acknowledged as intensifying 
neoliberal pressures, for instance in mining regions such as the Pilbara 
(Peck  2013; Taylor 2018), it has been also promoted by some as the 
panacea for the socioeconomic issues of remote Indigenous communities 
(Langton 2013, 2017). Marcia Langton has argued that post the Native 
Title Act, and the subsequent wave of negotiated agreements and 
improvements in the culture of mining companies, the extractive industry 
generates local benefits that exceed local costs (Langton 2013). Within 
Australia and Canada, as settler colonies, there has also been consideration 
that the retreat of the state has created space for Indigenous people to 
exercise their agency (for instance, Slowey 2008; Feit 2010), notably in 
relation to negotiating agreements for resource development (Langton 
et al. 2003; O’Faircheallaigh 2011). The state is rarely a party to these 
agreements and, as will be discussed, they usually contain a complex mix 
of training, employment and community development initiatives.
Like Canada, Australia does not have ‘[a] public policy framework that 
guides [agreements] negotiation, terms of reference or implementation’ 
(Cameron and Leviton 2014: 26). Although mining land use agreements 
can potentially be positive for the beneficiaries, any benefits hinge on their 
successful implementation. This includes the capacity of the company, 
the Aboriginal communities and the Indigenous representative body to 
uphold the conditions of the agreements. Given the significant level of 
disadvantage that requires addressing and, thus, what these agreements 
are expected to achieve, this lack of public policy is both surprising and a 
major gap.
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A Selectively Present State
As I have begun to outline, in the NT, the absence or retreat of the state 
has been selective. On the one hand, the state has never been present 
in relation to the many negotiated agreements between its Aboriginal 
citizens and mining interests,24 while we have seen a retreat of social 
welfare, such as the Community Development Employment Program and 
a mainstreaming of Indigenous services such as housing. On the other 
hand, we have seen an increase in the presence of the state in forms of 
punitive governance and surveillance, and a coupling of responsibilities 
and duties with citizenship entitlements (Holcombe 2018; Spiers Williams 
2019). While Shared Responsibility Agreements, which were introduced 
by the conservative Howard government and tied welfare entitlements 
with discretionary development funding, have fallen out of the policy 
toolbox, the ‘policy settings’ of shared responsibility have continued 
(Sullivan 2011: 33), as can be seen in the 2015 NT Homelands Policy: 
A Shared Responsibility. Memoranda of understanding (MOU) have also 
become commonplace, such as the community safety MOU between local 
communities, their regional shire and the local police service in relation to 
community safety issues. This attachment of responsibilities and duties 
to  (Aboriginal) citizenship entitlements is now an intrinsic element of 
public services and policies.
The NT Emergency Response of 2007 was a clear marker of this 
restructuring of Aboriginal citizen/state relations.25 Since 2007, various 
legal reforms have specifically targeted Aboriginal citizens in a selective 
increase in state interventions. These include mandatory sentencing and 
mandatory reporting laws in relation to domestic and family violence 
issues, leading directly to an escalation of male and female Aboriginal 
incarceration rates and the removal of ‘at risk’ children. The result is 
that Aboriginal people now make up approximately 85 per cent of the 
NT prison population (NTG 2018b), while there was also a threefold 
rise in child removals since 2007 (Gibson 2015). Other punitive laws 
24  As far as I am aware, one of the very few negotiated mining land use agreements in Australia where 
the state is also a party is the Century Agreement in Queensland (see Everingham et al., Chapter 9, this 
volume).
25  The Northern Territory Emergency Response was triggered by widespread allegations of child 
sexual abuse within Aboriginal communities. A raft of extreme measures were implemented that, 
taken together, constituted a governmental intervention unmatched by any other policy declaration 
in Indigenous affairs in the last 40 years (see Altman and Hinkson 2007).
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criminalise an increasing range of Aboriginal behaviours with a focus on 
‘public’ offences, such as alcohol consumption and driving infringements. 
As most small communities now have police stations, post 2007, the risk 
of over-policing is routine (Pilkington 2009; Pyne 2012). This punitive 
governance is an element in the state’s attempt at coercing a particular 
type of disciplinary civility (Hindess 2002; Holcombe 2018).
This active state presence in very particular areas of Aboriginal policy, 
programming and legislation, conversely brings into relief the state’s 
absence in other areas of legislation for these same peoples. This absence 
is in relation to the Environmental Assessment Act 1982 (NT), which 
establishes administrative procedures to address development interests 
across the NT that also affect the Aboriginal estate and Aboriginal rights 
and interests. This Act stipulates the range of procedures a developer will 
need to address in an EIS for a project.
How the State Minimises Indigenous 
Interests through the EIA Processes
As discussed, the NT is predominantly comprised of Aboriginal-owned 
land under the ALRA. Significant portions of the remaining areas are 
either recognised as native title, or under native title claim. Yet, the 
interests of these Aboriginal landowners and managers are barely visible 
in the EIA processes for development on these lands—especially in the 
extractive industries.
The predominant focus of the EIA process is to assess and manage for 
environmental impacts. Minimal guidance is provided for the social 
impacts that are embedded within the EIA process. The NT ‘Guidelines 
for Preparation of an Economic and Social Impact Assessment’ are six 
pages long (NTG 2013).26 This compares with the Queensland SIA 
Guidelines at 24 pages (QSG 2018) and the New South Wales (NSW) 
SIA Guidelines at 55 pages (NSWSG 2017). The NSW SIA Guidelines 
are also specific to the extractive industries, and the NSW Government 
has developed a comprehensive ‘Guide to Community and Stakeholder 
Engagement’, as part of their Draft Environmental Impact Assessment 
26  They guide the proponent in their collation of the range of data that needs to be provided to 
government and the public about the potential economic and social ‘contributions’ and the impacts 
and benefits of the project.
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Guidance Series, as well as a ‘Scoping Tool’. By way of comparison, 
in the EIS Terms of Reference for this particular project, while there was 
reference for the need to establish a ‘stakeholder communication strategy’, 
there was no guidance offered as to how to develop this strategy.
For TOs, the interdependence between the environment, customary law, 
governance and identity makes separating out the social impacts from 
the environmental impacts neither meaningful nor possible. Though as 
previously indicated, Aboriginal people own more than half of the NT 
and there are statutory requirements that underpin the ALRA, as well 
as other applicable acts, including the Commonwealth Native Title Act 
of 1993 and the NT Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act of 1989, the NT ESIA 
guidelines barely mention Indigenous peoples’ interests. Rather, they 
state that ‘consultation with Indigenous peoples has particular needs [sic]’ 
and point practitioners to an obscure reference from the United States 
(NTG 2013: 4).
This obscure reference to a three-page document as a generic piece 
on ‘Indigenous peoples’, rather than the specific context of the NT, 
exemplifies the disconnection from the reality that Aboriginal people 
have significant interests under law for much of this jurisdiction, while 
most of the major mines are also on these lands. Aboriginal people are the 
major stakeholder. Yet, this lack of recognition and regulatory guidance 
diminishes these rights and interests. Whether this is the result of ignorance 
of what good guidelines look like, or yet another form of ‘administrative 
violence’ (Lea et al. 2018) to marginalise Aboriginal interests, or perhaps 
a combination of both, results in the same effect. As this legislation does 
little to accommodate the particularities of Aboriginal interests, so it 
becomes a form of absence.
In some ways, the minimal guidance (and thus expectation) from the NT 
Government can be addressed for each specific project, as the proponent’s 
‘notice of intent’ to develop the project then triggers a more detailed Terms 
of Reference (ToR) for the preparation of the specific EIS. However, in 
this particular project, only 3.5 pages of the 36 pages of the ToR for 
this EIS were allocated to how the ‘cultural and historic’ issues and the 
‘socioeconomic environment’ should be addressed. A list of ‘suggestions 
that may assist with highlighting the social and economic value of the 
project’ was provided. Thus, when it comes to working with a junior 
mining company that is compliance-driven, pushing for higher standards 
was, I realised, a challenge. This became clear when I was discussing the 
223
7. THE STATE’S SELECTIVE ABSENCE
draft SIA scope of works with the company. As the company preferred to 
maintain minimum compliance, rather than going beyond compliance, 
we discontinued this element of the project, and it was subsequently 
taken up by a consultancy firm. As will be discussed, while major mining 
companies may well have similar compliance-driven approaches to 
permitting, it did seem to me at the time that I was operating in not only 
a regulatory void, but also a void of corporate social standards. There 
were no other internal policy levers that we could lean on to direct the 
company towards more responsible practices.
I had initially only been engaged to prepare the section of the EIS which 
became the public documents for comment on ‘Culture and Heritage’ 
and the draft ‘Cultural Heritage Management Plan’. The consultancy 
firm managing the entire EIS process had requested that I submit a scope 
of works for the SIA (excluding the economic component) and had 
also actively encouraged me to draw on the stronger practice standards 
of NSW, for instance. Among other issues, I had proposed to develop 
a ‘Community and Stakeholder Engagement Plan’ to augment the 
‘stakeholder communications strategy’ that was required for the ESIA as 
part of the EIA process. This engagement plan was proposed as a resource 
that, though driven initially by the EIA, also looked post-EIA and would 
be reviewed as part of the project life cycle, rather than an exercise 
focused on ensuring the company would get ‘over the line’ in community 
approvals. It seemed especially important that this company develop an 
engagement plan, given they did not have any community engagement 
processes in place. That Indigenous interests are externalities to the 
business of ensuring that the project proceeds seemed to be facilitated by 
the NT Government during the EIA processes.
Social Impact Assessment and Shifting 
the Baseline
In industrialised countries, such as Australia, the standard approach to 
social impact assessment is to document the existing socioeconomic 
conditions within which a proposed development is to occur, assess its 
likely impacts and identify strategies to minimise and mitigate these 
negative effects (O’Faircheallaigh 2011). This baseline is then used to 
evaluate ongoing impacts from the project. However, there is an emerging 
approach to SIA that is critical of this method—especially when it is applied 
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in regions with high levels of social vulnerability such as the NT. While 
the lack of attention to pre-existing negative impacts may be acceptable in 
some mainstream SIA contexts (such as regional or rural areas in Australia 
with a predominantly Anglo population), maintaining the status quo in 
contexts of marginality and vulnerability is not good enough. Applying 
a ‘no harm’ approach in this context renders invisible the particularities of 
local Aboriginal needs and interests. As Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh indicates:
existing [Aboriginal] social conditions are not simply a baseline 
against which subsequent changes caused by development are 
measured and deemed positive or negative. Rather they constitute 
a fundamental problem, and both social impact assessment 
(SIA) itself and the proposed development that is being assessed 
are judged in terms of their potential to change existing social 
realities. (2011: 138)
Attempting to carve out an approach that moves beyond mitigation and 
trade-offs recognises that the political ecology of extractive capitalism in 
the NT is currently limited to the two-sided conflict of economy versus 
environment (Escobar 2008). The state has been absent in recognising 
and facilitating alternative modes of production that celebrate or at 
least promote Indigenous interests, strengths and existing capabilities 
(see Altman and Kerins 2012; Chambers et al. 2018). There has been 
considerable critical analysis of the limitations of large-scale natural 
resource development, including mining, to fundamentally shift the 
well-being of the Indigenous peoples on whose lands mining operates 
(e.g. Trigger 1997; Langton and Mazel 2008; Altman and Martin 2009). 
However, these academic critiques (many of which focus on the NT) do 
not seem to have influenced NT resources policy, including EIA processes. 
There have, however been attempts over the last decade, co-funded by the 
federal government, to consider what a cultural and conservation economy 
could look like for northern Australia (Hill et al. 2008). Nevertheless, 
the only element of this approach to establishing sustainable forms of 
livelihood that has been actively supported by government are Indigenous 
ranger programs, which have been very successful and of which there are 
several in this region (AFG 2015; Mackie and Meacheam 2016).
An important feature of O’Faircheallaigh’s 2011 case study mentioned 
above (of an SIA undertaken for James Price Point in the Kimberley 
region of WA) was that while the proponent (Woodside) funded it, it was 
produced as part of an independent process. The goals of the SIA were 
driven by Indigenous interests and managed by the regional representative 
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body, the Kimberley Land Council. As he noted, in this context ‘SIA is 
inextricably bound up with achieving basic change in underlying social 
conditions; that is with social development [and]  …  sustainability’ 
(O’Faircheallaigh 2011: 139). Such an approach actively manages for the 
inadequacies of conventional SIAs and ensures that the process is useful for 
those most impacted. This is markedly distinct from the majority of SIAs 
that are undertaken as a state-initiated element of a development project’s 
permitting and compliance, which often lead to them being perceived as 
compromised—as they are funded by the proponent, specifically because 
they seek development approval. Likewise, Anthony Hodge, focusing 
on the extractives, uses a framework he terms ‘contribution analysis’ 
(Hodge 2018). He argues that a conceptual shift from the ‘current deeply 
entrenched practice of focusing on the identification and mitigation of 
negative impacts (or effects) to a “higher test” based on the achievement 
(or not) of a net positive contribution to human and ecosystem wellbeing 
over the long term’ needs to occur (Hodge 2018: 370; see also Bebbington 
and Humphreys Bebbington 2018).
Other relevant approaches to SIA, for this remote Indigenous context, 
include a human rights–based approach that draws on the core values 
of human rights as the framework (MacNaughton and Hunt 2011). 
Deanna Kemp and Frank Vanclay (2013) argue that in some contexts it 
is more effective to integrate human rights impact assessment with the 
social impact assessment process, rather than have them as stand-alone 
assessments. The linking of business and human rights initially emerged 
in response to a series of egregious cases of human rights abuses by 
business entities driven by market-based notions of access and entitlement 
to resources (for some notable cases see Kemp and Vanclay 2013). The 
mounting international pressure subsequently led the UN to establish 
the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ (Ruggie 2008) to promote 
business-related engagement with human rights, followed by the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to ‘operationalise’ 
the framework (Ruggie 2011). Though I am not aware of any human 
rights impact assessment being undertaken in Australia, one was recently 
undertaken for the first time in Papua New Guinea for an SIA for 
a proposed liquefied natural gas project (Götzman and Bainton 2019).
Indigenous-led SIA, contribution analysis and human rights impact 
assessment highlight the limitations of applying the usual ‘no harm’ 
approach in the context of a low socioeconomic baseline and challenging 
social conditions. This is further compounded by a political context that 
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actively marginalises Indigenous interests. Clearly, if the aim is only to 
mitigate in order to maintain this baseline, then the opportunity for 
mining to contribute or intervene in positive ways into these socio-
economic contexts is severely compromised. In this context, both the 
capacity and the attitude of the mining company is crucial, because if 
the company does not have capacity and positive intent then the SIA will 
be further compromised.
Choices in a Context of Limitation
Though the statistics of high unemployment and limited formal education 
do not define individuals, they do provide an indicator of the ways in 
which the parameters for agency and choice are established. This concept 
of ‘agency’ has gained popular currency in the development literature 
where it is sometimes defined as ‘empowerment’ and articulated through 
the related concept of ‘voice’.27 As a ‘process freedom’, the ability to exercise 
agency is now accepted as part of mainstream development thinking 
(World Bank 2014: 6). In this context, limited mainstream education 
and work experience in a market economy act as constraining elements 
to engaging on equal terms with the proponent, even as mediated by the 
NLC. The options and limits for TOs, as social actors, are also mediated 
by the interrelation between an individual’s subjectivity as a person and 
the subsequent agency they are able to manifest in any given context. 
As  cultural responsibilities and obligations assert a determining role in 
what sort of ‘agent’ an individual can be, these cultural parameters need to 
be taken into account, as well as the structural effects of material poverty.
Against this backdrop of apparent material need, structural disadvantage 
and political marginalisation, there are two major enticements being 
offered as the ‘big ticket’ items, if the mine proceeds. The first is that 
the proponent proposes to upgrade a significant section of the currently 
unsealed road to dual lane bitumen. This all-weather road upgrade, to 
enable the transport of the ore on road trains to the export market, will 
make the road safer in the long term; the trade-off being sharing it with 
large numbers of road trains (trucks hauling two to three carriages) and 
27  In the anthropological literature, the concepts of agency and personhood are understood as 
deeply intertwined. See, for instance, Wardlow (2006) and Holcombe (2018).
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also making the region more accessible to tourists and other interests.28 
Another enticement being discussed, and as part of the original local 
agreement, is the possibility of jobs during construction and operation. 
As a potentially 20-year mine, this possibility of employment for local 
TOs and other Aboriginal people from the region is very significant. 
This ‘opportunity’, in particular, is a major element in TOs considering 
reopening the mine, even though the haulage route has changed—and 
in a way that is seen to compromise the integrity of both the customary 
economy and the spiritual values of the land, river and sea countries.
In 2017, the local ABC radio station ran a story about the project and 
interviewed several senior women from the largest and closest ‘affected 
community’.29 According to this report, the women actively opposed 
reopening the mine for environmental and spiritual reasons. Yet, having 
since spoken with these same women, I can say that their opposition is 
a qualified one. If certain elements, including the dust from the transport 
of the ore can be mitigated and it can be can be guaranteed that certain 
other environmental changes do not occur, then perhaps jobs for their 
sons and grandchildren will sway their opposition.
Without having undertaken extensive qualitative research in relation 
to TOs’ and affected community members’ hopes, aspirations and 
concerns about the potential of the mine, some insight can still be drawn 
from comparable contexts, in both Australia and Canada.30 In British 
Colombia, when First Nations were asked what was needed in order for 
them to support an industrial-scale liquified natural gas plan, they stated 
that education, training and employment was the most important issue 
(Stokes et al. 2019). Likewise, in this NT context, the major challenge 
will be enabling employment opportunities through the company 
investing in pre-employment and work-ready programs and ensuring that 
the workplace facilitates a culturally amenable environment. Workplace 
retention for Indigenous employees is a major issue in all remote mines 
(Sarker and Bobongie 2007; Brereton and Parmenter 2008). Although 
these issues are an element of the SIA for the project, it will be down to the 
28  There are other issues as well that are currently unknown, including the length of time it will 
take to upgrade the road and if and how long the road trains will be using the road before it is sealed.
29  In the interests of maintaining the anonymity of the proponent this ABC report will remain 
un-referenced.
30  The extent of fieldwork for my role in the EIS was a five-day trip to communities in the region.
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effective implementation of the agreement as to whether the employment 
outcomes and other potential social benefits are met (see Everingham 
et al., Chapter 9, this volume for comparable discussion).
However, the disconnection between the legislation that promotes 
Aboriginal rights and interests and guide agreement making, and NT 
Government legislation relating to EIA, does little to facilitate the 
opportunities that are contained in these agreements. Thus, we find there 
is very little relationship between the SIA for the development project and 
the subsequent negotiated agreement.
Likewise, there is no trigger in the SIA process as to the appropriate time 
to engage with and include the Aboriginal representative body in dialogue 
about development projects. The role of the regional land council as the 
mediator and conduit for identifying and protecting Aboriginal interests is 
not defined other than in the ALRA legislation. There is no consideration 
of this role in the NT Environment Assessment Act. Rather, the only 
mention made in the ‘Guidelines for the Preparation of Economic and 
Social Impact Assessment’ is to bundle the ALRA and the Native Title 
Act with the other Commonwealth legislation. Guidance as to what 
stage to engage Indigenous interests (and the representative body and 
‘community stakeholder’ groups), or the most appropriate mechanisms 
for engagement, is not provided. To what extent it is the role of the 
Land Council to inform the TOs of the project prior to the proponent 
undertaking the SIA is unclear. While the general understanding is that it is 
the Land Councils’ responsibility to inform TOs and affected community 
groups about the proposed project, at what exact stage this occurs and in 
what form (i.e. a large community meeting and/or smaller meetings with 
particular TOs), is not specified in the ToR that proponents receive from 
the Environmental Protection Authority.
Likewise, the fact that the NT Government often fails to collect royalties 
from extractive industries, instead encouraging extractive industries to 
develop infrastructure, appears to be based on the assumption that any 
infrastructure and development the industry builds will create broader 
flow-on effects and benefits for communities and the region both 
during and beyond life-of-mine (see also Everingham et al., Chapter 9, 
this volume). This ad-hoc opportunistic approach is, again, directed by 
mainstream external interests with little systematic consideration of long-
term Aboriginal interests.
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Unfinished Business: The ALRA and 
TO Rights and Interests
When I was initially engaged on the ESIA for this mining project, I was of 
the understanding that TOs would have veto rights over a key element of 
it. This key element was in relation to proposed infrastructure on a major 
river as a transport corridor. My understanding was based on my being 
engaged, some years previously, as the lead author of the anthropologists’ 
report for the ‘Beds and Banks’ claim over this river, under the ALRA. 
The  Aboriginal Land Commissioner had recommended the grant of 
Aboriginal freehold title and, like other people familiar with the claim, 
especially Aboriginal claimants, I had assumed that it had progressed 
to the ‘finding’ (the technical term) of the grant of the river-beds and 
banks.31 However, as I now know, and as I have since informed some 
of the claimants that I worked with all those years ago (during a field 
visit for this project), this was not the case. Due to the high degree of 
‘detriment’ (the technical term for opposing interests), the final sign-off 
by the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal Affairs that is required 
under the ALRA did not occur. This was principally in relation to the 
opposition of the amateur fishing industry, as was also the case for another 
15, mostly beds and banks, claims in the ‘Top End’ of the NT.
However, coincidently during 2017 and 2018, Minister Scullion, then 
Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs, requested the Aboriginal Land 
Commissioner undertake a review of outstanding Aboriginal land claims 
(ALC 2019). The ToR for the review indicated that ‘a range of political, 
legal and procedural factors are likely to have contributed to the delayed 
resolution of detriment issues associated with the  …  land claims and 
therefore warrant consideration in this review.’32 For over 20 years, these 
claims had been in limbo and, as such, TOs were not able to exercise 
their rights as landowners over these customary areas, which also 
includes the right of veto over development interests (including mining), 
under the ALRA.
31  The Aboriginal Land Commissioner is a statutory officer of the Commonwealth appointed 
to perform functions outlined in section 50 of the ALRA. The Commissioner’s functions include 
undertaking inquiries into traditional land claims in the NT.
32  According to media reports, the Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs Scullion granted almost 
$500,000 to three industry groups—the NT Seafood Council, the NT Cattlemen’s Association 
and the NT Amateur Fishermen’s Association—to help resolve their detriment cases in outstanding 
land rights claims (Allam 2018; Gibson 2018). See: www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-31/indigenous-
advancement-strategy-funds-given-to-lobby-groups-nt/10451664.
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This was not surprising, and it reflects the disconnection between 
Commonwealth legislation and NT-based legislation. As the ALRA 
is Commonwealth legislation, the NT Government had an adversarial 
approach, consistently opposing land claims during the hearings in 
pursuing detriment and engaging anthropologists to find inconsistencies 
in the Aboriginal evidence. This approach to opposing Aboriginal interests 
was initially driven by the conservative Country Liberal Party who held 
power in the NT from self-government in 1978 until 2001, when the 
first Labor Government was elected. It was notable that during the 2002 
hearing for the river claim at issue here, the then new Labor Government 
took an almost facilitative approach to the claim. However, this approach 
of accommodation has since changed. The 2018 Report on the Review 
of Detriment outlines the current NT Labor Government’s approach. 
Of particular relevance is the submission made by the Department of 
Primary Industries and Resources in relation to minerals and energy. 
As summarised by the Detriment Review Report:
DPIR [Department of Primary Industries and Resources] 
claimed detriment on behalf of [4] energy interests in respect of 
negotiating agreements with traditional Aboriginal owners and 
the uncertainty that a future agreement would be made [i.e. that 
veto rights might be exercised]. They also claimed that failure to 
reach agreement poses a strong risk that proposed patterns of land 
use associated with [extractive] exploration and production could 
be adversely affected if access is withdrawn or restricted [i.e. the 
land is granted]. (ALC 2019: 181)
The Commissioner was dismissive of the Department of Primary Industries 
and Resources claim, noting that ‘whatever the validity of speculative 
claims, the ALRA was not intended to accommodate them; much less to 
permit them to stand in the way of a grant of land to traditional owners’ 
(ALC 2019: 182). Nevertheless, the federal minister still has the final 
sign-off on the grant of land of all of these claims. As Minister Scullion 
stated: ‘It is critical that this many years into the process we do all we can 
to help settle outstanding claims to provide certainty and opportunity 
to all Territorians’ (Scullion 2019).33 That these other interests have had 
33  As the Minister stated in the press release about the report: ‘All parties with an interest in the land 
claims reported on by the Commissioner will be given the opportunity to comment on the report before 
I make any decision about whether to proceed with the recommendations for grants of land under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 … I also maintain my commitment to work 
with all stakeholders to ensure that detriment issues are resolved’ (Scullion 2019). It is noteworthy that 
they also had ample opportunity to comment prior to the report.
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ample opportunity (including government funding), to make their cases 
of detriment heard, suggests that Aboriginal interests are not compatible 
with those of ‘all [other] Territorians’; and that his focus is ensuring that 
these ‘opportunities’ are not curtailed. This response makes clear that the 
state is more present for some Territorians than others, when it comes 
to facilitating particular forms of development. It is also of note that 
Minister Nigel Scullion was, at that time, also an NT Senator. Here the 
‘state’ includes both NT and federal levels.
Unfortunately, the Top End Mining company also submitted a case 
of detriment to the enquiry, indicating that their business model was 
threatened by any extension of Aboriginal rights and interests. This 
was the case, even though it was made clear to them (by myself and the 
other consultants engaged) that the SIA would also need to include this 
opposition to the granting of the land as a negative social impact, which 
could materially compromise their project. Their oppositional approach 
compounded the need for me to withdraw from further discussions in 
relation to undertaking additional elements of the SIA (recall that I had 
attempted to encourage higher standards beyond minimum compliance).34
Customary Rights and Interests: 
Contesting Ecologies of Knowledge
What are these Aboriginal interests? The detriment review report quoted 
the original land commissioner’s finding for this river claim: ‘there are few 
areas in Australia where the traditional attachment of the Indigenous people 
to their land exceeds that of the present claim’ (ALC 2019: 174). These 
interests understand the river as sentient, embodying not only customary 
harvest potential, but also the ancestral travels of the Gilyirringgilyirring 
(mermaids), and many other totemic species. Sections of the river are 
associated with the regional Kunapipi ceremonial tradition (Berndt 
1951). This necessarily means that those who hold the role Mingirringi 
(attachment through father’s father) and Junggayi (attachment through 
mother’s father) for these places will have to consider a much wider group 
34  Likewise, the irony for myself in proceeding in such a role with a company that was opposing 
the land claim that I had played a major role in preparing was perverse, not to mention professionally 
and ethically compromising.
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in their decision making. Ultimately, it will be these particular TOs that 
will carry the decision-making responsibility for river-based aspects of this 
project and any other development interests.
That TOs do not perceive the human/environment dichotomy that 
modern Western science and Western society in general practices 
represents a core challenge to the state, as exemplified by the ESIA process 
under the EIA. This other set of intangible spiritual interests confounds 
the state’s commitment to extractive capitalism and land as alienable 
resource empiricism. Such spiritual attachments to land are a direct risk 
to this enterprise, which may explain why the state practices a local form 
of ‘epistemicide’ in this neo-colonial ‘global south’ (Santos 2014). The 
marginalising and attempted diminishment of Aboriginal knowledges, 
as alternative ways of knowing that exist outside of the dominant 
epistemological norms, presents as an ongoing contest between the 
valued and undervalued, the recognised and under-recognised, the visible 
and invisible—even while these Indigenous ethno-epistemologies are 
increasingly named, and recognised as valid and valued (Maffie 2009).35
Yet, as one would also expect, within the regional Aboriginal population 
there is also contestation over decision-making rights and a diverse range 
of interests and intersecting responsibilities (see also Trigger 1997). These 
include those TOs who have specific rights and responsibilities under 
Aboriginal customary law to maintain and protect particular significant 
sites. There are also Aboriginal rangers, as the region just to the north of the 
major community at hand was recently declared an Indigenous Protection 
Area and the local land and sea rangers work out of this community. 
These rangers work with modern Western science and their ethno-
ecological knowledges, and they bring their TO rights and responsibilities 
to their work. The third loose grouping are those who are interested in 
the potential work that will come from the mining construction and 
operation, and the local Aboriginal Development Corporation is very 
interested in encouraging these. All of these interests—which are not 
mutually exclusive: individuals can endorse several positions—have to 
be weighed in the final decision by the TOs. Noting that, as I write, 
the extent of their legal decision-making rights in relation to the river is 
still unfolding.
35  As seen, for instance, in the growing body of research on ethnobotany (Janke 2009; Robinson 
2010; Ens 2012; Ens et al. 2012) and the expansion of the Indigenous Protected Area program, which 
jointly recognises the cultural and ecological values of the landscape (Hill et al. 2012).
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The State and Negotiated Mining 
Agreements
The local agreements that Top End Mining took over incorporate a range 
of benefits that will be in the TOs’ minds when they meet to discuss 
the project, post the EIA finalisation. These agreements, which were 
effectively abandoned along with the previous mine, were picked up by 
Top End Mining. Of note, at a regional full council meeting of the NLC, 
then CEO Joe Morrison stated that global market forces had played a part 
in the mine’s demise and had made the community ‘realise that we’ve just 
got to be a bit more aware of commodity prices and the impact that it has 
on local economies’. This issue is exacerbated with junior companies who 
are more likely to seek to develop smaller, and thus riskier, deposits.
As O’Faircheallaigh indicates, land use agreements can offer Aboriginal 
groups a degree of autonomy from the state in their provision of access to 
mining income and other benefits (O’Faircheallaigh 2010). The state does 
not play any role in these agreements: they are between the Indigenous 
representative body, on behalf of TOs, and the company. However, 
this raises questions as to whether there should be some sort of public 
policy framework to guide their negotiation and implementation. These 
questions have been explored in the Canadian First Nations context. 
In the Northwest Territories of Canada it was found that ‘the roles of 
mining companies, Aboriginal organisations and government are not 
properly defined and some inappropriate off-loading of responsibilities 
by government is occurring’ (Kennett, quoted in Cameron and Leviton 
2014: 29).
In the NT, this notable absence of the state from any role in agreement 
making is a reflection of their broader absence in not establishing public 
policy and institutional reform to address the raft of land rights that 
Aboriginal people have been successful in achieving. The ALRA and 
the Native Title Act seem to operate in a parallel, and still contested, 
sphere alongside NT Government legislation and programs as a form of 
segmentary state logic. It is entirely up to the capability of the Indigenous 
representative body to ensure that the agreement encompasses all that is 
sought by their constituents, including forms of community development. 
As it is standard for agreements to be commercial-in-confidence, the 
possible relationships between state-based social programs and the social 
programs offered within the agreements are not drawn. This includes 
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features such as education and training opportunities offered by the 
mining company through the agreement, and those that may already 
exist as public programs within the community. The capacity of a mining 
junior to deliver on these commitments, or the Land Council to ensure 
they are implemented, is not tested by the state.
Likewise, there is also the risk that the NT Government will cut its 
expenditure on communities in receipt of royalties and other benefits under 
agreements, negating some of their positive impact (O’Faircheallaigh 2004, 
2010). This ‘substitution funding’, where citizenship entitlements—such 
as health, housing and education—are effectively privatised, has been 
found to be the case in mining regions such as the Pilbara (Holcombe 2009; 
Taylor 2018). Likewise, in the NT, even before there were comprehensive 
agreements that included education and training and other negotiated 
community benefits, Jon Altman records early cases from the 1980s and 
1990s where substitution funding was standard for outstation services 
in the region serviced by the Gagadju Association that was established 
from the Ranger uranium mine (Altman 1998 in O’Faircheallaigh 2004). 
In light of the precedence of substitution funding elsewhere in the NT 
and remote WA, the presence of the company is likely to further facilitate 
the absence of the state in terms of infrastructure and other public services 
in this region.
Conclusions
This discussion of a junior mining company in northern Australia 
has been nested within the broader political economy of the ongoing 
marginalisation of Aboriginal rights and interests. While the Aboriginal 
citizens of the NT have consistently won court battles in relation to 
their land, those victories have not translated into public policy and 
institutional reform to ensure that development is inclusive of the majority 
permanent population of these lands (Morrison 2017: 4). Likewise, 
though the land use agreements that are routinely negotiated between 
Aboriginal interests and developers encompass a range of mechanisms 
that address disadvantage, public policy has not been developed to guide 
their negotiation, terms of reference or implementation. This absence of 
the state is also mirrored in the mainstream EIA processes that have been 
transplanted to these remote Aboriginal domains. Even though Aboriginal 
interests are the major landholding group, they are treated as another set 
of stakeholders.
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For the junior miner discussed in this chapter, the EIA processes function 
as a default corporate social performance system, and the inadequacy of 
the EIA process highlights this significant gap in the operations of junior 
companies more generally (although any mining company in this context 
is also likely to pursue a compliance-based approach). The SIA elements of 
the EIA regulatory framework, though a lesser standard than other states, 
reflect a conventional SIA approach that seeks to ‘do no harm’, focusing 
on mitigating negative impacts. Such an approach is not appropriate in 
contexts where the majority interests are Aboriginal, as it not only misses 
opportunities to contribute to genuine collaboration with these interests, 
but they also emerge from the presumption that these interests are aligned 
with the dominant mainstream population and nested among the other 
stakeholder groups.
The possibility of an extractive-led pathway to Aboriginal development, 
levering off the local agreement, is a hopeful one. The targeted support 
for big project development, such as mining, however still functions on 
the theory of trickle-down economics. As Peter Yu stated, this won’t work 
because it is not accompanied by a range of structural reforms to support 
Indigenous economic inclusion (Yu quoted in Morrison 2017: 3). That 
the operations of this junior miner fit into this neocolonial paradigm was 
notably apparent in their adversarial approach to the granting of the beds 
and banks land claim, as potentially impacting their operation by granting 
TOs free prior informed consent rights. Such an approach has Indigenous 
people as obstacles to development, rather than development partners.
This example from the NT has revealed a selectively absent state. Although 
my focus has been on absence in the context of extractive capitalism, in 
the broader socioeconomic context within which Aboriginal citizens 
live, the state looms ever present in forms of punitive governance and 
surveillance in a coupling of responsibilities and duties with citizenship 
entitlements. On the other hand, there has been a notable retreat of social 
welfare, such as the Community Development Employment Program 
and a mainstreaming of Indigenous services, such as housing. The state 
is notably absent in relation to the intersection of Indigenous interests 
and development interests, as market forces are enabled to be directive in 
shaping social outcomes in the interests of growth in state revenue. In the 
NT, the state has never been present in relation to the many negotiated 
mining land use agreements between its Aboriginal citizens and mining 
companies. In this context of development, while it may appear that 
these Aboriginal interests are appropriately served by Land Councils and 
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specific legislation such as the ALRA, without intersecting and supportive 
state legislation the contest between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
interests continues.
Ironically, this absent state is also reflected as a form of fiscal absence: 
in the absence of claiming taxes from the industry, at both territory 
and federal levels. This approach assumes that any infrastructure and 
development the industry builds will have flow-on and broader benefits 
to communities and the region both during and beyond life-of-mine. 
Yet, market-based solutions to social problems, as reflective of less state, 
is  a failure of the state to meet its obligations and commitments to its 
most vulnerable citizens.
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Broken Promise Men: 
The Malevolent Absence of the 
State at the McArthur River 
Mine, Northern Territory
Gareth Lewis
The open-cut is right in the place where the Rainbow Serpent 
rests. They cut open not just the snake, but us ceremony people 
too. They pushed us aside just like they did first time when they 
invaded our Countries with their guns and poison to take our land.
Jacky Green (Green et al. 2017)
Introduction
The McArthur River in the southeast of Australia’s Northern Territory 
flows from its source in the dry Barkly tablelands 520 km northwards 
to the tropical southwestern Gulf of Carpentaria where it meets the 
ocean near the Sir Edward Pellew group of islands. The township of 
Borroloola is situated on its western bank, 45  km upstream from the 
coast. The  McArthur is a river which has economically and spiritually 
sustained countless generations of Aboriginal peoples including, for its 
middle and lower reaches, the Gurdanji and Yanyuwa along with their 
Mara and Garrwa neighbours. Replete with food and utilitarian resources, 
a means of travel, trade and communication, the river’s importance is 
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reflected in its central place in an associative cultural landscape, being 
the foci for many narratives, ceremonies, songs and sites of spiritual and 
sacred significance for Aboriginal people across the Gulf region.
For recent generations, the river has been transformed. Following European 
arrival into the region in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Aboriginal people have experienced massive upheavals from violence, 
disease, dislocation from and usurpation of their traditional lands, and the 
devastating host of health, social and cultural impacts wrought by towns, 
pastoral stations and mining development. At the time of European 
‘settlement’ the McArthur River flowed with the blood of the Gulf 
country’s Aboriginal peoples, massacred at the hands of European police 
and ‘settlers’. Currently it flows with contamination from the McArthur 
River Mine located some 50 km upstream from Borroloola. Throughout 
this period the state in its various guises has played a critical role, usually 
from afar, in shaping the policies and practices of non-Indigenous people 
towards and regarding Aboriginal people in the Gulf region.
This chapter examines the role of the state as both sponsor and regulator 
of  resource extraction in this region. I explore recent Aboriginal 
perspectives  of the McArthur River Mine, its operator Glencore, and 
by default the state, who together have dominated and disrupted the 
local and regional Aboriginal world and literally reshaped Aboriginal 
people’s connections to their traditional lands and waters. Reflecting on 
the Indigenous historical experience and memory of state-sanctioned 
violence and dispossession in the region, I conclude that the state emerges 
as a consistently malevolent absence in Aboriginal peoples’ lives, bridging 
past violence with current environmental, social and cultural impacts of 
the state-sanctioned—yet questionably assessed and monitored—resource 
extraction activities at the McArthur River Mine.
I review the history of the development of the McArthur River Mine 
against a backdrop of shifting Australian Indigenous policy and mining 
company practices, then apply Sawyer and Gomez’s (2008) work on 
transnational governmentality and resource extraction, and Owen and 
Kemp’s (2017) work on social licence and countervailing power in the 
global mining industry, to explore the interplay of the state and mining 
company throughout. From recent Aboriginal voices expressed in word, 
song and imagery I conclude that the Aboriginal peoples of the Gulf 
have been brutalised as colonial subjects and are now disempowered as 
‘extractive subjects’ (Fredericksen and Himley 2019: 59) through the 
actions of a malevolently absent state.
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The Malevolent Absence of the 
Colonial State
From the 1870s the first wave of sustained European economic and 
physical presence in Gulf Country of the Northern Territory commenced 
with the rapid expansion of the pastoral industry from north Queensland 
into the Gulf region and beyond. Aboriginal inhabitants of the Gulf 
country felt the full force of this pastoral expansion from the late 1800s 
through to the early decades of the twentieth century. Referred to by Gulf 
Aboriginal peoples as the ‘Wild Times’, this was an era of rampant frontier 
violence with police, pastoralists and civilians taking to their guns against 
them with impunity. The contemporary Gulf Aboriginal perspective is 
simply put:
the government cleared us off our lands by shooting us and putting 
chains around our necks and dragging us off. (Kerins and Green 
2016: 124)
Conditions were described in the 1887 Northern Territory Government 
Resident’s Annual Report:
The whites look well to their Winchesters and revolvers, and 
usually proceed on the principle of being on the safe side. It  is 
an affectation of ignorance to pretend not to know that this 
is  the condition of things throughout the ‘backblocks’ and the 
‘new country’ of Australia. (South Australia 1887: 17)
The politicians, their policy, and decision makers in government were 
well  removed from the action in the corridors of power far away in 
Adelaide, which still administered the Northern Territory, or in the 
northern administrative outpost of Darwin. Extensive historical research 
into this frontier violence has been undertaken by Tony Roberts. Former 
public servant Brian Stacey notes Roberts’ description of the enormity of 
the dispossession and violence that overwhelmed Aboriginal people in the 
short space of three decades between 1881 and 1910. He writes:
On the back of a pastoral boom engineered by the South Australian 
colony, more than 600 Aboriginal men, women, children and 
babies, or about one sixth of the population, were killed in the 
Gulf Country.
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In just four years … the Aboriginal population of at least 4000, 
composed of 15 tribes or language groups, was dispossessed 
of every inch of land. (Stacey 2018: 13)
Stacey goes on to describe this practice as:
terra nullius applied in a savage, illegal and secret way in Australia’s 
last frontier by South Australia’s colonial politicians. The evidence 
is there were dozens of massacres in the Gulf Country which 
South Australia’s Attorneys-General and Premiers were alert 
to but refused to prevent, or to prosecute those responsible. 
(Stacey 2018: 13)
Robert’s 2009 essay The Brutal Truth details the gruesome original records 
of state-endorsed and sponsored ‘nigger hunts’, dispersals, and ‘picnics 
with the natives’. He notes the equipping of police and civilians in the 
Gulf Country with the latest powerful Martini-Henry rifles and unlimited 
ammunition:
Successive governments issued the police with unlimited 
ammunition and the authority to use it; they also issued arms to 
civilian punitive parties.
They kept sending the ammunition in massive quantities to the 
Territory, knowing it was being used for a single function: to shoot 
the blacks. They asked no questions, did no stocktakes, took no 
count of the dead … There is evidence of at least 50 massacres 
in the Gulf Country of the Territory up to 1910. It is impossible 
to estimate how many more went unrecorded. (Roberts 2009)
On the McArthur River some 60 km upstream from the McArthur River 
Mine is Dunggunmini: a permanent waterhole which is a Gurdanji sacred 
place (see Figure 8.1). John Avery recorded a narrative of a massacre at this 
place from a land claim informant during 1977:
There was a mob of Aboriginals camping here in the old times, 
poor buggers, when Top Station was up. Frank Meagan came 
out with pack horses, plant, trailing horses and rifles. They been 
hunting around for people to shoot. They left their horses north of 
the spring and swung around the spring. They into them and shot 
them all. They shot the whole mob. Some fellas got out, some got 
up the steep cliffs. The waterhole was all blood—girls and boys, 
old women and men were shot. They did the same all around right 
down to Kilgour and Amelia Spring. Frank Meagan also poisoned 
people at Warunguri. (Avery and McLaughlin 1977: 4)
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Figure 8.1 McArthur River Mine and surrounding region, 
Northern Territory
Source: Map by the author, background data supplied by the Department of Infrastructure, 
Planning and Logistics © Northern Territory Government
Kilgour is downstream again on the McArthur River closer to the mine. 
Amelia Springs is a site on the Glyde River where a rainbow snake travels 
northwards to meet its northern counterpart at the mine site. Nearby, 
upstream on Lamont Creek, a tributary of the Glyde, marked on the current 
topographic maps is Massacre Hill, unashamedly marking this rapid 
violent transformation of the local traditional geography and knowledge 
systems developed over countless generations by Aboriginal people.
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The historical records attest to the malevolent role the colonial state 
played in this violence. Administered from Adelaide by the South 
Australian Government, nearly 3,000 km away, up until 1911 and then 
by the Commonwealth Government even further away in Canberra, the 
physical distance of the state could not have been greater. Such physical 
distance combined with the lack of any administrative presence left the 
implementation of state policy on the frontiers in the hands of police, 
pastoralists and other civilians who were heavily armed by the state. 
It created the illusion of an absent state on the frontier when in actuality 
the state was embodied by those whom it armed. Andrew Lattas surmised 
similar processes in colonial New South Wales:
democracy makes every man an expression of reason … and thus 
makes him part of the state. It was precisely in these terms that 
pastoralists on the frontier justified their use of violence, they saw 
themselves as an extension of the rational ordering effects of the 
state. They appropriated often the state’s right to a monopoly of 
violence because they claimed to embody the principles of the 
state. (Lattas 1987: 50)
Such a ‘democratisation of violence’ during these Wild Times allowed the 
state to occupy with ambiguity the role of policy maker while, whenever 
convenient, feigning absence and ignorance of the violent implementation 
of their policies. Similar to Lattas’ observations on the ‘privatisation of the 
penal system’, here we witness the ‘privatisation of genocide’ in the Gulf 
Country through a malevolent and feigned absence of the state.1
McArthur River Mine and the Challenge 
of Land Rights
The ‘Here’s Your Chance’ deposit, one of the largest known sedimentary 
stratiform lead, zinc and silver deposits in the word, was identified 
by Mount Isa Mines geologists in 1955 on the McArthur River some 
50  km upstream from Borroloola, on land traditionally owned by the 
Gurdanji (MRM 2018: 1.1). Surface mineralogy had been noted as early 
as 1887 at McArthur River station and lead outcrops in the area had been 
1  Borrowing from Lattas’ (1987: 56) descriptions of the privatisation of the penal system in 
colonial NSW, where convicts were being transferred to the control of pastoralists at the same time 
as police and pastoralists were carrying out a ‘policy of genocide’ against Aborigines.
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sporadically mined since around 1910, but the nature of the orebody 
identified in 1955 made the project unviable for any development until 
mining technology had sufficiently advanced in the 1990s. This time, 
between the identification of the orebody and its development in the 
early 1990s, saw the political landscape of Australia and the Northern 
Territory undergo massive changes especially in relation to the Indigenous 
policy arena.
During the 1960s the fight for equal wages for Aboriginal station workers 
culminated in Gurindji station workers going on strike during 1966 in 
what become known as the Wave Hill Walk-Off, and in 1963 the Yolngu 
people of northeast Arnhem Land delivered the Yirrkala Bark Petitions 
to the Commonwealth parliament in Canberra protesting the grant 
of mineral leases on land excised from the Arnhem Land Aboriginal 
reserve (Walker 2013: 33). In 1967 a national referendum determined 
that Indigenous people be included in the Australian census and that 
the Commonwealth be empowered to create laws for Indigenous 
people. By 1968 the sentiments expressed in the Yirrkala Bark Petitions 
escalated into legal action. The Gove Land Rights case heard in 1971,2 
although unsuccessful, led to the Woodward Royal Commission 
inquiry into Aboriginal land rights in 1973–74 and the enactment by 
the Commonwealth of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (ALRA), using its post-referendum powers.3
This growth of rights-based protests and legal action was reflected in 
a major shift in Australian Indigenous policy in the early 1970s, with 
Commonwealth-led self-determination policies replacing decades of 
assimilationism, which since the 1950s had sought to economically, 
culturally and physically centralise and integrate Indigenous peoples into 
the majority Australian mainstream society (Altman 2009: 21). A national 
Indigenous representative organisation, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission or ATSIC, was created and funded to administer 
Indigenous-specific programs, while arguably the high-water mark of 
self-determination policy, the ALRA, delivered the ability for Aboriginal 
2  Milirrpum and Others v Nabalco and the Commonwealth of Australia.
3  There is abundant literature regarding the ALRA. For an early yet still relevant analysis of 
the principles of land rights as enacted in the Northern Territory see the introduction and relevant 
chapters in Peterson and Langton (1983).
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people in the Northern Territory to claim and win inalienable freehold 
title to their traditional lands and to control and negotiate benefits from 
any mining or other developments on such lands.
Mining companies seeking to explore and/or mine on granted Aboriginal 
freehold land were for the first time required to negotiate agreements 
with and obtain the consent of traditional Aboriginal owners before 
they could proceed. The ALRA established Land Councils as largely 
independent Commonwealth statutory bodies governed by elected 
Aboriginal community members (see Altman 2009: 22).4 These Land 
Councils administer the legislation, with the largest two, the Northern 
Land Council and the Central Land Council, employing considerable 
bureaucracies with professional legal, anthropological and technical staff. 
The ALRA also enabled the Northern Territory Government to set in 
place complementary legislation to protect Aboriginal scared sites in the 
Territory, which it did by enacting the Northern Territory Aboriginal 
Sacred Sites Act (NT Sacred Sites Act) soon after self-government was 
granted to the Northern Territory in 1978.5 Although it was intended by 
the Whitlam Commonwealth Government as a model to be applied on 
a national scale, the idea of land rights never had any political chance of 
survival in the mineral-rich state of Western Australia (Altman 2009: 22).
In 1992 Mount Isa Mines announced its intention to commence 
underground mining at McArthur River and an environmental assessment 
process was undertaken. An initial 1993 Northern Territory Government 
approval for the mine signified the start of a series of approvals made 
by both the Commonwealth and Territory governments for the project 
and its subsequent expansions, aimed at securing the development and 
ensuring its longevity. These approvals were remarkable in that they sought 
to curtail potential and perceived threats of opposition to the mine posed 
by Aboriginal land rights, and the newly recognised native title rights.
To put this into further context: the early 1990s saw an electorally 
entrenched conservative Country Liberal Northern Territory Government 
vociferously opposed to land rights and desperate for an investment and 
economic development ‘win’ after the controversial Coronation Hill 
project in southern Kakadu National Park, the prevention of mining at 
Guratba by the then Bob Hawke–led Commonwealth Government, and 
4  For details of the structure of the Northern Land Council, the most relevant land council in 
relation to this chapter, see their website: www.nlc.org.au/about-us/our-structure/our-people.
5  See the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority website: www.aapant.org.au/about-us/history.
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the uncertainty following the High Court recognition of native title in 
the Mabo case. The Coronation Hill decision was formed around a range 
of processes undertaken via the NT Sacred Sites Act, the ALRA, the 
Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Act 1984 and a Resource Assessment Commission inquiry.6 The High 
Court Mabo case saw the broadening of the recognition of pre-existing 
forms of Indigenous land ownership under the ALRA to a national level, 
transforming Australian property law and creating a new set of rights for 
those Indigenous peoples able to demonstrate a continuity of their society 
with that of their forebears at the time of European arrival. For governments 
and the mining industry it imposed new requirements, enshrined in the 
Commonwealth Native Title Act 1993, to negotiate with and compensate 
Indigenous peoples recognised as holding or potentially holding native 
title rights over land sought for development (O’Faircheallaigh 2016).
Soon after the Coronation Hill decision, the Keating-led Commonwealth 
Government, also wary of a post-Mabo negative investment environment, 
fast-tracked the Mount Isa Mines proposal to commence the McArthur 
River Mine development. So, by 1993, unique enabling Northern Territory 
legislation7 had been passed to validate the McArthur River mineral 
leases, and the Native Title Act had been amended to ensure the validity 
of the McArthur River mineral leases and to apply a non-extinguishment 
principle and future right to compensation (Young 2009:  8). In this 
manner, the state-enabled McArthur River Mine commenced operations 
in 1995.
As early as 1976 the Gurdanji, Yanyuwa, Mara and Garrwa peoples had 
sought support from the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission to acquire 
the McArthur River pastoral lease on their behalf.8 Instead, and despite 
protests by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs in Canberra, the 
Foreign Investment Review Board approved the sale of McArthur River 
to Mount Isa Mines in 1977 (Avery and McLaughlin 1977: 3). Avery and 
McLaughlin wrote:
6  See discussion in Lewis and Scambary (2016: 232).
7  McArthur River Project Agreement Ratification Amendment Act 1993 (NT).
8  The Aboriginal Land Fund was established in 1974 by the Whitlam Commonwealth Government 
during the development of land rights legislation to assist Aboriginal groups around the nation to 
purchase alienated or private lands.
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The attempted purchase of McArthur Station represented for 
many Gurdanji the last chance to develop their own community 
in the area. The Station covers core religious sites owned by 
a wide range of clans. Ownership of the land presented the 
real possibility for these people conducting an economic cattle 
enterprise, coupled with traditional foraging practices. (Avery and 
McLaughlin 1977: 3)
Given that the pastoral lease contained all of the mineral leases and port 
facilities required to operate the McArthur River Mine, and that had 
the pastoral lease passed into Aboriginal ownership an almost definitely 
successful ALRA land rights claim would have ensued, the 1977 sale to the 
mine operator can only be seen as a strategic move by the Commonwealth 
and Territory governments to prevent such a land rights claim over 
the station.
Instead, and nearly 20 years later, in 1994 the Commonwealth entered 
into  the McArthur River Agreement as a compensation deal with the 
broader Aboriginal community impacted by the project, which included 
the purchase of the Bauhinia Downs pastoral lease which adjoins 
McArthur  River station some 35  km east of the mine. This purchase 
allowed for a subsequent land rights claim to be run over that station, 
benefiting certain Gurdanji families associated with the McArthur River 
mineral lease areas, but not all of those whose traditional estates were 
associated with the Yulanji dreaming tracks along the McArthur River 
itself and at the mine site well to the east of Bauhinia Downs.
Former senior Commonwealth public servant Brian Stacey notes:
My impression, as a public servant in ATSIC [Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission] at the time, involved in the 
administration of the Land Rights Act, was that Aboriginal people 
were bullied into the McArthur River Mine. I also thought it was 
a grave injustice to the Aboriginal people of the Gulf who were 
denied the Right to Negotiate under the Native Title Act 1993. 
(Stacey 2018: 13–14)
With no land claim, there was no requirement for the company to establish 
a legal agreement with the traditional owners, and the representative 
organisation, the Northern Land Council (NLC), was hamstrung 
in its ability to negotiate with the mining company. In this sense the 
Commonwealth and Territory governments colluded to create a vacuum 
from which they absented themselves, leaving the mining company free to 
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operate and determine its own community engagement processes with no 
accountability to any agreement provisions or statutory processes afforded 
under land rights or native title laws. The traditional owners were left as 
impoverished bystanders effectively exposed to the whims of the company 
(Stacey 2018: 14).
The company took this opportunity to strategically apply their substantial 
resources to control and divide the community, isolating individual senior 
traditional owners, manipulating local Aboriginal organisations and 
undermining opposition to the mine. As noted by Kerins:
Reports from the 1990s, when the mine was first being 
developed, tell how MRM [McArthur River Mine] employees 
actively worked to separate Aboriginal people from their 
representative organisations and to create mistrust between them. 
(Kerins 2017: 12)
Mine Expansions
In 2002 mine expansion plans for the McArthur River Mine were 
announced that included a massive open-cut pit on the river-bed of the 
McArthur River, which would require a 5.5 km diversion of the river and 
a bund wall or levee some 100 m thick and 60 m high to block the river’s 
wet season flows (Young 2009: 9). These controversial plans soon gave rise 
to a new political turn. In 2003 global mining giant Glencore purchased 
the McArthur River Mine and a six-year highly politicised environmental 
assessment and approvals war raged in the courts, once again pitting 
the Northern Territory and Commonwealth governments against local 
Aboriginal people and their cultural, social and environmental concerns 
represented by the NLC, as well as considerable environmental opposition 
from environmental groups and broader society. In reaction to various 
legal defeats over the approvals process the Northern Territory once again 
enacted remarkable legislation in 2007 to validate the approvals process—
the McArthur River Project Amendment (Ratification of Mining Authorities) 
Act 2007 (NT). When the Federal Court declared the Commonwealth 
Minister’s approvals invalid, the Minister simply reissued his approval 
in a valid manner, allowing the open-cut development to proceed in 
February 2009.9
9  For a more thorough summary see Young (2009: 9–15).
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Mirroring the 1970s and 1990s, no agreements were in place and Aboriginal 
rights to and interests in their lands were again ignored, thwarted and 
overridden by a state that was negatively present in relation to Aboriginal 
people but very much positively present and active on behalf of the miners 
(see also Holcombe, Chapter 7, this volume). In 2013 the Northern 
Territory Government approved the Phase 3 expansion at the McArthur 
River Mine which allowed for expanded production, enlargement of the 
open cut and an increase in the size of the tailings storage facility and 
the footprint and height of the northern overburden emplacement facility 
(the ‘waste rock dump’) (Young 2015). Later that year, the waste rock 
dump began to combust and plumes of sulphur dioxide smoke poured 
off the mine site for over a year, drawing increased public attention to the 
project and concern about downstream contamination of the McArthur 
River itself (Bardon 2016). Glencore’s assessment of their waste rock 
material had proven to be wrong, forcing them into a new environmental 
assessment process which continues at the time of writing.
In August 2018 the Northern Territory Environment Protection 
Authority10 approved the expansion, purportedly favouring ongoing 
mining over the risk that the company would abandon the project. The 
mine still requires authorisation from the Territory and Commonwealth 
governments, including from the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority,11 
which will need to seek Aboriginal site custodians’ views regarding the 
proposed raising of the height of the waste rock dump from 80  m to 
140  m to match the height of the nearby hill which is a barramundi 
dreaming sacred site called Damangani (Bardon 2018).
Broken Promises
I first engaged with the traditional owners of the McArthur River Mine 
when working as an anthropologist for both the NLC in the mid-2000s, 
and then in more recent years with the Aboriginal Areas Protection 
Authority. This latter work involved conducting sacred site clearances 
in response to applications for Authority Certificates from Glencore, 
which were precursors to the approvals process for the most current mine 
10  The NT independent statutory authority established by and to administer the Northern Territory 
Environment Protection Authority Act 2012.
11  The NT independent statutory authority established by and to administer the Northern Territory 
Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989.
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expansion proposals (as described above). Based on this work, which 
involved various mine site visits, aerial and ground-based sacred site surveys 
and work on surrounding matters, I came to know the key traditional 
Aboriginal owners and site custodians for the mine and its surrounds and 
gained insight into company practices and their community relations.
During this time a senior man, Mr Coolibah, was active as a senior 
Gurdanji nimirringi (or ‘owner’) for the Mambaliya Wurrini estate on the 
McArthur River at the mine site. A regular informant for my work, he held 
strong knowledge of his estate and worked closely with a cohort of other 
nimirringi and junggayi (‘managers’) for his own as well as neighbouring 
estates and others with traditional connections to the mine area.12 He had 
emerged as a senior figure as the 2000s progressed and with the passing 
of his predecessors and senior Aboriginal figures of the region such as 
Harry Lansen and Bruce Joy. Throughout my work with him, Coolibah 
was a quiet but firm man seeking to improve his and his family’s lot while 
clearly being caught between the manipulations and promises made by the 
McArthur River Mine ‘company men’ and his broader cultural obligations 
to sacred sites, country and his fellow ‘countrymen’. Trapped by the 
historic chicanery of the state and the company, Coolibah and the rest of 
the Gurdanji have been marginalised in relation to the mine while other 
Northern Territory Aboriginal groups with mining projects on their lands 
have been able to negotiate benefits under the ALRA. The Gurdanji have 
experienced this powerlessness in the face of incomprehensible expansions 
to the mine, destruction of their lands, disturbance and contamination 
of their waters, and constant threats to their sacred sites.
In 2016 Coolibah was diagnosed with terminal cancer and after treatment 
in Royal Darwin Hospital he returned home and died in February 2017 
surrounded by family. During my many field trips, numerous phone 
conversations and other engagements with him he regularly spoke at 
length about the mine and its impacts on him, his people and his society.
12  Aboriginal society in the Gulf region (and many surrounding regions) recognises complementary 
affiliation to land which involves the transmission of rights in country along lineages of patrilineal 
descendants, who are considered to be ‘owners’ of an estate of land and its sites and dreamings. 
Complementary rights are transmitted via matrilineal connections to the same estate with matrifiliates 
considered to be ‘managers’ or ‘police’, whose role it is to ensure that the owners are caring for their 
country, sites and ceremonies appropriately. In the Gulf region the respective label for ‘owner’ is 
nimirringi and for ‘manager’ is junggayi. Also see further discussion in the chapter.
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The following is a selection of Coolibah’s reflections which I collected 
across my various times with him which I have paraphrased:
They gave me my block, dongas, motor car, bus, money, tank 
and fencing—that made me a little bit happy. But we didn’t 
understand—we knew about the old mine, but didn’t know it [the 
open cut and diversion] was going to be such a big mess.
Me, Bruce and Ronnie tried to stop it [the mine expansion] with 
a lot of other people. Didn’t know it was going really open like 
that, change that river—you can’t do that! We could see they gone 
in like a mob of worms under the ground, like a mob of termites 
or pigs digging everywhere [on seeing the underground operation 
being opened up].
They ask me I must’ve been stupid—me and the others. Old Harry 
was right he tried to block it. We tried to push them to get royalty. 
They bin breaking my promise man Bruce.
Mining company want to keep going higher for that dump. 
We said you asking too much—you need to give us good deal 
not rough deal. No higher than the barramundi they promised. 
Now they still asking. Everything changed and biggest mess since 
company came. Feel no good, sick, I can’t stand it.
Broken promises make me angry. That dreaming tree if that goes 
they gotta get something back.
Muminini they already broke him with the bucket. Yakuwala they 
already broke that one.13 Any more damage they gotta get a good 
deal. I’m sad, sick and worried. Gotta go this mine.
That open cut—you have to blame me for that—I was stupid. 
My  junggayi both said yes. I had to follow that line. Our way 
I have to follow them—old days you get belted if you ignore them.
That river diversion the snake line been damaged. That bund wall 
the Garbula tree gonna get poisoned. Downstream—fish, water—
can’t eat fish anymore we frightened.
That open cut—my head wasn’t working that day. I had no power.
13  During earlier mine works a bulldozer (‘the bucket’) cut into Muminini, a sacred hill near the mine, 
and rocks were disturbed at Yakuwala another sacred site located close to current mine infrastructure.
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Coolibah’s Aboriginal English was good, but the difficulty of 
communicating the impacts of damage and loss in a brief set of statements 
is immense (a common challenge with other sacred site matters I have 
worked on). Not only are these intangible personal and spiritual matters, 
but they occur within a cultural framework and normative system that 
never considered industrial-scale damage to land or sites (see Lewis and 
Scambary 2016: 244–5). In order to explore what Coolibah was seeking 
to communicate in these paraphrased statements, they need context, 
expansion and some interpretation.
In the late 2000s the mining company gifted Coolibah a small block of 
land on McArthur River station near Garanbarini conservation reserve 
north of the mine. The company also provided some transportable 
buildings to establish a small outstation. My earliest interactions with 
Coolibah in the early 2000s were often about his frustrations with this 
promised outstation. His comments above indicate that he considered 
this outstation to be personal compensation for the initial ‘old’ mining 
operations and the 1994 Commonwealth compensation deal which gave 
Bauhinia Downs to other Gurdanji people, principally Harry Lansen’s 
family. As Coolibah’s traditional Wurrini estate does not extend westwards 
to Bauhinia Downs, he and his immediate family did not directly benefit 
from the return of Bauhinia Downs. In this sense Coolibah is saying that 
his outstation and the few ex-mine buildings that he received from the 
mine were part of what he had always expected and demanded from 
the miners (and by implication the state) as compensation from much 
earlier events in the mid-1990s.
Coolibah’s words also express his and other traditional owners’ lack of any 
comprehension of, let alone any free prior or informed consent for, the 
expansion of the McArthur River Mine to an open-cut project. He laments 
not following Harry Lansen’s resolute opposition to the mine expansion, 
realising that he and others got caught out trying to get a royalty deal from 
the company. He notes the shock of the transformation of the landscape 
with the open cut and the river diversion and he notes that the company 
‘broke’ his junggayi Bruce Joy, his now deceased ‘promise man’. This was 
Coolibah’s way of saying that it was Bruce who gave in to company pressure 
and said yes to the expansion work and that he himself had to follow his 
junggayi. Precisely what Coolibah meant by ‘broke’ remains conjectural: 
it could mean that the company broke Bruce’s resolve, contributed to his 
death or both.
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The nimirringi–junggayi relationship remains prominent in Gulf 
Aboriginal society.14 Enshrined in ceremonial practices and in the 
codification of relationships to land this relationship extends into 
mundane life where the nimirringi will seek the approval of his or her 
junggayi for many decisions even in relation to apparently daily or trivial 
matters. It is always critical for the nimirringi to include their junggayi in 
land business, sacred site or cultural matters; failure to do so will usually 
result in acrimony and fines. In the context of McArthur River Mine 
approvals, Coolibah was implying a degree of self-redemption in that he 
was seeking to spread his own culpability for his decisions amongst his 
contemporaries.
Coolibah spoke of impacts of the latest expansion proposals on the 
Damangani sacred site, which is the hill associated with a barramundi 
dreaming immediately north of and downstream from the open cut. 
The waste rock dump is the subject of ongoing approvals processes with 
Glencore, who are seeking to increase the height of the current waste 
rock dump design. This was the subject of much earlier Aboriginal Areas 
Protection Authority Certificates where the original waste rock dump 
design was limited in height to 80 m in order to allay the concerns of 
Aboriginal custodians about perceived impacts on the integrity of the 
nearby Damangani sacred site. Attempts to dishonour this deal are read 
by Coolibah and others as a broken promise by the company.
The Garbula tree is another sacred site located within 50 m of the base 
of the open cut bund wall on the southern side of the McArthur River 
Mine pit. I visited this site on a few occasions with Coolibah and others 
and the decontextualisation of this and other sites from their natural state 
(and their proximity to the mine developments) have been a long-standing 
source of concern.15 This tree and others upstream, along with nearby 
permanent waterholes on the McArthur River, are manifestations of two 
Yulanji rainbow serpent dreamings which converge at this point of the 
river. These and other sacred places associated with Gurdanji ceremony 
and ritual are encompassed within the mineral leases controlled by the 
mine, which has effectively restricted access to them by Gurdanji and other 
14  See Footnote 12 for more detail.
15  See Bainton et al. (2012) for a comparable example of a decontextualised (or re-contextualised) 
sacred geography at the Lihir gold mine in Papua New Guinea.
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Aboriginal people for a generation.16 In my experience of site clearance 
work which required access to these sites with custodians, the irony is not 
lost on these custodians that the only time they can readily achieve access 
to these sites is when the company requires a site clearance for its own 
needs. Coolibah’s words ‘Broken promises make me angry’ barely capture 
the frustration, anger and sense of loss and despair that was palpable 
during such visits. The threats posed to sacred sites by the evolving works 
at the McArthur River Mine echo previous experiences where other sacred 
sites, such as Muminini and Yakuwala, were damaged by earlier mining 
activity in the 1970–80s. Coolibah was expressing concern about any 
more damage to sites and what this meant to his personal health—he 
was ‘sad sick and worried’ by such threats. By ‘a good deal’ he is alluding 
to potential compensation for mining and site damage, which I read as 
an attempted warning and reassertion of his traditional authority as well 
as his need to be seen by others, especially his junggayi, to be exercising 
his traditional responsibilities by punishing transgressors. When Coolibah 
stated ‘That open cut—you have to blame me for that—I was stupid’, he 
was particularly tearful and it was the first time that I had heard him admit 
any fault or blame. While, as noted earlier, he qualified this confession at 
least in part by blaming Bruce Joy as his junggayi, it was clearly a powerful 
and painful realisation.
The diversion of the river has been regarded by many site custodians as 
damaging the dreaming track followed by the two Yulanji or rainbow 
serpent dreamings, one from the north and the other (Coolibah’s) from 
the south which converge at the mine site. Coolibah notes the fears held 
by himself and his broader Aboriginal community about downstream 
contamination and impacts on their use of traditional resources.
The key theme which emerged consistently in my engagements with 
Coolibah, represented in the statements presented above, was the trope of 
the ‘broken promise man’ which I understood from him to be a multivalent 
figure that changes in identity as well as temporally to encompass a range 
of figures both real and conceptual who embody and enact moral 
uncertainty. The broken promise man is the mining company men who 
worked on Coolibah over many years manipulating and incentivising 
his tacit support when needed by making new promises, while delaying 
16  Section  47 of the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 preserves the right of 
Aboriginal custodians to access sacred sites located on private land. This right has been heavily 
mediated at the McArthur River Mine as an active mine site with occupational health and safety risks.
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on older promises for his outstation. The same mining company men 
damaged sacred sites at Muminini and Yakuwala in the past, and now 
threaten to destroy the Garbula tree and undo earlier promises (and 
agreements) made about limiting the height of the waste rock dump in 
relation to the barramundi dreaming at Damangani. The  state (in the 
collective sense of both the Commonwealth and Northern Territory) is 
also the broken promise man who disempowered Coolibah and his fellow 
traditional owners by thwarting their land rights and native title claims, 
denying them the right to a full prior and informed consent process and 
therefore any negotiating power in relation to the McArthur River Mine.17 
Coolibah’s junggayi Bruce Joy was also the broken promise man, in that 
according to Coolibah, he succumbed to the pressure and inducements 
made by the mining company and by approving the mine expansion, he 
forced Coolibah as his nimirringi to follow him. Finally and tragically, the 
broken promise man emerges as Coolibah himself, who through tears of 
regret faced his failures, realised that he too had been manipulated by the 
mining company, marginalised by the state, and ultimately had broken his 
own promise—his duty to care for his traditional lands and ancestral sites.
Coolibah’s broken promise man ultimately embodies his personal 
powerlessness, and that of his regional Aboriginal community, in the face 
of a long history of events unfolding around him associated with the mine. 
The state’s elusive role in facilitating the development meant that the face 
of Coolibah’s protagonists were never fixed and were forever moving like 
dancers around him, underscoring the moral and institutional uncertainty 
of this figure. Throughout the years I knew him and despite his best 
efforts, he never managed to engage with the state as the power behind 
the mine, because unlike the company men, the state actors were never 
present or accessible to him (see also Skrzypek, Chapter 2, this volume). 
The power of the state, embodied and exercised in the activities of the 
company, have produced what Fredericksen and Himley (2019: 58–9) 
call extractive subjects, in the form of Coolibah and his countrymen, 
who are simultaneously shaped by the exercise of power relationships at 
this extractive frontier and integrated into regional, national and global 
extractive economies.
17  I think that while Coolibah probably understood that these layers of government were 
geographically and politically distinct holding different powers, like many Aboriginal people of his era 
and older, he did not differentiate between the two. Both were seen as ‘Government mob’, a unified 
form of externalised non-Indigenous power.
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I was unable to attend Coolibah’s funeral in Borroloola but a colleague 
recalled the event to me as one dominated by high-visibility work shirts, 
corporate logos and a funeral procession led by a Glencore-marked tray-
back utility carrying Coolibah’s coffin. The eulogy was read by the company 
man most associated with Coolibah, the Health, Safety and Environment 
Manager, who recalled his friendship and noted with apparent pride that 
Coolibah had given him an Aboriginal name. Upon hearing this I recalled 
Coolibah telling me during a site survey a few years earlier that he had 
given this man a name which was intentionally unflattering and reflective 
of his role in a litany of broken promises made by the company. So it was 
with deep irony that this company man, one of Coolibah’s broken promise 
men, eulogised his ‘friend’. In death Coolibah was fully appropriated by the 
company, at least symbolically via the funeral, transforming him from an 
excluded, vociferous and politically volatile character, into a remembered, 
revered and now silent unproblematic stakeholder. Glencore had, to use 
Fredericksen and Himley’s terms (2019: 59), transformed Coolibah from 
an extractive subject into the perfect extractive citizen.
Open Cut ǀ Cut Open
A few months after Coolibah’s death, an exhibition of artwork and 
photographs protesting the McArthur River Mine was launched in 
Darwin’s  trendy market and gallery precinct of Parap. The modest 
exhibition of seven paintings by Jacky GreenWarngkurli, accompanied 
by a series of black and white portrait photographs of Gulf Aboriginal 
people by Therese Ritchie, was orchestrated by Sean Kerins, a research 
fellow at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research at The 
Australian National University (Figure 8.2). Jacky is a Garrwa Mambaliya 
man who I have worked with alongside other Gurdanji custodians, 
including Coolibah, on sacred site clearances at the McArthur River Mine. 
His long-standing public opposition to the project has meant that he is 
not popular with Glencore, who have resisted his access to the mine site 
and questioned his traditional connections to the area. In my experience 
Jacky’s ceremonial connections to sites at the mine and his broader 
knowledge of regional matters has meant that he has been considered 
by all senior Gurdanji to be an essential part of the sacred sites work that 
I undertook.
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The 2017 exhibition was entitled ‘Open Cut’. One wall was occupied 
by a selection of Jacky’s uncompromising paintings depicting the mine 
and environmental and cultural damage it has reaped upon the lands and 
people of the Gulf. Each painting was accompanied by a text from Jacky 
providing his insight into the mine and its irreconcilable conflict with his 
cultural values and those of his community. One example is the painting 
entitled Red Country (see Figure 8.3).
The exhibition catalogue for this piece reads:
Red Country
Right across the McArthur River region are The Dreaming tracks 
of the ancestral beings. The barramundi, the two snakes who 
travelled together and the one that come up from the south. The 
Rainbow Snake and the Stinking Turtle. They all there. So too are 
the places where they coiled or rested, or went down under the 
earth like at the place I have marked in the river. Big name places, 
important and sacred places, they are right across the region and 
they tie people to places and people together.
Right in the middle of this sacred country is a torn-up place, right 
where the Sacred Tree is that forms part of the Rainbow Snake 
story. It’s a big name place, right where the massive open cut pit 
now is. The black represents the hole that keeps getting bigger and 
bigger and the brown represents how the mining company is now 
talking about stuffing all the toxic waste rock back in the hole 
before they take-off with their money and leave us and generations 
to come with their toxic mess. (Green et al. 2017)
Such irreconcilable contestation over resource extraction in the Northern 
Territory has been a theme that I have noted elsewhere with Benedict 
Scambary:
This pattern of conflicting interests demonstrates how such 
contests have commonly focussed on and been articulated around 
matters of Aboriginal sacred sites. They have involved the collision 
of interests where areas of geological and mineralogical significance 
in the form of mineral deposits and ore bodies coincide with places 
of cultural significance to Aboriginal people in the form of sacred 
sites. (Lewis and Scambary 2016: 222)
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Figure 8.2 Jacky Green and Sean Kerins at Open Cut, Darwin, 2017
Source: Photograph by author
Figure 8.3 Jacky Green, Red Country, 2017, 96 x 88 cm, acrylic 
on canvas
Source: © Jacky Green
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On the wall opposite Jacky’s paintings were a set of black and white 
photographic portraits taken by Therese Ritchie of Gulf Aboriginal people 
with words and statements painted across their bodies in English and 
Garrwa. Jacky’s portrait has ‘Cut Open’ across his chest, others include 
‘Intergenerational Despair’, ‘Hope’, ‘Lead’, ‘Sovereignty’ and more. 
Kerins notes:
Just as previous generations of Aboriginal people from the Gulf 
country have used artistic expression to make their voices heard 
and their feelings known, Aboriginal people in the Open Cut 
exhibition continue to do so, scarifying their bodies to speak to 
power. (Kerins 2017: 13)
Such use of the body to communicate with the broader community reflects 
the heart of this contest over resources. As Scambary and I previously 
wrote, and extending from the above quote:
The phrase sacred bodies is used here with the intent of drawing 
focus onto the physical, and very much bodily, relationships which 
exist between place and people in Aboriginal Australia, as well 
the cultural, emotive and religious systems and traditions which 
underpin these relationships. We consider that such an emphasis 
is reflective of Aboriginal discourses about the impacts of damage 
to sacred sites … how the literal undermining of Aboriginal sites 
damages individuals, tears at the fabric of their societies and 
undermines the very ability of already vulnerable cultural groups 
to reproduce their traditions and thereby themselves. (Lewis and 
Scambary 2016: 222)
Prior to the 2017 exhibition, I was undertaking non-McArthur River Mine 
related fieldwork in Borroloola, Jacky took me aside and proudly showed 
me his ‘little song’ he had written about Ngabaya ‘the devil’. The key lyric 
components as explained by Jacky were: Ngabaya [devil] ngyirridji [fiddles] 
gunindjba [digging] (‘the devil that fiddles and digs in our country’).
The Ngabaya is a generic dreaming figure prominent at sacred sites and 
dreaming tracks which cross the region. Ngabaya, often called ‘devil’, 
is more accurately an anthropomorphic spirit figure of ambivalent nature 
rather than embodying any evil in the Christian tradition.18 I mistakenly 
18  As John Bradley and Yanyuwa families note (2010: 195): ‘The generic term ngabaya refers to any 
human-like spirit being, often translated as “ghost”, “spirit” or sometimes by the Kriol term debildebil 
(“devil”, which although probably originating in Christian teaching, was not generally thought of as 
a spirit of greater evil than other spirits)’.
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interpreted Jacky’s song to be demonising the mining company, but 
Jacky corrected me and described his more nuanced use of this character 
as referring to:
anyone who messes about with country and damages things—
it can be a mine operator, an Aboriginal person on a grader or 
a government bloke … anybody, they are dangerous because they 
don’t understand, they interfere and cause trouble … (Jacky Green, 
personal communication, January 2017, Borroloola)
With a multivalence similar to Coolibah’s ‘broken promise man’, this song 
about the Ngabaya was performed by Jacky along with other songs at 
the opening of the Open Cut exhibition in Darwin. On the end wall of 
the Open Cut exhibition was an annotated graphic timeline connecting 
the contact history of the colonial frontier ‘wild times’ with the policy 
environment of the present—which might be interpreted as a way of using 
memory to cope with uncertainty. Illustrated with photos and ‘credits’ for 
the notable actors in the history of the Gulf generally and the McArthur 
River Mine development in particular, this timeline presents like a wall 
of shame graphically demonstrating the connections between past and 
present for Aboriginal people of the Gulf region. Reflecting on the images 
displayed on the wall including their own photographic portraits, Gulf 
artists Stewart Hoosen19 and Nancy McDinny20 were quick to draw 
parallels between the violence of murderous frontier times to current 
experiences of marginalisation alongside the cultural and environmental 
damage inflicted by the McArthur River Mine. There is a consistency in 
this experience underpinned by the malevolent role of the state both past 
and present.
The Malevolent Absence of the 
Neoliberal State
For the Gurdanji, Yanyuwa and Garrwa in the Gulf, as for many Aboriginal 
people affected by other resource extraction projects across the Northern 
Territory, the state is often perceived as an absent actor. Engagement 
between miners and Aboriginal people has either been direct or preferably 
mediated by effective Indigenous representative organisations such as land 
19  See Cross Art Projects (2017a).
20  See Cross Art Projects (2017b).
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councils using legislative frameworks such as the ALRA or the Native Title 
Act. The Northern Territory experience of visiting politicians courting 
favour with and seeking project approvals from Aboriginal leaders during 
the early land rights era of the late 1970s and 1980s has faded. Safari 
suits have given way to high-vis shirts and hard hats as the neoliberal 
state has increasingly withdrawn from its remote servicing interests and 
responsibilities in favour of, and deference to, corporate community 
benefits packaged up as a social licence to mine, in what can be seen as an 
outsourcing of state responsibilities (see Scambary 2013: 9–10; see also 
Everingham et al., Chapter 9, this volume).
As noted earlier Australian Indigenous affairs has been the subject of major 
policy shifts over the last 40 years. The most recent of these shifts has been 
generated around the application of neoliberalism, which has witnessed 
the extension of market mechanisms into areas of the community 
previously organised and governed in other ways, especially in Indigenous 
communities, allowing for a broad reduction in the ambit and role of the 
state (Howlett et al. 2011: 312).21
From the self-determination era which ushered in land rights, Indigenous-
specific policy making and a decolonising approach in the late 1970s, to 
the revival of assimilationism and mainstreaming policies of the Howard 
Government in the 2000s, current approaches to universalise, ‘westernise’ 
and ‘incorporate’ remote Aboriginal populations have, according to 
Jon Altman:
been a mix of politics, ideology and cultural critique that has 
driven the current policy project to neoliberalise geographically 
remote Aboriginal people so as to free them from a relational 
ontology that emphasises commitment to family and kin, ties to 
place, and obligations in ceremony. (Altman 2014: 124)
For the mining industry operating across the physical and policy space 
of Indigenous Australia, the balance between unimpeded development, 
statutory requirements and social legitimacy or licence has both followed 
and influenced these spaces. From the dire warnings of industrial collapse 
in the face of land rights as companies were dragged into agreement-making 
processes with the Northern Territory land councils, to the  seemingly 
enlightened community engagement approaches from the mid-1990s, 
21  For thorough summaries of the Australian context see Altman (2014) and Howlett et al. (2011).
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there have been many shifts in these balances.22 Bound up in fluctuating 
terms such as ‘community engagement’, ‘social licence’, ‘social licence 
to operate’, ‘social sustainability’ or ‘corporate social responsibility’, the 
role and responsibility of mining companies in local as well as broader 
community affairs has become increasingly scrutinised in recent decades. 
Whether driven by demands from activists, civil critique, community 
pressure or by shareholder demand, the need to at least claim to be 
creating ‘social value’ or ‘delivering benefits’ has been driven more from 
within the industry rather than through any particular state intervention.
In my experience with the McArthur River Mine and elsewhere, social 
value via community engagement is a function often lumped in with the 
duties of other operational disciplines such as human resources, public 
relations, environment, or occupational health and safety. It was the 
Health, Safety and Environment Manager who played the key role in 
engaging with Aboriginal traditional owners such as Coolibah (including 
eulogising at his funeral, as noted earlier), and facilitating site visits at 
the McArthur River Mine. At the OM Manganese mine at Bootu Creek 
near Tennant Creek it was a staff member in a similarly titled role that 
organised liaison committee meetings, mine site visits, and fencing around 
an identified but ultimately ill-fated and desecrated sacred site (Lewis and 
Scambary 2016: 235–9).
The commentary I have received from the communities subjected to 
these engagement roles suggests an unsophisticated yet highly selective 
approach of capturing senior traditional owners. This commonly occurs 
via rudimentary support in the form of directing jobs to immediate family 
members, and/or providing valued resources such as spare parts or tyres for 
vehicles. Such forms of ‘social value’ or ‘community benefit’ appear to be 
driven purely by corporate self-interest seeking to appease and manipulate 
potentially problematic individuals—creating extractive subjects—
rather than by any underlying ethic or desire to meaningfully support 
communities impacted by their operations or to mitigate these impacts.
John Owen and Deanna Kemp (2017: 33) identify the vagaries of 
terminology as one part of the problem. Being a poorly defined, 
metaphorical and intangible concept, social licence (or social licence 
to operate) in mining has been interpreted and applied inconsistently 
22  For an excellent summary of these shifts in relationships between the mining industry and 
Indigenous peoples in Australia see Altman (2009: 2–27).
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by industry, regulators, commentators and impacted communities. 
In their analysis of the global mining industry this manifests as 
a counterproductive clash between an industrial ethic (where companies 
are exclusively focused on profit) and countervailing powers which seek 
to resist corporate control, influence and impact. Building on Galbraith’s 
modelling of such countervailing powers, they argue that an effective and 
mature ‘social function’ within mining companies is required to moderate 
their own self-interest (Kemp and Owen 2018: 492) and help to minimise 
some of the most perverse impacts upon local communities. The absence 
of this social function perpetuates self-interest and unleashes a range of 
consequences.
As detailed earlier, within this industrial and state policy framework, the 
McArthur River Mine has been allowed to occupy a unique space created 
by the state to ensure that the development of the project was unimpeded 
by Aboriginal land claims or native title claims. The state both actively 
removed what could have been a legitimate external countervailing power 
to the project, and allowed and legitimised the absence of any effective 
social function (or internal countervailing power) within the project. 
Kemp and Owen have observed a global decline in corporate commitment 
to the development of the social function and the capability to manage 
the social aspects and impacts of mining. They argue that ‘the demise 
of the social function will only be reversed, or rebuilt, if and when the 
industry is subjected to … conflicts and scandals that cannot be concealed 
by the machinery of public relations’ (Kemp and Owen 2018: 498). But 
in the case of the McArthur river mine, such scandals and conflicts have 
thus far had little impact upon the company.
In their work on transnational governmentality and resource extraction, 
Suzana Sawyer and Edmund Gomez state that ‘Common wisdom 
holds that public–private collaborations among governments, IFIs 
[International Financial Institutions] and multinational corporations 
(MNCs) will enhance social well-being by eradicating poverty, promoting 
sustainable forms of economic development, protecting the environment 
and advancing the rights of indigenous peoples’ (Sawyer and Gomez 
2008: iii). Contrary to this common wisdom, it is recognised that 
there are ‘monumental’ and ‘baffling’ problems and growing concerns 
over the adverse impacts of resource extraction projects on Indigenous 
peoples across many nations. Sawyer and Gomez note that despite many 
government and corporate attempts to create inclusive consultative 
institutions aimed at affording Indigenous peoples property, veto 
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and other empowering rights over resource extraction projects, the 
majority of Indigenous peoples find themselves increasingly subjected 
to discrimination, exploitation, dispossession and racism (2008: 1). 
The  public–private partnerships they have reviewed, including case 
studies from Australia, demonstrate how a combination of institutional 
capture, clientelism and political positioning undermines the neutrality 
of the state and its capacity to protect Indigenous communities. They see 
this manifest most conspicuously through the funding of political parties 
by mining corporations and key appointments made to the boards of 
directors of international financial institutions. Mining companies have 
then used such donations and appointments to influence state policies 
and laws to serve their interests.
For the McArthur River Mine such capture is evident in the earliest 
stages of the project via the legislative support and approvals processes 
described earlier. In September 2017, Rod Campbell of the Australia 
Institute reviewed the economic modelling for the Phase  3 expansion 
of the McArthur River Mine which Glencore claimed will generate tax 
and royalty payments of over AUD1.5 billion. His findings deplore these 
claims as based on assumptions which he found to be ‘almost comical’. 
He summarises that their modelling included payroll tax payments 
over a  thousand years to the year 3017, estimates of AUD435 million 
in royalty payments—which are not actually paid at all in most years—
and estimates of AUD1,035  million in company taxes when Glencore 
regularly pays no company tax at all in Australia.
Adding to this picture, the September 2017 disclosure that the size 
of Glencore’s environmental bond for the McArthur River Mine, at 
AUD476 million, is estimated to only cover 25 years of mine life and 
rehabilitation when the actual costs are likely to extend for hundreds of 
years (Vanovac and Breen 2017).23 Campbell concludes his analysis by 
pointing out that:
The NT government estimates their cost of cleaning up 
abandoned mines in the NT would be over $1 billion. Given 
this history and the present reality of the McArthur River Mine’s 
impacts on the environment and local community, it is likely that 
the environmental costs imposed by the mine will be far greater 
than the uncertain revenues that could be generated. From an 
23  This disclosure was only possible after legal action taken by Jacky Green, represented by the 
Environment Defenders Office of the NT.
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economic perspective, it is likely that the best approach would 
be to close the mine and rehabilitate the site, and to ensure this is 
paid for by Glencore. (Campbell 2017: 17)
Barrister Anthony Young has also reflected on the long record of failings 
of the environmental assessment process at the McArthur River Mine by 
successive Northern Territory and Commonwealth governments. He cites 
deliberate and reckless political choices and the ignoring of scientific 
and expert advice, which amplify the potential for the mine to cause 
catastrophic environmental damage:
The history of the McArthur River mine shows that governments 
are willing to sacrifice the health of the environment and of those 
directly reliant on it, such as the Aboriginal people of the region, 
to the mining industry and economic interest. (Young 2015)
The Phase 3 process appears to follow this trend with Glencore 
forced into a new approvals process after its failings in its assessment 
of the composition of waste material being placed on the NOEF 
materials [the northern overburden emplacement facility, or waste 
dump]. (Bardon 2016)
This mirrors the international findings of Sawyer and Gomez (2008: 28) 
who note the failings of self-regulated corporate social responsibility 
where the state is too easily compromised by the overwhelming influence 
of transnational capital (see also Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4, 
this volume). The state cannot effectively regulate or monitor what it 
is authorising in the name of investment or development. Sawyer and 
Gomez identify transnational solutions:
What is required is not public-private compacts but an effective 
arms-length and accountable relationship between governments 
and MNCs [multinational corporations] to deal with corruption, 
environmental degradation and violence. A viable institutional 
framework is thus required to honourably compensate local 
populations, including indigenous peoples, for the disruptive 
effects of resource extraction, not involving the state, given that it 
lacks neutrality, but an independent monitoring body, such as the 
UN (and possibly NGOs). (Sawyer and Gomez 2008: 28)
I have argued above that this accountability and a compensatory approach 
to the McArthur River Mine was available but avoided by the state from 
the start. Had a land purchase over McArthur River Station been allowed 
in the mid-1970s and had the ALRA been allowed to run its course, an 
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agreement would have ensued between the traditional Aboriginal owners 
and the company mediated by the NLC, an independent Commonwealth 
statutory body. Such an agreement, while not necessarily addressing all 
environmental matters at the mine, nor addressing all matters for all local 
Indigenous peoples, would have still been an empowering move, the 
benefits of which are now impossible to quantify. Instead what emerged 
in relation to the McArthur River Mine is that the state, in the form of 
both the Territory and Commonwealth governments, has been captured 
by extractive capital interests and actively undermined readily available 
solutions of the very sort identified by Sawyer and Gomez. In removing 
itself as much as possible in order to acquiesce to extractive interests, the 
malevolence of the state is thoroughly discernible.
Adding to the analytical commentary above, the McArthur River Mine 
has also attracted regular negative media coverage and reporting on aspects 
of Aboriginal opposition, environmental failures and regulatory concerns. 
In the face of such criticism and concern, the state approvals for the 
project have flowed. It seems that despite such coverage, controversy and 
opposition, there has been little cause for alarm at Glencore headquarters 
and at the mine site: no discernible social function exists while their pro-
mining commercials roll out regularly on Darwin television, which might 
be interpreted as a stronger corporate commitment to public relations 
than to actual local community relations.
The impoverished countervailing power of Indigenous interests expressed 
in the words of Coolibah and the protest art and imagery of people such 
as Jacky Green in Open Cut may have limited direct impact on corporate 
power, but it can at least draw this power to funerals and public protests, 
like the Open Cut exhibition. It demonstrates the unease which can be 
generated by the mobility of extractive subjects as unpredictable and 
uncontrolled characters. Just as Coolibah was his own broken promise 
man, Jacky Green in this sense embodies his Ngabaya figure, interfering 
with and disrupting the corporate power exerted on him and his fellow 
extractive subjects. Like other forms of Indigenous protest and opposition 
to mining, the mobilisation of art, words and story in social and other 
media in Open Cut appears to also be generative of reaffirmations of 
cultural beliefs and local discourses blending themes of cultural revival 
and resistance.24
24  See discussion in Lewis and Scambary (2016: 246–7).
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Conclusions
The various operators of the McArthur River Mine have been the 
beneficiaries of a state that has been positively present for resource 
developers and negatively present for Aboriginal communities—evidencing 
a dialectical relationship between the absence and the presence of the state. 
The mine operators have benefited from Territory and Commonwealth 
government approvals and manoeuvring to thwart Aboriginal land claims 
and agreements and from unique legislative measures and amendments to 
negate all legal challenges to date. This situation also suggests a dialectical 
relationship between the institutional capture and the political positioning 
of the state. The captured state, whether located in Canberra or Darwin, 
has advocated at the highest possible levels for this development while 
absenting itself from the locale of development and divesting its functions 
into decentralised and distant forms of regulatory and corporate power.
For the Aboriginal people of the Gulf, the captured neoliberal state has 
maintained the malevolent absence of the colonial state. Bound up in 
the same development agenda, with a shift from cattle to base metals, 
and employing comparable if less violent techniques of divesting power 
over local affairs into the hands of remote self-interested parties, while 
absenting itself from the consequences. In the expressed perceptions, 
transmitted memories and experiences of the Aboriginal people of the 
Gulf, the state has exercised a malevolent absence across the region for 
130 years. Absent decision makers have wielded power from afar directing 
punitive police raids, arming pastoralists and civilians, and approving 
mineral leases and mine expansions. The malevolent and selectively 
absent state looms as the agency behind Jacky Green’s Ngabaya devil figure 
instantiated in art, song and protest, and emerges within Coolibah’s dying 
attributions, confessions and absolutions of the broken promise men—it 
has subjectified Aboriginal people of the Gulf first as colonial subjects and 
now as extractive subjects.
Returning to the quote from Jacky Green prefacing this chapter, it was 
they that cut us open, they that pushed us aside, they who invaded. This 
collective and multivalent otherness of they—the police, the pastoralists, 
the miners, the Whites—has been consistently empowered by the state 
feigning absence yet looming malevolently present. As the authority behind 
massacres inflicted so recently that the victims include the grandparents 
of the remaining current senior generations of Gulf Aboriginal people—
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and as the authority preventing current and future generations from 
protecting their cultural sites and from sharing in the benefits being 
extracted from their traditional lands—the state has ultimately failed to 
protect its Aboriginal subjects and citizens of the Gulf, breaking its most 
fundamental of promises.
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The State’s Stakes at the 
Century Mine, 1992–2012
Jo‑Anne Everingham, David Trigger  
and Julia Keenan
Introduction
Century Mine, in the lower Gulf of Carpentaria region of far northwest 
Queensland, was once the third largest zinc mine in the world. It provides 
a distinctive example of the evolution of resource relations between 
governments, miners and local communities. It also evidences tensions 
in Australia between conceptions of the state’s responsibilities to ensure 
economic development on the one hand and the well-being of regional 
populations, particularly Indigenous people, on the other hand. It is 
therefore a suitable empirical case for exploring the complex sociopolitical 
process that unfolds over time as multiple state actors engage with the private 
sector and remote regional communities, including Indigenous Australians, 
residents of regional towns and pastoralists. Reflecting upon his involvement 
in this project, the lead negotiator for the company described Century Mine 
as a classic example of the recent trend for ‘social, environmental, cultural 
and heritage issues [to play] … a significant part in the development of 
major projects, particularly in mining’ (Williams 1996: 1).
Over a century ago, colonial interactions in Northern Queensland were 
characterised by considerable fighting and bloodshed between Aboriginal 
people and others, and on occasions between different Aboriginal 
groups in the regions. There were a number of massacres recorded 
and settler diseases also took their toll on the Aboriginal population 
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(Evans et al. 1975).1 It was a period of dispossession as land was occupied 
by pastoralists who often proceeded to force the Aboriginal people away 
from their land and waterholes. The police presence in the area focused 
on controlling attacks on settlers and their stock, but provided little 
protection or justice for Aborigines. Early legislation enabled controls 
over the lives of the Indigenous people through the establishment of the 
Protectorate system that gave administrators the power to remove people 
to government ‘reserves’ and church missions. The violence, dispossession 
and confinement of different language communities and family groups 
into common, small settlements, together with repressive missionary and 
colonial administrative practices all contributed to substantial Indigenous 
social crises and economic marginalisation (Rowley 1970).
The legacy of this historical experience, and the physical distance from 
key population centres, contributed to the situation whereby in the 
1990s, despite an abundance of natural assets, development in the lower 
gulf region, especially for Aboriginal residents, lagged behind that of most 
other regions of Queensland. This was due to a combination of factors: 
sparse population; remoteness from urban centres; poor transport, 
communications and other infrastructure. As well, for Indigenous people 
there was entrenched welfare dependency, weak governance institutions 
and tenuous relationships with various levels and agencies of government. 
The fact that these conditions persisted after the Century Mine project 
was underway calls into question a central tenet of long-discredited 
‘trickle-down’ concepts of development (Arndt 1983) and Australian 
national development, namely ‘The proposition that large-scale natural 
resource development is unambiguously beneficial to all of the citizenry’ 
(Trigger 1998: 155).
The discovery of the Century deposit in 1990 on the Lawn Hill Station 
pastoral lease spurred further exploration in the region and highlighted 
two factors shaping the government’s role—the priority given to corporate 
interests as a foundation for regional development; and the historical record 
of officially denying and curtailing the rights of Indigenous people. In this 
chapter we argue that, because of distinctive sociopolitical conditions, 
these two motives spurred an unusually prominent state presence in the 
pre-approvals phase of the mine. However, after the initial operational 
years, the state became more absent and adopted a less direct role, with 
contracted agencies delivering many government-funded programs 
and Indigenous residents depending on the mine for many functions. 
1  See also Lewis, Chapter 8, this volume, for comparable accounts in the Northern Territory.
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This temporal pattern in the state’s active presence had consequences for 
the widely held expectation that locals should benefit from development 
of a mine and that the state will ensure that mines are designed and 
operated in a way that builds local capacities, creates long-term economic 
and social opportunities, strengthens local communities and preserves or 
rehabilitates local heritage and the environment (Altman 2014).
This chapter examines the changing presence of the state experienced in the 
lower gulf region of Queensland during the 20 years from 1992 when the 
High Court made its historic Mabo decision2 and negotiation of the Gulf 
Communities Agreement (GCA)3 commenced in earnest. Martin notes 
that the GCA’s ‘formal signing followed protracted regional negotiations, 
initially outside the ambit of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (“the Act”) and 
involving the broader Gulf Aboriginal community’ (1998: 4). The 20 years 
under discussion covers the period of these negotiations, mine construction 
and commissioning and the production phase until the final (i.e. 15-year) 
review of that agreement as zinc production began to wane. The GCA is 
central to this case as the legislated mechanism for dealings between the 
signatories—namely the Queensland Government, the mining company 
and the designated ‘Native Title Groups’.4 This period, encompassing the 
major landmarks in the planning, commissioning and operating of this 
large mine, provides clear illustration of the leverage of diverse regional 
actors, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups of residents and various 
sections of government, to procure the state’s active presence and  state 
action in the region. It also reveals that initial active engagement by the 
state faded to less direct involvement after production was underway and 
royalties were flowing.
Our research investigates how the state presence was experienced and 
understood among Aboriginal people with respect to Century Mine 
and how that changed over time. We present the argument in three main 
sections, beginning by sketching the background to the Century case and 
2  The Mabo decision was the first time that an Australian court accepted that the pre-existing laws 
and customs of original inhabitants prior to European colonisation constituted a form of land and 
water tenure recognisable in Australian law.
3  The Gulf Communities Agreement (GCA) is a legal contract intended to cement an ongoing 
relationship between three native title parties (Waanyi, Mingginda and Gkuthaarn-Kukatj), referred to 
as native title groups in the GCA; Century Zinc Mine; and the Queensland Government. It came into 
effect in 1997. It is a comprehensive agreement about land use and benefit sharing in the lower Gulf of 
Carpentaria, Queensland, Australia covering a range of issues including compensation payments, land 
tenure arrangements, employment and training, and environmental and cultural concerns.
4  Groups of Aboriginal people claiming a historic and cultural attachment to parts of the land and 
sea affected by the proposed mining lease and mine development.
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the economic and Indigenous context. The main body of the chapter follows 
and details a sequence of phases of the state’s role in two pertinent policy 
areas: regional economic development and Indigenous affairs. It makes 
considerable reference to the GCA as a significant formal expression of 
the state’s ‘presence’ in the mining project since this agreement departed 
from the usual Indigenous benefit agreement configuration by including 
the Queensland Government as an active party rather than being confined 
to community and company undertakings (Scambary 2009).
The evidence to underpin this argument is drawn largely from secondary 
sources and from a series of studies conducted by the authors in the region 
during the period under review (1992–2012). These studies employed 
diverse qualitative methods and allowed us to examine aspects of the 
state–community–company relationships that rely on the memories and 
perceptions of those directly involved in historic events.5 The final section 
of the chapter discusses the sequence of phases in relation to governance 
theories and concludes by noting the disparate views revealed about how 
present the state should be in a development like Century Mine and the 
critical, yet fragile, role that formal agreements can play in engaging the 
state and compelling its presence in mining-induced development—
especially in peripheral localities.
Background
Century Mine and its associated infrastructure (including a slurry pipeline, 
port and processing facilities) are located approximately 250 km north-
northwest of Mt Isa, Queensland, in the lower Gulf of Carpentaria, on 
traditional lands of the Waanyi, Mingginda, Gkuthaarn and Kukatj people 
(see Figure 9.1). As noted above, the remote, monsoonal, hot and sparsely 
populated region experienced from early colonial times a turbulent history 
of relationships between the traditional inhabitants and settlers and a state 
intent on various kinds of development. The main communities within the 
lower gulf fall within two kinds of local government areas comprising the 
Aboriginal shire of Doomadgee (formed in 2004 under a Deed of Grant 
5  For example, a roundtable in November 2014 hosted by the University of Queensland’s Centre 
for Social Responsibility in Mining and MMG Century provided valuable historical details and 
insights. Eleven people who had played a prominent role in negotiating or implementing the GCA 
at various stages and who represented a mix of company, government and community perspectives 
attended the roundtable (proceedings and reflections of this roundtable are publicly reported by 
Brereton and Everingham 2016).
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in Trust) as well as the surrounding shire of Burke and parts of adjacent 
shires of Mornington and Carpentaria. With the exception of the port 
town of Karumba, and a range of cattle stations located on pastoral leases, 
the constituents of the shires are predominantly Indigenous. The main 
communities are Doomadgee (more than 90 per cent Indigenous) and 
Mornington Island (more than 80 per cent Indigenous), each of which has 
a population of around 1,500; Normanton, a town of similar population 
where Indigenous people make up around 60 per cent of the population; 
and the smaller township of Burketown where about half of the total 
population of about 500 is Indigenous (QSG 2017). When referring 
to regional residents and regional communities, the chapter’s focus is 
primarily the Indigenous population unless otherwise stated.
Figure 9.1 Map of lower Gulf of Carpentaria, northwest Queensland
Source: Scambary (2013: 189)
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Prior to the construction of Century Mine in 1997, employment was 
mainly seasonal and non-Aboriginal pastoralists, the state government 
or mining companies controlled the majority of land. Road connectivity 
was poor, and communities could be cut off for months during the wet 
season. The entrenched socioeconomic disadvantage of the region at 
the outset subsequently proved a major obstacle to diversifying the local 
economy and meeting local aspirations for advancement. The company’s 
lead negotiator at the time described the context as:
[L]ess than 50 people within a 100 km radius of the mine and 
only 700 in Karumba, the project will impact, if only indirectly, 
the communities at Doomadgee, Burketown, Normanton and on 
the Wellesley Islands. The project spans an area about the size of 
Tasmania with a population of only 7,000 people of whom some 
80 per cent are Aboriginal. The area supports an active pastoral 
industry and a fishing industry in the Gulf, but job opportunities 
for most people are non-existent. (Williams 1996: 2)
In the lead up to Century’s development, the Indigenous land rights 
movement in Australia was drawing to an apex, challenging the principle 
of terra nullius,6 which had underpinned crown control of land and sub-
surface resources. The concept of ‘native title’ was gaining attention, 
and ultimately legal weight in the High Court in Mabo v Queensland 
(No. 2) 1992 (the ‘Mabo decision’), and the Commonwealth law in the 
Native Title Act of 1993.7 These developments provided a legal pathway 
for recognition of Indigenous groups’ rights to land and waters. ‘Native 
title’ claims are based on the original laws and customs exercised by the 
groups of Indigenous inhabitants of Australia from a time preceding 
colonisation. If native title rights are determined to exist,8 that group 
of Indigenous people are recognised as the ‘native title holders’ over the 
specified area. Where the continuity of ‘law and custom’, albeit in adapted 
form, cannot be demonstrated, or where certain types of legal land tenure 
have been historically established, then native title rights are deemed to 
be ‘extinguished’.
6  Terra nullius is a legal principle whereby land is legally deemed to be owned by nobody. British 
colonisation and settlement of the Australian continent was based on this principle, which became 
the focus of several important legal cases in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
7  The Native Title Act, its amendments and other court cases established and refined a process 
whereby groups of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Australians can submit and register a ‘native 
title claim’ for determination by the Federal Court.
8  The rights that can be determined to exist vary between groups, depending on their traditions, 
adaptation since settlement, colonial history and other factors. Some native title rights also have the 
potential to coexist with some other types of land tenure, including pastoral and mining leases.
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One right endowed by the Act is the ‘right to negotiate’. This right 
requires that any party planning to undertake an activity that may impact 
native title rights (a ‘future act’) adheres to a three-month notification 
process, followed by a six-month (or longer) negotiation process with 
the native title holders (or registered claimants). Though this process is 
a regular feature of project development now (Trigger et al. 2014), at the 
time of Century’s development these procedures were new, controversial 
and untested. Against this background, intricate tripartite relationships 
emerged around Century Mine between the state, the mining company 
and local communities—with none of these parties being unified and 
homogenous entities. These relationships are institutionalised by, and in 
part governed by, the agreements and legislation that essentially represent 
contracts between the parties—notably the GCA and the Century Zinc 
Project Act 1997 (Queensland). These both privilege parties to the 
agreement (in sometimes asymmetrical ways) and exclude participation 
by others such as NGOs or broader society (Ballard and Banks 2003; 
St-Laurent and Le Billon 2015).
The shifts in the government involvement with the mine and the region are 
interesting to consider in the context of the state’s role in the regulation and 
governance of an industry that is often hailed as presenting vital economic 
opportunities to Indigenous communities in regions with few other 
development options (Langton 2013). Rather than a dissociation between 
business and state/regulator interests, there were active links between state 
and company—including with respect to regional governance. This sort 
of relationship has prompted the claim that, in Australia ‘state and capital 
have formed an enduring alliance that marginalises Indigenous people’ 
(Altman 2009: 39).
In Australia’s federal system, the subnational states and territories play 
a critical role in determining whether and how mining development 
takes place. This level of government owns the mineral wealth in 
their territory, and controls the institutional and legislative settings of 
resource development including most business, environmental and social 
regulation. These subnational entities are also key providers of public 
services, education and infrastructure. This is especially the case in remote 
regions, such as northwest Queensland, with sparse populations and 
a  low revenue base for local-level government, which is responsible for 
local waste management, utilities, public facilities and liveability. In such 
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locations, private companies such as mining corporations have been 
observed to assume some state responsibilities (Cheshire 2010; Cheshire 
et al. 2011; Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4, this volume).
While the construction and operation of the mine created significant 
employment opportunities for individuals and generated other benefits 
for communities in the region (such as improved infrastructure), after 
15  years of mining, in 2012, health and education standards and 
infrastructure provision remained below Queensland and national levels. 
The communities—especially those with large Indigenous populations—
faced ongoing social problems, including high rates of unemployment 
and welfare dependency (Everingham et al. 2014: 6).
Sequence of Events
While the shifts in relationships and strategies of the parties are complex 
and contested, the state’s activities over this period can be understood 
in three phases, each involving different actors, key developments and 
differing degrees of state presence. To a large extent, these phases mirror 
the mine life cycle as it progressed through exploration and feasibility 
to approvals and construction, through operational years to end of 
production (ICMM 2019). Each of these phases is typically characterised 
by different activities, local impacts and relationships with local 
stakeholders. Other factors associated with the phases included the five-
yearly reviews mandated in the GCA, changes of company ownership, 
political developments and fluctuations in zinc prices. A pre-development 
phase (from 1992 to the 1997 signing of the GCA and passing of the 
Century Zinc Project Act) was primarily a period of negotiations and 
marked by intervals of intense engagement between various parties from 
all levels of government, Indigenous and non-Indigenous lower gulf 
residents, those with traditional links to the land there, and the mining 
company.9 During this period, there was a strong presence of national 
and subnational state actors. The second phase, from 1997 to the first 
five-year review of the GCA in 2002, covers what was initially an intense 
9  This initial phase was conducted by the first of a series of five owning/operating companies 
(CRA-Rio Tinto). Pasminco assumed ownership after the GCA was signed, having reached an 
agreement to purchase in February 1997 that was conditional on the GCA being in place. Pasminco 
was not involved in the negotiations, except to assure the parties they would honour the agreement in 
full. After seven years Zinifex assumed control.
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period of construction and early operation of the mine involving many 
of the same parties adopting strategies to implement their obligations, 
or achieve their aspirations under the GCA. This was also a period when 
direct state presence began to diminish and dissatisfaction with the 
lack of  socioeconomic development emerged. The subsequent 10 years 
(2002–12) were the ‘big zinc’, mainly profitable years leading up to 
the 15-year review, a period of considerable turnover in actors involved 
but also of  greater complacency from most parties and considerable 
distancing of various state agencies from active engagement. During 
this phase, the state’s actions were often at a remove from the region, 
involving indirect advancement of its priorities through other actors. 
Key developments during each of these phases need to be understood in 
their social, economic and political context and, in particular, in terms of 
public policy and the state’s position on two key issues: state–economy 
relations and Indigenous rights.
Phase 1 (1992–97): Pre-development,  
Negotiating Phase
Century was a high-profile project, because of its scale, and because of the 
long-standing pro-business stance adopted by Australian governments in 
the prevailing minerals development policy at the time (Trebeck 2007). 
As well, the 1990s was the decade that saw planning and registration of 
the initial suite of Indigenous native title claims over areas of land and 
sea, including in the southern Gulf of Carpentaria in the wake of the 
High Court’s Mabo case (decided June 1992) and associated legal reforms 
recognising Indigenous rights. Century Mine came to be seen as an early 
test of the workability of the legislative response to the Mabo decision—
the Commonwealth’s Native Title Act 1993—and particularly of its ‘right 
to negotiate’ provisions (Howlett 2010). These factors meant that there 
was not only a high level of media interest in the project, it also attracted 
unparalleled attention from both the Queensland and Commonwealth 
(federal) governments, advocates and opponents of the new native title 
regime, as well as other miners, a range of politicians and activists.
After the discovery of the orebody was announced (late 1990), there were 
preliminary discussions in communities as well as anthropological and 
archaeological surveys of the proposed site commissioned by both the 
Indigenous parties and the company. Once Century Zinc applied to the 
Queensland Government for a mining lease, and the Native Title Act 1993 
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was passed, negotiations between the company and Indigenous people 
were coordinated through the Carpentaria Land Council Aboriginal 
Corporation10 and the United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Negotiating 
Team. The latter was the name adopted by a community group formed 
in the absence of a single representative body accepted by all Aboriginal 
interests. It involved members of the broad population of Aboriginal 
people living in the affected region, the Carpentaria Land Council, 
representatives of various local Aboriginal corporations, linguistic and 
territorial groups of traditional owners, and some of their advisors. At the 
time, the local communities, although inexperienced in dealing with 
large companies, had little trust in the mining industry. In fact there 
was considerable antagonism and concern that mining development was 
likely to be ‘history repeating itself ’11 and that people would be further 
displaced from, and denied access to, their traditional lands. However, 
there was also considerable support for a mine given anticipation of jobs 
and training opportunities (Trigger 1997).
In 1994, the region’s first native title claim was lodged on behalf of Waanyi 
people, over a small area known as the Camping and Water Reserve that 
was destined to be part of the mine development. Initially the claim was 
not accepted by the Registrar of the National Native Title Tribunal. The 
case was appealed as far as the High Court of Australia. A protest sit-in by 
Aboriginal people occurred in October that year at Lawn Hill National 
Park (subsequently named Boodjamala National Park), located adjacent 
to the small reserve and the proposed mine area. It was not until 1996 that 
the National Native Title Tribunal accepted the claim, as referred to them 
10  In Australia, Land Councils are key representatives of the interests of Indigenous people and are 
closely engaged with the traditional owners of a particular region. They are community organisations, 
generally organised by region, that are formed to represent the Indigenous Australians who occupied 
that particular region before the arrival of European settlers. Their functions and responsibilities vary 
somewhat in different Australian jurisdictions but central to them are consultation with Aboriginal 
people and assistance with claims to and management of traditional lands. In the case of the region 
affected by Century Mine, the Carpentaria Land Council Aboriginal Corporation was formally 
determined to be a Native Title Representative Body in 1994. However, the right to negotiate 
provisions and Century negotiations applied more broadly than to those seeking recognition of 
Native Title Rights and there were some internal divisions among parties, so the broader group, 
the United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Negotiating Team, became involved.
11  Besides the history of colonial appropriation of land and displacement of people from their 
ancestral territory, there were more recent experiences and observations that coloured perspectives. 
These included reports of irresponsible mining company actions in the neighbouring Northern 
Territory, and contemporary actions during exploration whereby the company interested in 
developing Century Mine used its superior financial power to purchase pastoral properties in the 
region despite awareness of Indigenous interest in acquiring them.
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by the High Court, significantly strengthening the Aboriginal bargaining 
position in negotiations with the company. Indigenous positions ranged 
across outright opposition to the mine, outright support and a lurching 
between more qualified expressions of each of those stances (Blowes and 
Trigger 1999). There were challenges in the diverse interests of local 
Indigenous people, and the lack of experience and resources of their 
groups and organisations, to negotiate on an equal footing with a mining 
company or governments (see Blowes and Trigger 1999 for a detailed 
account of key factors influencing the relative bargaining positions 
and powers of the various parties to the negotiations). The federal and 
Queensland governments and the company all supported establishing the 
United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Corporation, which would constitute 
a formalised (incorporated) representative structure to act on behalf of all 
Aboriginal organisations, communities and individuals across the lower 
gulf region in negotiations and which could be a party to any agreement 
and bind those organisations, communities and individuals. It involved 
some 15 constituent organisations and was avowedly focused on the region 
as a whole and on all Aboriginal people affected, not exclusively those 
with a native title connection. The governments and company therefore 
contributed tens of thousands of dollars to assist the transformation of the 
United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Negotiating Team into this incorporated 
body, which would then expand the range of Indigenous voices, inform 
Aboriginal residents, communities and interests about the project and 
its impact and facilitate equitable participation. The negotiations were 
described by one Indigenous participant as a sequence of community 
meetings, ‘biting it off piece by piece and then taking it back to the mob. 
We never gave an answer on the spot’ (Anonymous roundtable participant, 
personal communication, November 2014).
During the 1990s in Australia, prevailing rationalities of government 
echoed economic liberalism, with its lauding of a ‘small state’ and 
market forces (Palmer 2008), new regionalism (Everingham et al. 2006) 
and the contractual state (Plant 2012). This was evident in Queensland 
politics with strong support for Century Mine, initially from the Goss 
Labor Government as part of the vision for a Carpentaria–Mount Isa 
mineral province (Trigger 1998). Despite its strong desire to see Century 
Mine proceed, the nature and level of the Queensland Government’s 
involvement in negotiations between 1992 and 1995 was unclear. Some 
reports claim that it remained in the background and stayed at arm’s length 
from the intense interactions the company had with native title claimants 
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and communities (Blowes and Trigger 1999), though others suggested 
it worked behind the scenes to encourage local and Indigenous support 
of the project (Howlett 2010). As progress stalled and confrontation 
mounted, the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Robert Tickner, 
intervened and appointed Hal Wootten (QC), of Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody Commission12 repute, to mediate between the company 
and Aboriginal communities—both native title claimants and other 
Indigenous residents. Another federal agency representing Aboriginal 
interests, ATSIC,13 strongly supported the mine because it was convinced 
that if Century Mine proceeded it would prove that native title rights were 
not necessarily contrary to mining and economic development. Wootten’s 
intervention achieved a resumption of negotiations.
In early 1995, the company requested that the Queensland Government 
initiate the ‘right to negotiate’ procedures as prescribed by the Native Title 
Act 1993 (Williams 1996). However, the government declined to do so 
because of its view that native title had been extinguished by the pastoral 
lease history. It believed initiating the ‘right to negotiate’ procedures would 
create an unwelcome precedent for the future that could possibly prompt 
more claims (Howlett 2010). The mining company was more pragmatic 
in seeking a solution—eventually proposing, in July–August 1995, to 
the United Gulf Regional Aboriginal Corporation, an AUD60 million 
package of opportunities, cash payments and community investment in 
return for Indigenous support of the mine (Williams 1996: 12).
Once elected, in February 1996, Queensland Premier Borbidge 
enthusiastically maintained state support as he saw an operating Century 
Mine as a potential major achievement of his government, though he 
lacked specific plans for implementing his vision. Economic growth was 
seen as a greater imperative than economic redistribution and there 
was a winding back of welfare state commitments in favour of delegating 
delivery of state services through competitive, contractual arrangements 
(Palmer 2008; Plant 2012). To the Queensland Government, mining 
could provide a much-needed catalyst for socioeconomic development 
12  This Royal Commission 1987–91 responded to concerns similar to those of the contemporary 
‘Black Lives Matter’ movement about deficiencies in custodial care, both systemic and individual, and 
disproportionate rates of imprisonment for Indigenous Australians due to historical and social factors.
13  The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) (1990–2005) was established by 
the Hawke Labor Government as a national body of elected representatives through which Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Australians had a formal voice in the processes of government affecting 
their lives.
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in this sparsely populated region distant from key manufacturing, service 
and agricultural centres and lagging behind the rest of the state on 
most indicators. Support for the mine at the federal level was similarly 
strengthened with a change of government in March 1996 to the Howard 
Liberal–National Coalition, which supported the market-oriented regime 
and championed an economic growth agenda.
After this series of political, legal and economic developments in late 
1995 and early 1996, negotiations broke down and the Queensland 
Government presence peaked when recently elected Premier Borbidge 
offered to intervene. Discussion with a number of Aboriginal leaders in 
the region led to a ‘summit’ meeting to discuss the project and hear views 
firsthand in April 1996. Subsequent negotiations, facilitated by ATSIC, 
solidified the views of those Aboriginal representatives who regarded the 
mine favourably because of the foreshadowed benefits to be received. 
However, this became more muted when the Queensland Government 
publicly announced they would introduce special legislation to suspend 
Indigenous rights and allow the mine to proceed. Recognising the strong 
opposition to special legislation, and confident of a strong current of 
Indigenous support for the mine, the company asked the government 
not to proceed with that strategy and to accept the inevitability of the 
time-limited ‘right to negotiate’ process (Williams 1996). During this 
six-month period, the company sought to maintain a regional focus in the 
agreement (Blowes and Trigger 1999), though inevitably individual native 
title groups and their key spokespersons were focused on their particular 
interests and the possibility of negotiated benefits. Non-Indigenous 
residents of the region were not involved in the native title right to 
negotiate process.
The Queensland Government continued its close engagement with the 
appointment of ex-Governor General, Bill Hayden, to negotiate on its 
behalf while legal representation and anthropological advice, funded 
by ATSIC, was obtained for the claimant native title groups (namely 
Waanyi, Mingginda, Gkuthaarn and Kukatj peoples). A panel headed 
by the President of the National Native Title Tribunal, Justice French, 
was established and it appointed Rick Farley and Dr Mary Edmunds to 
mediate between the parties, though preparation of various positions took 
some months and negotiations really only commenced two months before 
the negotiation deadline. This negotiation, the first major one under the 
right to negotiate process, was being keenly followed by various interests 
in the Queensland and federal governments and the mining and pastoral 
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industries, as well as Indigenous interests. Much internal discussion in the 
Queensland Government resulted in the government’s chief negotiator 
outlining its position and making an offer which included significant 
Queensland Government commitments with an anticipated value of 
AUD30 million. This package was enshrined in the eventual agreement 
and included: an upgrade of the road from Nardoo to Gregory, servicing the 
mine and communities of Burketown and Doomadgee (AUD15 million); 
a comprehensive regional social impact study (AUD1.8  million) with 
funds to address issues identified (up to AUD5.7 million); AUD3 million 
for an outstation development at Gregory; AUD2 million for training and 
vocational education; and a number of other items relating to cultural 
and social issues (GCA 1997: Schedule 1—see summary in Blowes and 
Trigger 1999).
On 13 February 1997, the last day of the six-month negotiating period 
provided for by the Native Title Act, the native title groups pressured the 
company and the government to increase their respective offers, though 
few concessions were forthcoming and not all native title claimants 
agreed to sign (Brereton and Everingham 2016: 8). Given the failure 
to reach an agreement that required all signatures from the Indigenous 
parties (a  disappointment to the company, government and many in 
the native title  groups) the company announced it would initiate the 
arbitration provided for under the Native Title Act (Williams 1996).14 
This represented a third stage in the pre-approvals phase. A visit to the 
region by the Chairperson of ATSIC, a well-attended public meeting 
in Doomadgee and a petition and delegation of pro-mining native title 
claimants to Canberra to meet with the prime minister (John Howard), 
the leader of the opposition (Kim Beazley) and Cheryl Kernot (who 
was the leader of the Democrats and their spokesperson on Aboriginal 
and  Torres Strait Islander affairs and reconciliation) all focused on 
overcoming the deadlock. In March, the deputy chairperson of ATSIC, 
Ray Robinson, engaged in a series of meetings with the claimants, 
including non-signatories, while the Commonwealth Government also 
involved senior public servant (and ATSIC Commissioner), Charles 
Perkins. After further revising of positions, Robinson eventually 
produced a fully signed copy of the agreement for the company and 
14  Under the right to negotiate provisions of the Native Title Act, compulsory arbitration is 
instituted if negotiations reach an impasse after the designated notification of future acts and six-
month negotiation period. The formality of the arbitration meetings added a new and disconcerting 
dimension and encouraged a greater willingness to sign.
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Queensland Government to sign in May 1997 (Williams 1996: 22). 
Even before striking the agreement, the company was reported to 
be on site, constructing the pilot plant and employing hundreds of 
workers (Anonymous roundtable participant, personal communication, 
November 2014).
Shortly thereafter, the Queensland Government passed the Century 
Zinc Project Act 1997 to enshrine its obligations. The wording of the 
Act reveals the Queensland Government’s priorities: ‘The project will 
improve the economy of Queensland and Australia’ (Preamble, Clause 5); 
and ‘The  project will result in social and other benefits for all people 
of the mineral province’ (Preamble, Clause 6). As well, Section 3 of the 
Act details the purpose as ‘to facilitate certain aspects of the agreement 
made under the right to negotiate provisions of the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cwlth)’. It goes on to detail the government’s commitments in 
terms of the mine, including compensated compulsory acquisition of 
land for mine infrastructure such as the pipeline and Karumba port 
and processing facilities and associated construction works. As well, it 
legislates for the Queensland Government to take over the development 
application by Bidunggu Aboriginal Land Trust proposing work at the 
Gregory outstation (which had gone to the relevant Shire Council/local 
government). These undertakings used state government powers to ensure 
land access and to smooth the way to granting leases under the Mineral 
Resources Act 1989 (Queensland), such that they did not extinguish 
native title rights. Throughout Phase 1 (1992–97), there were active links 
between the company and a state government that was very sympathetic 
to a view of progress and regional development centred on mining 
expansion. This, in turn, fuelled active state government engagement 
with the region, primarily seeking to counter opposition to the mine 
and secure wide support for the project. Early efforts of both Century 
Zinc and the Queensland Government sought to confine the scope of the 
GCA to issues they regarded as flowing directly from the mine (Blowes 
and Trigger 1999: 109) and to maintain a distance between the mining 
company and the state government on the one hand and more nebulous 
issues of culture, welfare and social development on the other hand. This 
functioning of agreements to maintain power relationships and create 
distance between the state and other actors including ‘affected Aboriginal 
peoples with territorial claims’ has been remarked upon in Canada too 
(St-Laurent and Le Billon 2015).
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Phase 2 (1997–2002): Early Operations
The Century Mine project was envisaged by all parties to the GCA as 
providing a means to reduce welfare dependency among Aboriginal people 
in the region. The state is responsible for welfare, with the Commonwealth 
providing social security payments and state-level governments providing 
much of the vital education, health and basic infrastructure that citizens 
need. Some of these responsibilities may take some years to fulfil, as do, 
for example, the subsequent consequences of educational opportunity.
With the signing of the GCA and the passing of the Century Zinc Project 
Act, there was an initial period that mining company participants describe 
as ‘frenetic activity’ on behalf of the mining company to begin production 
(Everingham and Keenan 2017). This involved construction of the 
mine, port, pipeline and infrastructure. For example, the company spent 
some AUD26 million to upgrade (though not seal) the continuation of 
a Queensland Government road from Gregory to the mine. In addition, 
the company funded a 220-KV transmission line from Mt Isa to the 
mine, with the understanding that it would be extended to Burketown, 
Gregory and Doomadgee (by the state-owned electricity authority of the 
time). The various construction and commissioning activities culminated 
in the first shipment of zinc concentrate in 1999. This was despite the 
company facing technical challenges, such as the propensity for the zinc 
concentrate to spontaneously combust in stockpiles and transport ships. 
Initially Century Zinc was diligent in ensuring the ‘GCA was the bible’ 
(Brereton and Everingham 2016: 15). In particular, they invested heavily 
in employment and training and signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the Queensland Department of Employment and Training. This 
demonstrated that the mine adopted a strategic approach to the GCA 
despite the socioeconomic constraints, with education and skill levels in 
the Indigenous communities proving significant hurdles to broadening 
access to employment opportunities. The company also moved promptly 
to implement some other parts of the GCA—notably returning partial 
title to pastoral holdings to Indigenous stewardship. For the major 
holding in this respect, the Lawn Hill and Riversleigh stations, a staged 
transfer was envisaged with initial joint management by a pastoral holding 
company set up under the GCA. These properties were seen as providing 
opportunities for Indigenous pastoral enterprises, cultural renewal on 
country, employment and training (Everingham et al. 2014).
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Some state actors, likewise, engaged intensively at the outset of this period. 
Federally, ATSIC was active in establishing the institutional framework 
envisaged in the GCA. Considerable effort was invested in establishing 
the committees, Gulf Aboriginal Development Corporation, Aboriginal 
Development Benefits Trust and pastoral company specified in the GCA. 
For instance, Century Environment Committee, Century Education 
and Training Committee, Gulf Aboriginal Development Corporation, 
and Century Liaison and Advisory Committee were established with 
ATSIC facilitation after the GCA came into effect. As specified in the 
GCA, these bodies had varying membership of representatives from the 
mining company, government, native title groups and regional Aboriginal 
residents. After the withdrawal of ATSIC’s direct support, however, many 
of these bodies were dormant by the turn of the century (Martin 2009). 
For instance, the Gulf Aboriginal Development Corporation did not 
hold an annual general meeting between 2001 and 2008 and the Century 
Liaison Advisory Committee, after only five meetings, did not reconvene 
until 2012. By 2002, the draft Five Year Review Report noted a need for 
renewed effort in institutional development—an early warning sign that the 
complicated governance structures of the GCA had not been sufficiently 
embedded. This was particularly true of the Gulf Aboriginal Development 
Corporation, which was noted as having a poorly defined role and lacking 
adequate financial resources after the start-up injection of funds to fulfil dual 
roles of administering GCA funds and furthering native title group rights 
and interests (Martin 2009). As a creature of the GCA, this corporation 
lacked capacity, influence and legitimacy with the disparate groups whose 
interests it was to further, and who were unused to working together for 
common goals (Everingham and Keenan 2017: 19). Just as the government 
and company struggled with the new native title regime and unclear legal and 
tenure issues, the Aboriginal groups had no familiarity with or experience 
of the new order and had not established decision-making processes aligned 
with the Native Title Act 1993 (Martin et al. 2014).
The Howard Coalition Government that had come to power federally 
in 1996 did not enthusiastically embrace the GCA and held a less 
sympathetic view of Indigenous affairs than prevailed in the Hawke-
Keating years. This was particularly evident in 1998 with the ‘practical 
reconciliation’ policy15 (Gunstone 2008), and revision of the native title 
15  Rather than even limited recognition of Indigenous rights and aims of structural change, this 
policy rejected ‘symbolic’ measures and defined government priorities as efficiently addressing the 
substantial socioeconomic disadvantage experienced by many Indigenous people in health, education, 
housing and employment, often through contracting out public services in these areas.
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policy regime—particularly the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). 
The latter implemented much of prime minister Howard’s 10-point plan 
that would curtail rights, including the right to negotiate about mining. 
As well, a Ministerial review of the Native Title Representative Bodies 
was proposed, and changes foreshadowed to encourage the negotiation 
of binding, voluntary agreements as an alternative to formal native title 
agreements (Altman 2009).
In the wave of initial enthusiasm for the mine, the Queensland 
Government, for its part, was galvanised to action as well, notably 
spending AUD15 million to upgrade and seal the road from Nardoo west 
to Gregory, and initiating the training that was intended to overcome low 
skill levels and lead to mining employment. It has been suggested, though, 
that investments in infrastructure and vocational training benefited the 
mine and Queensland as a whole, as much as advancing prospects of local 
Indigenous people (Howlett 2010). The local land council later observed 
that the interest groups they represented presumed that agreement 
commitments were additional to the government’s responsibility for 
funding human capital development of its citizens:
What needs to be highlighted is what proportion of the 
State’s commitments constituted normal government service 
delivery … which should have been provided in any event … [and] 
commitments by the State which have been more about serving 
the primary interests of developing the Century Mine rather than 
benefitting the Gulf Communities generally. (CLCAC 2002: 49)
In fact, the Queensland Government itself observed ‘an apparent trade-
off ’ in targeting their education spending between the dual goals of their 
commitments to both supporting Century Mine by maximising trained 
labour available to them, and enhancing the broader human capital and 
skills in the Aboriginal population of the region (QSG 2002). It remained 
clear, five years into the GCA, that both the company and the state 
maintained a, possibly naïve, vision that ‘The GCA can be a significant 
stimulus to regional development and the creation of a more diversified 
and robust post mining economy in which Aboriginal people have a much 
higher participation rate’ (Pasminco et al. 2002).
The GCA anticipated early vigorous engagement by identifying some 
immediate ‘wins’ while other initiatives needed staged progression. Among 
the latter were the outstation commitments—and notably development 
of an outstation resource centre. Development of this centre and a policy 
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on outstations were to be coordinated by Queensland’s Department of 
Family, Youth and Community Affairs (Office of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs). However, there was criticism that there had been 
no action beyond a report and no attempt to align with federal (ATSIC) 
initiatives on outstations (CLCAC 2002). Such long-term commitments 
are always vulnerable to changes, not least to shifts in government policies, 
contrasting state and national priorities and turnover of personnel.
As a consequence of such changes, the GCA did not maintain a prominent 
status with the Queensland Government, and the government’s active 
presence in this region, 2,000  km away from the state capital and 
locus of most development, faded. The initial road works, training and 
other investments in infrastructure and service provision (whether as 
Queensland Government obligations or under the GCA) were rarely 
delivered through an approach that favoured local enterprise development 
or boosted regional capacity. The benefits of some initiatives dissipated, 
and others never gained traction. In part, this related to insufficient 
attention to institutional capacity building and to the state relying on 
the Gulf Aboriginal Development Corporation as the voice of the various 
Indigenous rights holders. This was despite the fact that the draft document 
reporting the initial review of the GCA in 2002, supposedly produced 
according to Terms of Reference drafted by the Queensland Government, 
the company, and the Gulf Aboriginal Development Corporation itself, 
as representative of the Native Title signatory groups, described this body 
as ‘no longer effectual’ (Pasminco et al. 2002: 9). The draft report of that 
review also noted:
Implementation of the Queensland commitments is substantially 
complete except for land transfers at Karumba, the Gulf Area 
Social Development Fund (GASDF) Trust implementation 
as part of the Social Impact Assessment initiative, ongoing 
initiatives in training support, and environmental information 
provision (following on from the Multiple Use Strategic Plan). 
Approximately 90 percent of the $30.29 million commitment has 
been allocated or committed, with substantial additional funding 
provided to training initiatives. (Pasminco et al. 2002: 4)
These generally positive conclusions were contested by many in the 
region. For instance, the Carpentaria Land Council, in response, and 
claiming to represent the interests of the Waanyi people, was scathing in 
its criticism of government and company. Their report, prepared as part 
of the five-year review of the GCA, claimed:
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
298
The State’s failure to conduct the SIA [social impact assessment] 
has been a glaring failure in the agreement. Not only is it a failure 
of implementation, but it has been a breach of the Agreement 
which has had serious ramifications for the Waanyi Native Title 
Group whose members are among the most disadvantaged in the 
Gulf Region. (CLCAC 2002: 1)
The Carpentaria Land Council further claimed that this meant that:
[S]trategies to prevent the corruption of indigenous cultures, 
strategies to re-affirm cultures and enhance lifestyles and initiatives 
in relation to health, employment, education and other social 
indicators have lagged behind and that this has been especially 
disadvantageous for the Waanyi. (CLCAC 2002: 24)
Concerns were that various specifics were not complied with in the 
spirit or  in the substance of the agreement. Queensland’s initiatives are 
classified as commitments under the GCA, intended to benefit the native 
title holders  and the Aboriginal communities and ‘to demonstrate its 
commitment to the project and its good faith to the Native Title Groups’ 
(GCA 1997: Schedule 1, Clause 11). However, some initiatives, such as 
road upgrades and investment in power supply served commercial interests 
of the mine and native title holders were only ‘peripheral’ beneficiaries.
A related concern was that the Queensland Government’s undertaking 
to conduct a social impact assessment (SIA) was to serve as the basis for 
a framework for monitoring, assessing and responding to social change 
in the region. The native title parties to the agreement understood the 
Queensland Government to be committing to a major exercise over 
three years (1998–2001) costing AUD1.8  million to assess the social 
situation and potential impacts of the Century project, so as to develop 
a  community development strategy to mitigate potential negative 
effects and enhance potential positive impacts (GCA 1997: Schedule 1, 
Clause 24). Though the draft five-year review reported that half of the 
allocation was spent, local stakeholders were adamant that a study had not 
occurred. This perceived breach of the GCA obligations with respect to the 
SIA (Schedule 1 Clauses 23–30), also led the native title groups to reject 
the establishment of a Gulf Area Community Social Development Trust 
Fund without an SIA since, ‘Targeted, planned economic development 
according to a sound strategy cannot be undertaken without the SIA’ 
(CLCAC 2002: 39). A major complication was that AUD3.5  million 
of the AUD5.76  million earmarked in Schedule  1 of the GCA for 
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‘social impact projects’ was channelled, in 2001, through the Northwest 
Queensland Community Benefits Strategy (as the first distribution of 
funds meant to address shortcomings identified in the promised SIA). 
The grants went to projects in Mt Isa, Cloncurry and other parts of what 
the Queensland Government regarded as the northwest minerals province 
that were outside of the affected lower gulf communities. This reflected 
the government’s position from the outset that this was a ‘regional 
agreement’, with their definition of ‘regional’ being the whole northwest 
minerals province centred on Mt Isa rather than being confined to the 
lower gulf region (The Right Mind 2008). However, in the eyes of local 
people the spending had been strongly influenced by the Mt Isa-based 
local Member of the Legislative Assembly and benefited the core of 
his electorate rather than the periphery in the lower gulf (Anonymous 
roundtable participant, personal communication, November 2014). 
There was strong opposition to him having any future role in distribution 
of trust funds and to the funds having a broader geographical focus than 
the affected native title groups (CLCAC 2002). The vexed question of 
the extent to which Indigenous people have benefited from mining in 
Australia has been frequently raised in the context of the Century Mine 
and in other cases (Martin et al. 2014).
Cracks had begun to appear in the tripartite relationship as well. These 
were particularly evident in November 2002 when Waanyi people and 
other Aboriginal supporters from the region occupied the worker’s camp 
and canteen at the mine site, staging a multi-day protest. Triggering 
issues included the lack of employment or other economic advancement 
opportunities for local Aboriginal people afforded by mining on 
their traditional land, and implementation of the GCA including the 
Queensland Government’s commitments in the agreement. Other 
concerns were focused on the storage of stone tools and artefacts that 
had been displaced by the mine and a general lack of sensitivity about 
cultural issues on site (Martin 2019: 157). Then Queensland premier, 
Peter Beattie, is quoted as suggesting native title was part of the problem:
Native title and all those issues has produced bugger all for 
Indigenous people and frankly not a lot for the mining industry. 
And that’s why we have embraced a number of strategies involving 
negotiated outcomes to get results both for the mining industry, the 
State of Queensland and for Indigenous people. (Townsend 2002)
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This reveals the Queensland Government’s intent for the mining 
company and itself to benefit, and also suggests a preference for bilateral 
partnerships and contracts over the multilateral arrangements of the 
GCA. One notable memorandum of understanding (MOU) between 
the company and the government (specifically the education provider, 
TAFE Queensland) related to the employment and training obligations. 
This sort of issue-specific, bilateral arrangement in preference to working 
through the agreement and its structures and processes aligns with notions 
of the ‘contractual state’ (Plant 2012). Once the mine was in production, 
governance structures formed and immediate obligations fulfilled, the 
Queensland Government distanced itself from the mine and region 
and was described as passive and extraneous (The Right Mind 2008). 
Having established what it saw as the enabling conditions, it assumed 
a background role leaving GCA mechanisms and the market to proceed 
with implementation. Both the Queensland and federal governments 
engaged in strong, cross-government, pro-mining advocacy (Howlett 
2010). Through policies such as ‘practical reconciliation’ and the 
Community Development Employment Program adopted in 1998, they 
expressed consistent propositions about responsibilities of government, 
the private sector and citizens. These favoured mainstreaming service 
delivery to Indigenous Australians and encouraging their economic 
participation. Such policies resonated with sections of the Indigenous 
communities of remote North Queensland (e.g. see Pearson 2000).
Phase 3 (2002–12): The ‘Big Zinc’ Years
In ensuing years, governments maintained an emphasis on ‘steering’ 
development (Peters 2000) to maximise the opportunities mining 
provides to Indigenous people, especially through employment, often in 
partnership with the private or non-government sectors. For example, 
there was an MOU between the Australian Government and the 
Minerals Council of Australia, reached in 2005, to increase Indigenous 
employment and training (Martin et al. 2014). The Queensland 
Government and the Queensland Resources Council formed a similar 
MOU in 2007. As well as public–private partnerships, partnerships 
between levels of government or various government departments also 
burgeoned. During this phase, a shift occurred as the focus of government 
partnerships, joint initiatives and agreements extended beyond the initial 
emphasis on employment creation and training to encompass areas of 
community development such as health, education, infrastructure and 
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governance, as well (Martin et al. 2014). Most prominently, this related to 
the National Indigenous Reform Agenda when, in 2007, the Council of 
Australian Governments committed to ‘Closing the Gap’ in opportunities 
and outcomes between non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians. This 
program originally had six targets and eight strategic areas for action that 
were subject to a suite of multi-year partnership agreements between the 
state and federal governments. From 2008–09, the Federal Government 
channelled AUD8  billion in funding over 10  years into these bilateral 
partnerships, which especially targeted remote areas like the northwest of 
Queensland where the gaps were most pronounced (QSG 2009).
Just before such reforms provided new impetus, the Ten-Year Review 
of the GCA had very similar messages to those surfaced five years 
earlier in the first review of the implementation of the GCA. The 
recommendations highlighted the need to improve communication 
between parties, especially from the government (The Right Mind 
2008). As well, the reviews emphasised the critical requirement for 
effective Aboriginal institutions—eligible bodies, the Gulf Aboriginal 
Development Corporation, and committees including Century Liaison 
Advisory Committee—observing that there was insufficient investment 
in the relevant organisations to ensure they were strong and their capacity 
developed. While not underestimating the complexities of achieving 
such capacity development, and without minimising efforts particularly 
among Indigenous employees and committee members over the years, for 
much of this phase some institutions were dormant if not dysfunctional. 
In the state’s eyes, these governance failures were a broader issue. This 
was illustrated in prime minister Howard’s justification for dismantling 
ATSIC by asserting: ‘We believe very strongly the experiment in elected 
representation for Indigenous people has been a failure’ (Anon. 2004). 
With the abolition of ATSIC, the Indigenous supporters of the mine had 
lost a key federal supporter. The Queensland Government’s attention 
similarly waned. Reflecting on the government’s activity during the 
period 2002–07, the 10-year review of the GCA, halfway through this 
phase, noted, with respect to Schedule 1:
Whilst the [Queensland] Government might have been engaged 
at the beginning of this agreement … The Government corporate 
memory, commitment and will to leverage the Agreement to build 
leadership and management, to improve regional development 
through carefully planned linkages from mining activities to 
regional development have been all but forgotten. (The Right 
Mind 2008: 22)
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The review noted the stalling of key government commitments under 
the GCA—to the SIA, the Bidunggu outstation and fostering a Men’s 
Business Association—as well as neglect of its responsibility to provide 
infrastructure and undertake regional coordination of training and other 
regional development initiatives. These issues had ramifications for 
the tripartite relationships. For instance, Bidunggu became reliant on 
the goodwill of the mining company for asset maintenance and some 
operational needs (such as diesel generator fuel).
In fact, over this third phase, there was no further progress reported on 
any of the government’s obligations under Schedule 1 of the GCA that 
had already been highlighted as lagging at the five-year review. While this 
neglect may indicate challenges with less feasible elements in the GCA, it 
also encourages the inference that the Queensland Government directed 
attention to new objectives (such as Closing the Gap targets). Hence, the 
economic self-sufficiency and community development initially envisaged 
as accompanying the mine were not fully realised and programs outlined 
in the GCA languished (The Right Mind 2008; Everingham et al. 2013). 
Most parties to the GCA appeared to become defensive and reactive 
during this phase. For instance, the company reverted to a more internal 
focus and to appeasement and opportunistic tactics rather than former 
proactive, strategic approaches. Even the 2009 determination of Waanyi 
native title to the Lawn Hill and Riversleigh pastoral properties resulted 
in only cautious advancing of the phased transfer of control (Everingham 
et al. 2013). One view is that reactive approaches did not encourage strong 
Aboriginal organisations with the capacity to leverage full advantage from 
state-sanctioned mining, but encouraged a self-interested approach by 
the native title groups as responsible for their own participation in the 
economy and their own social circumstances rather than the state bearing 
any collective responsibility for their well-being (Trebeck 2007). However, 
we also note research across the region that has depicted internal drivers 
of self-interest and competition among Indigenous parties (Trigger 1988, 
1997). Outcomes from mining then are best understood as a complex 
mix driven by customary norms and the circumstances of relations with 
the state and the company.
Significant changes in policies of the Queensland and federal governments 
reinforced the state’s arm’s-length position with respect to service provision 
and greater reliance on contracted service providers, including corporate 
actors, to fulfil governance requirements. For example, after a review found 
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significant flaws and ineffectiveness in the Community Development 
Employment Program, that program was discontinued from July 2009 
and replaced by the Remote Jobs and Communities Program. This more 
recent program aspired to greater emphasis on job readiness and genuine 
employment outcomes. However, judging by 2011 Census figures and 
2015 Closing the Gap reports, it was slow to evidence any improvement 
in the lower gulf region (Brereton and Everingham 2016; QSG 2017).
This was unfortunate since education and employment were key targets 
set in 2008 in the National Indigenous Reform Agreement. Mid-2008, 
the Rudd Government established the National Indigenous Health 
Equality Council, and in subsequent years additional Closing the Gap 
targets were added to strengthen the focus on equity with respect to 
health, education, employment and community safety. Many of the 
national partnership agreements supporting these action areas, arguably 
‘marketise’ the delivery of services to remote Indigenous communities at 
the same time as supporting Indigenous aspirations for participation in 
the market economy. This ambivalence in the policy agenda undermines 
state support for the kinds of benefits envisaged in the GCA.
Other developments over this decade similarly affected the relationships 
between company, communities and government and reveal the 
Queensland Government increasingly acting at a distance, through 
others, to achieve its goals while itself taking a ‘hands off ’ approach to 
governance in the lower gulf. However, it was no longer feasible to rely 
on the corporate party to the GCA for continuity and implementation, 
since this period saw a sequence of changes of ownership and staff 
turnovers with seven general managers and four companies between 2002 
and 2012.16 As well, the mining operation faced technical challenges 
that consumed its attention. For instance, during a storm in 2007, the 
Wununa barge, used to tranship ore from the Karumba processing plant 
to the bulk export carriers offshore, had to be temporarily abandoned 
at sea, threatening the company’s licence to operate. While that was an 
unwelcome prospect in 2007, by 2012 viable reserves were becoming 
depleted and the company sponsored a closure SIA with a view to ceasing 
production within five years, when they anticipated the mine would reach 
the end of its ‘economic life’. This was accompanied by a scaling down 
16  Corporate owners of Century Mine: CRA/Rio Tinto: 1990–97; Pasminco: 1997–2004; Zinifex: 
2004–08; OzMinerals (a merger of Oxiana and Zinifex) 2008–09; MMG 2009–12.
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(and some redirecting) of training and employment activities and eventual 
elimination of the ‘community liaison officer’ roles which had primarily 
supported those efforts in relation to Indigenous residents of the region.
The third phase, in sum, was characterised by gathering momentum 
of the federal rhetoric of practical reconciliation, the championing of 
economic liberalism and market-based economics as the route to regional 
development, and strategic partnerships with industry and service 
providers. This was particularly evident between 2005 and 2007, when 
the Howard Government controlled both houses of federal parliament. 
This less present, more distant, state was variously embraced and criticised 
by some regional residents and some within all parties to the GCA.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Queensland Government viewed mining as the ideal avenue to 
development and closing the gap in the remote northwest, a region 
where the state’s capacity to directly achieve economic outcomes for the 
Indigenous majority is limited. Accordingly, Century Mine was a key driver 
of development, environmental impacts and sociocultural circumstances 
of residents in the lower gulf for 20 years. It was, for some years, the largest 
private employer of Indigenous people in Queensland (Miles et al. 2005). 
Perhaps its most striking achievements were maintaining 15–20 per cent 
Indigenous employment through direct employees and the contractor 
workforce, providing training opportunities in a region where these are 
in short supply and significantly increasing revenue to the region. For 
example, average household and individual incomes improved, and 
household material assets such as white goods and vehicles became more 
widespread. As the 15-year review of the GCA concluded, these were 
essentially narrow, individual benefits so ‘the main regret of native title 
groups is that there have not been more such changes’ (Everingham et al. 
2013: 41).
In this region, as elsewhere, national economic growth and Queensland 
economic prosperity have provided temporary benefits for locals but have 
historically failed to deliver broad and lasting benefits to mining-affected 
areas (Eriksen 2018). Mining-affected communities now demand of the 
state a new balance between state economic priorities and local interests. 
In Century Mine’s case, the finale is yet to come, with the years since 2012 
seeing dramatic shifts in the leverage and the aspirations of the major 
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parties all of whom have seized upon a ‘stay of execution’ as the closure of 
the mine has been averted. The mine ownership transferred in early 2017 
to a smaller company with ‘economic rehabilitation’ plans. The Indigenous 
parties see renewed hope of active participation in environmental aspects 
of this economic lifeline to the region, while the Queensland Government 
grapples with the spectre of large mine closures in northwest Queensland 
and the need for regional resilience and revitalisation (Macguire 2019). 
However, in the period under review, initial expectations were not met. 
The very real achievements such as employment and financial benefits 
were unevenly distributed and the aspiration that two decades of mining 
could overcome decades of regional disadvantage proved overly ambitious.
Century Mine proceeded after a highly contentious negotiation process, 
in a historically troubled and disadvantaged region (Blowes and Trigger 
1999). The GCA, to an extent, reflects Indigenous and regional 
dissatisfaction with various levels of government as much as it is an 
expression of hope for a better future. The negotiations about the mine 
came to represent the initial trial of the Commonwealth Government’s 
‘right to negotiate’ procedure contained in the Native Title Act 1993 
(Howlett 2010). Hence, there was unusually intensive government 
engagement in the pre-approvals negotiation and planning about the 
mine, and the Queensland Government was involved as a party to the 
GCA. However, within five years of the mine receiving the ‘green light’, 
a group of Waanyi people and their peers staged a sit-in to express their 
discontent with the progress and outcomes of the GCA. This was, in part, 
a consequence of the state leaving market forces to deliver its commitments, 
rather than adopting a more engaged role as a party to the agreement. 
Relevant sectors of government became less present and proactive soon 
after the mine began operating, and adopted a more arm’s-length strategy 
with limited government intervention and institution-building in line 
with national regional policy (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005). 
As elsewhere in Australia, this region was losing jobs, services, public 
amenities and infrastructure rather than developing a  thriving regional 
economy and  tackling socioeconomic disadvantage. The economic 
injection stimulated by the mine provided a partial distraction from this 
underlying trend, but was not a sustainable antidote.
The state monopolises regulatory powers with respect to mining—but 
with Century mine, as in other cases, such regulations have at times 
encouraged a minimalist compliance approach. Governments have proven 
to be a weak link in moving from the historical, exploitative model of 
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
306
mining development to delivering the promise offered by the sustainable 
development approach that mining peak bodies advocate (IIED 2002). 
Australian governments’ overriding rationality appeared to regard 
economic growth as a precursor to social justice and they demonstrated 
primary responsiveness to politico-economic imperatives at state and 
national levels while maintaining a distance from local socioeconomic, 
structural and cultural issues.
There are regular examples in the literature of forms of private regulation 
and governance—with both direct and arm’s-length involvement of the 
state (Moon et al. 2011; Raschke et al. 2013). This has been observed 
to result in non-government actors, including mining companies, filling 
a governance void where state capacity is weak (Cheshire 2006, 2010; 
Eversole and Scholfield 2006; Cheshire et al. 2011). Wilson and colleagues 
even conceptualise private actors as ‘meta-governors’, steering the various 
actors (Wilson et al. 2018). Their analysis of the role of corporate actors 
in such arrangements suggests they shape social and economic agendas. 
Corporations operating in Australia may not experience the same level 
of pressure as corporations operating in countries like Papua New 
Guinea and similar developing economies to take on traditional state 
responsibilities (see, for example, Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4; 
Skrzypek, Chapter  2; and Burton and Levacher, Chapter 10, all this 
volume); nevertheless, where states are not fulfilling regional development 
mandates, the boundaries between state and private roles are blurred. It 
is difficult to distinguish government from company responsibilities with 
the state’s steering being more assumed than scrutinised. What has been 
termed ‘governance without government’ (Rhodes 1996) can also be 
interpreted as a strategic withdrawal and implicit delegation of the state’s 
active agency to self-managing, non-government actors largely free of state 
interference. Rather than these being ‘stateless’ spaces, with a passive state 
playing a limited role, they can be understood as spaces where the state 
takes ‘action at a distance’ to pursue its ends indirectly, through the actions 
of others, in this case a  mining corporation. This has sometimes been 
described as cost-shifting from the state to mining companies (Martin 
2009). The approach can also be criticised on the grounds of ‘steering’ and 
small government being an inadequate response to the policy challenges 
in regions like the lower gulf—where one corporate development project 
is insufficient to drive the transformation and reform needed to ensure 
desirable long-term socioeconomic outcomes.
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There are multiple narratives of Century Mine during the 1992–2012 
period.  As Ballard and Banks (2003) argue, the state, community, 
company  and ‘fourth estate’ of NGOs, each with their own matrix of 
relationships, interact in a network of roles and interests. The uneven 
distribution of benefits is but one of the imbalances evident in this 
case. The  state’s story is a celebratory one of economic development. 
In  contrast, for many residents and traditional owners of the lower 
gulf, the salient threads of the story relate to rights, relationships to 
land and unmet expectations as state and private sector interests and 
roles converged. The  Century Mine case illustrates conflicting notions 
of the extent to which  the state should actively intervene in regional 
development, which reflects unresolved questions about the state’s role 
in an era of governance (Rhodes 1996). Likewise, there are multiple ways 
to interpret the contestations over development in remote Indigenous 
Australia, and persistent tensions characterising resource relations in 
far northwest Queensland. The case also illustrates the significance of 
temporal dimensions, with the state alternating between presence and 
absence in the affected region. Periods of ‘absence’ frequently involved 
an indirect ‘presence’ through the mining company’s actions. As well 
as the fluctuations over time, there were varying spatial limits to the 
state’s presence, with the remotely located Century Mine communities 
experiencing mostly absence. These spatial and temporal influences 
varied as the mine moved through its project life cycle, as political 
changes brought new policy imperatives for Indigenous affairs, regional 
development and economic prosperity and as diverse actors within 
or beyond the state exerted an influence. The GCA proved to be an 
ambitious instrument, yet in some respects flawed in that it was unable to 
carry the sole responsibility for ensuring all parties contributed to regional 
advancement. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates that, in peripheral 
mining localities, agreements such as the GCA can play a critical role in 
engaging the state and compelling its presence.
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The State That Cannot 
Absent Itself: New Caledonia 
as Opposed to Papua New 
Guinea and Australia
John Burton and Claire Levacher
Introduction
The other contributors to this volume have come to broadly consistent 
views of the state in the two jurisdictions that are the focus of this book, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia. The writers on PNG have 
profiled what community members aspire to: variously, a locally realised 
Utopia unhindered by the fact that ‘the developers are foreigners and the 
State is only a concept’ (Lihir: Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4); an end 
to ‘waiting for the economic development’ (Frieda: Skrzypek, Chapter 2); 
an Engan version of ‘development, law and order, and prosperity’, where 
the ‘furious contest’ for ‘jobs, cash, houses, vehicles’ can continue without 
restraint (Porgera: Golub, Chapter 3); and an end to the immorality of 
the ‘corruption and neglect of an absent state’ to save the world from 
entropic decline and, of course, bring the worldly rewards of development 
(PNG Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project: Main, Chapter 5). All the 
Indigenous voices represented capture a desire for something better than 
what national independence has so far brought them, but perhaps only 
the Frieda River people, in their feeling of simply being forgotten about 
(as opposed to the Huli feeling of being immorally neglected), expect the 
state to be the means of delivering it to them. The rest express a desire 
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for their projects to trigger various versions of self-actualisation which, 
to judge from their various ways of expressing dissatisfaction, has yet to 
happen. Certainly, the overall picture is of an absent state. At Porgera, the 
executive part of the state, in the form of prime minister James Marape, 
suddenly woke up on 24 April 2020 to announce that Barrick Niugini 
Limited’s lease renewal had been rejected. Was this a presence, or just 
feeble hand-waving? No one can be sure quite yet.
The writers on Australia portray a different, but similarly consistent 
picture of the Australian state. At the McArthur River Mine, the historic 
chicanery of the state and the company replicates the nineteenth-century 
dispossession of vast expanses of the Northern Territory for private gain 
(Lewis, Chapter 8). In the Northern Territory generally, poor ‘recognition 
and regulatory guidance’ means that the state is ‘selectively absent’ for 
Aboriginal people, has a ‘fiscal absence’ in the mining sector because of 
tax concessions and rebates to companies, and—as is notoriously the case 
in PNG—has a tendency to cut expenditure on Aboriginal communities 
to which mining benefits flow (Holcombe, Chapter 7). In Queensland’s 
Western Downs region, the extremely rapid uptake of coal seam gas 
developments since 2010 highlights the state’s ‘organised irresponsibility’ 
to approve resource developments without evaluating them effectively, 
leaving private land holders ‘responsibilised’ to do as best they can (Espig, 
Chapter 6). At the Century Mine, also in Queensland, the state is framed 
as taking ‘action at a distance’, with the ambitious Gulf Communities 
Agreement delivering unevenly distributed benefits to disadvantaged 
Aboriginal people whose land was needed for mining (Everingham et al., 
Chapter 9). All the above backs the decades-old finding that Indigenous 
economic status in remote parts of Australia is barely changed by the 
presence of long-life mines and with whose operators they have entered 
into seemingly favourable agreements (e.g. Taylor and Scambary 2005).
The consistency here is that, in all the areas described, local ‘host 
communities’ have an expectation that extractive industry projects will 
summon distant governments to be present to assist them with complex 
negotiations and afterwards to bring services which urban dwellers, in 
both jurisdictions, take for granted. Alas, this imagined emanation from 
nothingness disappoints time and again. In each case the kinds of state 
encountered, when stripped down to basics, cast themselves in the role 
of investor-enablers, and appear to be in retreat from (or never attained) 
the ideal of giving first priority to the human needs of citizens. The 
state is either remote or irrelevant (Skrzypek, Chapter 2; Bainton and 
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Macintyre, Chapter 4), or it can be irresponsible, immoral or malevolent 
(Espig, Chapter 6; Main, Chapter 5; Lewis, Chapter 8). In other words, 
to a greater or lesser extent, local communities consistently view the state 
as looking after someone else’s interests.
What if there was a different kind of state entirely?
This chapter responds to this question by comparing experiences of PNG 
and Australia with those of New Caledonia. The aims of this chapter are 
twofold. First, we use Jeffrey Wilson’s model of different state forms to 
analyse resource nationalism across the three nation states and explore 
whether, when compared to PNG and Australia, New Caledonia is, 
indeed, a different kind of state. Second, we explore if and how the state is 
absent or present in resource contexts in these countries and ask whether 
the notion of ‘absent presence’ can be applied to the study of the state in 
resource settings in New Caledonia where, unlike in the cases from PNG 
and Australia, it would seem that in some ways at least the state cannot 
absent itself.
Wilson’s Kinds of States
Wilson (2015: 399, 403–4) identifies three forms of resource nationalism 
that can be summarised as follows. A first form is associated with rentier 
states, where governments often fashion loyal societal coalitions, finance 
repressive apparatuses and engage in neopatrimonialism, exemplified 
by the Gulf states of the Middle East. A second form is associated with 
developmentalism, where governments maintain their standing through 
an ‘ability to deliver industrialisation, economic modernisation and high 
rates of growth’, exemplified by states in East Asia. And a third form 
is associated with liberal market economies, where the role of the state is 
(theoretically) limited to that of an arm’s-length regulator, exemplified by 
the USA, Canada and Australia.
Of the three countries considered in this chapter, only Australia, having 
recently overtaken Qatar as the world biggest exporter of LNG (Owen 
2020), could become a rentier state. However, as we discuss below, its 
resource rental regime is not capturing enough of the benefits to make 
this possible. PNG is not in the running, while New Caledonia has 
a mixed outlook but, here too, no one economic sector is poised for an 
East Asian–style boom (Bouard et al. 2016). All three places aspire to 
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some kind of developmentalism, but none has achieved the desired goal 
of economic modernisation. Australia has de-industrialised in recent 
years and seems to have abandoned an industry policy. PNG is not doing 
at all well at translating resources incomes into development outcomes 
(UNDP 2014), and, again, New Caledonia has a mixed outlook, although 
no single economic sector is placed for rapid take-off. Elements of the 
last of Wilson’s forms of the state, the liberal market economy, can be 
found in each but, as we will show, the hand of the state intervenes to 
varying degrees.
For our purposes, Wilson’s model provides a useful way of conceptualising 
the question of state presence or absence in PNG and Australia, using 
New Caledonia as a point of comparison. To aid this objective, we have 
structured our analysis along three policy axes, based on three core sets 
of policies identified by Wilson in his modelling of resource nationalism. 
We have further clarified the three sets and define them as follows:
• Axis 1. Concerning ownership or equity. The key question here, 
regardless of who invests the initial capital, is who ends up owning 
resource projects and what political project this matches.
• Axis 2. Concerning the exercise of mining, oil and gas powers, other 
aspects of regulation, and non-regulatory influences on the conduct 
of the resource industries. The exercise of mining powers ranges 
from full state control of extractive resources (Bebbington 2014) to 
various degrees of delegation to authorities at the subnational level 
(Childs 2016). Whether regulation is or is not effective is likely to be 
a proxy for the presence or absence of the state at different levels.
• Axis 3. Concerning resource rents and benefit distribution. Thinking 
on this ranges from the position that states must attract investors on 
generous terms to the opposite idea that if foreigners want national 
resources they should pay as much for them as the market will bear. 
Once received, how should economic returns be shared out: should 
the state put them into its coffers, or how much should it share with 
other levels of government, local communities and landowners? 
Both dimensions of this problem raise difficult economic and 
political questions.
These three axes now provide the basis for comparison between PNG, 
Australia and New Caledonia. In the sections that follow, we draw upon 
these different dimensions or axes to consider how the state may be more 
or less present (or absent) in resource extraction contexts.
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New Caledonia: A Different Kind of State
New Caledonia became a French territory in 1853 and is now engaged in 
the process of decolonisation. A violent period in the 1980s known as ‘the 
events’ (Les Événements), centred on Kanak1 struggles for independence, 
ended in a hostage siege on the island of Ouvéa. This triggered a  first 
set of political agreements between loyalists and separatists, the 
Matignon-Oudinot Accords, negotiated in Paris in May and June 1988. 
The  accords led to new initiatives for Kanak economic development 
and administrative decentralisation, seen as the first steps in a process of 
decolonisation. A territorial government was created; the previously wide 
powers of the High Commissioner, a delegate of Paris, were curbed; and 
provincial governments were set up for new North, South and Loyalty 
Islands Provinces. A second political agreement was signed in 1998, the 
Nouméa Accord, resulting in further transfers of powers from France, 
more formalised economic financing, and with provisions for up to three 
referendums on the question of independence from France. Two have 
now been held: the first, on 4 November 2018, resulted in a 56.7 per cent 
‘no’ vote while the second, on 4 October 2020, resulted in a 52.3 per cent 
‘no’ vote (HCRNC 2019, 2020). In 2020, the split between the Kanak-
dominated Islands and North Provinces, where 84.3  per cent and 
78.3 per cent voted ‘yes’ respectively, and the loyalist-dominated South 
Province where 70.1 per cent voted ‘no’, was manifest. While the results 
are narrowing, the heavier population of the South Province, where 
voters cast over 100,000 votes in 2020 as against 53,000 in the other 
two provinces, means that the result in 2022’s third referendum will be 
extremely tight.
The nature of government in New Caledonia is very distinctive and 
differentiates it from the other two countries explored here. In both 
Australia and PNG, governments are formed in winner-takes-all 
systems of government, but this is not the case in New Caledonia. Here 
government is formed in a tiered way, from a starting point of five-yearly 
general elections for 76 provincial seats in the assemblies of the South 
(40), North (22) and Loyalty Island (14) Provinces. Without further 
elections, a quota of the members of each assembly is selected by party 
list proportional representation to also sit in the Congress (South: 32 
seats; North 15 seats; Loyalty Islands: 7 seats). The 54 members of the 
1  Indigenous Melanesian inhabitants of New Caledonia.
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newly formed Congress then vote to determine the 11 members of the 
executive government of New Caledonia. From among their number, 
the 11 members of the government elect a president and vice-president. 
The government is termed a collegial government because it incorporates 
what in other jurisdictions would be opposition members. Its key role 
is to propose legislation for forwarding to the Congress for discussion 
and voting. An unwritten rule is that once the president is elected, the 
members of the losing bloc choose the vice-president.
A supra-governmental body, the Committee of the signatories of the 
Nouméa Accord (Comité des signataires de l’accord de Nouméa) meets 
annually in Paris to monitor progress on the implementation of the 
Nouméa Accord, nowadays bringing together an enlarged delegation 
of members of the Congress and mayors as well as surviving signatories 
from 1998.2 This is supported by the GTPS, the working group of the 
presidents and signatories of the Nouméa Accord (Groupe de travail des 
présidents et des signataires de l’accord de Nouméa) which meets locally. 
Technically there are further superior bodies, such as the Conseil d’État 
(‘Council of State’) to which appeals can be made, but these are part of 
the French state.
The implication for critical legislation, such as that concerning resource 
extraction, is that the make-up of the government has always reflected the 
spectrum of political positions held by the members of the three provincial 
assemblies and, in turn, among the electorate of New Caledonia. Critical 
legislation cannot therefore be changed easily by the biggest party to fit 
with its electoral platform, in disregard of the electoral platforms of its 
rivals. While a majority of the members of the government is all that is 
technically required to make a decision, in practice a broader consensus 
must be achieved because of the complexity of party positions in the 
Congress. If the minority were to be disregarded in the government, 
it would run the risk of chaos in the Congress and of joint positions 
collapsing in relation to other matters.
Because of the unusual manner in which its institutions of democracy are 
interlaced, it is possible to suggest that the state, in its territorial form in 
New Caledonia, cannot absent itself. The institutions were designed in the 
post-conflict situation in which France and New Caledonia were locked 
2  The first meeting was held on 2 May 2000. The nineteenth meeting, chaired by the French 
prime minister, Edward Philippe, was held in Paris on 10 October 2019.
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together in May 1988 and have evolved over three decades into the form 
they have today. Whether it is due to the special design of the institutions, 
or that a kind of post-conflict vigilance on the part of all parties affects 
the way they operate, or that living people made the original agreements 
and they are still politically active, is not especially relevant to the present 
discussion. What is true is that the expression of the state in terms of 
policies, laws and governmental decrees must follow the political templates 
laid down in the foundational agreements—Matignon, Nouméa, Bercy, 
the Organic Law of 1999, etc.—and that deviations from them have not 
so far been possible.
This does not mean that there are no conflicts among lower-level entities; 
indeed, there have been bitter ones concerning which shareholder 
group should control this or that enterprise and which financing entity 
should or should not exercise influence or should yield its capital to 
local interests. But it does show the difference that the structures of the 
state can make to its relative absence or presence in resource extraction 
contexts. The value of this point of comparison is that it helps to highlight 
some of the structural similarities between PNG and Australia where they 
might otherwise be rendered invisible or masked by other more seemingly 
obvious differences, such as state capacity to use mineral wealth for the 
benefit of the population, as we discuss below.
A Short History of Mining in 
New Caledonia
New Caledonia’s mineral wealth is linked to its nickel mining industry. 
Nickel was discovered there early in the colonial period, with exports 
starting in 1874. Today mining is carried out, in the first place, by three 
large companies that operate their own refineries. The first is Société Le 
Nickel (SLN), founded in 1880, from time to time partly state-owned, 
and now majority-owned by the French multinational group Eramet 
(see Newbury 1955; Bencivengo 2014; Black 2014). SLN’s Doniambo 
nickel refinery on the outskirts of Nouméa has operated since 1910. 
The second is Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS), a joint venture between 
the Société Minière du Pacifique Sud (SMSP) and Glencore plc. KNS 
has built a refinery in the North Province. The third is Vale Nouvelle-
Calédonie SAS (Vale NC), a subsidiary of the Brazilian energy and mining 
group Vale SA. It has built a refinery at Goro in the South Province. 
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Twenty or more second-line companies that are only engaged in parts of 
the process of mining, and do not do their own refining, operate across 
the territory and are loosely known as ‘petits mineurs’ (or ‘small miners’). 
The fact that some of these ‘small miners’ are well capitalised, hold large 
concessions and directly export nickel (Bouard et al. 2019), only seems 
to reinforce Sarah Holcombe’s observation (Chapter 7, this volume) that 
there is very limited consensus around the definition of a ‘junior miner’.
The French state has asserted a presence in mining in various ways from 
1859 when French mining law was first extended to New Caledonia. 
However, the hand of the state in mining was weakly felt to start with and 
a local decree in 1873 authorised mining on pegged claims (‘possession par 
invention’), similar to what is seen in Anglophone countries (Le Meur 
and Mennesson 2011). The state remained a spectator while the Paris-
based bank Rothschild Frères owned the main producer SLN from 1883, 
and after its merger in 1931 with its main rival, André Ballande, during 
the Great Depression. When the Second World War started, trade with 
Germany and Japan, which made up 95 per cent of exports before the 
war, came to a stop, halting the economy until the US entered the war and 
took all of New Caledonia’s nickel production.
In the 1960s, in promoting the autonomy of the territory, the Union 
Calédonienne,3 expressed interest in attracting foreign capital. But when 
the global price of nickel boomed in 1967, the French Secretary of State, 
Pierre Billotte, declared to the National Assembly in Paris that ‘there can 
be no question of delivering New Caledonian nickel to a foreign trust’ 
(Brou 1982: 112). Whereas previously licencing had been handled at the 
territorial level, the 1969 ‘Billotte Laws’ classified nickel, chromium and 
cobalt as strategic raw materials and transferred control of them to the 
Ministry for Industry. This period also saw French interest in creating 
a company with French investment majority to face off foreign investors, 
but nothing eventuated before a slump in prices in 1972 threatened the 
entire industry with collapse. To prevent this from happening, a 50 per 
cent stake in SLN was taken out in 1974 by the (then) state-owned oil 
company, Elf Aquitaine. Further restructuring took place in 1985 when 
another majority state-owned enterprise, Eramet, boosted state-ownership 
to 85  per cent of SLN. Since this peak of state control, metropolitan 
3  A political party founded in 1953 with the goal of promoting more autonomy for New 
Caledonia, the Union Calédonienne moved from its original multi-ethnic base to become part of the 
pro-Independence FLNKS in the 1970s.
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public ownership of Eramet has been progressively diluted, then finally 
reduced to zero by offloading the last third to a New Caledonian entity 
STCPI (see below) in 2000.
Modernisation of the Mining Sector
Up to this point, in our exploration of the role of the state in resource 
contexts in New Caledonia, the state we are concerned with was exclusively 
conceived of as that of metropolitan France. After 1988, though, 
the political solutions of the metropolitan state pursued a new set of 
objectives directed at (a) averting violence and (b) redressing the injustice 
of the underdevelopment of Kanak communities, particularly through 
the doctrine of economic rebalancing (rééquilibrage). These objectives can 
be seen as aspiring to non-traditional, more progressive ‘state effects’ and 
creating new institutions able to define and enforce collectively binding 
decisions on members of society (Lund 2006: 685).
Mining had not been mentioned in the 1988 Matignon Accords, but 
it soon became integrated into pro-independence claims for sovereignty 
as a  precondition for talks4 in the following years. Simultaneously, the 
presence of the French state in the New Caledonian mining industry 
mutated from direct involvement—it was selling off most of the 
concessions it held globally at the time5—to indirect involvement, seen 
in its capital injection into the newly formed mining and metallurgical 
company, Société de financement et d’investissement de la province Nord 
(SOFINOR), a financing entity for the new Kanak-run North Province. 
The leader of the anti-independence groups in New Caledonia, Jacques 
Lafleur, was both a signatory to the accords and a major player in the 
nickel industry, through his ownership of another extractive company, 
Société minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP). In a surprise move, Lafleur sold 
his shares to SOFINOR on 5 October 1990, giving it an 85 per cent 
holding. SMSP focused on the export of nickel ore for the next eight years.
4  The catchphrase préalable minier (‘mining precondition’) expressed the specific political position 
that talks could not proceed if mining issues were not included at the outset.
5  Between 1990 and 1995, the Bureau de Recherche géologique et minière divested much of its 
global mining portfolio; in New Caledonia its concessions were mostly acquired by SLN and Inco 
(Pitoiset and Wéry 2008: 101).
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The first strictly mining-related agreement was the Bercy Accord, 
signed on 1  February 1998.6 Two months later, a joint venture was 
entered into between SMSP (51 per cent) and Falconbridge of Canada 
(49 per cent) to form Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS), which began to plan 
a USD5.3  billion nickel processing plant at Vavouto. The project was 
incentivised, along with the Goro project in the South Province, with 
a tax holiday for 15 years in 2001, with further exemptions granted in 
2004. Construction started in 2007 after Falconbridge was bought by 
Xstrata, and the plant entered production in 2013 as Xstrata was bought 
by Glencore plc. This was a  new form of state intervention—via the 
politics of providing a financing vehicle for a subterritorial provincial 
government—which has resulted in the North Province having majority 
control of both the Koniambo massif and its linked processing plant.
The Koniambo project was conceived from the start as an economic 
engine around which the North Province as a whole might develop. 
Far  from the state being absent-malevolent, as seen in Australia, and 
absent-irrelevant, as seen in PNG, the Koniambo project is the projection 
of the presence of two levels of the state in an industry: foremost as part of 
a long-term political project of the Kanak-run North Province and its 
mining company, SMSP; and financing mechanisms ultimately devised 
by the French state in the shadows behind SOFINOR.
The North Province and its mining arm SMSP have been able to expand 
into offshore processing of ore unsuitable for processing at Koniambo 
(Bouard et al. 2016: 121–2):
• Investing in a new processing plant in Gwangyang, South Korea, in 
2006, creating a Caledonian offshore company, the SSNC (Société du 
Nickel de Nouvelle-Calédonie et de Corée).
• Forming the New Caledonia–based Nickel Mining Company (NMC) 
with 51 per cent ownership by SMSP and 49 per cent by the Korean 
steelmaker POSCO, to feed the Gwangyang plant from NMC 
concessions at Oauco, Poya, Nakéty and Kouauoa.
• Concluding an agreement for a nickel processing plant in Guanxi 
Province, China, to also have 51 per cent ownership by SMSP (Jinchuan 
project) and for the offshore processing of New Caledonian ore.
6  Signed by SMSP, Eramet and its subsidiary SLN, and three French ministries (Economy and 
Finance, Industry, Overseas Territories), in the presence of the French Agency for Development 
(CFD, now AFD).
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At the same time, the Goro project, located in the communes of Mont-
Dore and Yaté, came into being outside the template involving Kanak 
interests that the Matignon and subsequent agreements provided for. 
It began with the acquisition of mining titles at Goro by Inco of Canada in 
1992. Inco tested a pilot plant in 1999 and began construction of a refinery 
in 2002. Technical problems resulted in the suspension of construction 
until 2005. Inco was acquired by Vale of Brazil to form Vale Nouvelle-
Calédonie (Vale NC), but projected costs rose from USD1.4 billion to an 
eventual USD4.3 billion when it began operating four years after the Vale 
takeover, in 2010. The project has most recently been described as having 
cost USD9 billion (Mainguet 2019). Ownership was transferred to Prony 
Resources, a 51 per cent locally owned consortium, in March 2021.
Goro faced stiff opposition from both local communities and civil society 
organisations between 2001 and 2008. Loyalist forces dominate in the 
South, and the manner of developing the project was seen as a way to 
assert the old way of doing things. Three chieftaincies in Yaté formed 
the Rhéébu Nùù (‘Eye of the Country’) committee, which was successful 
in widening the circle of stakeholders to include local interest groups 
(see Demmer 2007; Horowitz 2009; Levacher 2016, 2017). This led to 
the signing of a Pact for the Sustainable Development of the Far South 
(Pacte pour un Développement Durable du Grand Sud) by Vale and local 
stakeholders, including Rhéébu Nùù, in 2008 (Le Meur, Horowitz and 
Mennesson 2013; Horowitz 2015).
Three Axes of Resource Policy: 
Comparisons with PNG and Australia
So far in this chapter we have introduced Wilson’s model of resource 
nationalism and provided information necessary to establish New 
Caledonia as a point of comparison with PNG and Australia. For the 
remainder of this chapter, we turn our attention to the three policy axes, 
based on core sets of policies identified by Wilson, along which we make 
comparisons between the three countries. The axes are drawn along the 
critical issues of ownership or equity; exercise of mining powers, other 
aspects of regulation and non-regulatory influences; and resource rents and 
benefits distribution, respectively. We use them here to consider ways in 
which the state is absent and/or present in resource extraction contexts 
in PNG, Australia and New Caledonia across the identified policy areas.
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Axis 1: Concerning Ownership or Equity
Papua New Guinea
The PNG government has frequently expressed an intention to own 
equity in resource projects. At the Ok Tedi copper and gold mine in the 
Western Province, the state started as a 20 per cent owner when the mine 
opened in 1984. Wounded by the environmental record of the mine, the 
majority owner BHP placed its 52 per cent share ownership in an offshore 
company structure, the PNG Sustainable Development Program (SDP), 
in 2001, and left the country. In the 2000s, SDP’s and the state’s shares 
grew to about 65 per cent and 35 per cent respectively as minor partners 
divested, but a long-standing feud between the 2011–19 prime minister, 
Peter O’Neill, and the 1999–2001 prime minister, Mekere Morauta, 
changed things when Morauta became chairman of SDP. O’Neill, who 
hails from Southern Highlands Province, pushed through legislation 
to cancel SDP’s shares, nationalise the mine and replace Morauta as 
chairman, saying, ‘I ask, who is he? He’s not from Western Province. He 
has done enough damage to this country and he has protected his foreign 
friends enough’. He added, ‘the people of Western Province must run the 
company’ (Nalu 2013). But when the new executive team was announced, 
it did not noticeably include anyone from Western Province, and O’Neill 
appointed a prominent Australian as the CEO.
At Porgera the state initially took a 10 per cent stake in the mine, which 
opened in 1990. When the mine produced a million ounces of gold each 
year, the government of Paias Wingti demanded a greater stake (Davis 
1993; Jackson and Banks 2002: 191–8). Seemingly a textbook example 
of a state wanting to take a lead role in managing national mineral wealth, 
the next five prime ministers gradually lost interest, and the government’s 
shareholding in Porgera was diluted from a high of 25 per cent in the 
mid-1990s to 0 per cent in 2007. Most of the shares ended up back in 
the hands of the operator to 2020, the Porgera Joint Venture, 95 per cent 
owned by Barrick Gold and Zijin Mining. In 2020, James Marape’s 
government refused an application for a 20-year mine lease extension, 
under the policy slogan ‘Take Back PNG’ (see Afterword, this volume). 
Marape prepared poorly for the announcement, with no obvious plan as 
to what new entity would run the mine. Meanwhile, 2,700 workers were 
laid off just as the gold price passed USD2,000/oz, a record high.
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In the oil and gas sector, the O’Neill government borrowed AUD1.2 billion 
from the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) to buy a 10 per cent stake in Oil 
Search, a partner in the PNG LNG project, on the advice of consultants. 
Commentators deprecated the move (Yala et al. 2014), and an official 
report concluded that O’Neill and several others had broken the law 
(GPNG 2018). When the oil price slumped in 2016, PNG abandoned 
the loans at a loss of about a third of the amount borrowed (Grigg et al. 
2019). Kumul Petroleum Holdings, the state-owned oil and gas company, 
and the beneficiary of the loans, made losses of PGK481 million in 2016 
and PGK1.8 billion in 2017, despite being a 16.6 per cent partner in the 
PNG LNG project which has been exporting gas since 2014.
Australia
Taking a different approach, Australia does not seek government equity in 
the extractive industries. A short-lived Petroleum and Minerals Authority 
was created in 1974 but was struck down by the High Court over states’ 
rights (Bambridge 1979). However, Australia invests in other ways. It has 
recently taken up a long-standing commitment to the International 
Energy Agency to maintain a 90-day oil reserve (Taylor 2020), and 
its ‘critical minerals strategy’ incentivises various kinds of research 
funding allocations to universities and the CSIRO (the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) (AFG 2019, 2020). 
The Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility offers concessional loans 
to resource companies to upgrade ports, airports, and road and rail 
links, while many states own or part-own energy retailers like Energy 
Queensland (Queensland), Aurora Energy (Tasmania) and Horizon 
Power (Western Australia).
A further ‘other way’ concerns the Australia–Timor Leste sovereignty 
dispute. In 2004, Australian secret agents bugged Timor Leste’s delegation 
during talks over oil and gas sharing in the Timor Sea leading up to the 
signing of a treaty providing for 50 per cent of the income to be allocated 
to each country. When the spying operation was exposed, Timor sued 
Australia in the Hague and negotiated a new agreement giving 80 per cent 
of the income to Timor Leste and 20 per cent to Australia. Agreement on 
the maritime boundary between the two countries, and therefore the 
absolute ownership of the oil and gas, was settled in 2018 (Rothwell 2018).
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New Caledonia
We have already discussed the long-standing political project for New 
Caledonia to assume majority ownership of resource projects. In the 
South, both Indigenous and environmental movements favoured the 
South Province investing in the Goro Nickel project as the North Province 
had done at Koniambo. The idea was endorsed politically at a meeting of 
the Comité des signataires and in 2005 a new entity, the SPMSC (Société de 
participation minière du Sud calédonien), acquired a stake in Goro Nickel, 
though a small one. In 2000 the three provincial governments created 
yet another equity vehicle, STCPI (Société territoriale calédonienne de 
participation industrielle), as a step towards joint involvement in mining. 
By means of various transfers from the French state, via each province’s 
financing arms—SOFINOR, PROMOSUD, SODIL,7 etc.—STCPI had 
acquired 34 per cent of the historically largest nickel company SLN by 
2007. As shown in Figure 10.1, all three onshore refineries are part-owned 
by provincial governments, with the North Province’s 51  per cent of 
Koniambo being the highest. The same and/or linked entities, like Nord 
Avenir in the North Province, also offer financing for mining contractors.
Figure 10.1 Provincial shareholding in New Caledonian nickel refineries
Source: C. Levacher (data to 2020)
7  PROMOSUD, Société De Financement et de Développement de la Province Sud; SODIL, Société 
de Développement et d’Investissement des Îles.
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Axis 2: Concerning the Exercise of Mining, Oil 
and Gas Powers, Other Aspects of Regulation, 
and Non-Regulatory Influences on the Conduct 
of the Resource Industries
Papua New Guinea
The first piece of mining legislation to be passed after PNG’s independence 
in 1975 was the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 (Jackson 1982; 
Burton and Haihuie 2017: 22–5). A working group drawn from the 
major economic ministries in Port Moresby was the point of consultation 
for key decisions. Reference to local viewpoints and interests was almost 
non-existent (Burton 1997). Ok Tedi is well known for the environmental 
damage done to the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers below the mine, and 
landowners in the impact area, in alliance with international lawyers, 
mounted litigation so damaging that it eventually forced BHP out of 
PNG, as recounted above (Banks and Ballard 1997; Kirsch 2001, 2007). 
All later extractive industry projects have been governed by national 
mining and environmental legislation: currently, the Mining Act 1992, the 
Oil and Gas Act 1998, and the Environment Act 2000 (Filer and Imbun 
2009). However, each project to date has been characterised by localised 
agreements (Burton and Haihuie 2017) emerging from Development 
Forums (Filer 2008) where the state takes second place to negotiations 
between companies and landowner representatives (Bainton 2010; Main, 
Chapter 5, this volume).
In reality, the state is barely visible in regulatory matters. Just to cite waste 
disposal problems, the government has watched on while landowners 
have rebelled, sued, lobbied ministers, engaged with international NGOs, 
or got their (opposition) MPs to complain about damage to five separate 
river systems: Jaba River (Bougainville mine: May and Spriggs 1990), Ok 
Tedi-Fly river system (Ok Tedi mine: Banks and Ballard 1997), Porgera-
Lagaip river system (Porgera mine: CSIRO 1996; Bainton et al. 2020), 
Angabanga River (Tolukuma mine: OCAA 2004), and Watut River 
(Hidden Valley mine: Ketan and Geita 2011).
From the 1990s, international mining companies operating in PNG have 
turned to sustainability reporting to assure investors about their social and 
environmental performance. Close examination, though, reveals a patchy 
approach to applying standard reporting criteria (Burton and Onguglo 
2017) and selective amnesia over past failings that poor government 
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
328
alertness allows operators to get away with. A quarter of a century later, 
mining, oil and gas policy is out of step with several cycles of national 
development plans (e.g. GPNG 2009, 2015) and has a puzzling fit with 
PNG’s international commitments to initiatives like the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. Worst, the Department of 
Petroleum Energy is unfit for purpose: its ministers have failed to take up 
external offers of help and the department has not published an annual 
report since 2009 (PNGEITI 2019).
Australia
Unlike PNG, in Australia responsibility for the regulation of the extractive 
industries is located at the subnational level in state and territory 
governments and governed by subnational legislation. This means that 
the expectations placed upon extractive companies differs between states 
and territories. For example, as Holcombe has observed, there is a large 
gulf between the requirements and guidance for environmental and 
social impact assessment for new extractive projects in New South Wales 
compared with the Northern Territory. As a result, we also find a good 
deal of variation in the capacity and willingness of state and territory 
governments to closely regulate the activities of extractive companies 
to minimise social and ecological impacts, and to harness the economic 
benefits of extraction to provide broad-based development for local 
project-affected communities and the wider population. This partly helps 
to explain the incomplete or uneven nature of the state, where different 
actors experience different incarnations of the state in stronger or weaker 
ways, or as a more or less consequential force supporting some interests 
and not others. These subnational differences are particularly apparent 
when it comes to unconventional gas extraction and development, 
which is sometimes known as ‘fracking’. While some states have placed 
a moratorium on unconventional gas extraction, others have actively 
encouraged these developments. But the discrepancy between the state’s 
sovereign power to approve extractive projects and its ability to oversee 
and responsibly regulate the sector can be problematic, particularly for 
local residents who are caught up in this disparity (Espig, Chapter 6, 
this volume).
The influence of the coal seam gas industry, and the feeble regulatory 
capacity of the Queensland Government, point to larger considerations 
around the degree of state capture by industry and a ‘growth-first’ political 
economy in Australia. The considerable political influence and lobbying 
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power of the extractive industries has found a favourable reception among 
successive federal, state and territory-level governments—especially in 
Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in regards to Indigenous interests. Since at least the 
1970s, the mining and petroleum industries have become increasingly 
influential in Australian politics and policy making. As Jon Altman has 
previously noted, historically the mining industry’s relationship with 
the state in terms of land rights and native title has been fundamentally 
oppositional, seeing consent or negotiation provisions where the state 
has supported land rights as just another regulatory hurdle in the way of 
unimpeded access to Aboriginal land for mineral exploitation (Altman 
2009: 25). In the 1970s, the Australian Mining Industry Council, now 
known as the Minerals Council of Australia, strongly opposed land rights, 
and mounted an effective campaign against these rights in Western 
Australia. These diminished rights are now reflected in Western Australia’s 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972, specifically Section 18 which provides a legal 
basis for extractive companies to destroy specified Aboriginal heritage 
objects and places. This piece of legislation has served the interests of 
the extractive industries over Aboriginal people, most recently witnessed 
in the apparently legal destruction of the Juukan Gorge by Rio Tinto 
in 2020 (see Afterword, this volume). So while many multinational 
extractive companies working in Australia have embraced the rhetoric of 
corporate social responsibility—including Rio Tinto, who was once at the 
forefront of this corporate shift (Kemp and Owen 2018)—it would seem 
that in practice these higher corporate standards are trumped by lower 
legislative standards.
New Caledonia
A key institutional effect of the 1998 Bercy Accord was the transfer of 
mining powers from Paris to New Caledonia. An organic law8 followed 
that prescribed work on a Framework for the Development of Mineral 
Resources (Schéma de Mise en Valeur des Richesses Minières) and decreed 
that future decisions relating to mining must follow the principles set 
out in it. It was meant to be ready by 2004, when a local Mining and 
Energy Department was indeed created—DIMENC, the Direction de 
l’Industrie, des Mines et de l’Energie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie—but rounds 
8  Organic law n°99-209 of 19 March 1999 in relation to New Caledonia.
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of consultations across New Caledonia took five more years until the 
Framework, and a territorial mining law, were adopted concurrently by 
the Congress of New Caledonia.
The Framework and the mining law not only set out the rules by which 
the mining should be run, as standard mining policy and legislation 
might be expected to do but, backed by the organic law, they also act as 
almost inviolable constitutional documents of a longer-term view of the 
mining industry in New Caledonia. That is why the adoption in 2015 
of a ‘nickel doctrine’ by the territory-wide pro-independence coalition 
FLNKS (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste) raised strong 
opposition especially from the smaller producers and ‘truckers’ (rouleurs) 
who wanted to retain the freedom to export raw nickel to lower-cost 
overseas processors (Demmer et al. 2018). This policy advocates: better 
use of nickel resources by seeking efficiency gains in local mining 
operations and by striking economic agreements more advantageous to 
local interests; ceasing exports of unprocessed nickel ore (except those 
destined for New Caledonian offshore processing plants); and promoting 
the territorially owned STCPI to reach a 51 per cent shareholding in SLN 
(Bouard et al. 2016: 122) up from 34 per cent at present (Figure 10.1). 
The question of unprocessed mineral exports and the balance prescribed 
by the Framework between exporting nickel and doing onshore processing 
continues to lie at the heart of political contestation over the nickel 
industry (Demmer 2017; Anon. 2020b).
The combination of the political agreements (Matignon-Oudinot and 
Nouméa), the increased importance of mining issues in politics since the 
1990s and the rise of environmental concerns has led to an evolution in 
the relations between mining companies and local populations. Newer 
negotiated agreements aim to recognise the special Kanak link to the land 
and to compensate for the impacts of mining in a variety of ways, notably 
in undertakings regarding employment and contracting by local entities.
Another point of evolution in regulations in the last two decades is the 
rise in awareness of New Caledonia’s status as a biodiversity hotspot and 
increasing local concerns over environmental impacts combined with 
calls for environmental compensation (Levacher and Le Meur 2019). 
This is illustrated in the fact that protests around the Goro Nickel mining 
project in the south played a key role in the inscription of the New 
Caledonian lagoon as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008 (Merlin 
2014; Horowitz 2016). At the institutional level, both North and South 
Provinces introduced new environmental legislation in 2008–09, which 
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include compulsory environmental impact assessments, with a special 
emphasis on impacts on ecosystems with heritage value and protected 
species, provisions for compensation, action plans for mitigating impacts, 
and long-term monitoring and reporting of results.
Axis 3: Concerning Resource Rents and 
Benefit Distribution
Papua New Guinea
Despite a perpetually renewed national rhetoric of reaping benefits from 
the exploitation of the country’s endowment of natural resources, the 
latest version of which is James Marape’s mantra of ‘Take Back PNG’, 
the effectiveness of the state in collecting fair returns has waned over 
time. The Australian colonial administration included tax incentives 
in its 1967 agreement with the mining company Conzinc Riotinto of 
Australia (CRA) to develop the Bougainville copper mine. A normal tax 
regime prevailed by the time of independence and an additional profits 
tax (Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1975) was brought into use, exemplifying 
Wilson’s third policy axis: the use of tax mechanisms to capture economic 
rents for public purposes. This was when the state’s powers to control 
income from mining were strongest. In the last year of full operations, 
the government’s share amounted to 66 per cent of revenues from the 
Bougainville mine, after operating costs, while CRA’s shareholders 
received 34 per cent (Bougainville Copper Limited 1988: 3–4).
As in New Caledonia, it was assumed that people in Bougainville would 
benefit from business and employment; compensation payments to 
traditional landowners were small. Local grievances escalated during 
the 1980s (Filer and Le Meur 2017: 18–9) until landowners demanded 
PGK10 billion (approximately USD11.6 billion) in compensation and 
50 per cent of future profits to be shared by local stakeholders (AGA 1989). 
As is well known, rebel landowners fought a decade-long civil war against 
the PNG Defence Force (Filer 1990; May and Spriggs 1990; Braithwaite 
at al. 2010). A referendum on independence from PNG was held in 2019 
at which over 98 per cent of the electorate voted ‘yes’.
Not surprisingly, later mining agreements made greater provisions for 
benefits to be made to local communities (Filer 1997). Royalty had 
been set at 1.25  per cent of production at Bougainville and Ok Tedi, 
of which the host province and landowners took 95  per cent and 
5 per cent shares respectively. In 1989, landowners at Porgera negotiated 
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a balance of 77  per  cent (province) and 23  per cent (landowners and 
local institutions). In 1995, the Lihir landowners negotiated a balance of 
50 per cent (province), 50 per cent (landowners and local institutions) 
and an increase in the rate of royalty to 2 per cent of production (Bainton 
2010: 168). In turn, this caused the Porgera landowners to renegotiate 
their agreement, and from mid-1995, they too shared royalty at the rate 
of 2  per cent and the breakdown became 50  per cent (province) and 
50 per cent (landowners and local institutions) (Banks 2001: 44).
On the side of compensation and business development grants, where 
in the 1970s landowners reckoned in the tens of thousands of PNG 
Kina, in the 1980s they began reckoning in hundreds of thousands of 
Kina (e.g. Banks 2001), in the 1990s in millions of Kina (e.g. Bainton 
2010: Table 5-1; Golub 2014), in the 2000s in tens of millions of Kina 
(e.g. Johnson 2012) and in the 2010s in hundreds of millions of Kina 
(Nicholas 2011, 2019).
All this points to the state exhibiting a weaker and weaker capacity to 
control resource revenues: (a) its local presence, manifesting in its 
bargaining power with citizens, has faded and (b) its ability to collect 
mining and petroleum taxes from corporations has faltered. Tax receipts 
averaged AUD650 million/year 2010–12, but only AUD85 million/year 
2014–17 (Figure 10.2).
Figure 10.2 Mining and petroleum taxes collected in PNG during 
the 2010s
Source: PNG Department of Treasury data 2010–18
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A brief gold price shock in mid-2013 was a local trigger for gold miners 
to restructure their tax affairs, but this was merely an acceleration of 
worldwide trend for multinationals to more aggressively minimise tax. 
It should be noted that Australia (below) has its own troubles with resource 
rents, but as a developing country PNG has fewer means of redress and 
PNG’s long-awaited sovereign wealth fund, intended to capture LNG 
revenues and stabilise the economy (Osborne 2014) and supposed to start 
accumulating from 2014, has still received no deposits (Anon. 2020a). 
As Banks and Namorong (2018) note, something has gone significantly 
wrong with PNG’s investment settings.
Australia
Extractives-friendly politicians in Australia constantly boast about the 
number of jobs created in the key producing states, with a multiplier 
effect generating benefit in the wider economy. However, the tax take 
from resources is acknowledged as inefficient.
The 2010 ‘Henry Tax Review’ (AFG 2010) recommended that the 
government should replace the existing regime of state-based mining and 
petroleum royalties with a resource rent tax. As is well known, the attempt 
by the then Labor Government to introduce a Resource Super Profits Tax 
(RSPT)—matching the existing petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT)—
was met with strident industry protests: the announcement was ‘shocking’ 
(Rio Tinto), ‘highly regrettable’ (Xstrata) and ‘a surprise attack on us’ 
(Fortescue Metals). The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA)—the 
peak lobby group representing the mining industry—ran an advertising 
blitz over the next two months, a key factor in the Labor Party replacing 
its leader, Kevin Rudd, in mid-2010 (Davis 2011). His successor, Julia 
Gillard, introduced a weaker Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) which 
was initially forecast to raise AUD3.7 billion a year, but net revenue was 
only AUD88  million in its two years of operation, 2012–14. Reasons 
for its failure have been split among weak commodity prices, ‘industry 
capture’  of the process of designing the legislation—BHP, Rio Tinto 
and Xstrata had a hand in this—and insufficient technical expertise 
in the Treasury (Valle de Souza et al. 2016). The situation is no better 
in the energy sector, where it could be decades before the PRRT brings 
significant returns from new gas projects coming online in the north of 
Australia (AFG 2016: 4).
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The MCA says its members ‘dig deep’ to pay royalties and tax, contributing 
AUD39.2 billion to public finances in 2018–19 (DAE 2020; Zakharia 
2020). But data from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) shows that 
many of the largest extractive companies, with collective revenues of 
AUD54.5  billion, paid no tax at all in 2017–18, including Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, Woodside, Shell, Santos, Peabody Coal, Yancoal and BHP.9 
In recent years, the ATO has taken to the courts to recover unpaid tax. 
In 2018, Chevron settled a dispute for AUD866 million concerning loans 
between subsidiaries in different countries. BHP, which reduced tax by 
using the ‘Singapore Sling’, a method of transfer pricing via Singapore, 
settled claims for AUD529 million in 2018 (Chenoweth 2020). Rio Tinto, 
which does pay tax, faces action over AUD500  million in the transfer 
pricing of aluminium and iron ore (TP News 2020).
New Caledonia
The preferred method of obtaining returns from the mining industry in 
New Caledonia is through dividends arising from provincial equity-holding 
in mining companies, rather than from production levies or royalties, and 
by adding as much economic value as possible by maximising onshore 
processing. In the current absence of a royalty regime, benefits to local 
communities arise largely as government spending on infrastructure and 
services, and through opportunities for employment and subcontracting, 
especially when agreements were signed. However, it seems inevitable that 
some form of production levy or royalty10 will be introduced eventually; 
both a recent agreement at Kouaoua (Mainguet 2020) and the proposals 
currently before the Congress to permit mineral exports are believed to 
contain provisions for a levy as a form of compensation (Lalande 2020).
Discussion
Wilson’s three policy axes provide an informative way to see the presence 
or absence of the state. It is suggested that two particular phenomena are 
shared between the three country contexts explored here.
9  See: data.gov.au/data/dataset/corporate-transparency
10  The French term redevance is frequently heard in demands by local communities. While redevance 
is the standard translation of ‘royalty’, the French term has additional meanings that royalty does not in 
English.
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First, each version of the state has problems collecting resource rental 
incomes. PNG appears addicted to attracting new projects to repair the 
budget problems caused by the old ones, only to again fall into the trap of 
offering overly generous tax holidays and other incentives. Australia has 
a huge resource industry, but it is not doing a lot better at getting good 
returns on exporting the national wealth. New Caledonia is at the mercy of 
the fluctuating price of a single commodity and, as a high-cost producer, 
struggles to match its political commitments to onshore processing with 
the reality of lower-cost competition in China, South Korea and elsewhere. 
Sometimes, different dimensions of the same state present a very different 
face to different parts of the same issue. For example, political leaders can 
see themselves as enablers of the extractive industries, while tax collectors 
like Australia’s ATO are locked in combat against large corporations—
an observation which points to the multivalence of the state.
Second, if the domain of the feasible lies in the hands of transnational 
corporations, putatively regulated by each state in its own way, it is 
increasingly the case that their activities are moderated by local actors with 
their own points of view and which none of the states (or corporations) 
has found a way to consult with in an optimal way. We see numerous 
disputes with landowners in PNG; blockades and vandalism in New 
Caledonia, where the label ‘conflit des coutumiers’ (approximately: ‘conflict 
with clans in the local communes’) conceals much complexity; and 
polarising political stand-offs in Australia forming part of the so-called 
‘Culture Wars’ (Wallace 2019) between conservative and progressive 
political actors.
Issues of this type have been widely discussed elsewhere in terms of 
‘glocalisation’—the simultaneous movement of influence away from 
states, ‘upward’ to globalised international capital and ‘downward’ to 
local citizens’ groups (Swyngedouw 2004; Le Meur, Ballard, Banks and 
Sourisseau 2013). While the processes of glocalisation are evident in all 
three places, it is only in PNG and Australia that they are accompanied 
by a series of ‘cut-offs’ of the democratic will of voters. The two countries 
have electoral systems where citizens elect representatives to parliaments, 
but where the range of viewpoints canvassed in elections is greatly 
simplified by the process of forming governments. Only the viewpoints 
of the winning parties prevail; those of the opposition parties, and the 
electors who voted for them, fail a first cut-off and are discarded. The 
process of forming a cabinet of ministers from the members of the winning 
parties further forms a second cut-off. Only ministers and their assistants, 
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a small handful of winning party representatives in a parliament, translate 
the policies of their parties into the actions of government. In this way, 
governments can adopt courses of action that citizens did not broadly vote 
for and that ultimately distance them from their electorate and election 
promises—though governments have long sought to persuade citizens 
after the fact that particular policies are what they wanted all along. 
The  absence of politically alternative voices in the executive can mean 
that decision makers are susceptible to industry capture; if so, ‘successful’ 
legislation may be that which is smiled on by interests outside mainstream 
politics, not by a consensus of the parliament.
Conclusions: What a Difference the 
State Makes
In the introduction to this chapter we noted that in PNG and Australia 
the state is largely seen as ‘the enemy’ in the eyes of customary owners 
seeking some good to come out of permitting mining or oil and gas 
extraction from their land. This, in turn, informed peoples’ experiences 
and perception of state absence and/or presence and created space for 
experience of the ‘absent presence’ phenomena, where the presence of the 
state is experienced through its perceived absence. We asked: is there an 
alternative where the state is not the enemy? Is there a different kind of 
a state? And what impact would such difference have on the role and 
experience of the state in resource contexts?
As we have demonstrated above, New Caledonia’s ‘collegial’ government 
is of a different form where electors vote once and their representatives are 
filtered by party list into the Congress, and then 11 are chosen to form the 
territorial government, which will always be from a mix of parties. While 
parties may differ in their support for broad platforms hammered out 
over years of consultation, such as the Framework for the Development 
of Mineral Resources discussed earlier, when voters back them their 
positions are carried all the way through to the formation of the territorial 
government so that alternative voices remain intact among the executive. 
This makes New Caledonia a different kind of state when compared to 
PNG and Australia.
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There are also similarities between PNG, Australia and New Caledonia, 
which emerge from the comparative material presented above, and our 
findings demonstrate the value of the comparative approach adopted 
here. Most notably, our analysis shows that crisis plays a central role in 
shaping—or rather, periodically resetting—public and industry policies 
in all three places. Even when all the tools to control and exercise powers 
are present in principle, crisis appears to act as a policy brake, forcing 
perspectives to remain local and focused on particular projects, political 
movements and communities. What sets New Caledonia—and notably 
its North Province—apart is that, when things are democratically in 
step, the policy brake reaches directly from communities into the heart 
of government. When things are out of step, of course, conflicts jolt 
those in power and bring them to the table. In PNG and Australia, the 
first scenario is rare. In many cases, the only recourse that communities 
have is to go on treating the state as the enemy, experienced through its 
irrelevant presence or malevolent absence, or a phenomenon described 
in this volume as ‘absent presence’—which is especially evident when 
the state fails to meet expectations and fulfil its role in resource contexts, 
when it is present for some but absent for others, and where its presence 
(and absence) fluctuate over time.
In their work on the resource curse theory, Emma Gilberthorpe and 
Dinah Rajak (2017) discuss the roles of marginalised or subaltern actors 
on the one hand, and the elite agencies of actors with power on the other. 
Their aim is to shift the focus away from revenue management and to 
make the social and political relations of extraction ‘front and centre’. 
We can agree with this and suggest that it is not the problem of resource 
rents in the three jurisdictions that exposes them to a resource curse 
pathology, but the degree to which decisions made at the top fall in line 
with the interests of citizen stakeholders. In this respect, New Caledonia 
holds an advance over Australia and PNG in that, as we said above, the 
state cannot absent itself.
This may be a counter-intuitive proposition to make for a jurisdiction so 
divided over the politics of territorial sovereignty, and on other matters, 
and we are certainly not waving away the deep fissure that has existed for 
so long between loyalists and separatists. What we observe is that exactly 
the same balance of these political forces as exists in society as a whole 
is mirrored in the Congress, in the government of New Caledonia, and 
indeed in the review body, the Comité des signataires. Citizens may not 
obtain satisfaction that the positions they debate among themselves can 
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be resolved easily, but at least they can be sure they are the same ones that 
are fought out in the Congress, and in the executive government above 
that. At the same time, as we show here, interpreted in the context of the 
historical as well as contemporary relationship between New Caledonia 
and the French government, and with consideration of Kanak struggles 
for independence, the questions of absence and presence of the state, 
or indeed its ‘absent presence’, gains significant traction. So while the 
distinctive form of the state in New Caledonia means that, in terms of 
political representation and forms of governance the state cannot absent 
itself, exploring the role of the state in resource contexts in terms of an 
interplay between its presence and absence, and how they demonstrate at 
different levels of discourse and experience, offers new insights and reveals 
the dynamic and uncertain nature of the state in resource contexts—in 
PNG and Australia, as well as New Caledonia.
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Nicholas Bainton, John R. Owen  
and Emilia E. Skrzypek
Estragon: Godot?
Pozzo: You took me for Godot.
Estragon: Oh no, sir, not for an instant, sir.
Pozzo: Who is he?
Vladimir: Oh, he’s a … he’s a kind of acquaintance.
Estragon: Nothing of the kind, we hardly know him.
Vladimir: True  …  we don’t know him very well  …  but all  
the same …
Waiting for Godot (Samuel Beckett 1956)
Introduction
This volume opened with a set of questions about the relationship between 
absence and presence and what this might tell us about the nature of 
contemporary states from the perspective of resource arenas: how the state 
may be experienced as more or less present for different actors in different 
times and circumstances, and how its presence can be experienced through 
its absence—an absent presence. As the dialogue between Beckett’s troubled 
characters attests, persons, things and processes that exhibit an absent 
presence are often experienced as ambiguous and indeterminate phenomena. 
Standing on the broken ground of resource extraction settings, the state 
is sometimes like a chimera: its appearance and intentions are misleading, 
and for some actors, it is unknowable and incomprehensible. It may be 
easily mistaken for someone or something else, like a mining company, for 
example. As a partial and incomplete project, the state is experienced in 
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Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia as both a form of uncertainty 
and a progenitor of uncertainty. If this condition of uncertainty is slightly 
tempered in places like New Caledonia where the state assumes a somewhat 
different form, as Burton and Levacher claim in their final comparative 
chapter for this volume, this reinforces the point that the absence or the 
presence of the state is never absolute.
Two significant events have recently occurred in the period since we 
compiled the bulk of this volume. These events directly challenge our 
thinking on absence and presence and happen to have occurred in 
Australia and PNG: the destruction of the Juukan Gorge rock shelters in 
Western Australia by Rio Tinto, and the announcement by the PNG prime 
minister James Marape that his government would not renew Barrick 
Nuigini Limited’s mining lease at the Porgera Gold Mine. In closing out 
this volume, these events give pause to reflect further on the meaning 
and the effects of the absence and the presence of the state. These events 
evidence the uncertainties that constitute the modern state and serve as 
a kind of postscript to the cases we have considered in this volume—
but they do so in unexpected ways and open up new perspectives on the 
presence and absence of the state, and the relationship between the ‘state-
idea’ and the ‘state-system’ (Abrams 1988). We briefly describe these events 
here, necessarily glossing their immense historical complexity, followed 
by some concluding comments. Each of these events will likely reshape 
future resource relations and encounters in these nations, and beyond. 
As the ramifications of these actions reverberate past the publication of 
this volume, it will be important to keep in mind ideas about absence, 
presence and absent presence as we try make sense of ongoing state and 
corporate effects at resource extraction projects.
The Destruction of the Juukan Gorge 
Rock Shelters
In the lead up to the July 2020 NAIDOC1 week, which celebrates 
the history, culture and achievements of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples in Australia, the Puutu Kunti Kurrama People and 
1  NAIDOC originally stood for ‘National Aborigines and Islanders Day Observance Committee’. 
This committee was once responsible for organising national activities during NAIDOC week. The 
acronym has since become the name of the week itself. See: www.naidoc.org.au/
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Pinikura People  (PKKP) requested permission from Rio Tinto to visit 
their ancestral lands encompassed by the lease for the Brockman 4 iron 
ore mine in Western Australia’s Pilbara region. The mine, one of 16 in 
the region owned by Rio Tinto, was opened in 2010 at an initial cost 
of more than AUD1.5 billion, with an estimated mine life of 20 years, 
constituting a major boost to the already mining-dependent state 
economy. The PKKP wanted to visit the rock shelters at Juukan Gorge, 
which had been confirmed as a site of Aboriginal occupation dating 
back some 46,000 years before the present, and was now threatened by 
expanding mining operations.
Rio Tinto had commenced negotiations with the PKKP over access to 
their lands in 2003, and in 2011 this relationship was formalised through 
an Indigenous Land Use Agreement, or what Rio Tinto prefer to call 
a ‘Participation Agreement’.2 The Juukan Gorge area lay within the 
proposed mine expansion footprint, and as such, it has been the subject 
of considerable archaeological and ethnographic investigation to  assess 
its heritage value. In 2013, Rio Tinto obtained state permission to 
destroy the rock shelters—known as Juukan 1 and Juukan 2—for mining 
purposes. Under the terms of Western Australia’s Aboriginal Heritage Act 
1972, ministerial consent was granted for the destruction of the Juukan 
Gorge rock shelters. This authorisation occurred under Section 18 of the 
Act, commonly referred to as a ‘Section 18 approval’ or ‘s18’ for short. 
This set in train a major program of salvage archaeology, sponsored by 
Rio Tinto, which confirmed that the site was of the highest archaeological 
importance in Australia, and of global significance. Archaeological 
surveys conducted in 2014 provided evidence of human life during the 
Pleistocene and continued human presence in that place going back tens 
of thousands of years.
Undeterred by these findings, and satisfied that the site was ‘fully salvaged’ 
and that they were legally compliant, Rio Tinto continued with a mine 
plan that progressively encroached upon the site. By 2020 the company 
had been blasting for two years within the vicinity of the rock shelters, and 
in May 2020 a sequence of explosives was loaded into 382 blast holes to 
access an estimated AUD135 million worth of ore located around Juukan 
1 and Juukan 2. When the PKKP approached Rio Tinto for access to 
their country to ‘celebrate Juukan’ as part of NAIDOC week, they were 
2  In 2003, Rio Tinto was present in the negotiations through its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd.
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informed of the impending blast and reminded via email correspondence 
that ‘the sites are within the current mine pit design, and RT was granted 
s18 approval for that activity in 2013’ (Rio Tinto 2020: 32). Last-minute 
appeals from the PKKP and their representatives were not enough to stop 
the destruction of the rock shelters and on 24 May Rio Tinto proceeded 
with the blast on the basis that it was no longer feasible to remove 
the explosives.
The timing of this event has been critical to the broader response. 
In  addition to the upcoming NAIDOC week, Australia, like much of 
the global North, was gripped by the rapid escalation of the Black Lives 
Matter movement. Local, national and international condemnation 
ensued. In June 2020 the Australian Senate referred the matter to the Joint 
Standing Committee on Northern Australia, and a parliamentary inquiry 
was launched.3 By September, outraged investors had forced the board 
of Rio Tinto to sack its chief executive along with two senior executives 
partially responsible for the destruction of the rock shelters (Hopkins 
and Kemp 2020). While many observers have applauded this move, 
Marcia Langton (2020) was quick to remind the public that the decision 
evidenced the power of shareholder interests, not Aboriginal interests.
In a statement submitted to the inquiry, Rio Tinto expressed their belief 
that, under the terms of the 2011 Participation Agreement, it had secured 
‘Free Prior and Informed Consent’ to conduct mining operations on 
PKKP land including the destruction of the rock shelters. Reflecting 
on the archaeological evidence amassed over the past decade, Rio Tinto 
described these reports as ‘missed opportunities’ to re-evaluate the mine 
plan (2020: 3). In a submission to the same inquiry, the Government 
of Western Australia stated that the destruction of the rock shelters was 
‘devastating for all parties involved and was clearly avoidable’ (2020: 1). 
As Langton later lamented:
Rio Tinto had four opportunities to stop the destruction of the 
Juukan Gorge caves. There were alternatives that would have 
allowed mining but lessened the impact on the site. The company 
deliberately and consciously failed to share these possibilities with 
the traditional owners and instead chose the most profitable and 
expedient option. (Langton 2020)
3  At the time of writing, the inquiry had received 161 submissions, and remained open.
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The PKKP have rejected Rio Tinto’s claim that they provided their free, 
prior and informed consent for the destruction of Juukan 1 and Juukan 2. 
In their damning submission to the inquiry, the PKKP stated that while 
Rio Tinto agreed to their request to delay the blast (to assess options for 
removing the explosives) the company kept loading charges at the site 
without informing them. In the words of the PKKP, ‘The Juukan Gorge 
disaster tells us that Rio Tinto’s operational mindset has been driven 
by compliance to minimum standards of the law and maximisation of 
profit’ (PKKP 2020: 8). They described destruction of the rock shelters 
as a ‘yet another example of the low importance accorded to Aboriginal 
people and Aboriginal culture’ (ibid.: 60) and argued that ‘Rio Tinto’s 
submission ignores the grossly unequal negotiating position of the parties, 
a matter Rio Tinto was acutely aware of ’ (ibid.: 30). Ultimately, ‘the 
destruction of Juukan 1 and Juukan 2 has caused immeasurable cultural 
and spiritual loss and profound grief to the PKKP People’ (ibid.: 7).
Many questions have been asked from many different quarters, including 
‘where is the state in all of this that such an outcome can occur?’ These 
types of questions lie at the heart of the parliamentary inquiry—which 
essentially involves the state looking at the state as much as, if not more 
so, than the state looking at the mining company.
Reclaiming the Porgera Mining Lease
In late August 2020, the Government of PNG announced that it had 
granted the Special Mining Lease (SML) for the Porgera mine to Kumul 
Minerals Holdings Limited (KMHL), a state-owned mining company.
This follows a three-year period of uncertainty over Barrick Niugini 
Limited’s tenure in Porgera, after their lease expired in 2019 and their 
application for a further 20-year extension was denied by the incoming 
Marape government as part of his strategy to ‘take back PNG’. Barrick 
has challenged the decision domestically in the National Court to no 
immediate avail. One commentator, who goes by the name Vailala on 
The  Australian National University’s DevPolicy blog, reported Deputy 
Chief Justice Kandakasi as stating the following on 10 July 2020 as he 
denied Barrick’s right to appeal:
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Counsel for the defendants led by the learned Solicitor General’s 
arguments are that the State is under no obligation to give 
reasons  and one of his colleagues in this case, joined in to say 
it is like a lease situation. When a landlord decides to terminate 
a  lease, the landlord is not required to give reasons. Whether 
that is a correct analogy or not, I am not getting into that space 
except to say in this case that a decision has been made and that, 
there is no expressed statutory provision for disclosure of reasons. 
(Vailala 2020)
For observers tracking the project, the lead up to the lease renewal 
(or  refusal) has been at least a decade in the making. Much of the 
observable commentary has been dominated by the project and its 
discontents. For example, former prime minister Sir Michael Somare went 
on the parliamentary record in 2005 over 29 alleged killings involving the 
mine’s security forces, announcing his intention to establish a committee 
to investigate the matter: ‘we want to know why they are killing those 
people, and whether the law allows them to do that’ (Anon. 2005). 
A report presented at the time by the Akali Tange Association, a  local 
Porgera organisation, alleged that the company was directly involved in 
extrajudicial killings going back as far as 1993 (ATA 2005).
Similarly, allegations of sexual assault by company personnel have 
circulated around Porgera for well over a decade. In response to claims 
that Barrick personnel were responsible for the gang rape of local women, 
Barrick’s chief executive Greg Wilkins issued a letter to Porgeran leaders 
stating that the allegations were ‘most distasteful, to say the least as you 
know these allegations to be untrue.’ Three years later in 2011, after 
several investigative reports from international organisations, including 
MiningWatch Canada, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, 
Barrick finally admittedly publicly that there was a problem (Anon. n.d.a).
The proposed solution invoked further issues, and more international 
scrutiny. Barrick’s approach to resolving what were effectively criminal 
activities was to construct a series of direct financial settlements as 
a  means to expunge its future liability to the victims. During the first 
half of 2013, MiningWatch Canada issued at least two letters to the 
United Nation’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, alleging that 
the company’s remediation framework ran contrary to the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNOHCHR 2013). 
In April 2015, the General Counsel for EarthRights International said 
that ‘Porgera presents one of the worst cases we’ve seen of human rights 
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abuse associated with extractive industry’ (Anon. n.d.b). EarthRights 
International had been central in supporting the Porgera Landowners 
Association (PLOA) in its complaint to the Canadian government and 
had been actively exploring a case against Barrick in the United States.
By this stage, it looked as if Barrick was trying to get itself out of the 
Porgera Joint Venture (PJV). In early June of 2015, the PLOA wrote 
what became an open letter (courtesy of PNG Mine Watch) to Barrick 
raising concerns about the recent 50 per cent acquisition of the project by 
Chinese developer Zijin, noting in particular, a concern that the company 
under Zijin’s management would not honour its commitments to the 
landowners (PLOA 2015).
In the same year, the company finally proposed to resettle households 
from the villages surrounded by the Anawe dump after the PNG Mineral 
Resources Authority (the state regulator of the industry) indicated that 
a  new national policy guideline would require developers to resettle all 
people living on an SML. This commenced a four-year pilot project in 
which Barrick actively sought to demonstrate progress against a very long 
and very overdue set of commitments to resettle villages impacted by the 
operation (Kemp and Owen 2015). Among a raft of sticking points, the 
lack of a clear position by either the national government or PJV on who 
would take responsibility for law and order post-relocation, off-lease in the 
Porgera Valley, was a major hurdle that none of the parties could see beyond.
In April 2020, the decision by several of the leaders of the PLOA to 
issue a  joint press release with Barrick, defending the company’s right 
to  continue its operations would indeed seem curious—especially 
in light of the project’s colourful past (PLOA and PJV 2020). Some 
commentators have suggested that this move by factional leaders was 
not supported by the broader community, or indeed by Zijin. This may 
well be the case; however, following the formal announcement that the 
national government had granted the SML to Kumul Consolidated 
Minerals Limited (KCML), the leadership of the PLOA issued yet another 
media release in which Mr Maso Mangape, the Chairman of the PLOA 
Negotiating Team, was quoted as saying:
Our interest in reaching an agreement with BNL was fuelled by 
the desire to have certainty about issues such as resettlement and 
closure, as well as increased benefits for our community. Will 
KCML and the National Government now meet these obligations? 
(Anon. 2020)
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Roles and Interests, Absences 
and Presences
On the surface, both of these events reflect common patterns of absence 
and presence. They also raise critical questions about the nature of the 
state. In the case of Juukan Gorge, an absent state allowed Rio Tinto and 
other extractive companies to operate almost unilaterally. At the Porgera 
mine, an otherwise absent state has suddenly presented itself, initially 
proposing to displace Barrick Niugini Limited. The latest development, 
as this volume goes to press, suggests that Marape has cut an eleventh-
hour deal with Barrick’s chief executive Mark Bristow, which will give 
the state a majority interest while retaining Barrick Niugini Limited as the 
mine operator (PJV 2020).
To a large extent, public commentary on these events, and the analysis 
of other cases in this volume, has drawn upon and reinforced traditional 
assumptions about the roles of different actors: states are supposed to 
act in the best interests of their citizens, and it is generally accepted that 
corporations are simply out to make a profit on behalf of their shareholders. 
From these ‘role assumptions’ we easily find corresponding absences and 
presences as states fail to act in expected ways and regulate the excesses 
of the industry. At the same time, corporations appear to colonise these 
absent spaces. But if we direct our assumptions at the ‘interests’ of specific 
actors, then the absence or the presence of the state begins to look very 
different—and from a longer-term perspective it seems that neither 
Barrick nor Rio Tinto have really acted in their own interest.
As noted in the introductory chapter, and reiterated throughout the 
volume, the interests of the Australian state have long been captured by 
the extractive industries at all jurisdictional levels. In the case of Western 
Australia, there is a structural tension between the state’s heavy reliance 
upon extraction, and its executive role in issuing extractive licences 
and safeguarding Aboriginal heritage. These apparently contradictory 
functions draw attention to the interests of the state, or what motivates 
the state to act. From the vantage point of interests, one could argue 
that the state’s presence is clearly felt—in ways that privilege extractive 
capital. While there may be a certain truth to this observation, perhaps 
the question is not ‘whether the state has acted to protect or promote’, but 
whether the permissive approach to the extractive industries is an active 
and total representation of the state’s interests.
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The uncertainty created by this proposition reinforces the value of an 
ethnographic approach to the state. As Alex Golub reminds us in his 
chapter, an accurate understanding of history cannot take collective 
actors like ‘the state’ or ‘the company’ for granted. If we are going to grasp 
the interests of the state then we must engage the networks of people 
who emerge in different times and situations as personating these kinds 
of entities, promoting particular interests. From this perspective, states 
may well appear both concrete and uncertain. For example, it cannot 
be assumed that the current Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in Western 
Australia necessarily shares the same interests as the Minister for Mines 
and  Petroleum or the Minister for Environment, or that these office 
holders have any interests in common with previous incumbents or the 
minster who originally provided the Section  18 approval to destroy 
the Juukan Gorge caves. At this level, the ‘interests of the state’ appear far 
less certain.
On another level, regardless of the interests pushed by politicians enacting 
the state at any single point in time, the state has long exerted a hegemonic 
presence in structural and ideological ways through the Aboriginal Heritage 
Act, specifically the Section 18 terms.4 Once ministerial consent has been 
granted to destroy heritage sites there are very few legal pathways to oppose 
the decision, and the destruction of Aboriginal heritage and the erasure 
of Aboriginal interests appears to become unavoidable. More importantly, 
other options, like not proceeding with existing mine plans, appear to 
be unthinkable. The logic of the Section  18 terms reflects a  historical 
coalition of state and corporate interests that licences a dominant social 
order that governs ‘common sense’ by shaping ideas about what is 
‘acceptable’, feasible and necessary, and what is unthinkable, unreasonable 
and unworkable. The captains of the industry and various state actors 
have used these forms of ideological, structural and instrumental power to 
set the ‘rules of the game’ and suppress the political power or effectiveness 
of their opponents (Lukes 1974).
It could be argued that this particular form of state presence is manifest in 
a certain level of resignation about the inevitability of heritage destruction 
and the power of extractive interests. Recognising or acknowledging 
4  The 1972 Aboriginal Heritage Act was already under review by the Western Australian 
government prior to the destruction of the Juukan Gorge caves. This event has highlighted both the 
need for urgent legislative reform, and the historical influence of the extractive industries over state 
processes.
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resignation does not imply that people actually consent to the destruction 
of their heritage, or that they necessarily agree with the terms of any 
contractual arrangements that have been struck. Rather, attention to 
resignation can highlight the structural limitations that impede the ability 
to bring about change. Or in this case, the structural presence and the power 
of the state that supresses more active forms of opposition—particularly 
through its legislation and the so-called ‘gag clauses’ embedded in land 
use agreements which limit traditional owners’ ability to publicly object 
to specific mining activities.
The appearance of interests over roles and responsibilities is likewise front 
and centre in the unfolding narrative over the fate of the Porgera Gold 
Mine. In the quote provided to the media explaining their preference 
for Barrick, the PLOA make it amply clear that the known presence of 
the developer (for all its faults) was more desirable than an absent state 
(for all its faults). Over months of negotiations the PLOA representatives 
demonstrated an acute awareness of this critical difference between state 
roles and state interests. The begging question from the above quote is 
this: what responsibilities can landowners expect the state to step into 
under these new arrangements? Will this newly acquired role as majority 
shareholder translate into a presence of another kind?
There is, in addition, the looming question of whether the state’s ‘role 
absence’ from Porgera across the decades, and especially in relation to 
the more egregious issues that have unfolded around the project, has not 
in fact worked to the advantage of the state as it now exerts its interests. 
This is almost an exercise in hypothetical history, but the question remains: 
if the state had positively intervened in the many serious environmental, 
social, legal and governance matters in the last 30 years, would the project 
have reached the stage where onlookers see appropriation by the state as 
the only responsible course of action?
Marape’s expressed enthusiasm for taking back PNG on behalf of the 
country’s eight million ‘shareholders’ represents a curious turn in 
language, a quasi-corporate utilitarianism that offers self-contained 
justifications for  otherwise quite challenging decisions. One supposes 
that corporations habitually act in their self-interest. Marape is suggesting 
that  nation states ought to do the same, and with a similar resolute 
sentiment in the communication of the outcomes. Acquiring majority 
ownership of the Porgera Gold Mine, according to Marape, could see 
a substantial windfall for the state’s coffers, and a marked expansion in 
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the country’s share of resource development projects. This assumes that 
together, Barrick Niugini Limited, Kumul Minerals and the state will be 
able to restart the operation after these developments and avoid the ‘time 
bomb’ scenario, hinted at by Filer, Burton and Banks, which is created by 
the conflict within the mine-affected communities over the distribution 
of the burdens and benefits of mining (Filer et al. 2008: 165).
Of course, there is a fine line between this type of corporate utilitarianism 
and good old-fashioned opportunism. The time at which the SML 
expired certainly worked in Marape’s favour. Striking a balance between 
his nationwide shareholders and the many legitimate demands of the 
project’s most immediate stakeholders will be key for the state in this new 
venture, and any slippage between its commercial interests and its local 
responsibilities in the Porgera Valley will be imminently visible and could 
have devastating effects.
In both the Australian and the Porgeran case, it has taken a series of 
disastrous events to remind the state of its obligations to its citizens. 
While the Australian state, after notable absence, has suddenly appeared 
for the PKKP in the form of a parliamentary inquiry into the destruction 
of their heritage, assuming a more critical (even hostile) stance towards 
Rio Tinto, the PNG state now claims to be acting in the interests of the 
Porgera landowners. But this sudden appearance of the PNG state seems 
to have only created more uncertainty, and not everyone is convinced that 
the prime minister, or the directors of Kumul Minerals, have acted with 
the interests of the landowners foremost in mind.
While we might conclude that the presence of the state of Australia and 
PNG appears uncertain or indeterminate from the vantage point of 
resource extraction settings, the existential presence of the state cannot 
be passed over. As the material in this volume reveals, and the Juukan 
Gorge and Porgera cases confirm, the consequences that follow in the 
wake of state interests are, in fact, highly visible if not patently palpable.
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